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I make the case for regarding the period from the mid-1960s to the very early 
1980s in the Falklands as being a period of slow, rather than fast, emergency. 
This, I argue, was a time of real emergency in the Falklands, but one which 
did not accelerate to the point of an irretrievable fast emergency until the 
outbreak of Anglo-Argentine war in 1982. In unpacking this slow emergency I 
contend that the colony of the Falkland Islands experienced sustained, 
attritional socio-economic decline and political marginalisation over time. The 
prospect of the geopolitical demise of the Falkland Islands as a British entity 
became increasingly proximate, as time progressively ‘ran out’ for this 
struggling and neglected colony. 
 
This speed-based framing is important as it helps to open up an important 
counter-narrative to the conventional perspective that the 1982 Argentine 
invasion of the Islands, and consequent war for the Islands, constitutes the 
Falkland emergency. Reflective of its ‘under the radar’ potency, the unfolding 
of slow emergency in the period prior to 1982 has simply been obscured by 
the dramatic fast Falklands emergency events of 2 April to 14 June 1982. 
However, it is this less speedy form of emergency which, had it been allowed 
to run its chronopolitically powerful and subtle course, offered Argentina a 
more certain path to securing la recuperacion of the Malvinas Islands. 
 
Emergency is initially introduced in Chapter 2’s ‘Literature Review’ followed by 
Chapter 3’s focus on ‘Methods and Sources’. The slow emergency for which I 
argue manifested itself in a variety of ways, with the following chapter 
structure focused on four key areas for investigation. These are sequenced 
thematically rather than chronologically, reflective of how the project seeks to 
bring to the fore the different aspects of the slow emergency. 
 
Chapter 4 addresses how far there was a political emergency earlier on in the 
slow emergency era, and focuses on both the context to, and performing of, 





ministerial visit to this struggling colony. The visit brought into sharp relief and 
helped essentially frame the political issues which run throughout the slow 
emergency era, such as the degree of British commitment to the Islands, and 
Islander opposition to a ‘British present (and past)’ being over-scripted by an 
Argentine future. Chronopolitical discourse emerges as a prominent feature of 
the Chalfont episode, as do the practices and articulation of loyalty, which on 
occasions is expressed through what I call angry loyalty. The ways in which 
loyalty was ‘narrated’ by Falkland Islanders are considered, including the 
three-dimensional politicised use of objects such as flags and placards, and 
written and photographic renderings of loyalty. The mobilisation of 
performative loyal protest in the Falklands is considered, such as through the 
Daily Express photo-shoot of October 1968, and in Chalfont’s November 1968 
visit to the Islands. The role of elements of the British press, particularly the 
Daily Express, Daily Telegraph and The Times, in supporting and amplifying 
the loyal narrative are also considered, as well as the dissenting narrative of 
Richard Gott for the Guardian. Interviews, notably with Sir Cosmo and Lady 
Haskard, further inform this chapter.  
 
Informed by Elden (2013), Chapter 5 considers how far there was a three-
dimensional emergency in the slow emergency era up to 1982, in which the 
Falkland Islands as a territorial volume was penetrated by Argentine 
insurgency, particularly in the air, with the British reluctant to ‘protect the 
volume’ if this meant straining relations with Argentina. The chapter considers 
the Fitzgerald aerial incursions of 1964 and 1968, and the Condor hijacking of 
1966; it asks ‘what if the Falklands’ volume were handed over to Argentina 
and no one noticed?’ It argues that the 1971 Anglo-Argentine 
Communications Agreement led to the establishment of an Argentine 
‘aerotectorate’ over the Islands, with the 1974 YPF Agreement and abortive 
1980 leaseback initiative all exposing the weakness of the British three-
dimensional position. 
 
Chapter 6 introduces and explores the workings of slow emergency in the 
‘Shackleton-French era’ of 1975-77. This framing was chosen as Lord 





Report, ran from October 1975 through to July 1976, its (non)implementation 
remaining a live issue into 1977; this largely coincided with the tenure of 
Neville French as Governor of the Falklands, which ran from 27 January 1975 
to 2 December 1976. The Shackleton-French era provides valuable evidence 
about, and insights into, the nature and processes of slow emergency in the 
Falklands. It also sheds new light as to why the Report became ‘a cause of 
conflict in itself’ (Rowlands in Charlton 1989, p.48), as did French’s 
governorship, intensifying rather than alleviating the speed of emergency as it 
became chronopolitically outmaneuvered by Islanders. 
 
Chapter 7 examines the extent to which there was a bodily emergency in the 
Falklands’ slow emergency era, focusing on the mid to latter 1970s; 
depopulation of the Islander micro-community was exacerbated by the 
presence of Royal Marines and numerous marriages to young Islander 
women. I explore how these demographic difficulties played out in this period, 
and use what I call the ‘Angry Islander’ controversy to shed light on how the 
presence of Royal Marines and loss of Islander women amplified societal 
tensions, placing strains on relations between the sexes within the Islander 
community. 
 
The thesis concludes by arguing for the period prior to the outbreak of the 
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1 Chapter One – Introduction: ‘Falklands foregrounded’ 
 
1.1 ‘The Tin-Pot Foreign General and the Old Iron Woman’ 
 
In 1984 Raymond Briggs’ satirical children’s book The Tin-Pot Foreign 
General and the Old Iron Woman was published, in which Argentine leader 
General Leopoldo Galtieri and British Prime minister Margaret Thatcher were 
presented as non-human metallic monsters fighting over the bleak and 
isolated Falkland/Malvinas Islands, both actors depicted as heartless 
belligerents. The striking cover of the book depicts the Falklands/Malvinas 
Islands as almost incidental in what he portrays as an angry territorial quarrel, 
evidenced in the faces of the metallic protagonists. The voice caption from 
non-visible Islanders vainly crying ‘Help!’ can be seen in the distance, the 
author’s representation depicting the Islanders as helpless, vulnerable and 
lacking agency. Briggs (1984) depicts the Islanders as exposed to a 
dangerous present and future, sidelined marginal actors engulfed by the 





























Fig. 1.1. Cover of The 
Tin Pot Foreign 












While the focus of this thesis is from the mid-1960s prior to, but not including, 
the 1982 Conflict, Brigg’s characterisation of Falkland Islanders provides an 
interesting point of departure. Unusually, in his depiction of the Islanders he 
considers their pre-Conflict condition in The Tin Pot Foreign General and the 
Old Iron Woman and how this changed. Briggs’ image on the front of the book 
(Fig. 1.1) expresses the extreme vulnerability of Islanders in the ‘angry’ 
militarised emergency of 1982, whilst his post-Conflict image (Fig. 1.2) depicts 
the quotidian emergency encountered by Islanders in their new existence 
living in a recent war zone, outnumbered by British soldiers. In their 
exaggerated and satirical representations of the military emergency of 1982 
(Fig. 1.1), and the post-Conflict emergency (Fig. 1.2), both images can readily 
be seen as providing a framing of emergency for the Falklands. However, Fig. 
1.3 can similarly be read as a more subtle, less dramatic expression of 




Fig. 1.2. Post-Conflict Falklands as depicted by Raymond Briggs (1984, London: 
Hamish Hamilton) 
 






characterised by poverty, isolation, a lack of opportunity and facilities, bad 
weather and poor diet. This theme of the ‘Falklands as emergency’ runs 
through Briggs’ representations, with the struggle to survive in this hostile 
South Atlantic space a constant theme; as Briggs wryly records in The Tin Pot 
Foreign General and the Old Iron Woman, not all Islanders survived: ‘Three of 





Fig. 1.3. Pre-Conflict Falklands as depicted by Raymond Briggs (1984, pp. 2-3, London: 
Hamish Hamilton). 
Source: original copy 
 
Briggs’ imagery in The Tin Pot Foreign General and the Old Iron Woman 
acquires new significance seen through the lens of emergency. Aulich, who 
studied Briggs’ book, saw his depiction of Islanders more conventionally: ‘He 
represented Islanders as simple shepherds, freeborn Englishmen living in 
liberty until they are interfered with, first by the Argentinian and then the 
British armed forces. Eventually, they return to their original pastoral state, 
their material conditions devastated under the rhetorical weight of The Iron 





us so far, with its focus on pastorality and war; applying the idea of 
emergency to these images not only obliges us to re-consider their meaning, 
but as with Fig.1.3, helps us re-consider what, from the mid-1960s up to 1982, 
the ‘Falklands as emergency’ involved. This alternate reading of Emergency 
within the Falkland Islands is the purpose of the thesis: to re-consider the pre-
Conflict Falkland Islands and their inhabitants through the lens of speed-
related emergency, to extend our understanding of what has been described 
as the ‘Falklands problem’ in this period.  Unlike during the Falklands Conflict 
itself, the political emergency in the period from mid 1960s up to the 1982 
conflict often proceeded at a slow pace, with occasional moments of 
acceleration; to that end, the thesis makes the case for slow even lingering 
emergency in relation to the Falklands of this era. 
 
1.2 Key contributions of the thesis 
 
 There are two main contributions that this thesis seeks to make. Firstly,   
  it makes the case for the importance of a temporally extended, (usually) 
 slow  emergency,  with periods of acceleration and deceleration. The 
 central positioning of emergency is this thesis is reflected in its title  of   
 ‘Slow  Emergency and the Contested Politics of Loyalty: Reinterpreting the 
 Territorial Dimension of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands prior to the 1982 
 Conflict’. The attritional nature of ‘slow emergency’ ensured that there was a 
 very real prospect that the  exigencies of the present would result in the end of 
 the Falkland Islands as a British territory, either through socio-economic 
 collapse or a territorial transfer to Argentina, the former potentially  facilitating 
 the latter. Each chapter in the thesis is therefore used to develop our 
 understanding of how slow emergency as an analytic helps us understand the 
 Islands in the period up to 1982. 
 
The other key aim of this thesis is, for the first time, to examine the Falkland 
Islander experience through an island-centred study. It is conceived as a 
research project  which takes the Falkland Islanders as its main empirical 
focus, and pays close attention to the Islander voice. In this way it seeks to re-





dominant framing of the 1982 Conflict, and instead engage with the lived 
experience of Islanders in the Falklands in the period from mid 1960s up to 
the emergency of the 1982 Conflict. In its emphasis on the Islander 
experience, it also considers the role of those in the United Kingdom, often 
called ‘The Falkland lobby’, who supported Islander efforts to maintain their 
British territorial connection in their era of emergency. In focusing on the years 
from 1964 up to the outbreak of the 1982 Conflict, the thesis takes a longer 
and more nuanced view of emergency in relation to the Islands than that 
afforded by the prevailing scholarship of the islands, which sees the 1982 
Conflict as the Falkland emergency.  
	
1.3 Key developments in, and concerning, the Falklands 1964 -1982 
 
The	rationale	for	the	choice	of	periodization	of	1964-1982	is	that,	in	these	years,	the	
future	of	the	Falklands	became	increasingly	uncertain. Two key moments in 1964 
and 1965 respectively presaged geopolitical change, effectively marking the 
onset of the Falklands’ slow emergency with its corrosive erosion and 
destabilisation of the Islands as a British territorial entity; in this way a difficult 
present anticipated an insecure future and cession to Argentina. 
The first of these came on 8 September 1964, when Argentine aviator Miguel 
Fitzgerald flew from Rio Gallegos to Stanley racecourse, planted the 
Argentine flag and left a note asserting Argentine sovereignty. This flight’s 
significance, as both a disruptive performance of Argentine sovereignty 
ambitions, and an unsettling harbinger of territorial change, can be seen as 
amplified by UN Resolution 2065, the second key moment which marks the 
start of the slow emergency era. 
In a striking diplomatic breakthrough for Argentina, UN Resolution 2065 of 16 
December 1965, formally recognised the existence of a sovereignty dispute 
over the Islands. In passing this, the UN General Assembly noted the 
‘interests’ rather than ‘wishes’ of the Falkland Islanders, by implication 
opening up the distinct possibility of an Argentine future for the Islands against 





Both these events delivered a similar message to Falkland Islanders; 
Argentina and United Nations members were now actively questioning and 
challenging the status quo of the Falkland Islands as a British colony. The 
uncertainty these developments exacerbated existing socio-economic 
difficulties in the Islands, intensifying slow emergency processes which would 
corrosively eat away at the continuation of the Falklands as a British colony.  
A rapid succession of disruptive developments for Islanders now followed; in 
September 1966 a DC4 was hijacked by the nationalist Argentine Condor 
Youth group, and diverted to Stanley racecourse, again highlighting the 
Islands’ aerial vulnerability. British readiness to de-escalate this 36 hour 
hijacking, including deporting rather than arresting the hijackers, did little to 
reassure Islanders about the United Kingdom’s commitment to the Falklands.  
Confirmation that the territorial future for the Islands was in play came in early 
1968, when it became apparent that the British government was seeking a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Argentina, which would transfer 
the Islanders to Argentine sovereignty. This prompted the March 1968 appeal 
from the four unofficial members of the Falklands Executive Council (ExCo), 
the colony’s key governing body, to the British Parliament. With the support of 
the newly formed Falkland Islands Emergency Committee, as well as discreet 
backing from Governor Haskard, this initiative was frustrated, notwithstanding 
Lord Chalfont’s unsuccessful November 1968 visit to sell the idea of territorial 
change to Islanders.  
The July 1971 Communications Agreement, an Anglo-Argentine initiative to 
foster air and cultural links between Argentina and the Falklands, offered a 
softer way to develop Islander interactions and connections with Argentina 
than a sovereignty transfer. The importance of this Agreement was 
heightened by the December 1971 withdrawal of the passenger carrying RMS 
Darwin, which ceded practical control of transportation on and off the islands 
to Argentina; similarly, the eponymously named Anglo-Argentine YPF 
Agreement of 1974 gave Argentina’s state oil company YPF a monopoly over 





In the same year as the Argentine Navy fired on the RRS Shackleton 
(February), and occupied the Falkland Islands Dependency of Southern Thule 
(September), the 1976 Shackleton Report was released (August). Its 
suggestion of ways in which the viability of the Falklands could be developed 
(for example, developing oil and fisheries, and extending Stanley’s permanent 
airfield) proved awkward for the Anglo-Argentine relationship, and the report 
was soon shelved. By 1977, sovereignty talks were resumed, and the 
struggling colony was in 1980 offered leaseback, an arrangement under which 
sovereignty would be transferred to Argentina but British administration would 
continue for a limited period. As with Chalfont in 1968, Nicholas Ridley’s 1980 
ministerial visit to the Islands ended unsuccessfully, and attritional slow 
emergency looked set to reduce the Islands to the point of non-viability. This 
decay process was disrupted by the Argentine occupation of the Islands from 
2 April to 14 June 1982. 
1.4   A brief introduction to the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas 
This section provides a brief introduction to the Falklands, both as general 
background but also to provide the context as to why the colony was 
structurally vulnerable to slow emergency. Mercau has noted of this southern 
oceanic archipelago that 
 One feature peculiar to the Falkland Islands was their remoteness and 
 marginality; their place in the British imagination was virtually non-existent 
 and, until the 1982 conflict, few in the UK would even have been able to 
 locate them on a map (2019 p.29) 
Mercau (2019) identifies the importance of the Islands’ remoteness and 
marginality (2019 p.29), and both will be addressed in this section, with a 
particular emphasis on marginality of the Islands, which is a key reason why 
slow emergency was readily available as a means for the British government 
to put pressure on the Islanders.  
Geographically the Falklands or las Malvinas are remote; the islands are 
situated in the expanse of the South West Atlantic, the nearest continental 
land mass being South America 300 miles away, with Rio Gallegos, 
Argentina, as its the nearest point. The 7,500 miles between the Falklands 





geographically remote in respect of the distance separating this archipelagic 




Fig 1.4 Reference map of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands 
Source: Chater, T. ‘The Falklands’, Penna Press, St. Albans, 1993 
The archipelago, the largest in the South Atlantic, consists of two main 
Islands, East and West Falkland, or Isla Soledad and Gran Malvina 
respectively, and hundreds of smaller islands; in total, the archipelago is 
approximately 4,700 square miles (Gibran 1998 16). The Islands too have a 
cool oceanic climate, with highly variable weather conditions; whilst gale-force 
winds are common, the temperature range - from approximately 21 degrees 





Unlike other settler territories of the British Empire, the Falklands’ remote 
geography, and climate, attracted few colonists, and compensations of land 
and other wealth for such challenges (in contrast with, say, more remote 
regions of Canada and Australia) were rarely on offer. From the mid 19th 
century onwards, Falkland Islands economic life, and much of the Islands’ 
land, had come into the possession of the Falkland Islands Company, which 
effectively converted the colony into a great sheep-ranching concern, with 
neo-feudal conditions for its landless employees.  
In The Handy Atlas of the British Empire (Bartholomew 1904, p.xvi-xvii) the 
Islands, the size of the population was noted as being a little over 2,000: 
Falkland Islands, group in the South Atlantic, east of Magellan Straits. There 
area about 200 islands in all, of which only East and West Falkland are of any 
large extent. Area 6500 sq. m., Pop. 2050. Cap. Port Stanley (916) inh., an 
Admiralty coaling station […] Crown Colony.  
 
The population of the Falkland Islands, largely of British or European descent, 
continued to be stubbornly marginal, with the 1931 census recording a 
maximum population for the Islands of 2,392, and the 1980 census a figure of 
only 1813 (Gibran 1998 17). Those Islanders who did not live in the Camp, 
that is in the rest of the Falklands outside of the Lilliputian capital Stanley, 
were likely to be working in some capacity for the colony’s government, in 
small business, ship repairs, or retired. 
Whereas the development of the Falkland Islands can, in many ways, be seen 
as a history of marginality, there has been a similar marginality in historical 
agreement about the Islands’ discovery and ‘rightful’ sovereignty. Contested 
narratives about which Europeans first discovered the Islands are used to 
fortify British and Argentine sovereignty positions, and offer very different 
accounts of the discovery of the Islands, the British claiming Captain John 
Davies did so in 1592, whilst Argentine histories counter-claim French, 
Spanish and Portuguese sightings of the islands throughout the 16th century.  
By 1690 the British, who claim the first record landing in the Islands in that 
year began to call these Islands ‘the Falkland Islands’ after Viscount Falkland; 
in contrast French sailors, who are recorded as landing in 1701, named them 





Spanish name of las Islas Malvinas is derived. With no indigenous population, 
the Islands remained uninhabited until 1764 when the French established a 
colony at Port Louis, East Falkland/Isla Soledad against Spanish wishes. 
Spanish-French competition over the Islands was however short-lived, with 
France leaving its Port Louis settlement in 1767. This did not, however 
resolve (for the Spanish) the British presence in West Falkland, which had 
been recently established in 1764; following the 1770-1 Anglo-Spanish 
confrontation over London’s presence in West Falkland/Gran Malvina, Britain 
withdrew from the archipelago. Britain’s presence ceased until 1833, when it 
seized control of the Islands from the Confederación Argentina, the successor 
state to Spain, and thereafter established a British colony (see Royle 2001 
pp.135-6 for details of early Falkland history)  
Notwithstanding the ensuing British settlement of the Ilsands, which emerged 
from the 1840s on, Argentina continued to maintain its claim, which Yale legal 
scholar Julius Goebel awkwardly (for Britain) endorsed in his influential 
Struggle for the Falkland Islands (1927); such academic backing proved 
useful in reinvigorating Argentine sentiment towards the Islands in the mid 
twentieth century. With the post 1945 dismantling of the British Empire, a new 
opportunity for Argentina to reverse the 1833 occupation/usurpation of las 
Malvinas appeared had arrived, and Argentine President Peron actively 
encouraged a Malvinero mentality to support the cause of ‘la recuperación de 
las Malvinas’, the recovery of the Falkands.  
 
The establishment of a settled, British descended Islander population in the 
years since the 1840s ensured that a new ‘actor’ – the Islanders - now 
existed, who were opposed to Argentine territorial and sovereignty ambitions. 
Faced with both British disinterest and Argentine territorial ambition in the post 
1945 era of decolonsiation, the future of the Islands as a British colony looked 
less certain. As Hepple observed: 
 
 For many Islanders, the future of the Falklands mattered immensely as their 
 home, whereas to the British they were inevitably a remote, low priority 
 …British writers (and policy makers) did not evaluate the islands’ potential in 






As will be seen, it was from 1964 that the struggle for the future of the 
Falkland Islands became pronounced, especially with the passing of UN 
Resolution 2065. This was the point at which longstanding structural socio-
economic weaknesses in the Falkland Islands became useful pressure points, 
as well as a reason for not continuing the colony, in what the thesis sees as 
the Islands’ slow emergency era (1964 up to 1982). 
 
1.5 Structure of chapters 
 
The thesis seeks to develop an understanding of slow emergency through 
addressing different aspects of the emergency as experienced in the Falkland 
Islands in the period from 1964 up to the 1982 Conflict, for example political 
insecurity, socio-economic difficulties, a shrinking demographic, and aerial 
vulnerability. With slow emergency as the overarching theme/argument 
running through the thesis, each chapter is used to focus on a key area, 
specifically chapter 4 on 1968; chapter 5 on aerial matters; chapter 6 on 
socio-economic decline and the 1976 Shackleton report; and chapter 7 on 
gender and emotion. It should be noted that the concepts and ideas 
addressed in these chapters, such as loyalty, volume, gender and race, whilst 
important, come lower down the register of ideas and concepts used in this 
thesis than that of slow emergency. 
 
In this way, using the lens of slow emergency, the thesis seeks to offer new 
interpretations of the Falklands as a British territory in this time, and to 
mobilise new understandings of emergency as a theoretical concept (see 
Adey and Anderson (2011), Neocleus (2006), and Aradau (2012)). Its focus is 
specifically on the Islanders and Islands, and quotidian/everyday experiences; 
it is not therefore intended to be a traditional diplomatic history such as Peter 
Beck’s (1998), though significant diplomatic developments are addressed. 
Rather the selection of these chapters is designed to highlight particular 
aspects of slow emergency in the Falklands within the periodisation of 1964 
up to the 1982 Conflict, with the empirical content illustrative of this. Drawing 





on the quotidian experiences of slow emergency, as well as research 
undertaken at Royal Holloway, University of London and the National 
University of Singapore, the thesis consists of seven chapters. 
 
It should be noted that the use of each of the terms ‘Falkland’, ’Malvinas’ or 
‘Falkland/Malvinas’ in these chapters is applied as suits the particular context. 
For example, when specifically referring to developments in, or concerning, 
the Islands as a British colony, ‘Falkland’ is applied. When referring to the 
Islands in terms of a broader geopolitical, or specifically Argentine, context, 
the terms ‘Falkland/Malvinas’ and ‘Malvinas’ respectively, are used. Enabling 
the thesis to use more than one term to describe the Islands thus allows for a 
more contextually focused and nuanced handling of empirical content. Just as 
there has been no British colony called the ‘Falkland/Malvinas’, neither does 
simply calling the Islands ‘Falklands’ reflect the wider geopolitics, and 
Argentine dimension. Usage of any of these names for the Islands is not 
intended to denote any assumption, or position, on sovereignty by the thesis.  
 
This Chapter (1) seeks introduces the thesis, and set out the main focus 
areas empirically and theoretically. It uses Briggs’ vignette of Islanders in the 
Falklands Conflict era to introduce emergency, after which the chapter 
positions slow emergency and delivering an Islander based study as its two 
main aims. It positions slow emergency as the key argument running through 
the thesis, and explains the rationale for the periodisation of 1964 up to (but 
not including) the 1982 Conflict. It also offers an introduction to the Islands, 
after which the chapter structure is explained. 
 
Chapter 2 is the literature review. The aim of this chapter is to make plain 
what slow emergency adds to the existing literature, describing Islanders 
experiences, which have hitherto not been studied in detail, and also provide 
a new framework for understanding British government policy in this period. It 
explains that while the main empirical of the thesis is on gaining new 
understanding of the Islanders’ experience, the thesis also seeks to offer new 
perspectives on British government policy. After an introduction to the Islands, 





our understanding of the Islander experience, with theorisation, notably the 
work of Adey and Anderson (2011), Aradau (2012), Neocleus (2006), and 
Thrift (2000), particularly helping us to gain new insights into slow emergency. 
In this way, slow emergency is seen as integrating the Falklands into wider 
debate about decolonisation and the end of the British Empire. Lower order 
areas of focus such as volume, loyalty, chronopolitics, gender, race, affect, 
performance and visuality are also considered. 
 
Chapter 3 reflects on ‘Methods and Sources’ and reviews the processes 
pursued, and challenges encountered, in gathering and deploying the material 
used in this project. It seeks to provide a clear overview of the research 
process for this project, including fieldwork in the Falklands. A particular 
challenge was that, in a community of rarely more than two thousand people, 
the range of available resources was finite; the challenges of interviewing in a 
small community and triangulating these with other written sources is 
considered. The importance of using quotations from Islanders and visual 
material is raised, and the value of these materials for giving voice to 
Islanders in the thesis. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on a key episode in the Falklands’ slow emergency 
through ‘1968, Loyalty and All That: Political Emergency, Loyal Struggle and 
the Falklands Territorial Future’; it examines the sudden 1968 acceleration of 
slow emergency for Islanders, during which the British government proactively 
sought to reach a solution with Argentina to the Falkland Islands ‘problem’, 
according to which sovereignty over the Islands would be relinquished in 
favour of Argentina. This prospective future prompted the Falkland Islands 
Emergency Committee to be formed (so, literally, bringing emergency into 
Falkland discourse), and the first ever ministerial visit to the Islands by Lord 
Chalfont. Particular attention is paid to the role of Falklands Governor Sir 
Cosmo Haskard, who was interviewed for this project; the role of Islander 
loyalty and domestic loyal British support, including occasions of what the 
thesis calls ‘angry loyalty’, are also considered. In terms of slow emergency, 
much of 1968 represented an acceleration and acute intensification of 





brought into question. This was, however followed by a deceleration late in 
the year when, in the face of Islander objection and domestic criticism, the 
British government pulled back from arranging a definitive settlement with 
Argentina over the Islands. 
 
Chapter 5 unpacks ‘Volume Control: Volumetric Emergency in the 
Falklands/Malvinas in the period prior to the 1982 Conflict’ which, particularly 
through drawing on Elden’s (2013) theoretical work, seeks to address the 
volumetric aspect of the Falklands’ slow emergency era. It considers the 1964 
and 1968 volumetric incursions of the Argentine aviator Miguel Fitzgerald, and 
the 1966 Argentine nationalist Condor hijacking incident in the Falklands. It 
also addresses the significance of the 1971 Anglo-Argentine Communications 
Agreement, and argues that Argentina established a de facto ‘Aero-tectorate’. 
In this way, the importance of volume as a component of the Falklands slow 
emergency is addressed. 
 
Chapter 6, as its title suggests, develops the concept of ‘Slow Emergency in 
the mid-1970s Falklands’, in which emergency in this era is considered with 
an empirical focus on the 1976 Shackleton Report, and the governorship of 
Neville French (1975-77). In addressing symptoms and cause of slow 
emergency in the Falklands, the Shackleton Report offered recommendations 
to address the ongoing deterioration of socio-economic conditions, potentially 
offering hope to Islanders beleaguered of an amelioration, or even end, of 
slow emergency conditions.  Its subsequent neutralisation by the Foreign 
Office ironically ended up making the Report another element of the 
Falklands’ slow emergency. Governor French’s rule at this time proved a 
source of disquiet and soon aroused significant opposition amongst Islanders, 
resulting in a political emergency, an accelerative episode which cost him his 
gubernatorial role. 
 
Chapter 7 considers how slow emergency affected gender and race, with a 
particular focus on women’s agency and manifestations of violence. Entitled 
‘The ‘Angry Islander’ Controversy: Bodily Emergency in the mid to latter 





affecting the Islands’ population and Islander responses to this. This 
population decline was made more acute by the presence of Royal Marines 
who, somewhat counter-intuitively, undermined the long-term security and 
sustainability of the Islands, through marrying young Islander women. It then 
proceeds to unpack the nature and significance of what the thesis terms the 
‘Angry Islander’ Controversy of November-December 1978. This chapter 
considers the conundrum of the Royal Marines’ presence in the Falklands: 
intended to deter a military emergency, on a quotidian basis the Marines 
intensified the slow emergency affecting the Islands, with the demographic 
shortfall caused by the loss of young women accelerating the likely demise of 














Chapter Two – Literature Review 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to what slow 
emergency involves, and a review of key literatures which have both informed 
and shaped this research. In addition to its focus on emergency in its own 
right, this chapter will also consider how slow emergency relates to other 
concepts and ideas such as volume, loyalty, gender and race; while these are 
important in their own right, they are lower order concepts to slow emergency. 
 
2.1 What Slow Emergency adds to our understanding of  Falkland 
Islander Experience 
 
Slow Emergency is used to address the main empirical focus of this thesis, 
that is the Islander experience from 1964 to the outbreak of the 1982 Conflict. 
This theorisation provides a means to see and describe Islander experiences 
which have not been studied in detail before; it also provides an important 
framework for interpreting British government policy, which while previously 
studied, has not until now been interpreted in this way.  
 
 
As I researched the Falkland Islanders’ experience in this period, it 
increasingly struck me that there was an everyday emergency facing the 
Islanders. Given that the Falkland Islanders’ experience forms the main 
empirical focus of this project, it was vital not only to reflect not only on what 
this encompassed, but also to develop a theorisation which would further 
helps us understand the Islanders’ experience. I also hoped that such a 
theoretical framework could be productively applied /adapted to other political 
geographic cases, in particular connecting with debates about decolonisation 
and the end of empire. Nixon’s concept of slow violence (2011) and work on 
emergency, notably Adey and Anderson (2011), would provide the theoretical 
background from which slow emergency was developed. Before going further, 
it is important to consider Falklands historiography, and why this left a lacuna 






2.2 Falklands – historiographic understandings 
 
Whilst there has been important academic attention on the Islands prior to 
1982, including Peter Beck (1988), Lawrence Freedman (1988, 1990, 2005) 
and Klaus Dodds (2002), Aaron Donaghy (2014), scholarship about the micro-
population of a geographically remote territory in the Southern Ocean has 
been noticeably limited. The 1982 Anglo-Argentine Conflict has meant that the 
Falkland Islander experience is often viewed through the prism of ‘1982 and 
all that’, in which 1982 is viewed as a kind of ‘Year Zero’, with developments 
of the latter 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s becoming interpreted as part of its 
causation, or alternatively ignored rather than studied in their own right. 
Freedman’s two-volume ‘Official History of the Falklands Campaign’ (2005) is 
a clear example of a ‘1982’ framing, in which his attention to the Falkland 
Islanders is positioned in the relation to the Conflict, as indicated in the title of 
his first volume ‘The Origins of the Falklands War’ (2005), with the second 
volume entitled ‘War and Diplomacy’ (2005).  Even where there has been a 
recognition that there was more to the Falklands Conflict than ‘1982 and all 
that’, as in and Jenkins’ reference to the preceding period as ‘The Seventeen 
Years War’  (Hastings and Jenkins 1983 p.15), this description is still seen in 
the context of ‘war’ rather than Islander experience. Where the Islanders have 
been considered, it has usually been more as a casual element in the 1982 
Conflict than as a subject in their own right.  
 
Such historiography as exists frequently depicts the Islanders as expendable 
and disposable. Mercau states with  ‘It was clear that, in the eyes of the 
Foreigh Office officials, Britain was neither willing nor able to keep the colony 
indefinitely….. Without any material to invest in the Islands’ future, a 
settlement with Argentina appeared to be the logical way forward’ (2019 pp. 
29-30). Regarding the Islanders’ future, Bicheno argues ‘There can be little 
doubt the intention was to force them into the arms of Argentina’ (2007 p.40); 
according to Royle, the Falklands’ economy and society was ‘rather moribund’ 
(2001, p.61) and Hastings and Jenkins (1983) claimed that the aim was for 
them ‘eventually to be assimilated into the essentially European mainland 





view that ‘Successive British government… [had shown a]  negative attitude 
to the Islanders, regarding them as small things that had to be adjusted’ 
(Cawkell 2001 p.128). 
 
That the Islanders were vulnerable to manipulation and potentially disposable 
is self-evident. Freedman states ‘there were not many of them and their 
numbers were dwindling’ (2005 p18), Gonzales sees them as a ‘miniscule and 
exposed population’ (2014 141), and Hastings and Jenkins state that in 
number they were ‘almost comically small’ (1983 p.25). Bicheno saw them as 
‘Unsophisticated and shy, all they wanted was to be left alone’ (2007 p. 36) 
yet they faced ‘a predicament which seemed particularly stark: they felt they 
were being handed over to an enemy’ Hastings and Jenkins (1983, p.25). If 
unwilling to embrace an Argentine future, relocation to a Scottish island was 
one option mooted (Freedman 2005 p18), about which Middlebrook 
speculated that ‘It might have been better to persuade the Islanders to leave 
their Islands and settle elsewhere – there was already a Falkland ‘settlement’ 
near Auckland in New Zealand’ (Middlebrook 1987 p.87).  
 
The British national interest clearly ‘overrode’ that of the Islanders (Hastings 
and Jenkins 1983 p.16), of which Livingston (2018) observed, in relation to 
the 1968 bid to effect a territorial transfer of the Islands, that; 
 
 Chalfont’s views reflected those of Foreign Office, which emphasised the 
 ‘national interest’ prioritises political and commercial relations with Latin 
 America above the 1900 islanders (Livingston 2018 p.5).  
 
She also rejects the view that ‘the FCO pursued a policy of appeasement 
towards Argentina’ (Livingston 2018 p.227) in the years up to 1982, noting 
that there was a British governmental wish to resolve the matter, which has 
been highlighted by Gibran, who saw  ‘the government’s determined effort to 
promote a negotiated settlement with Argentina in the period after 1976’ 






Yet, as Dongahy (2014) notes, British government efforts to manage and 
direct the Islanders after the failure of Chalfont’s 1968 initiative, took a 
different and more subtle approach, and involved playing a longer game; 
 
 After the 1968 diplomacy had ended in disaster, and facing mounting 
 pressure at the UN, the Foreign Office devised a new strategy. They 
 persuaded their counterparts in Buenos Aires to conduct a ‘hearts and 
 minds’ strategy with the Islanders, thereby demonstrating the benefits of a 
 close relationship with Argentina …. The objective was transparent.  The 
 Islanders beset by economic problems, would gradually come to accept that 
 prospects depended on Argentina rather than Britain. This theory perfectly 
 suited the British government, reluctant to bear the costs  of sustaining the 
 Islands from such a vast distance (Dongahy 2014 pp. 11-12). 
 
What Donaghy describes is the wider contextual setting of slow emergency as 
experienced by Islanders, that is exploiting the colony’s ongoing decline and 
neglect provided the British government with a useful (and highly cost-
effective) means to exert pressure on Islanders to update themselves 
geopolitically, and re-orientate towards Argentina. Interestingly he calls this 
approach ‘a theory’ (Dongahy 2014 p12), with the clear implication that this 
method of political leverage over the Islanders was intended, not accidental. 
He also notes how Islanders increasingly viewed ensuing benefits from 
Argentina (such as travel, educational and cultural opportunities under the 
1971 Communications Agreement) ‘sceptically’ (Dongahy 2014 p.12), 
highlighting that there were clear limits to the effectiveness of this approach. 
This argument, however, risks placing too much emphasis on such limitations, 
when the overall declinist trend was remorselessly hollowing out the viability 
of the colony.  
 
Where slow emergency adds particular value to scholarship is that it provides 
a new way to bring together understand and interpret the Islander experience 
in the years up to the 1982 Conflict. As theorization it highlights the 
importance of decline over time as a subtle but cogent means to change the 
territorial status quo, both through undermining the viability of the status quo 
and support for it amongst those living there. In the case of the Falklands, 
either Islanders would have to engage with the new reality of an Argentine 





failing colony, and so remove a major source of contention from Anglo-
Argentine relations.  
 
Slow emergency enables us to see the elements of decline (such as those 
cited in the historiography) in a new framing, not as individual pieces in the 
disintegration of the colony of the Falkland Islands, but as part of an engine of 
decline, each element (for example, depopulation) functioning as cogs 
working together at different speeds to end viability of the colony. That this 
slow emergency process was prematurely and abruptly interrupted by the 
1982 Conflict does not mean it was not already working; the process was 
already approaching the point where the Falklands were barely viable. Rather, 
as its name suggests, being a slow process, more time was needed time to 
run its course. 
 
What the slow emergency does is for the first time to highlight the experience 
of those on the receiving end of these processes, namely the Islanders, a 
deliberate reversal of the telescope, so that slow emergency is understood on 
the ground. In this way the lens of slow emergency help us understand how 
this beleaguered Islander micro-community, faced with socio-economic 
decline/demise and the prospect of an unwanted territorial takeover, 
experienced the daily manifestations of this process. 
 
Slow Emergency not only adds value to our reading of the Falklands in our 
periodisation, but also provides an important new way to join up the Falklands 
with the era of decolonisation, and in particular the Emergencies that British 
colonial authorities oversaw. The term ‘emergency’ was itself employed by the 
Falkland Islands Emergency Committee in 1968, and slow emergency 
provides a means to connect the Falkland Islander experience of this time, 










2.3 Developing a conceptualisation of slow emergency 
 
As the empirical focus of the Falklands will be used to show, slow emergency 
provides a useful tool for examining a territory on the geopolitical margins, 
rather than at the centre, where detrimental change is happening; such places 
are likely to experience slower rather than faster emergency, being away from 
dynamic centres of power. 
 
This approach opens the way for Islanders’ exposure to everyday emergency 
to be considered, and moves beyond the traditional focus of Anglo-Argentine 
high diplomacy such as Beck (2002) or Freedman and Gamba (1990) have 
written about. I identified four sub-emergencies of slow emergency in Table 
2.1, made up of these areas; socio-economic: geopolitical: governance and 
information control respectively. Additionally, as later set out in 4.1, logics of 
pre-emption, prevention and conditioning are also applied to the respective 
sub-emergency descriptor. 
 
Constituent elements of the 
Falklands’ slow emergency (as 
experienced by Falkland Islanders 
and British authorities) 
Sub-emergency Descriptor: 
Sub-emergency 1: Socio-economic Coping with ongoing socio-
economic decline. Attitude to 
present/future. 
Sub-emergency 2: Geopolitical Containing/managing Argentine 
pressure for the eventual cession 
of the Falklands. 
Sub-emergency 3: Governance Corrosion of trust between the 
British authorities and Falkland 
Islanders.  
Sub-emergency 4: Information 
control 
Controlling dissemination of 
information to Islanders/ censorship 
over time. 
 
Table 2.1 Constituent elements of the Falklands’ slow emergency  
 
Slow emergency is, according to the framework, conceived as a collective 
term for four sub-emergencies; the overall acceleration or deceleration of slow 





intensification or de-intensification of these sub-emergencies. As a case in 
point, an intensification of sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical) would result from an 
incident with Argentina, such as happened in 1976 when the Argentine Navy 
fired on the RRS Shackleton, near the Falklands; thereafter, as happened 
tensions may recede somewhat, until another disruptive occasion. Different 
sub-emergencies may also intensify or de-intensify synchronously, 
accelerating or decelerating slow emergency accordingly.  
 
Whatever the speed of slow emergency was at any one time, as the term 
itself suggests, there is the real risk that slow emergency may destroy the 
polity item it is affecting. Sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) lies at the heart 
of slow emergency, and ‘stuck’ most to the Falklands; the Islands were 
approaching the point of non-viability owing to depopulation and general-
socio-economic neglect. This intensity of this sub-emergency was serious, to 
the degree that the Falklands appeared close to being without a demographic 
future, which irrespective of Argentina, would mean the end of the colony.  
 
A sub-emergency intensification weakens the Falklands as a geopolitical 
entity during slow emergency, but sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) was 
existential, even more so than sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical). Potentially, the 
Islander community could have continued to live under Argentine rule, but 
without an Islander population then there was literally no future for the 
Falkland Islanders as a people (although a successor population of Malvinas 
Islanders could be established on the Islands).  
 
Underpinning the geopolitical dimension of slow emergency in the Falklands 
was that, for Buenos Aires the Islands were regarded as territorially integral to 
the Argentine Republic; for Britain, they were a territorial appendage, an 
appendix of a deceased empire. In this slow emergency era, the former’s 
determination to recover the Islands met with the latter’s prevarication; until 
such time as matters could be resolved by British diplomatic efforts, as nearly 
happened in 1968, the ups and downs of Anglo-Argentine diplomacy were 
effectively hard-wired to ensure that there would be heightened and lessened 






As will become evident in this thesis, the hydra of emergencies that 
composed slow emergency manifested themselves in many different ways – 
the loss of women and female reproductivity from the colony; multiple 
infrastructural inadequacies; numerous political and expert visits to address 
Falklands emergencies, the former (as with Chalfont’s 1968 visit) having the 
capacity to engender protest; communications and mobilities; and disruptive 
reportage/comment, both locally and in Britain, particularly in the pages of the 
Falkland Islands Times and Daily Express, respectively.  
 
2.4 Scholarship on emergency 
 
In this section I review emergency-related literature that has helped me see 
how the concept of slow emergency could be developed. 
 
Until recently, critical geopolitics has had little to say about emergency as a 
concept. Emergency as a term has often been positioned in a legal, medical 
or civil planning context, and yet in geopolitics, where emergency can be very 
productive, it has received comparatively little attention. 
In foregrounding emergency in geopolitics, it is useful to consider the type of 
framings emergency has had in other areas, notably legal, medical and civil 
planning. To begin with emergency in a legal context, Stephen Morton (2013, 
p. 2) – who notes that ‘a state of emergency […] is [a] profoundly elusive and 
ambivalent concept’ – offers this explanation as to what it encompasses: 
Countries are considered to be in a ‘state of emergency’ when executive 
power is used to suspend the normal rule of law, and power is transferred to 
police or military. Emergency legislation is often associated with totalitarian 
governments or so-called terrorist states, but liberal democracies have also 
made use of emergency law in times of social and political crisis (Morton 
2013, p. 1). 
A profound conundrum inherent in legal forms of emergency is how 
emergency is legally introduced or implemented, given that it suspends 
existing legislation. John Reynolds maps out ways in which potentially 






a number of mechanisms are triggered by a declared state of emergency. For 
one, the government is authorised to enact discrete administrative emergency 
regulations to circumvent ‘normal’ constitutional guarantees […] As regards 
international law, formal declaration of a public emergency allows the state to 
trigger the regime of emergency derogations contained in international human 
rights treaties, and to suspend certain legal obligations in responding to a 
“threat to the life of the nation” (Reynolds 2010, p. 43). 
Yet, the conundrum of emergency remains, using law to suspend law. 
Agamben sought to address this in State of Exception (2005) and in so doing 
helped activate further interest in emergency, and what it can mean in a 
geopolitical, and interdisciplinary, context. Morton, whose States of 
Emergency; Colonialism, Literature and Law (2013) has done much to 
advance interdisciplinary understanding of emergency, draws our attention to 
how Agamben symbolically crossed through the word law with an erasure 
mark, to help articulate its binary exterior/interior nature: 
By placing the word ‘law’ under erasure, Agamben emphasises how the force 
of law used to suspend the normal role of law produces and maintains the 
state of exception from a position of exteriority to the state of exception as 
soon as the law is suspended. Yet at the same time, Agamben also 
emphasises that the state of exception is also ‘interior’ to the law in so far as 
the force of law is required to suspend the rule of law in a time of emergency. 
(Morton 2013, p. 4). 
 
Yet emergency has been positioned in other ways too, such as in the medical 
and civil planning domains. A recent example of its usage can be seen in the 
rationalities behind a recent Harvard International Review article Epidemics: 
Neglected Emergencies? (Cone and Rull 2016) which examines the 
emergency of measles epidemic in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
and its wider significance. The term emergencies is directly associated with 
epidemics, that is a medical/public health framing is given to emergency, in 
which the term is applied to describe the urgency and gravity of a medical 
situation out of control. In similar fashion, planning for civil emergencies also 
pays much attention to emergency in discourse. Indeed, as will be considered 
later, it is significant that in advancing critical geopolitical understandings of 
emergency, Adey and Anderson (2011) made much use of UK civil 
contingency planning schema in unpacking emergency conceptually. MI5’s 





and lexicon, providing its own framing or definition of what, for M15, 
emergency is considered to involve:	
Emergencies cover a wide range of situations. This includes not just man-
made events such as terrorist attacks but also natural and accidental events 
such as disease outbreaks, industrial accidents and flooding. Responding to 
emergencies is usually the task of a number of agencies, including local 
authorities. In most instances, the police or one of the other emergency 




With emergency a term thus used in a number of key areas, developing 
emergency geopolitics offers much potential; this in turn led me to see it an 
area that would help critically unpack key aspects of Falklands geopolitics. It 
is wide-ranging, and involves areas such as: how a state deals with a crisis; 
how mobility, borders and regulation of objects are remade through 
emergency; how laws are suspended; and how emergency laws produce 
exceptional geopolitics.  The attention scholars such as Anderson, Adey, 
Neocleous and Virilio have paid post 9/11 to emergency has helped bring 
emergency significantly more into critical geopolitical discourse.  
 
This section has two key purposes: firstly, it will consider the relationality of 
emergency and speed, and secondly it will engage with scholarship that is 
productive in helping us to conceptualise emergency geopolitics, not least in 
unpacking how slow emergency functions.  
 
To begin, Anderson and Adey (2015) have provided this definition of what 
emergency involves: ‘Typically, emergency refers to an event or situation of 
limited but unknown duration in which some form of harm or damage is in the 
midst of emerging (Anderson and Adey 2015, p. 4). The themes of time, and 
injurious consequences which may result from this, are evident here. There is 
an unspoken assumption of speed, as implied in the phrase ‘in the midst of 
emerging’, but what does this mean for emergency geopolitics? Implicit, if not 
explicit, is the assumption of a fast speed, whether this is intended or not. 





caught up in a time-sensitive/pressurized reading as they are based on citing 
UK civil contingency planning schema, in which: 
 
The present is perched on the threshold of disruption once a range of 
threatening events have been identified and registered […] the action that 
responders prepare for occurs in an interval between the occurrence of the 
event and the expansion of that event from the initial site or set of sites 
(Anderson and Adey 2011, p. 1099). 
 
There is a clear sense of a fast-moving imminent emergency; this immediacy 
of emergency, and its implied speed, are palpable in this cited civil 
contingency planning schema, reinforced through assumptions of ‘correct, 
timely action’ (Anderson and Adey 2011, p. 1099). Yet such renderings, 
implicitly based on a ‘fast’ reading of the unfolding of emergency, serve to 
obscure the more subtle, less dramatic dynamic of slow emerging emergency, 
which is particularly pertinent for geopolitics.  
 
As an example of emergency geopolitics at state actor level, the progressive 
disintegration of an empire over time can be seen in the Ottoman Empire. The 
so-called ‘the sick man of Europe’ of the 19th and early 20th century 
experienced slow imperial decline, with instances of accelerated emergency 
such as the 1877-78 Eastern Crisis, and of deceleration such as the 1878 
Berlin Congress. Nonetheless, the ongoing slow decline of the Turkish Empire 
meant that from 1908, after the Young Turk Revolution, ‘The Empire that 
Europeans had dismissed as ‘the sick man’ of Europe was about to succumb’ 
(Findley 2010, p. 193). This notion of ‘sick’ – that is, it was not ‘well’ enough to 
exercise full agency over a period of time - represents a slow emergency 
framing for Turkey which has endured to the 21st century, prompting Dimitris 
Livanios (2006, p. 308) to ask whether, in respect of Turkey and the 
vicissitudes – or slow emergency – of its relations with the EU, is there ‘A way 
out for the sick man?’ Unlike the temporally extended usage of the phrase 
‘sick man’, the Turkish Empire itself disappeared, its final phase (1908-1922) 
of disintegration of the Turkish Empire representing the acceleration of a 






Inter-ethnic persecutions over decades, which suddenly accelerate to a new 
intensity – as happened between the Hutus and Tutsis of Rwanda in April to 
June 1993 – provide a further example of how slow emergency is a process 
that can extend over generations with acceleration and deceleration, before 
reaching its denouement, prior to the 1990 genocide, in which 800,000 
Rwandans, predominately Tutsis, perished:  
 
Hutu-Tutsi violence had already broken out before independence, but in 1963 
and 1964 perhaps 10,000 Tutsis were slaughtered in a planned and 
organised attack. The killings sparked a mass exodus of hundreds of 
thousands (the exact number is contested) of Tutsi into neighbouring 
countries. In 1973, a coup d’etat brought to power President Juvenal 
Habyarimana… Tutsi were [now] marginalised and discriminated against, but 
there were no more mass killings of Tutsi until the early 1990s (Smith 2012, 
p. 142). 
 
In cases as geopolitically disparate as the Falklands, Turkey or Rwanda, it is 
clear emergency geopolitics has the potential to provide new perspectives 
over multiple temporalities. A move overtly slow ‘approach’ to emergency 
geopolitics allows for a ‘drawn out’ rather than fast reading of emergency, and 
so opens up new ways to unpack emergency geopolitics; this is particularly 
the case when extended temporality is involved.  
 
Whatever its speed, emergency’s capacity to be injurious over a longer, or 
shorter, time period remains, and the consequences of slow emergency can 
be as profound as a sudden emergency. In developing a speed-related 
understanding, Nixon’s concept of slow violence (2011) has particular 
purchase, helping us to unpack what a more temporally graduated reading of 
emergency looks like: ‘Violence, above all environmental violence needs to be 
seen – and deeply considered – as a contest not only over space, or bodies, 
or labor, but also over time (Nixon 2011, p. 8)’. This emphasis on the 
relationality of the application of violence to time is key; just as violence can 








In unpacking the challenge of ‘slow violence’, Nixon (2011, p. 8) draws our 
attention to the contradictory binary implicit with it, ‘the oxymoronic notion of 
slow violence’. As with emergency, violence is widely seen as immediate, 
visible and impactful, which lends itself to dramatic reportage; this, however, 
simply – and for practitioners of it, conveniently – serves to obscure more 
subtle, less obvious forms of violence over time.  
 
There is also a real risk that embedded framings or understandings of 
emergency as a ‘fast’ phenomenon may actually prevent emergency being 
discerned, precisely because it is happening slowly. When an actual or 
anticipated emergency of ‘limited but unknown duration’ (Adey, Anderson and 
Graham 2015, p. 5) is ‘obvious’ and ‘discerned’, it is very likely be understood 
as ‘fast’, but that does not mean it is necessarily ‘fast’. Indeed, actors’ 
unawareness or inability to perceive that slow emergency, as with slow 
violence (Nixon 2011, p. 8), can operate ‘under the radar’ over an extended 
temporality, provides opportunities for those who do grasp this point.  Nixon 
warns that when the ‘challenge of visibility’ (Nixon 2011, p. 5) is not met, an 
opportunity is created for ‘patient’ actors instigating violence – or in this case, 
emergency – to play a ‘long game’ in fulfillment of their aims. Undue attention 
to an immediately visible but transient emergency may, in fact, simply serve to 
divert attention from another, longer and more serious (slow) emergency. 
Slow emergency can, in this way, prove to be more injurious than a quickly 
contained fast emergency; in this sense, emergency over time has the 
potential to be a more dangerous form of emergency. 
 
A particular benefit of emergency as a theoretical concept is its ‘elasticity’, and 
how this functions; he argues that ‘[i]t does not permit any exact definition, but 
merely points to a state of affairs calling for drastic action’ (Neocleous 2006, 
p. 194).  This in itself reinforces the point that an idée fixe of emergency as a 
‘fast’ phenomenon is inaccurate. Through such conventional ‘fast’ 
understandings, emergency can be seen as having more in common with 
Virilio’s ‘hypermodern’ emphasis on speed, rather than Nixon’s’ ‘slow’ 
perspective.  Yet when emergencies unfold, they are a process rather than an 





scope for the emergence of an emergency, within which ‘lies the idea of 
something coming out of concealment or issuing from confinement by certain 
events’ (Neocleous 2006, p. 194).  This idea of concealment, which 
essentially is another framing of the ‘challenge of visibility’ (Nixon 2011, p. 5) 
when applied to emergency, also implies too that emergency can be subtly 
directed or weaponised as a technique to achieve certain desired ends, for 
instance as a discrete tool to persuade Falkland Islanders to see that the 
future was Argentine.  However, the timing of an intensification of slow 
emergency is a crucial consideration when using it as a technique to pursue 
desired geopolitical outcomes. As a case in point, in 1980 the British Foreign 
Office sought – prematurely and so unsuccessfully – to maneuver ‘squeezed’ 
Islanders into accepting a ‘leaseback’ of the Falklands to Argentina. Although 
Islanders were in a geopolitical space ‘where the conditions for sustaining life 
become increasingly but gradually degraded’ (Nixon 2011, p. 3), that did not 
mean that sufficient numbers were ready to accept the rationality of 
accommodating Argentine sovereignty aspirations and accept leaseback. 
When actors seek to achieve desired outcomes through emergency 
geopolitics, slow emergency needs time as a technique to ‘run its course’, in 
this case to allow for mentalities to adjust to new rationalities. 
 
This said, while it has been noted that ‘life can be lived in and after 
emergency, but also in the presence of anticipated emergency’ (Adey, 
Anderson and Graham 2015, p. 5), this is unlikely to be sustainable 
indefinitely. Emergency is a process felt by those on its receiving end, and in 
this sense can very much be seen as ‘an experiential phenomena rather than 
a legal one’ (Anderson and Adey 2011, p. 1102). When the cumulative effects 
of slow emergency – or its sudden intensification – occur, geopolitical change 
is likely to follow. In the Falklands case, the logic of slow emergency was the 
demise of the colony as a British geopolitical entity, involving a progressive 
degradation of the quality of Islander life and its viability as a community.  
In extremis, however, slow emergency can extend to genocide, through the 
systematic loss of bodies, rights and life. Whilst not suggesting that the 





to genocide, or warrants the term ‘slow genocide’ (Zarni and Cowley 2014), it 
is worth noting that both communities face(d) a denouement in their continued 
existence. For Islanders, this was primarily one of political and socio-cultural 
demise, and for the Rohingyas their physical destruction, and accompanying 
political and socio-cultural demise.  
Zarni and Cowley (2014) have unpacked the slow processes operative in 
‘Burma’s slow-burning state-led process of deliberate destruction of the 
Rohingya as a population since 1978’ (Zarni and Cowley 2014, p. 753); they 
identify four main ‘mechanisms of the slow-burning genocide’ (Zarni and 
Cowley 2014, p. 690), namely ‘violence, forced migration, and illegalization’; 
‘marriage and birth restrictions’; ‘deliberate destruction of social foundations’; 
and ‘erasure of their legal and ethnic identity’ (Zarni and Cowley 2014, p. 
690). Elements of these mechanisms can be discerned in the Falkland 
Islander experience prior to 1982, for instance migration forced by the 
colony’s socio-economic degradation; the assertion of Argentine bureaucratic 
control over Islander mobilities through the tarjeta provisoria, commonly 
known as ‘the white card’; and the impending loss of British Citizenship for 
numerous Islanders under the 1981 British Nationality Act. 
 
Slow emergency can in many ways be understood as a temporally-extended 
assemblage of processes presenting varying degrees of threat to life, its 
periodic acceleration resulting in an intensification of impact on life. This latter 
point, concerning the dangers inherent in acceleration, was pointedly invoked 
in an open, admonitory letter of 7 September 2017 to Aung San Suu Kyi by 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu. With regard to the speed-related intensification of 
the persecution of the Rohingya in 2017, he noted of the exacerbation of their 
plight: ‘But what some have called ‘ethnic cleansing’ and others ‘a slow 
genocide’ has persisted – and recently accelerated (Tutu’s letter in The 
Guardian, 7 September 2017)’. In such ways, accelerations of slow 
emergency amplify slow emergency’s harmfulness to quotidian life and its 
exigencies, whether (for instance) in South East Asia or the South West 
Atlantic. 





accelerative or declarative role of the crowd which, applied in the Falklands, 
holds particular purchase. As Aradau (2015) signposts, the chronopolitical 
agency of a crowd to act as an accelerant or decelerant in the development of 
emergency is important: ‘Crowds have the potential to disrupt institutions and 
power relations, to disconnect from the status quo, and challenge the fictions 
of freedom and equality through momentary enactments of ‘real’ freedom and 
equality’ (Aradau 2015, p. 171).  
In terms of unpacking the role of the crowd in (slow) emergency, as 
experienced in the Falklands, a variety of types of crowd can be identified: 
politicised and emotional assemblage of bodies in a particular space, virtual 
radio or radio-telephone crowds and users/readers of local newsletter letter 
pages. What is common to these crowds is their potential to function as a 
technique to amplify the views of individual Islanders in resisting ‘Argentine 
irredentism’; in this way, assembled bodies operate as an actor with 
potentially some measure of agency in influencing how the processes of slow 
emergency evolve. 
The relationality of emergency to necropolitics is also important to consider, 
especially so when Europe’s ongoing migrant crisis, itself a major slow 
emergency, with periodic intensification, highlights the relevance of a     
necro-dimension to emergency. However slow, or fast, Europe’s migrant 
emergency is at any particular point in time, it nonetheless continues 
attritionally, with no prospect of an end in sight. Davies et al observe of the 
former Calais ‘Jungle’ that: 
the squalor and permanent wounding of the Calais camp can be likened to 
Mbembe’s (2003:40) “death-worlds”, where the conditions therein, as well as 
the political inactions of the state, assign its inhabitants the status of the 
“living dead” (2003:40); not actively killed - as would befit a “bare life” reading 
- but destined to suffer the harm and indignity of long-term cruel conditions 
(Davies et al 2017, p.18).  
This idea – a technique of strategic, injurious state inaction through calculated 
neglect – holds some measure of purchase for the Falkands in the pre-1982 
era. Whilst Mbembe’s (2003, p. 40 cited in Davies et al 2017, p. 18) ‘death-
worlds’ concept may be too strong a framing to apply to this empirical case, 





readily be used to substantiate ‘decline-world’ as an apt way to consider the 
Falklands at this time. Mbembe’s ‘living dead’ framing can also, with some 
justification, be applied to Islanders at this time, with their community 
progressively allowed to decline into a zombie colony. Through this 
technology of zombification, that is the technique of ‘sustained’ British neglect 
and disinterest, the Islander population was ‘kept alive but in a state of injury’ 
(Mbembe 2003, p. 21, cited in Davies et al 2017, p. 7). Interestingly, Davies et 
al (2017, p. 7) refer to constriction as a necropolitical tool that can be 
discerned in Mbembean necropolitics, involving: ‘being deprived of the 
opportunity or freedom to improve one’s hazardous or miserable condition. 
This constriction can be operationalized through political action — but also 
through inaction’. 
Unlike detained migrants, Islanders held the key to exit their own ‘constrictive’ 
South Atlantic ‘Camp’, should they have chosen to use it, that is accept the 
‘rationality’ of accommodating Argentina and its sovereignty claim. This said, 
the utility of a necropolitical understanding of developments in the Falklands 
up to 1982 can be seen in British ‘necropoliticking’ techniques, such as when 
the 1976 Shackleton Report was sidelined, or when the withdrawal of HMS 
Endurance was announced (1981); the former symbolised ‘no future’ and the 
latter ‘no protection’ (Royal Marines garrison excepted), both necropolitically 
compounding slow emergency for Islanders, both actually and affectively.  
Finally, in terms of further unpacking slow emergency, a schema of a supra-
emergency, composed of sub-emergencies and logics, is used to offer a 
helpful framing for understanding how slow emergency functioned in the pre-






2.5 Emergency – historiographic understandings 
  
Often framed as a transient part of the narrative of decolonisation and 
independence, colonial emergency has received less attention than it merits, 
both empirically and conceptually. One need only look at a number of 
significant texts on the British Empire, and many make no reference to it in 
their respective indexes, for example The Lion’s Share (Porter 1984); The 
Rise and Fall of the British Empire (James 1994); Cambridge Illustrated 
History of the British Empire (Marshall et al 1996); the Oxford History of the 
British Empire in the Twentieth Century (Brown and Louis 2001; The British 
Empire (Ferguson, 2003) and Ghosts of Empire (Kwarteng 2011). It is as if 
colonial emergency itself experienced a kind of slow emergency in its lack of 
empirical prominence. 
 
Whilst there has been significant scholarship on colonial emergency, it has 
attention from a limited number of academics. Frank Furedi is notable as an 
early writer on emergency, publishing a number of articles, including one 
‘Creating a Breathing Space; the Political Management of Colonial 
Emergencies’ which appeared in Robert Holland’s seminal Emergencies and 
Disorder in the European Empires after 1945 (Holland et al 1994). This book 
brought together key articles relating to British and European management of 
colonial emergency; academics whose work focused on British colonial states 
of emergency and is included in this collection include; John Kent (Egypt); A. 
J Stockwell (Malaya); Richard Rathbone (Ghana); Robert Holland, and David 
Anderson (Cyprus): John Darwin (Central African Federation). Over two 
decades since its publication, this remains a seminal collection on colonial 
emergency. 
 
In recent years, colonial emergency has received attention in ways which 
have been uncomfortable for the British government, nowhere more so than 
Kenya. Caroline Elkins’ research for her book, entitled Britain’s Gulag (2005) 
in the United Kingdom and Imperial Reckoning in the United States (2005), 





management of colonial emergency has been secreted at Her Majesty’s 
Government Communications Centre (HMGCC), at Hanslope Park, 
Buckinghamshire. Elkins’ research on the Kenyan colonial emergency has 
proved expensive for the British government, providing the basis for a 2009 
legal claim by five Mau Mau detention camps survivors, which resulted in 
2013 in the British government having to pay millions of dollars to victims of 
colonial emergency human rights abuses in Kenya.  
 
Cobain highlights the mass concealment of files from Kenya and other parts 
of the empire at the time of independence, naturally including those related to 
the handling of colonial emergency, describing it as ‘one of the most 
extraordinary clandestine processes at the end of Empire; Operation Legacy’ 
(Cobain 2016, p. 118). He draws attention to the scale of this officially 
sanctioned bid to suppress knowledge of – and so liability for – the excesses 
of colonial emergency and rule: 
Operation Legacy continued for more than two decades until the early 1970’s. 
Hundreds if not thousands of British colonial officials were involved, as were 
Special Branch Officers and local MI5 liaison officers, all three branches of 
the armed forces, and countless service men and women (Cobain 2016, p. 
130). 
When one considers the geopolitical extent of the application of colonial 
emergency, it is hardly surprising that, as the secret repository of files at 
Hanslope Park confirms, the British authorities have been reluctant to 
encourage scholarship on colonial emergency. In this way, there has been a 
convenient alignment between the wishes of British officialdom and 
academics who have been content to position colonial emergency in the wider 
framing of independence and decolonisation.  
 
Reflecting, however, the recent growth in interdisciplinary interest in colonial 
emergency, John Reynolds has approached colonial emergency from a legal 
perspective; this appears to be part of a wider interdisciplinary trend, as 
Stephen Morton’s States of Emergency: Colonialism, Literature and Law 





Reynolds provides an idea of the scale of the geographically extensive, 
decades long, British technique colonial emergency, highlighting that: 
 
There were states of emergency imposed in twenty-nine British colonial 
territories in total from 1946 onwards. The list reads like an A-Z of the Empire, 
from Aden to Zanzibar. These were simply the latest images of in the 
transmission of colonial emergency that had flared up in Ceylon in 1848, or 
Jamaica in 1865, at in Amritsar in 1919. This was emergency governance as 
a technique of control and population management, but one which allowed a 
certain formulation of order to be preserved (Reynolds 2017, p. 32). 
 
Through the mechanism of emergency, a deteriorating geopolitical situation 
could – over time – be decelerated, but where was it applied? Inevitably, a list 
‘from Aden to Zanzibar’ (Reynolds 2017, p. 32) is geographically extensive 
and temporally drawn out (see Fig. 1.5). For the purposes of this list, the focus 
is on the post-World War Two era; emergency action has been taken to cover 
not only formal declarations of a colonial state of emergency supported by 
British military backing, but also emergency military interventions on behalf of 
a British-dominated client state such as Oman. 
 
Colonial emergency, handled successfully, provided a decelarative 
technology to slow emergency over time, framing the terms for a colonial 
territory’s future independence on terms favourable to British interests.  
Fundamentallly, as Reynolds notes, with reference to Rajagaapol, Britain’s  
 
last major wave of colonial wars during the late 1940s and 1950s were 
‘euphemistically self-styled as emergencies’ so that mass resistance could be 
dealt with by special powers enacted in the name of the restoration of 
normalcy (rather than the competing, and less flattering, narrative of resort to 
force to sustain hegemonic control) (Reynolds 2010, p. 20).  
The idea of restoring normalcy to an inherently abnormal situation is an 
interesting one – it implies that settled British curatorial governance was a 
more natural state than rule by indigents; it did, nonetheless, give British 
colonial emergency the sympathetic framing that it undoubtedly needed if 
political rights were to be curtailed and miltarised governance applied, with the 
attendant likelihood of human rights abuses. Emergency, applied to colonial 
territories such as Kenya, Malaya and Aden, thus entered the lexicon of 





1960s post-World War Two colonial emergency had been normalised and 
running for two decades and in its 1968 co-option in the name Falkland 
Islands Emergency Committee it was cleverly, even subversively, re-
imagined. Here the emergency was unusually a colonial people seeking 
freedom under – rather than from – the Union Jack, the perceived protagonist 
being a revanchist Argentina.  
The Falklands emergency running from the mid 1960s up to the 1982 Conflict 
deserves to be seen as both part and consequence of Britain’s ‘era of 
emergency’, one in which pre-independence British-prosecuted wars and neo-
colonial hegemonism, were given the respectable cover of overcoming 
nihilistic emergency by destructive local elements. Whilst unpacking the 
empirical backgrounds of each colonial emergency lies beyond the scope of 
this thesis, the issue nonetheless arises of why pre-1982 emergency in the 
Falklands has received so little attention. 
2.6 Empirical relevance of emergency – and the establishment of the 
Falkland Islands Emergency Committee in March 1968 
 
As can be seen, emergency helps us position the Falklands into the wider 
context of British decolonisation and the end of empire, and its discourses. 
The establishment of the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee in March 
1968 (my italics) provided an emergency framing, this terminology helping link 
the Falklands with recent and contemporary colonial emergencies in Kenya, 
Aden, Cyprus and Rhodesia.  Fig. 1.5 (below) provides a sense of both the 
temporal and geographical scope of emergency in the post war era. By the 
time the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee was formed in March 1968, 
there had been over two decades of colonial emergencies from Africa to Asia 







Date of Emergency          Territory 
1945-48 Palestine 
1947 Aden riots  
1948  Gold Coast   
British Honduras 
1948-60   Malaya 
1948-51 Eritrea  
1950 Singapore  
[1950-53 Korean War] 
1951 Aqaba  
1952-56 Kenya 
1953  British Guiana 
1954-87  Cyprus 
1955 Singapore  
Oman 
1956  Bahrain  
Hong Kong  
Singapore  
Suez  
1957 British Honduras 
1957-59 Oman 
1958  Bahamas 
Aden   
Jordan/Lebanon  
1959 Maldives 
1960  Jamaica  
1960-61 Cameroons 
1961  Kuwait 
Zanzibar  
1962  British Honduras  
British Guiana  
Brunei  
1963  Swaziland 
Zanzibar  
1963-66 Borneo 




1964-67  Aden  
1965 Mauritius 
Bechuanaland  
1966 Hong Kong riots  
Das Island (Trucial Coast) 
Seychelles  
1967 Hong Kong riots 
1968 Bermuda  
Mauritius  
1969 Anguilla  
Bermuda 
1969-2007 Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ 
1970 Oman 
1979-80 Rhodesia/Zimbabwe  
1980 New Hebrides  
1982 Falklands and South Georgia  
o  
 
Fig. 2.1. (above) Post-WW2 Emergency deployments of British troops in colonial or 
client territories; adapted from ‘Brush Fire Wars’ (Dewar 1984, pp. 186-87). 
 
What was odd, and indeed unique, in the case of the Falklands was the 





Islands Emergency Committee, itself rather than the British government 
deciding to mobilise this term. In the Falklands context, ‘emergency’ was 
applied in a different and original way. Rather than conceived as a framing for 
a decolonising ‘hotspot’, the term was re-imagined to describe a territory 
where the population wanted to continue British colonial rule, the policy of the 
British government (in conjunction with Argentina) - as opposed to its colonial 
subjects – the threat to the territorial status quo. The Falkland Islands 
Emergency Committee was therefore brought into existence to forestall the 
emergency of lowering the union jack against the Islanders’ wishes  
 
In our foregrounding of the use of emergency in this thesis, it is important to 
highlight the empirical circumstances which led the term ‘emergency’ to 
become formally associated with the Falkland Islands. The formation of the 
Falkland Islands Emergency Committee in March 1968 was in itself a 
response to an imminent acceleration of what I perceive to have been the 
broader Falkland ‘slow emergency’, one of political and socio-economic 
uncertainty and decline, with the apparent likelihood of an Anglo-Argentine 
settlement of the Falkland Islands’ future the factor portending the demise of 
the territory as a British colony.  
 
William Hunter Christie, Lincolns Inn barrister, former British diplomat in 
Buenos Aires (1946-48), and author of The Antarctic Problem (1951), is 
regarded as the ‘prime mover’ (Charlton 1989, p. 76) in the establishment of 
the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee. Hunter Christie offered the 
following, revealing account of how the Falkland Islands Emergency 
Committee was formed, which from its inception mobilised well-connected 
London-based networks in support of the ‘keeping the Falklands British’. What 
is striking about the formation of the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee 
is that it appears to have been a pre-emptive, ‘fast’ response to the Islands’ 
ongoing ‘slow emergency’; the prospect of an imminent ‘catalysation of 
emergency’ loomed due to the British government’s apparent readiness to 






As framed by Hunter Christie in the following interview transcript (Charlton 
1989, pp. 78-79), the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee was a 
spontaneous initiative to assemble cross-party support to stop the ‘madness’ 
of Foreign Secretary George Brown’s Falkland policy. ‘Christie’s source [...] a 
fellow [Falkands] sympathiser in the Ministry of Defence’ (Gamba 1987, p.90) 
was Captain W.J.R. Pennefather. Hunter Christie’s account describes how 
Pennefather initiated the pre-emption process through alerting Hunter Christie 
to the impending prospect of territorial cession, in a deliberate leak to thwart 
British government efforts to ‘solve the Falkland problem’. Drawing on Hunter 
Christie’s lobbying skills, and practical and financial support from the Falkland 
Islands Company and its Chairman Patrick Ainsley, an assembling of political 
support to prevent the territorial cession for the Falklands was rapidly put 
together.  
 
Excerpt from interview of William Hunter-Christie by Michael Charlton for the 
BBC 
 
Do you want to know its earliest roots? I attended a meeting of the Court of 
the Worshipful Company of Clockmakers …. another member of the Court 
came up to me. He was a senior officer, Captain Pennefather, Royal Navy, 
and a member of the Committee still. And he said “Bill, [Foreign Secretary] 
George Brown’s gone mad! He wants to sell the Falkland Islands to 
Argentina. I can’t do anything about it. You have to do something about it!” 
 
And so I came back and thought what to do. I knew the Chairman of the 
Falkland Islands Company, Patrick Ainsley, who was a solicitor in New 
Square, and I went round to see him, and I told him what I’d been told. He 
said “Well, it’s astonishing. I’m just looking at a cable from my manager in 
Port Stanley saying more or less what you’ve said to me, and I haven’t any 
idea at all what to do”. And I said, “Well we must get a committee together, 
and we must resist this. You can’t do it because everyone will say it’s the 
Falkland Islands Company trying to defend its property, and the capitalists 
and so on. We must have an all-party committee, and we must run a political 
campaign and get this into the open and use the press”. And he said “Right 
ho”. And the next thing I heard, a few days later, was asking me to attend a 
meeting at the the offices of the Falkland Islands Company at 97 Piccadilly. 
………We got Labour members of Parliament to join, we got Conservatives 
and we got Liberal members. And we set to work (Charlton 1989, pp.78-79). 
 
Interestingly Argentine historian Martin Abel Gonzalez points to a ‘slowness’ 
in the process of the formation of the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee, 





Anglo-Argentine negotiations which only officially being confirmed on 27 
February 1968, he argues that:  
 the explosive combination of slowness and secrecy that characterised the 
 negotiations provided enough time and motivation for Islanders to become 
 organised and to establish contacts with audiences in Britain most willing to 
 embrace them’ (Gonzalez 2013, p. 204).  
The ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ interpretations are not preclusive; as Hunter Christie 
makes clear, the formation of the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee was 
a ‘fast’ response to the ‘emergency’ prospect of an Anglo-Argentine deal over 
the Falklands. Yet, as Gonzalez’ comment implies, embedded and developing 
networks were available for activation in the event of the acceleration of 
emergency, such as those of Conservative MP and FIC Director Sir John 
Barlow who ‘in 1968 became the Chairman of the Falkland Islands 
Emergency Committee – the main institutional face of the Falklands lobby’. 
(Gonzalez 2013, p. 142). 
The Falkland Islands Emergency Committee soon made its presence felt: the 
swift mobilisation of parliamentary and press networks in support of the 
Falkland Islanders helped limit the scope of the Government of the day. For 
example, ‘[t]he front page of the Daily Express was to become one of the 
campaign’s key weapons’ (Gamba 1987, p. 90). The agency of the Wilson 
Government to territorially dispose of the Falkland Islands was compromised, 
to the degree that Freedman observed that: The future of the Falkland Islands 
was now a matter of domestic British politics’ (Freedman 2005, p. 26). 
Chapter four will consider the impact of the resistance to territorial cession of 
the Falklands as it materialised in the political emergency of 1968, with the 
focus of this thesis being on the Islander experience ‘below’ and 
representations of this rather than the ‘high’ politics of the Committee ‘above’. 
It will also seek to place the ‘Falkland problem’ within the wider context of 
contemporary British discourse about decolonisation and the end (or loss) of 
empire, not least Commonwealth immigration at the time, including Enoch 
Powell’s reaction to this, and the ‘loyalty emergency’ of Rhodesia. This wider 
political context helps explain why the cause of ‘The Falklands’ proved such a 





Notwithstanding Lord Chalfont’s November 1968 ministerial visit to the Islands 
to ‘win over’ Islanders to the benefits of incorporation into Argentina, this 
sovereignty transfer initiative failed. As a consequence, emergency in the 
Falklands decelerated, stabilising to a point that in 1972 the designation of 
Falkland Islands Emergency Committee was changed. Merle Christie, Hunter 
Christie’s widow, notes that ‘at the request of the Falkland Islanders’ (Christie 
in Tatham 2008, p. 151) ‘emergency’ was dropped from the Committee’s 
designation, and was re-named the United Kingdom Falkland Islands 
Committee (UKFIC), alongside a ‘sister’ Falkland Islands Committee set up in 
Stanley, formalising a London-Stanley information network. The detaching of 
‘emergency’ from the designation of what was now the UKFIC did not, 
however, remove the grinding reality of quotidian ‘slow emergency’ facing the 
Islanders, with its hydra of geopolitical and socio-economic challenges.  
 
With the question of the Falklands’ future still unresolved, emergency endured 
and periodically accelerated, such as when in 1976 the Argentine navy fired at 
the RRS Shackleton, and in 1980 when the Ridley leaseback initiative was 
rejected by many, though not all, the Islanders. The first and only time British 
authorities officially used the term ‘emergency’ to describe the Falklands in 
the slow emergency era came on 2 April 1982 at 04:30, when Governor Rex 
Hunt declared a formal state of emergency in response to imminent Argentine 
invasion. Thereafter, from April through to June 1982, the Falkland Islanders 
experienced a period of unprecedented military-political emergency, living 
under Argentine military occupation and experiencing what became the 1982 
Falklands Conflict, a euphemistic appellation for Anglo-Argentine war. Three 
civilian Islanders died in this emergency, and the Falkland Islander community 
experienced first-hand the trauma and violence of war. 
 
Given the centrality of ‘emergency’ to the Falkland Islands in the period from 
1964 to 1982, the focus on emergency seems particularly apt for a study 
focusing on the Falkland Islander experience. The thesis’ investigation into 
emergency does not extend into the outbreak, duration and consequences of 
the 1982 conflict, although, as with Raymond Brigg’s representation in the 






2.7 ‘When is an Emergency not an Emergency?’ 
This project is also intended to push back against a dominant historiography 
of the Falkland Islands as the 1982 Conflict, to reveal an under-studied history 
of Islander struggle. This is not ‘a national liberation struggle of decolonisation 
involving emergency such as experienced in numerous parts of the former 
British Empire, such as Cyprus, Kenya and British Guiana. More conventional 
colonial Emergencies, once they had run their course, offered the prospect of 
independence from the (British) colonial power, of varying degrees of 
palatability to Britain.  In contrast, post-World War Two decolonisation did not 
offer a route to greater Islander self-determination, instead it offered the 
prospect of an unwelcome territorial incorporation into a military dominated 
Argentina. This, for many Islanders, meant a hostile colonisation in an era of 
decolonisation, enabled by British acquiescence at best, and encouragement 
at worst. 
 
During the slow emergency era, Islander resistance worked to maintain rather 
than remove British colonial rule and. as will be seen, manifested itself with 
different intensities; at times, this meant counter intuitively working against 
British officials and politicians, such as Governor French and Lord Chalfont 
respectively, who advocated an Argentine rather than British future for the 
Islands. It is difficult not to conceive such a state of affairs as being an 
Emergency for the Falklands, one which was intensified by official British 
neglect, and threatened the very viability of the Islands as a functioning socio-
economic entity.  
 
The aforementioned dominant discourse of emergency as a politically directed 
legal and military development runs the risk of obscuring less conventional 
forms of emergency, such as that experienced in the Falklands. Naming a set 
of circumstances as emergency makes a difference, both at and after the 





in the Falklands prior to 1982, more academic attention to the Islands is likely 
to have been a consequence of such a labelling.  
 
The same can be said of individuals in their labelling – or not – of a set of 
circumstances as emergency. An emergency framing makes a difference. 
This can apply to Islanders narrating everyday emergency through writing 
urgent letters to the Falkland Islands Times, as much as to a prominent 
politician, such as Enoch Powell. As is addressed in chapter 4, this right wing 
politician, who ‘became the touchstone for speaking about race and nation’ 
(Schwarz 2012, p. 12), appeared to experience more difficulty in naming 
emergency than in provoking it. 
 
We now turn our attention to other areas, specifically volume; loyalty; end of 
empire; affect; performance; visuality and chronoplitics. With slow emergency 
as the thesis’ dominant theme, these lower order (for the purposes of this 
thesis) areas shed valuable further light on its workings. 
 
2.8  Volume 
 
As will be argued in Chapter 5, a three-dimensional understanding of the 
Falklands offers an important way to understand its geopolitics, particularly in 
the thesis’ periodisation up to 1982, in which slow emergency operated three-
dimensionally, with aerial and submarine developments further eroding the 
viability of the colony. This requires us to think about volume, and (non) 
representations of space. Whilst two-dimensional maps ‘textually’ record the 
sovereignty of a state over territory such as Britain over the Falkland Islands, 
the control of volume and vertical power, which underpin this domination, is 
entirely neglected by such a flat representation. As Graham has argued ‘a 
classical, modern formulation of Euclidean territorial units jostling for space on 
contiguous maps [is inadequate to explain] the (geo)politics of verticality 
(Graham 2004, p. 20). The problem of two-dimensional territorial 
representations, which obscure rather than reveal the realities of three-
dimensional power, is highlighted by the (non-)depiction of airspace; 





missing from maps, but control and occupation of this ‘territory’ – what 
Weizman calls ‘the politics of verticality’ – is critically important  to states’. As 
Argentine aerial incursions into Falkland airspace of 1964 and 1968 
(Fitzgerald), the 1966 Condor hijacking, and then 1971’s Communication 
Agreement show, British inability/unwillingness to assert sovereign control 
over the Islands’ aerial volume, left a vacuum for Argentine actors to subvert 
Britain’s territorial position. 
 
Eldon (2013) in particular has sought to theorise what we understand about 
volume; in examining the meaning of ‘volumetric’, an important term he 
mobilises, he notes that: 
  
The Oxford English Dictionary suggests this word dates from 1862, is formed 
from Volume and Metric, and means “Of, pertaining to, or noting measurement 
by volume”. While the term is used in cartography and physics, there is real 
potential in working out in detail its two aspects: the dimensionality implied by 
‘volume’ and the calculability implied by ‘metric’ [...] Just as the world does not 
exist as a surface, nor should our theorisations of it; security goes up and 
down; space is volumetric (Eldon 2013, p. 15). 
 
With Elden’s ‘Secure the Volume’ (2013) a key contribution to current 
geopolitical theorisation about volume, further understandings have also 
emerged, such as those of Adey and Bridge, who have addressed areas such 
as how volume relates to bodies, and the sub-surface, respectively (Adey 
2013, pp. 1-3; Bridge 2013, pp. 1-3).  
 
Volume left uncontrolled and unclaimed creates both a geopolitical vacuum 
and opportunity, and seeking to exercise volumetric control becomes ipso 
facto a political act (and equally, not seriously defending Falklands volume 
until the 1982 conflict was a political act).  Weizman’s (2002, p. 2) conception 
of Israel/Palestine as ‘a territorial hologram in which political acts of 
manipulation and multiplication  of territory transform a two-dimensional 
surface into a three-dimensional volume’ reflects how seizing the volumetric 
initiative advances a state actor’s interests, in this case Israel, and 
Falklands/Malvinas geopolitics in the period up to 1982 similarly illustrate that, 
with use of vertical power, control can be asserted over volume. As a case in 





aircraft, warships and submarines – along with its 1976 occupation of 
Southern Thule in the South Sandwich Islands – signified a politically driven 
bid for control over southwest Atlantic volume. Likewise, Buenos Aires’ bid to 
develop oil from, and assert de facto sovereignty over, the Falkland/Malvinas 
seabed reflects the importance of asserting volumetric power on, and 
beneath, the waves. Gustafson (1988), who provides the definitive account of 
the Argentine-British volumetric struggle for sub-surface resource and 
sovereignty, concluded that: 
 
By March 1982 Argentina was perhaps well on its way to exercising de facto 
sovereignty over the seas around the Malvinas […] Argentina’s creeping title 
would have been at best political and de facto, little worse than Britain’s title to 
the Falklands based on contested acquisitive prescription. Had Argentina 
continued to license oil exploration around the Islands, it is difficult to imagine 
how Britain could have stopped it (Gustafson 1988, p. 116). 
 
Slow emergency in, above and under the Falklands archipelago functioned three-
dimensionally, and not just horizontally on the islands’ land and sea surfaces - not 
only had the archipelago’s aerial volume increasingly come under Argentine 
domination, especially after the 1971 Communications Agreement, but the Islands’ 
submarine volume was also being simultaneously eroded.  
 
On land, slow emergency continued to test the Islanders on a daily basis, but 
for Argentina, particularly after the collapse of Chalfonts’s efforts to divest 
Britain of the Falklands in 1968, this  technique created promising  
opportunities for establishing new, de facto geopolitical realities; volumetric 
faits accomplis in turn had the potential to hollow out existing geopolitical 
realities, so encouraging  future territorial ‘adjustments’.  
 
For state actors alive to vertical geopolitics, tangible opportunities to extend, 
or defend, spatial control over a territory exist, be that on, above or below the 
territorial surface. On the other hand, Weizmann (2002, p. 2) warns of the 
risks inherent in an anachronistic, volumetrically unaware ‘flat discourse’ 
which ‘largely ignores the vertical dimension and tends to look across rather 
than to cut through the landscape. This was the cartographic imagination 






In this way, volumetric outcomes can be shaped through political manipulation 
of the vertical, whether by politicians or officials; as Bridge explains: 
‘Verticality is significant because adding height and depth to the horizontal 
plane magnifies the possibilities of relative location, affording additional 
means of control’ (Bridge 2013, p. 1). Depending on which actor exercises 
vertical control, volumetric power can be seen as relational to security or 
insecurity; such control can operate as a means of security (for some), as it 
‘can be found in the idea of no-fly zones, of providing security for the ground 
through a mechanism from the air’ (Elden 2013, p. 5).  
 
Volumetric impotence, however, functions as a source of insecurity, as in the 
Falklands in the period up to 1982, where there was no Royal Air Force 
operational presence. The volumetric vacuum was filled by the Fuerza Aereas 
Argentina (FAA) through the application of techniques such as unauthorised 
landings and flights over the Islands. In extremis, volumetric insecurity may 
result in one actor adopting ‘atmos-terrorism’ (Schlotedijk 2009, p. 49), 
whereby the air is turned into a ‘terrorist’ weapon, subverting it from a means 
of life to one of death. ‘Atmos-terrorism’ (Schlotedijk 2009, p. 49), is conceived 
in these terms:  
 
According to its principle of execution, all terrorism is thus conceived as atmos-
terrorism. It has the form of an attempted attack against the environmental 
conditions of the enemy's life, beginning with the toxic attack on the most 
immediate resources of the surrounding of a human organism, the air that it 
breathes (Schlotedijk 2009, p. 49). 
 
Whilst ‘atmos-terrorism’ (Schlotedijk 2009, p. 49) did not become a factor in 
determining Falkland/Malvinas geopolitics, Islanders did experience another 
form of ‘terrorism’, namely the September 1966 hijacking of a flight from 
Buenos Aires to Rio Gallegos by Argentine ‘Condor’ nationalists. This 
episode, along with other key volumetric developments, will be unpacked and 
critically examined in Chapter 5. What is clear though is that volume deserves 
to be considered as a significant factor in Falkands-Malvinas geopolitics; as is 
evident, securing dominant vertical control provides state actors with a 





rationality of their control accords with the mentalities of the inhabitants living 
within the ‘bubble’ (Schloterdijk 1998) of territory three-dimensionally affected. 
 
2.9 Loyalty 
Loyalty is another clearly significant aspect of the Falkland slow emergency, 
and Islander loyalty was both tested, and counter-intuitively amplified, by it. As 
reflected in Chapter 5 and its focus on Islander loyalty during 1968’s abortive 
attempt by the British government to maneuver/persuade Islanders to accept 
an Argentine future, loyalty was mobilised against government policy. When 
Chalfont made the first ever-ministerial visit to the Falklands to sell territorial 
accommodation of Argentina, he met organised loyal protest, which mobilised 
the Union Jack, loyal slogans and crowds; reportage and photographs were 
then relayed back to the British public by the accompanying Fleet Street 
journalists. The clear message was ‘The Falklands was their home and that is 
where they wanted to stay under the union jack’ (Freedman 2005, p.18). 
Dodds, Lambert and  Robison (p.368, 2008) note that loyal demonstration ‘is 
performed …… It had to be imagined, planned and executed at a particular 
moment in space and time’. This assessment was made in respect of the 
1954 Royal visit to Gibraltar, another small colonial territory with a revanchist 
neighbour but which, unlike the Falklands, did receive a visit from the reigning 
monarch; here, the nature of loyal demonstration was in support of Queen 
Elizabeth II’s visit, with its implied rebuttal of Spanish sovereignty ambitions. 
Demonstrating loyalty required much preparation; Dodds et al further 
comment (2008, p.370) that the mobilising loyalty needs organisation, offering 
an insight into the practices behind the performance. 
 The Gibraltar element of the 1953–54 Royal Tour illustrates the work that 
 went into the performance of loyalty only too clearly: flags were waved, 
 streets were painted and renamed, lunches were planned, gifts were 
 organized, speeches  were composed, Royal security considered  and press 
 coverage mobilized.  
Invoking the monarch as a means to redress iniquitous policy was a loyal 
practice which had been applied elsewhere in the (former) British Empire. In 
relation to King-Emperor George VI’s tour of South Africa in 1947, Sapire 





described as 'black loyalism' which stretched  back to the indigenous empire 
loyalism of eighteenth-century Canada, pre-and post-Mutiny India and the 
nineteenth-century Cape.’ Further, Sapire (2012, p.217) sees the readiness of 
many black South Africans in 1948 to express loyal support to the visiting 
monarch as reflective of a broader point, namely how ‘the British crown 
figured as a source of protection and succour against the wrongs of colonial 
states and the 'betrayals' of British governments’. 
Yet the nature of loyalty as practiced in the Falklands, unlike black South 
Africans who had African nationalism to turn to, was that it had no other 
obvious ‘home’. Mercau argues that ‘The Falkland Islanders saw themselves 
as distinctly British, and like other settler societies in the empire, they stressed 
their loyalty and whiteness’ (Mercau 2019, p. 27).  
In terms of developing a ‘Greater British’ loyalty in the inter-war period, there 
had been royal tours, notably those of the future Edward VIII in 1919-20, in 
which 
 Assumptions about the superiority of British settler stock, with royalty cast as 
 its apogee …were present in the intellectual thinking of most of the 
 courtiers and  politicians who pioneered the tours, both at home and in the 
 dominions (Mort 2018 p6). 
In this sense, loyalty was not colour blind in ‘Greater Britain’, with the ‘white 
dominions’ loyal to a ‘white’ House of Windsor monarch; indeed, this line of 
thinking appears to endure within the February 1968 Unofficial Councillors 
letter to Parliament, which as both Dodds (2002, p. 130) and Mercau (2019, 
p.36) observe, highlights that there was ‘no racial problem’ in the (white) 
colony. 
The wider ‘Greater British’ context of Islander loyalty in terms of a identity is 
raised by Mercau; he highlights the profound damage done in the settler 
dominions of Canada, and especially Australia and New Zealand, to the idea 
of a transcontinental ‘Greater British’ community (2019, pp.22-3) by the British 
government’s 1961 decision to join the emerging European Economic 
Community. Further, Mercau sees Donaghy’s assessment (2014, p. 15) that 





(Mercau 2019, p.26) as establishing itself from the early 1960s, the framing of 
‘abandoned Britons’ originating from Curran and Wards’ The Unknown Nation; 
Australia after Empire’ (2010). Islander loyalty to, and self-identification with, 
Britain had, in the post-1945 era, gone largely unrequited; this in turn 
intensified an affective sense of being undermined and sold out by the British 
government, which was an enduring feature of slow emergency. 
Even without the recrudescent pressure of Argentine territorial aspirations, the 
‘unraveling of Greater Britain’ (Mercau 2019, p.29) meant that the Falkland 
Islands’ status was vulnerable to change by the mid 1960s. With the United 
Kingdom’s retreat from a ‘Greater British’ community and advance into a 
European one, the Falklands had effectively ended up as unwanted baggage 
from a former Empire, with Islander loyalty being both a product, and leftover, 
of an increasingly defunct ‘Greater British’ identity.  
Developing a post-Greater British Islander loyalty to a Falkland micro-nation 
was not a serious option, even though real Argentine ‘apprehensions’ about 
the possibility of the Falklands progression to independence existed 
(Gonzalez 2013, p.35). Loyalty in the Falkland Islands had nowhere to turn 
other than to hold tight to a neglectful Britain, which still compared favorably 
with Argentina during the slow emergency period.  
Pinkerton’s ground-breaking work on radio in the Falklands throws interesting 
light on some of the practical difficulties which Argentina encountered in 
winning over Islanders’ loyalty. Radio served as a vital means for ‘ethereally 
connecting Islanders with the United Kingdom 8,000 miles away’ (2007 
p.386), reinforcing Islander loyalties‘ and keeping a struggling ‘Greater British’ 
connection afloat. Yet Islander loyalty was driven too by news about the 
domestic behaviour of the Argentine junta, such radio reportage being 
 ‘….intensely geopolitical; news of the ‘Dirty War’ being waged in Argentina 
 by successive military governments (broadcast by the BBC Overseas 
 Service) had been instrumental in fortifying Islander resistance to ongoing 
 Argentine claims over the Falklands throughout the late 1970s (Pinkerton  
 2007, p.349). 
As can be seen, there are a variety of reasons for loyal performance, such as 





government or its policies, and the mobilisation of identities. Loyal 
performance is selective, and can range from uncritical to highly critical. In the 
latter case, this can usefully be seen as evidenced in the Falklands of 1968, 
when loyal protest carefully distinguished the British monarch from the 
Government of the day, Elizabeth II representing the part of the British state 
that was trusted, unlike the ‘disloyal’ Wilson Government. 
2.10  End of Empire 
Chamberlain (1999, p.63) cites how, in 1829, the Westminster Review 
claimed that ‘it is pretty much with colonies as with children’; whereas sons 
would make their own way in the world, some ‘sickly infants’ and ‘unmarried 
daughters’ would need to stay at home; using this analogy, he likened the 
Falklands to such a ‘daughter’, with Argentine advances rejected. However, 
the British Empire, the Islands’ geopolitical ‘home’ since 1833, had by the start 
of the slow emergency period largely ceased to exist, the end of empire 
leaving the colony of the Falklands exposed; this section considers 
explanations for the end of empire, and its relationality to the Falklands. 
 
The human and material costs of fighting two World Wars, the rise of 
nationalism in British colonies, domestic reluctance to maintain an Empire, US 
anti-imperialism and the Cold War conspired to bring about Britain’s end of 
empire. In reviewing historiographical literatures about the end of the British 
empire, Darwin (in Winks 1999, p.542-5) highlighted four explanatory 
definitions, namely that this decolonisation was: the legal-constitutional event 
of the formal transfer of sovereignty to newly independent states, and the lead 
up to this; that independence was often a façade to maintain discretely, rather 
than end, British influence; and that since 1945 the global infrastructure and 
order which supported British and European imperialism generally, had 
collapsed. Darwin’s preferred definition of decolonisation was the fourth, that 
is; ‘the more or less complete overthrow of this structure of institutions and 
ideas between 1945 and the mid 1960s, and its replacement by a post 
colonial order whose first phase ended in 1990’ (Darwin in Winks 1999, 





imperial mission had been fulfilled; and that changes in international 
capitalism led to colonies being seen as an anachronistic impediment to 
business (Darwin in Winks 1999, pp.544-5).  
 
With no nationalist movement, and independence neither sought or achieved, 
the Falklands provide a highly unusual example; whilst clearly affected by the 
wider breakdown of erstwhile British imperial ‘order’, the Islands had 
traditionally had to ‘make do’ and received little nurturing under British colonial 
rule. Similarly, the colony’s leading capitalist actor, the Falkands Islands 
Company, was no advocate of decolonising change, in the latter case 
supporting the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee from its inception in 
1968. The Falklands’ geopolitical predicament was that it was now a territory 
in the uncomfortable position of being a colony in a postcolonial world. 
Gonzalez notes the relationality of decolonisation to the failed 1968 bid to 
transfer the colony’s sovereignty to Argentina; he saw decolonisation as a 
particularly pressing factor for Argentina rather than Britain, since ‘could 
Buenos Aires remain indifferent to the fact that the UN regarded the Falklands 
not as an Argentine province but a non-self governing territory that  had to be 
decolonised? (Gonzalez 2012, p.34). 
 
More broadly historiographically-speaking, postcolonial critique has 
challenged traditional scholarship on British imperialism, and has highlighted 
‘how it continued to cling to the methodology and mentalité of ‘the official 
mind’, as Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher term it’ (Kennedy in Sauer 
p.10, 2003). Whether from a postcolonial or other perspectives, there has 
been an increasing challenge to established official British narratives that the 
end of empire, by and large, ran smoothly, a point addressed by Ballantyne  
(2010, p.344), who notes: 
 
 ‘Anthropologists, literary scholars, feminist critics, and historians in South 
 Asia have recovered the centrality of rape, violence, and displacement in 
 Partition’, and stress the long term traumas on political culture and social 
 relations in independent South Asia’ 
 
Ballantyne (2010, p.344) similarly cites Elkin’s reference to Britain’s’ Kenyan  





work on British neo-colonial ambitions in South East Asia as disruptors of a 
narrative that the end of empire was generally handled well. In contrast, Grob-
Fitzgibbon (2011, p.3), argues that British decolonisation was actually more 
effective than much recent scholarship recognises, as the British government 
had across its decolonising territories  ‘a concerted imperial strategy … in this 
endeavour the government met with considerable success’. Some common 
ground with more critical narratives of the end of empire, however exists, 
when Grob-Fitzgibbon acknowledges that (what he frames as) ‘liberal 
imperialism can only be sustained by illiberal dirty wars. Britain’s imperial 
endgame demonstrates that it is possible to achieve success in both’ (2011, 
p.377). Applying the logic of this argument, in this way the questionable and 
sometimes violent methods employed in Britain’s ending of empire can be, 
depending on one’s readiness to accept this, uncoupled from the political 
outcomes.  
Whether a scholar’s preference is for contemporary research on the end of 
empire with ‘explicitly transnational approaches’ or one which is more focused 
on ‘diplomatic records and the official mind’ (Ballantyne 2010, p.347), it is 
clear that the slow emergency Falklands provides an atypical empirical case 
in this field. 
2.11 Gender and Race 
For the purposes of this section, gender and race will be considered the key 
areas for literature review, mindful of both their distinctiveness and 
interconnectedness, applying the rationale that “Both gender and race are 
real, and both are social categories…..And although the ideologies of race 
and gender and the hierarchical structures they sustain are substantively very 
different, they are intertwined (Haslanger 2000, p. 51) 
Firstly, gender, in the wider framing of the British Empire, has been described 
by Wylie (p.286, in Winks 1999) in these terms 
 the significance of gender in the context of Empire has invited scholars  to 
 understand gender as a creation of social and political circumstances rather 
 than as a biological given, and to see how critical it was in the interaction  





who also notes there has been dispute about how much emphasis should be 
attached to gender ‘as opposed to race and class’.  
 
Gender-related literature provides a valuable perspective on the slow 
emergency Falklands, and offers new perspectives on (then) established 
perceptions and practices in the Islands which appear firmly based on a once-
conventional understanding of gender as biological rather than social 
construct. This socio-cultural framing can be seen as part of the wider colonial 
experience - which as described in the seminal book Imperial Leather 
(Mcclintock 2002) - usually, if not always, worked to the detriment of colonial 
women ‘Marital laws, property laws, land laws and the intractable violence of 
male decree bound them in gendered patterns of disadvantage and 
frustration’ (Mcclintock 2002, p6).  
 
Gender tensions were exacerbated in the Falklands owing to the numerical 
paucity of women; while sometimes this gave women a measure of power and 
agency, much would depend on the individual female and her circumstances 
as to how far this was, or could be, exercised. ‘Gender-based violence’ 
(Brickell 2008, p. 1668) was far from unknown, which some men used to re-
balance ‘power relations’ with women, physical aggression being exercised 
not only to rein in women’s agency, but also to assert hierarchical power over 
other men. Butler’s (2004) argument that gendering and other binary 
categories enact violence (Mountz in Gallaher at al 2010 p.319) appears to 
hold purchase in the slow emergency Falklands, as a feature in some male-
female relationships.  
 
Blunt and Dowling (2006) have examined the cultural geographies of home; 
informed by approaches in this work, Brickell (2014) has investigated gender 
tensions in Cambodia, where home is often the site of violence and 
contention, and found ‘the causes and consequences of [marital dissolution] 
which can be read through contestation and re-negotiation of the material and 
symbolic spatialities of home’ (Brickell 2014, p.270), an understanding 
similarly applicable in the Falklands domestic environment.  Gender, 





[which] is a gendered phenomenon, in its incidence and prevalence but also 
its social and political dynamics’.  Gray (2016, p.139) similarly emphasises the 
connection between gender and violence in the home, highlighting that 
women are the ‘overwhelming majority’ of those abused; further, she 
contends that ‘domestic abuse is a form of gendered violence that is shaped, 
facilitated, and understood through socially constructed ideas about gender 
and the unequal gendered roles and structures that these entail’. In this way, 
gender is presented as integral to, rather than incidental in, the making of 
domestic violence.  
 
Inside, but also outside of the home, gender-related tensions and abuse have 
often been exacerbated by the presence of alcohol, in the Falklands and 
elsewhere. West highlights the relationality of ‘liquour and libido’ in another 
part of the British Empire, Southern Rhodesia, where ‘cross-gender drinking’ 
at beer halls proved problematic for African husbands who ‘sought to control 
the sexuality of their wives by keeping them away from the beer halls’ (West 
1997 p, 645); he later notes that ‘control of women’s reproduction’ (West 1997 
p, 659) became another area for patriarchal focus. Smith  (in Cloke et al 2005, 
p. 26) also highlighted, with reference to Pratt and Hanson (1994), that 
‘organisation of space … plays a role in constructing social difference’. In the 
predominately male-dominated spaces of the colony of the Falklands, 
particularly in Camp where the female presence was highly limited, gender 
roles and gendered practices were reinforced by the spatial organisation of 
work and recreation, be that in Camp sheep shearing sheds or Stanley’s 
public houses, serving to feed into the aforementioned types of gendered 
behaviour. 
 
Race holds purchase as another significant aspect, of the thesis. 
Representations of the racial homegenity of the Falklands provide an 
important dimension to how Islanders represented themselves to, and were 
seen by, others. In relation to the racial dimension, the February 1968 
statement to Parliament and the Press from the four unofficial members of 
ExCo councillors petition to parliament, presented Islanders’ white European 





notes how the positionality of this claim in the then contemporary debate 
about how Britain was becoming an increasingly multi-racial society: 
 
 By 1968 British discussions of race and nationalism were imbued with 
 references to national belonging and the character of British society …..[In 
 the Falklands] Unlike  Britain, the Councillors were arguing that Britain did not 
 have a ‘racial problem’ because ‘race’ was something that applied to 
 other people’.   
 
The essentialisation of white Britishness as a key feature of Islanders spoke 
to many white Britons that the Islanders were ‘us’ rather than some disruptive 
foreign ‘other’. In this era of decolonisation, the idea that there was (still) a 
white, British-based, Commonwealth community which Britons could be 
connected to, endured, not least in migration to settler states such as 
Australia and New Zealand, a point which Schwarz (2011, p.60) has 
highlighted in his assessment that ‘The presence of migration to the white 
colonies, both actual and desired, marks an important dimension of the 
postwar experience in metropolitan Britain’. Irrespective of the mismatch 
between the idea that white British emigration was desirable but Asian and 
Afro-Caribbean emigration to Britain was not, the framing of a lawful white 
British Falklands provided a powerful narrative in contemporary British 
politics. The Falklands invoked an enduring sentiment of the white imperial 
Briton, which implied that Britons were part of a wider Commonwealth world. 
Beaumont (2019, p.400) has outlined how this the affective experience of 
being a British imperial, subject had felt to many Australians during the First 
World War, who ‘embraced an identity in which there was no contradiction in 
their being simultaneously Australian and British. Rather, as imperial citizens 
and British subjects, they gloried in the ‘race patriotism.  
 
One can see how this ‘race patriotic’ identity of the loyal, white Briton 
continued in the slow emergency era Falklands, with the cause of ‘keeping the 
Falklands British’ mobilising similar sentiments in the United Kingdom itself, 
the clarity of preserving this homogenous white British-descended population 






Contemporary theoreticisation of race recognises it social construction; 
Glassmann (2010, p.57) explains how race is understood in critical geography 
‘Critical geographers work within the schools of social theory that regard race 
as a powerful and irreducible social construct (eg, Hall, 1980; Omi and 
Winant, 1986; Gilroy, 1991; 2000)’. Hanafi (2016, p.365) is particularly critical 
of how race has traditionally been understood in geography, citing the 
‘discipline’s over-reliance on a scientific/empirical approach to the issue of 
race and negligence of socio-historical explanations, its parochial conception 
of race, and its white-dominated racial composition’.  
 
In moving towards a more critical and holistic understanding of what race 
involves, a discourse that takes into account the socio-political meanings of 
the body is needed. Tolia Kelly (2016 p.363) invites us to see ‘the body ..[as] 
the site of the politicization of difference …… Questions of race, identity and 
‘other’ bodies fuel our contemporary lived environments and world politics. As 
can be seen from the invocation of whiteness on behalf of the Falkland cause, 
politicised perceptions of ‘the racial body’ make a difference to narratives. 
Similarly, the spatial dimension of race needs to be recognised as more than 
a bodily space; Kobayashi and Peake (2000, p.362) argue that ‘Racialization 
is part of the normal, and normalized landscape’, whilst Glassman (2010, 
p.508) highlights the view that that ‘space is also produced racially’, citing 
Pulido’s 2006 study of Los Angeles as one example of this. In a similar vein, 
Tolia-Kelly (2016, p.363) highlights socio-economic implications of the 
relationality between race and space, such that: ‘racial stratification and 
economic mobility have been deeply correlated with the spatial distribution of 
the population.’ In considering the Falklands as a racialised space, it is clear 
that the remoteness and literal insularity of the Islanders helped preserve 
‘British’ ethnicity, as well as ensuring (for most Islanders) limited economic 
opportunities. The vulnerability, indeed precarity, of the Falklands as British 
racialised space deserves to be seen as a key feature of the slow emergency 
era. The fragile racial composition of the Falkland Islander community is 
recognised in Dodds’ assessment: ‘as the [1966] Condor [hi-jacking] incident 
had demonstrated, the sea did not always provide a natural defence against 






2.12 Affect, Performance and Visuality 
Affect is an important element in understanding the Falkland Islander 
experience in the slow emergency era, even influencing behaviours, 
interactions and responses within the community. As Dittmer (2010, p.91) 
explains affect is a sensation that is linked to the environment; he outlines 
how ‘affect means, in an academic sense, sensation that is linked to the 
environment, which may be can be biological or relational’. In the former case, 
affect can be understood as ‘the connection between the social/cultural world 
and the biological realm of our bodies’, and in the latter case, is seen as less 
biological, focused instead primarily on the relationships between people, or 
people and objects (Dittmer 2010, pp.91-2). Carter and McCormack (in 
Macdonald et al, 2019, p107) take a holistic view, explaining ‘affect  (sic) can 
be understood as a kind of turbulent background field of relational intensity, 
irreducible to and not containable by any single body or object’. Pile (2009. 
P.17) has vigorously challenged how affect is re-presented and represented in 
affectual  geography, arguing that seeking to communicate ‘smiles, laughter, 
jokes or hope, anger, shame and so on…. and in language’ is a contradiction 
in terms, and is ‘straightforward hypocrisy’.  Such a critique assumes that 
affect is re-presented and represented.  
It is, however, the case, that affect may not be communicated. Take, for 
example, ‘the affectual geographies of humour’ (Dodds and Kirby 2013, p.53) 
in which they refer to laughter and Billig’s (2005) notion of unlaughter (Dodds 
and Kirby 2013, p.48), in which an individual’s sensation of laughter, and the 
bodily urge to express this, is suppressed in order to avoid unwelcome 
consequences. This helps highlight that while affective sensation may be 
outwardly expressed by individuals, it may not be; nor should assumptions be 
made about how, when (if) laughter is expressed, it is affectually received. 
Dittmer (2011 p.511) cautions that ‘We should not assume the effects of 
humour from the content of humour’. In essence, however widely it is 
circulated, if at all, the affect experienced by individual/s is still felt by them, 





In the Falklands, affect, and the responses it engendered (whether expressed 
or not), were intimately interwoven into the practices and discourses of 
Islander life. It is important too to signal the relationality affect has with space, 
not least in a territorial dispute. Laketa (2016, p.680) addresses this, drawing 
our attention to how ‘a focus on the spatiality of affect and emotions enhances 
our understanding of “how certain bodies stick to certain places” in ways that 
might undermine or enable peace-building’. Affective sentiments about their 
insular home (in both meanings of the word), underpinned Islanders’ 
resistance to Argentine territorial aspiration; self-evidently, as the slow 
emergency period demonstrated, the expressed desire by many Islanders to 
‘stick together’ with the Islands, was a key factor in frustrating Anglo-Argentine 
diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute. 
 
Performance and visuality, to varying degrees, depending on the particular 
context, interconnect with affect; in the case of the Falklands, performance 
and visuality were necessary for this remote community to communicate to a 
wider British audience what they affectively felt about wanting to remain 
British subjects. Performance, as ‘the study of embodied practice’ (Griffin and 
Evans 2008, p.10), brings to the fore the performer and his/her ‘cultural store 
of expressive longings, sometimes explicitly articulated, sometimes ….left 
unsaid’ (Thrift  in Duncan et al, 2007, p.129).  
As Craggs and Mahony (2014 p. 415) have argued, conferences provide ‘a 
visible stage on which delegates can perform their legitimacy’, highlighting the 
importance of visuality ‘in the demonstration of political ideas and identities’’; 
conferences, they argue, create ‘sites for the negotiation and performance of 
consensus, but also of dissensus and protest – by both the delegates and 
activists outside of the formal conference programme’ (Craggs and Mahony 
2014 p.426). Evidence of the strength of Craggs and Mahony (2014) case for 
the significance of the ‘visible stage’ can be seen in the 1968 Chalfont 
ministerial visit; this served to create a publicly visual opportunity for the 
politically vulnerable Islanders to be seen together asserting their British 
identify. Militz and Schurr (2016, p.61) have argued that ‘national community 





of ‘British-ness’ on a public stage designed to engender a response of 
affective solidarity in fellow Britons. Bright (2017, p.557) refers to; 
  Homi Bhabha’s argument that nations need to create a shared history, 
 which gives them a shared ideology and legitimacy, a sense of “deep, 
 horizontal comradeship.” It cements who “us” is, that feeling of groupness, 
 and who is excluded. That history has to be constantly performed to maintain 
 that groupness.  
A highly visual expression ‘groupness’ amongst Islanders was evident in 
Chalfont’s public walk from Stanley’s jetty with Governor Haskard, one in 
which Britishness ‘truly’ belonged to those who resistant to a territorial transfer 
of the Islands to the ‘Argentine Other’; further, it can be seen as an affective 
performance of insecurity. Bright (2017, p.554) argues that ‘insecurity meant 
that there was a constant need to reassert dominance through an “us” versus 
“them” performance’. The empirical case she refers to is the practice of some 
settler colonists in early twentieth century South Africa collecting Chinese 
scalps as trophies; in the case of the slow emergency Falklands of 1968, 
Islander insecurity and othering of Argentina was particularly driven by their 
struggle for the colony’s survival, so that it did not become (to subvert the 
example) a metaphorical scalp for Argentina. 
Shimazu’s description of the importance of the performance of a high profile 
geopolitical walk holds particular purchase here; he describes the significance 
of the Freedom or Merdeka Walk at the 1955 Bandung Conference  
 for our purpose of understanding the power of performance in international 
 diplomacy. It acted as a crucial form of non-verbal communication between 
 the leaders and the crowd, its symbolic meaning reaching out even to 
 audiences globally who observed this performance through the media 
 (Shimazu, 2013 p. 247) 
Whereas the Bandung Merdeka Walk was a performance of inclusion, the 
Stanley Walk was one in which Islanders visually protested against (what was 
felt to be) Chalfont’s efforts to exclude (and extinguish) their colony from the 
British community, affectively mobilising the symbols of their imperiled British 
identity such as the union jack. Further, Shimamzu (2013, p. 247) states: 
 ‘‘Walk’, ‘wave’, ‘smile’ are all integral components of non-verbal 
 communication…….physical movements speak out to the people as non-





 between the leaders and the people. 
Unlike in this example from Shimazu (2013), a ‘shared space’ may not 
necessarily be a comfortable one; as captured in photographs of the walk of 
Chalfont’s bodily discomfiture and Islanders protesting, such a space may 
become a site of uncomfortable performance. Performance may, however, 
prove to be more positive than expected as an experience for both parties, 
such as when, at the 1979 Lusaka Commonwealth Conference, an evening 
dance between Zambian President Kaunda and British Prime Minister 
Thatcher resulted in a more positive relationship, seen by conference 
participants and non-participants, in the latter case through photographs in 
contemporary media. Not only did this episode serve to highlight the 
importance of public performance of identities at conferences, but  ‘the dance 
as staged performance, and its representation in text and image, helped to 
assure particular readings of the geopolitical event adhered in later narratives 
about the conference (Craggs 2014, p.50).  
Tuathail’s (1990) dissection of ‘ocularcentrism’ highlights the emphasis given 
to visuality in geopolitical narration, though MacDonald (2006, p.69) posits 
that this insufficiently recognises ‘geopolitical agency [as]….the active 
character of observant practice (which is situated, embodied and connective 
with other sensory registers) is itself lost’. For the purposes of this thesis, the 
nature and practices of journalistic photography, not least in the Falklands in 
latter 1968, deserve to be considered, offering as it does the (then) 
geopolitical gaze of Fleet Street. Hughes (2007, p.980) addresses the 
‘backstory’, practices and purposes of this type of visual culture, which can 
capture, and provoke, affective sentiment: 
 Photography guaranteed a (visual) recollection of the past that was far 
 more exacting, (apparently) objective, transmissible and manipulable than 
 private remembrance….. While some photojournalists worked to expose 
 otherwise under examined places, conflicts and suffering, much 
 photojournalism suffered the  same ‘fixed spectatorial position’ as earlier 
 visual technologies in its readiness to show the world back to a select 
 audience within dominant nation-states in ways that conformed with extant 
 geopolitical scripts. 
In sum, affect, performance and visuality often interlink, helping to establish, 







Chronopolitical understandings play an important part in the thesis.  Within 
contemporary discourse surrounding the Falkland Islands, temporal framings 
permeate practices and language. Slow emergency draws on the work of 
Nixon (2012) and Adey and Anderson (2013), and its relationality to 
temporalities essential to the concept, as unpacked previously in this chapter. 
In the Slow emergency era, bookended by its periodisation by the 1964 flight 
and the 1982 conflict, chronopolitical framings feature consistently. Certain 
contemporary framings operated in a temporally backward looking way, such 
as when Islanders invoked past certainties of their post 1833 history as a 
British colony, in contrast with the unwelcome uncertainty of the slow 
emergency present; others framings look forward temporally, offering different 
conceptions of the future, be that territorial incorporation into Argentine or a 
continuance of the Islands as a British territorial entity.  
Throughout the slow emergency period, time becomes politicised, be that in 
the 1971 Communications Agreement in which it was thought that over time 
Islanders would increasingly see their future as Argentine, or in the 1980 
leaseback initiative which envisaged a time-limited period of British 
administration in the event of the Islands being ceded to Argentina. Norum 
and Mostafanezhad’s (2016) focus on the importance of perceptions of 
authenticity and temporality holds particular purchase in the Falkland context; 
the following observation, whilst made about tourism, offers a much broader 
relevance, since they help highlight how chronopolitical understandings affect 
perceptions of what is authentic: ‘Perceptions of authentic others, whether 
human or non-human, from other times and other places, are powerful agents 
of othering and of legitimizing such others as sites of touristic value and 
attention’ (Norum and Mostafanezhad, p.158, 2016). 
Depending on chronopolitical readings of authenticity in the Falklands, the 
discovery and naming of the Islands, commemorations, and their settlement 





narratives validated or invalidated according to how their respective 
legitimacies are perceived. 
Within chronopolitics, the relationality of time and place has been a source of 
much discussion, notably in respect of Virilio’s ‘hyper-modern’ thesis with its 
‘emphasis on speed, logistics and a radical restructuring of warfare and 
society itself: the move from geo- to chronopolitics’ (Klinke 2012, p.685). 
Klinke strongly makes the case  ‘Contra Virilio’ (2012, p.685), disagreeing with 
the premise that the politics of time can be made distinct from those of space. 
He instead argued: 
 that time and space are to be approached not as separate phenomena but 
 as intimately interwoven categories ….it is therefore best to think of 
 chronopolitics as a discursive structure that  operates inside rather than 
 outside of geopolitical narratives (2012, p.685). 
Whist Kaiser (2015, p.167) acknowledges Virilio’s contribution to the 
discussion on the politics of time as ‘an avowed political resource’, he remains 
persuaded by the thesis’ assumption that time is invariably a source of contest 
amongst political actors; ‘It provides an understanding of the fact that various 
actors fight for this  resource, try to exploit and diminish it, but it  does not 
account for the less polemical facets of everyday politics (Kaiser 2015, p.168) 
In the specific case of the Falklands, a space where the politics of time have 
been so conspicuous as a (de)legisitiming factor, and where chronopolitics is 
hardwired into place names and performance, the politics of time and space 
are self-evidently mutually entwined. Interestingly, in relation to Agnew’s work, 
Klinke notes how space is often geopolitically organised into ‘blocks with the 
help of often binary temporal attributes into ‘modern’, ‘backward’, ‘primitive’ 
and ‘advanced’ spaces’ (Klinke 2015, p.677). When one considers how 
chronopolitical terms such as ‘backward’, ‘feudal’, and ‘Victorian were used to 
frame the Islands, one is struck by how such understandings were used by 
politicians and officials to create narratives about the desirability of future 
geopolitical change. 
Applying temporal pressure as a means to persuade Islanders that change 





tension was done not only through verbal narratives but economically 
convenient British government inaction. Whilst Islanders waited to see what 
was going to be the ‘next development’ in their faltering colony, the urgent 
attention was needed to arrest/reverse the Islands socio-economic decline 
was largely left unattended (as the non-implementation of the 1976 
Shackleton Report illustrates).  
The chronopolitical ‘theory’ behind the 1971 Communications Agreement to 
was that Islanders would progressively opt for an Argentine future was 
effectively an inversion of a more usual process such as that Olson (2015, 
p.523) described; ‘Waiting can be productive or unproductive for radical 
praxis, but urgency compels and requires response’. Chronopolitical 
manipulation of treatment of the Islanders, as per the 1971 Communications 
Agreement bid to wean the Islanders off their British connection, implied that 
they were remote and marginal enough to be made to wait, effectively 
consigned to a temporal ‘internal exile’ of waiting, urgency only entering the 
equation in Whitehall in early 1982, when the Argentine junta itself grew tired 
of waiting. 
An interesting contrast to the Islanders’ waiting experience in the slow 
emergency period can be found in the waiting pressures on exiled Tibetans in 
north India. McConnell (2011) relates how waiting pressures have led to some 
disparagement of efforts made by the Tibetan Government in Exile to develop 
welfare programmes, which have been criticised as they 
 over-prioritised the welfare needs of the exile population at the expense of 
 the freedom struggle and the ultimate aim of returning to Tibet. As a 
 student in Majnuka Tilla, Tibetan colony in Delhi put it: ….There is too 
 much time wasting going on here. Our people shouldn’t be owning 
 buildings, restaurants here – this isn’t our country (McConnell 2011, p.12). 
This reflects how even if authorities are seriously trying to improve socio-economic 
conditions, which self-evidently not the case in the slow emergency Falklands, the 
pressures of waiting can be divisive, and this is also reflected, to varying degrees 
and with different intensities, in the Islander experience of the Slow Emergency 
period. The phrase ‘Time wasting’ appears an apt way to describe how the 
chronopolitical pressures of the slow emergency Falklands worked out, both for 





governments, neither of whom saw the ‘longer game’ of chronopolitical manipulation 





3 Chapter Three – Methods and Sources 
 
3.1      Research pursued and challenges presented 
 
The research undertaken was conceived in order to provide an original 
understanding of the experience of the micro-community of the Falkland 
Islanders, through mobilising empirical material and theoretical 
understandings which offer a fundamentally new framing for understandings 
of the Falklands. It specifically seeks to draw on the Falkland Islanders’ 
experience, and unpack how this relates, and adds, to the theoretical concept 
of emergency.   
 
The positionality of this project combines respect for, and empathy with, the 
Islander community, with an openness to understand the undoubted 
challenges of living in the Islands. The thesis takes no position on the ongoing 
sovereignty dispute concerning the Islands; this said, my own perspective on 
the question of territorial possession of the Islands is that this is a matter best 
left for the Islanders, rather than external state actors or supra-national 
organisations, to decide. In this sense with the positionality of the thesis is 
reflective of my own perspective, with its emphasis on the importance of the 
role of Islanders.  
 
In particular, I seek to give voice and agency to Islanders as a community in 
their own right, so challenging narratives of the Islanders as peripheral and 
incidental. The thesis speaks as it finds, and while this often means it is 
empathetic in its approach, it is also unsentimental about the Islander 
experience in the period up the 1982 Conflict. It is intentionally focused on 
developments in - and concerning - the Islands, and understandings of these, 
as articulated by both Islanders and contemporary observers such as 
journalists, experts, politicians and expatriates. The beating heart of this 
project lies in Stanley rather than in Whitehall. Such an Islander based 
approach does not denote or presuppose an uncritical eye by this author; it 
instead represents a conscious effort to rebalance and reframe our 
understanding of Islanders’ experiences in this era. In repositioning Islanders 





insights as key aspects of the Islanders’ experience in this critical period 
leading up to 1982 are unpacked and revealed. 
 
This project’s aim of engaging with the Islander voice and experience has its 
genesis in early 1984 when I spent several months in the Falklands as part of 
a ‘gap year’ prior to university. This was soon after the 1982 Conflict, and a 
number of books from that time had stimulated my interest. One in particular 
had caught my interest, namely ‘Authors take sides on the Falklands’ (and 
Moorcroft Wilson 1982), which had highlighted the striking and sometimes 
polarised range of perspectives on the Falklands as a (then) contemporary 
issue. The contested discourse within ‘Authors take sides on the Falklands’ 
provided a thought-provoking platform for the views of those who did, and did 
not believe, that the Falkland Islands and their people were worth fighting for. 
An example of the debate in the volume which developed my interest can be 
found in Roald Dahl’s argument that; 
 
 In 1939 we were all prepared to risk our skins to fight against aggression. 
 Today excessive socialism seems to gave bred a flabby and idle breed of 
 people who would rather compromise than fight. I would fight. Thank 
 goodness there are still some left who would do the same’ (Dahl in Woolf and 
 Moorcroft Wilson 1982 p.26). 
 
A counter-example can similarly be found in (the aforementioned) cartoonist 
Raymond Briggs’ response, in which he posed a number of questions about 
the Islands and their inhabitants, positing a clear overall answer; 
 
 If the Falkland Islands are so important to the British, it would be interesting 
 to know why the Falkland Islanders lost their nationality under the 1981 Bill; 
 why they are not entitled to a British pension; why they all get their major 
 education in Argentina; and also, if the Argentine regime is so bad, how is it 
 that several thousand British people chosen to live there? If the regime is so 
 corrupt, why have the British been selling them arms and training their service 
 men?   
 This issue was not worth the sacrifice of a single life 
 (Briggs in Woolf and Moorcroft Wilson 1982 pp.113-4). 
 
It struck me that Falklands were being discussed more as a ‘political football’ 
than as an established place and community in its own right. Other Falkland-
related literature from the time which further encouraged my interest included 





(Dalyell 1982) and ‘Iron Britannia’ (Barnett 1982). Having read much on the 
subject, it was increasingly apparent that such accounts largely narrated ‘The 
Falklands’ as a ‘war’ or a ‘political issue’, rather than focus on views and 
experiences of the Islander community, which for me lay at the heart of a 
deeper understanding of Falkland related issues. Aware of this incomplete 
picture, I thought it would be interesting to learn more about the Islands and 
its people during my ‘gap year’, and so in the hope that this might lead to the 
opportunity to visit the Islands, I contacted the Falkland Islands Office, which 
led to several months work in the in the civilian Stanley Post Office, alongside 
the BFPO also operating from the same building.  
 
The Stanley Post Office provided an excellent opportunity for me to 
experience aspects of life in the Islands first hand. The Post Office on Ross 
Road was a social hub for Stanley residents, who would come into collect 
their mail from individual post boxes, as well as indirectly for Camp residents 
whose mail would be collected by FIGAS pilots and distributed to the various 
settlements across the archipelago. My duties included preparing mail to go to 
the different Camp settlements, which in a short space of time meant I had 
acquired a clear sense of the geography of the Islands, and the respective 
size of the settlements.  
 
Through my work in the Stanley Post Office, I soon experienced and became 
part of Island life. Through renting a room in the house of Mrs. Ada Watts in 
Davis Street, Stanley, I was able to live within the Islander community, who 
was a kind and generous host. Living and working in Stanley led to many 
conversations with Islanders about their views from the prosaic, such as the 
post-conflict potholes in Stanley’s concreted roads and the availability of food 
items, to the profound, such as concerns about a future Argentine invasion (it 
should be noted too that a number of Islanders then had to cope as best they 
could with what today would be recognised as the symptoms of Post-
traumatic stress disorder, PTSD).  
 
Listening to the Falkland Islands Broadcasting Service (FIBS) alongside the 





gain insights into how the world, both locally and internationally, was sonically 
presented to, and understood by, Islanders. One also heard broadcasts on 
then FIBS of passenger lists of who was arriving and departing from the 
Islands, as well as travelling by air between Stanley and the Camp, and within 
the Camp itself; in this way, mobilities were widely known. Similarly, the 
Falkland Islands Government operated Radio-Telephone system enabled 
Island residents, myself included, to hear messages often of a personal 
nature broadcast across the Islands as these would interject across the 
airwaves. 
 
The emphasis on the importance of the Islander community, which is central 
to the positionality of this thesis, stems from this first hand experience of living 
and working within the Islander community, an experience which also gave 
me numerous insights into the challenges of life in the Islands. Of the latter, a 
couple of instances are salient, the first being a kind invitation from Sally and 
Tim Blake to stay a week at Hill Cove on West Falkland. This visit enabled me 
to experience settlement life first hand, with the warmth of the community, 
elemental vicissitudes (such as a sudden storm on Mount Adam) and an 
affective sense of being in a geographically remote location among the 
abiding memories. The second, and still very memorable instance, was 
seeing the fire at Stanley’s King Edward Hospital on 10 April 1984 in which 
eight people died. In the days immediately afterwards, this tragic episode 
powerfully demonstrated the closeness of the Islander community as 
Islanders rallied around; it also brought home, even in Stanley, the potential 
vulnerability and fragility of life in the Islands.  
 
I felt privileged to have been part of the Falkland community in 1984, and 
these formative experiences stayed with me over the years, and I had in mind 
that someday, drawing on both my subsequent experience of tertiary 
education and my time in the Islands, I might seek to write academically about 
the Islands. It was when I was working in Singapore from 2002-2016 that I 






There was a moment which acted as a spur for me to embark on this thesis. It 
was on a visit to the Sembawang district in the north of Singapore in 2009 
where I saw Falkland Road (once home to British officers and their families), 
one of a number named after British colonies. This road, with its direct, 
visualised connection between Singapore and the Falklands as part of an 
erstwhile British Imperial network, prompted me to reflect on my time in the 
Islands, and to re-visit the Falklands as an area of academic interest.  
 
It was no coincidence that I began this academic journey in another small 
island territory; as with the Falkands, Singapore sits somewhat uncomfortably, 
even precariously, in its immediate geographical region. As the possibility of 
incorporation by Argentina remains an enduring geopolitical concern amongst 
Falkland Islanders, so too in Singapore the possibility of a takeover by 
Malaysia or even Indonesia is not taken lightly. Living in Singapore, one is 
presented with frequent reminders of invasion, such as an extensive network 
of museums, sites and memorials connected with the 1942-5 Japanese 
invasion and occupation, and the ubiquity of National Service, which gives 
Singapore significant military manpower to resist an invasion (until assistance 
arrives from the United States or other friendly states).  
 
The similarities between Singapore, and the Falklands in the twentieth 
century, became increasingly apparent, with both island territories having 
experienced first hand invasion from an external power. In the case of 
Singapore this came in 1942, and in the Falklands, forty years later in 1982. 
Whilst both cases are distinct, certain similarities can be discerned; in both 
territories after a dramatic and humiliating initial displacement of the British 
colonial authorities, the territorial status quo ante bellum eventually ended up 
restored, notwithstanding the respective Japanese and Argentine efforts to 
the contrary.  
 
In re-visiting Falklands-related literature, I was hoping to learn more about the 
Islanders’ experience, but it soon became apparent that as in the 1980s, 
Islanders were not accorded a central role, the first volume of Freedman’s 





rarely heard. It has been noted that “Historians of the British Empire have 
largely ignored the Antarctic” (Jones 2014 p.857), and it became evident that 
a similar neglect of the Islanders’ role and experience endures, not least in 
respect of developments in the Falklands community prior to the 1982 
Conflict.  
 
Professor Dodds’ Pink Ice (2002), with its real interest in the Islanders, proved 
a welcome exception to this marginalization of the Islander’s role, further to 
which I contacted him about the possibility of writing a thesis on the subject. 
The encouraging response I received from Professor Dodds led me to embark 
on this project (part-time), with support and guidance from both himself and 
Dr. Alasdair Pinkerton at Royal Holloway, and further assistance from 
Professor James Sidaway and Assistant Professor Dr Woon Chih Yuan at the 
National University of Singapore. 
 
In respect of the period stretching from the mid 1960s to the early 1980s, this 
research project therefore consciously set out to remove the Falkland Islands 
and its people from the dominant framing of the 1982 Conflict, and reposition 
the Islanders’ experience as central rather than peripheral to the research. In 
seeking to provide Islanders with more prominence than they have previously 
been afforded, it was important to take advantage of whatever original 
material was available which articulated Islander sentiments. The finite 
amount of sources available meant that, where appropriate, important content 
is intentionally deployed at some length, including through the use of longer 
quotations and photographic records. As an example of the former, Islanders’ 
letters published in local newsletters are, at times, cited through the use of 
longer quotations, and visual material is also often deployed, for example the 
mobilisation of the Union Jack as a symbol of loyal protest. Using such key 
primary source material helps fulfill the thesis’ aim of giving voice to the 
Islanders in the period up to 1982, repositioning them to a central role in our 
understanding of this period. 
 
Theoretically, emergency became key to this research project. The Falkland 





Committee, was formed in 1968 to frustrate the British government’s then 
initiative to arrange a sovereignty transfer of the Islands to Argentina through 
a Memorandum of Understanding. The term ‘emergency’ not only reflected 
the perceived exigencies of the time, but also drew on the widespread use of 
the term in recent British conflicts in the post-World War Two era of 
decolonisation, which were either recent or contemporaneous, notably 
Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Rhodesia. Emergency thus not only has a 
particular contextual and empirical relevance to the Falklands, but it is a 
theoretical term which has received much new attention through the work of 
scholars such as Anderson and Adey (2012, 2015). Emergency became the 
natural theoretical focus for this research, offering a valuable means to 
understand the Falklands ‘emergency’ and to test emergency conceptually.  
In the iterative processes of unpacking how emergency related to the 
Falklands conceptually, it became increasingly clear that the speed of 
emergency was a vital factor. Nixon’s Slow Violence (2011) was key in 
helping me to address this, leading me to put forward and interrogate ‘slow 
emergency’ as a concept for understanding developments in the Falkland 
Islands. 
 
In unpacking ‘slow emergency’, the research became focused on four main 
areas of investigation, namely socio-economic, the body, three-dimensionality 
and political. The research has consciously sought to understand Islanders as 
actors in their own right, however much ‘structures’ circumscribed their 
agency. Similarly, the role of slow emergency in shaping, and being shaped 
by, Islanders will also be examined. Through unpacking the Islanders’ socio-
economic and political experience, and critically opening up the body and 
three-dimensionality for interrogation, the research seeks to offer original 
interpretations of the Falkland Islands in the period prior to the 1982 Conflict. 
  
For this project to be viable, research in the Falklands was a sine qua non. 
Professor Dodds wrote to Sukey Cameron, the Falkland Islands Government 
Representative in London about my planned research, whom I then contacted 
and subsequently met at the Falkland Islands Office, in Westminster, in March 





Government support was secured, without which this research project would 
have been simply impractical. Sukey Cameron was most encouraging, and 
also informed me about the Shackleton Scholarship Foundation, chaired by 
former Falkland Governor, David Tatham. I subsequently applied for a 
scholarship to visit the Islands, and was awarded funds to do so in April 2012. 
Being able to undertake research in the Islands was a remarkable opportunity, 
enabling me to carry out research ‘on the ground’. A grant from the 
Shackleton Scholarship Foundation provided me with the financial support to 
fly to the Islands, with Falkland Islands Office also arranging a subsidised rate 
for me on the UK-Falklands ‘Air Bridge’ form RAF Brize Norton, Oxfordshire to 
RAF Mount Pleasant Airport. 
 
Sukey Cameron also put me in touch with former Falklands Governor and 
former President of the Falkland Islands Association, Sir Cosmo Haskard, and 
his wife Lady Haskard, who would be very important sources for this project. I 
was able to undertake two visits to their home in Bantry, Ireland, in July 2011 
and July 2012 to interview them about their time in the Falklands, as well as in 
Malawi (Nyasaland), when it was part of the Central African Federation; in 
both cases, the Haskards had experienced periods of emergency. The 
Haskards were generous with their assistance, and provided valuable content 
for this project, notably interviews and photographs from their private archive. 
During the writing of this thesis, Sir Cosmo sadly passed away (February 
2017 at the age of 100); this, I believe, adds further to the importance of the 
research undertaken with the Haskards at Bantry, a research opportunity 
which now no longer exists. 
 
In pursuing a research project with a specific, empirical focus on the Falkland 
Islander experience, it was essential to be able to access the Islander ‘voice’, 
both in terms of accessing rarely accessible contemporary newsletters and 
speaking with Islanders. The logistics of conducting the research in these 
remote South Atlantic islands was complex, with the additional complication 
that I was then working in Singapore. Assistance from the Falkland Islands 
Office made the whole process very manageable, and in October 2012, I flew 





Brize Norton where I connected with the weekly 20-hour long ‘Air Bridge’ to 
Mount Pleasant Airport, East Falkland (Fig. 3.1). As can be seen in Fig 3.1 
this journey included a stopover (for refuelling) at the British overseas territory 
of Ascension Island, the mid-way point of the Royal Air Force (RAF) ‘Air 
Bridge’ linking Britain and the Falkland Islands, via Ascension Island. In this 
way, the journey to the Falklands can be seen an Atlantic archipelagic 




















Reaching Mount Pleasant Airport on East Falkland therefore marked the end 
point of an 8000-mile journey from the UK, which was followed by an hour-
long minibus transfer to Stanley (Fig. 3.2.) As Fig. 3.2 shows, the journey to 
Stanley is in close proximity to the Southern Ocean, with the Malvina House 
Hotel my destination, sited next to the sheltered waters of Stanley harbour. 
After the Upland Goose Hotel having closed in 2008, the Malvina House - its 
name a recognition of the Islands contested geopolitics - serves as Stanley’s 
Fig 3.1 Air Bridge 
from RAF Brize 
Norton, 














largest hotel, and along with Government House, fulfills the five key functions 
identified by Craggs (2012).  
 
Fig 3.2 The route from RAF Mount Pleasant to Stanley’s Malvina House Hotel 
 
Source: Google maps 
 
Of the qualitative methods employed during my visit to the Islands, recorded 
interviews and informal conversations were a particularly important means for 
gathering, and understanding, authentic Islander perspectives. The location of 
the Malvina House Hotel on Ross Road proved valuable in terms of meeting 
with Islanders. It is situated on Ross Road, Stanley’s main east-west road 
which runs alongside the harbour, and is in close proximity to the West Store 
(the Islands’ main supermarket) and Government House. It thus provided a 
convenient venue for many of the interviews and conversations that I had with 
Islanders. The oral histories resulting from these interviews proved 
consistently valuable, and could then be triangulated with other primary and 
secondary sources, such as letters and autobiographies, to scaffold a clear 






One Islander explicitly said to me that he trusted me to use what he said 
responsibly, and this was a common – and entirely understandable – 
sentiment that I encountered. There was a clear and generous willingness to 
help my understanding of the Islander experience in the period leading up to 
1982, but a discernible reluctance for words to be quoted directly did exist. In 
the numerically small community that the Islanders in, where there can be an 
immediate accountability for what is said, discretion in what is said is a 
prudent course; there is also the concern about who might read those words 
outside the Islands, including in Argentina, where comments made can be 
manipulated by a third party for political ends.  
 
For this reason, the thesis primarily uses the comments made as part of the 
aforementioned triangulation of evidence, with a conscious decision to be 
sparing in use of directly quoted oral content cited in this thesis. Importantly, 
the backgrounds of Stanley and Camp-based Islanders that I interviewed – 
from farming to building to education to aviation to journalism – gave me 
access to a cross-section of Islander society, one which was clearly 
representative of much of Islander society in the period prior to the 1982 
Conflict. Indeed, all the Islanders I spoke with in these conversations had 
been part of the Islander community prior to 1982, often very prominently as 
Islander leaders such as Councillors and Farm managers.  
 
Other key methods underpinning the research included obtaining access to, 
and then systematically reading through, print materials in the Jane Cameron 
National Archives in Stanley, with its extensive collection of contemporary 
Falklands newsletters, such as Falkland Islands Times, Falkland Islands 
Monthly Times and Penguin News; this was a unique opportunity, as it is the 
only research facility where such an extensive array of Falkland primary 
sources exists. In terms of securing access to materials, the Shackleton 
Scholarship Foundation award was most helpful as it gave me an ‘official’ 
academic introduction, and chief archivist Tansy Newman regularly liaised 
with me by email before my arrival, and was ever helpful once I was in the 
Archives. This enabled her to plan ahead with scheduling files for me to study 





to the Archives, time was used most productively, and I had access to the 
sources I needed whilst in the Islands. With no other researchers at the 
Archives during my visits, she was available to answer my questions 
whenever they arose, which also helped me to keep the research focused on 
the most relevant files, a vital consideration when my time in the Islands was 
so finite. 
 
This archival research enabled me to access generally complete runs of local 
publications, particularly the Falkland Islands Times, Falkland Islands Monthly 
Times and Penguin News files. They are rare records, both in the sense that 
not only were original print runs low in the first instance (a few hundreds), but 
also very few copies – and sometimes none – survived. It soon became clear 
that letters from contemporary local publications would be particularly 
important for unpacking the challenges of ‘Falkland life’. Correspondence in 
the Falkland Islands Times, Falkland Islands Monthly Times and Penguin 
News yielded not only a rich seam of hitherto neglected primary source 
material, but also helped me develop a growing understanding of how slow 
emergency was manifested in the Islands prior to 1982. I refer to these 
publications as newsletters; while they have many of the attributes of a 
newspaper, the limited scale and frequency of these publications means that 
newsletter is a more apt description, though it is clear in the unique context of 
the Falklands they functioned as a local newspaper. 
 
It came as no surprise to find that there were certain recurring themes in 
Islander epistolary anxiety in these newsletters about the future. These 
included Foreign Office ‘appeasement’ of Argentina’s sovereignty ambitions; 
frustration at colonial neglect; and concern about a variety of other issues 
including the impact of resident ‘non-Islanders’ (including Royal Marines and 
Argentinians), Islander emigration, and Falkland Islands monopolism. These 
themes can clearly be seen in the following chapters.  
 
Through studying these files, I was able to access articles, speeches and 
letters which were unobtainable elsewhere, and offered a unique and 





experiences.  As will be evidenced in subsequent chapters, the primary 
materials gained there proved invaluable to the research, enabling me to draw 
on many contemporary Islander voices in unpacking ‘slow emergency’ in the 
Falklands discourse, which invariably involved disappointment about the 
present, and anxiety about the future. 
 
As anticipated, the sources studied during my time in the Jane Cameron 
National Archives, notably the Falkland Islands Times, Falkland Islands 
Monthly Times and Penguin News, offered content which provided distinct 
and authentic Falkland points of view to me a researcher. One particular value 
of the contents of these newsletters was that the views expressed and 
experiences recorded stood exactly as originally published; unlike with the 
human memory, there was no risk of accounts becoming faded or distorted 
over time. Whilst a lack of impartiality in such primary material is a source 
limitation, this need not be overly problematic if the sources are read, and 
approached with, critical awareness; the reality is that the perspectives which 
feature in these publications are in themselves accurate evidence of views 
then present and circulating in the Falklands. 
 
As per my interactions with the Jane Cameron National Archives, for a 
researcher visiting the Islands undertaking the necessary preparations to 
engage with the Islander community is absolutely essential. The method that 
needs to be applied can be described as ‘preparing the ground’. As will 
already be evident, this was achieved with assistance from the Falkland 
Islands Government, financial support from the Shackleton Scholarship 
Foundation, and the connection with Sir Cosmo and Lady Haskard.  
 
The importance of undertaking pre-visit preparation should not be 
underestimated for researchers who wish to meaningfully engage with 
Islanders, who have become accustomed to treating visiting external actors 
such as academics and journalists with caution. I was also visiting at a 
sensitive time, with the policies of then Argentine President Cristina 
Fernandez de Kirchner widely perceived as hostile to the Falklands 





suspicion, amongst Islanders is, however, not a new phenomenon; illustrative 
of this point is a memorable passage from Velma Malcolm’s As Ignorant as 
Sheep (2002), which reveals much about the context an academic researcher 
in the Falkland Islands is likely to encounter in undertaking field work there. In 
this, Malcolm articulates perceptions and frustrations about external actors 
which are widely present within the Falkland community. I have italicised parts 
of the passage which are of particular significance: 
 
 As I finish writing this, it is already 2002 and the Falklands 20th anniversary of 
 its invasion by Argentina and many journalists and a few of the many TV 
 teams intending to visit have already called writing or voicing their usual 
 disparaging remarks about the Islands and Islanders […] I’m sorry for those 
 people who have already voiced opinions about why did we bother to come 
 and it’s just a windswept rocky outcrop inhabited by a few shepherds […] 
 Well people, we have a way of life which is the envy of however millions there 
 are in the world […] We have a much wider knowledge of world affairs than is 
 generally the case elsewhere. Even children at school are aware of world 
 affairs […] One last sentence, do not pity us, try living in the Falklands, or 
 even just think about it, you may end up envying us’ (Malcolm 2002, pp. 294-
 95). 
 
Essentially these sentiments articulate views that were shared with me in the 
course of my visit. Islanders did not wish to be dismissed, or described 
through ‘disparaging remarks’ (Malcolm 2002, p.294), as ill-informed 
backwoodsmen living on some inhospitable South Atlantic ‘rocks’, and wanted 
external actors to listen to their voices without prejudice. They did not want to 
be regarded or portrayed as ill informed, as the emphasis Malcolm places on 
Islanders’ knowledge of ‘world affairs’ makes clear (Malcolm 2002, pp.294-
95).  
 
Unpacked, behind Malcolm’s reference to the Falklands being an ‘enviable’ 
place to live (Malcolm 2002, pp.294-95), lies a belief in the value of the 
Falkland community and Islands. Researchers who are unaware of such 
Islander perceptions are unlikely to have as productive a dialogue as they 
might otherwise have achieved. Similarly, the Falkland community lives in a 
post (1982) war era, in which there is a ‘Cold Peace’ with Argentina, and 
Islanders continue to have very real concerns that interviews or conversations 
with them could be appropriated or manipulated for the purposes of advancing 





discretion in interviews, both within and outside of the Islands is a prudent 
course for Islanders, and researchers in the Falklands are well-advised to be 
aware of the context in which they are working, and mindful of Islander 
sensibilities and sensitivities. Interestingly As Ignorant as Sheep as a 
publication usefully highlights the challenges posed to a researcher in the 
Islands. Obtaining this important but privately published document was 
difficult as it had only been distributed within the Islands. After making 
numerous enquiries as to where I might find a copy, I was eventually able to 
obtain one in person from Velma Malcolm’s daughter and son-in-law, Aisla 
and Tony Heathman, whom I met at their home in Estancia, East Falkland in 
the course of fieldwork.  
. 
Falkland Islanders who met me did so knowing that my research project had 
already been positively received by the Falkland Islands Government and the 
Shackleton Scholarship Foundation; this was of great value in helping 
Islanders feel comfortable about sharing their perspectives and experiences in 
our interviews and conversations, both formally in the Malvina House Hotel, 
and informally. An announcement of my impending arrival was also publicly 
disseminated on 3 October 2012 to the wider Falkland community, through 
the medium of a Shackleton Scholarship Foundation press release to the 
locally read, but Montevideo based, English language website MercoPress 
(see Appendix B).  
 
 At no point was there ever a sense that this official help carried with it any 
expectation as to what I might write about the period from the mid-1960s prior 
to 1982. With my research being under the auspices of Professor Dodds at 
Royal Holloway, University of London, both Sukey Cameron and David 
Tatham as the ‘gatekeepers’ for my research visit to the Falklands, were very 
receptive to the project, seeing the academic value of a study of the Falklands 
in this era. Indeed, there was a widespread recognition amongst Falkland 
stakeholders that I met that this period from the mid 1960s to early 1982 had 







As a researcher in the Islands, it is ever important to be aware of historical 
context of the relationship with both Argentina and Britain, both within and 
beyond this period. In many ways the Argentine dimension was more 
straightforward; Argentina had aspired to territorially incorporate the Islands 
both before and after 1982, providing a continuity of objective, albeit one 
unwelcome to Islanders. Perceptions of Argentina among Islanders were 
inevitably framed by the experience of the 1982 Conflict, as they are in 
Stanley’s townscape, notably the 1982 Liberation Memorial, as well as street 
names such as Jeremy Moore Avenue and Margaret Thatcher Drive, the latter 
with its own Thatcher memorial bust.   
 
In contrast the relationship with Britain appears more complicated, and it 
became very apparent during the course of this research that Islanders’ 
experience with the ‘1982 Conflict Britain’ that recaptured the Islands, is not 
the same as with the ‘pre-Conflict Britain’, which neglected the Islands and 
discussed sovereignty with Argentina; ‘our dark years’ is how one Islander 
informally described this period to me, and is a subject that neither Islanders 
nor the British authorities today would prefer to dwell on.  
 
For this research, it was vital to unpack the everyday realities of the pre-
Conflict ‘slow emergency’ era for Islanders, which were no rural idyll. As will 
be evidenced in the thesis, the research uncovered many sources in local 
publications attesting to the hardness of life, so that the researcher is left with 
the impression that at least for some Islanders, daily existence felt like an 
oppressive sentence, comparable to living in a prison. One source I 
uncovered explicitly said this: ‘A Kelper (one of the pawns)’, an anonymous 
contemporary letter-writer to the Falkland Islands Times, likened the Islands 
to ‘A political prison for 2000 British subjects in the South Atlantic’ (Falkland 
Islands Times, 15 April 1977, p. 3). Whilst this is but one perspective from an 
individual who did not feel able to share his/her name in a public forum in this 
micro-community and was particularly exercised about mobilities, his/her view 
helps the researcher appreciate how keenly aspects of everyday emergency 






As the research unfolded, it became palpably clear that for Islanders of less 
social importance in Stanley or in the remoteness of Camp, this was an 
everyday existence of limited opportunities, mobilities and infrastructure, with 
no ‘Government House as Hotel’ to ease life. As also became apparent in the 
research, emigration was the obvious solution for Islanders who concluded 
quotidian conditions in the colony were too hard; the ensuing further 
depopulation of the colony resulting from such a choice gave Britain more 
leverage over remaining Islanders, in encouraging an accommodation with 
Argentina.  
 
In the research, it was important to consider how Falkland slow emergency 
was positioned in relation to other colonial emergencies. Whilst there was no 
formal declaration of emergency in the Falklands until the 1982 Argentine 
invasion, during this slow emergency period the experience of the ‘Islands as 
an affective prison’ appears to have existed, with the Islands’ geographical 
isolation effectively functioning as a territorial container of neglect.  
 
This was not the obvious type of imprisonment which characterised other 
British colonial emergencies, such as (say) that of the Kenya Emergency 
(1952-6). By 1956, in what has been termed ‘Britain’s Gulag’ (Elkins 2005), 
24,000 ‘detainees’ in thirty-nine camps and 8,400 convicts in twenty-one 
prisons (Dewar 1987, p.62) had been incarcerated; in contrast, this was a 
subtle ‘below the radar’ everyday emergency for a 2,000 strong community, 
the incarceration - for those who felt - it being of a geographical rather than 
legal nature. Numerous recollections - often poignant - of the toughness of 
this period remain within the Islander community, and helps the researcher 
appreciate that Islanders’ perceptions of British behaviour are more multi-
layered than a simple narrative of ‘1982 and all that’. 
.  
With so much to investigate whilst in the Islands, keeping a daily record of the 
visit was a vitally important method employed, from which the table below is 
constructed; this sets out the research schedule undertaken whilst in the 
Islands, as well as an overview of the Islanders whom I met, and in many 





constituted over 0.5% of the Islands’ population (16 people out of 2,932, the 
estimated total population in 2012). Details of the interviews conducted in the 
Falklands are set out in Appendix C; these ranged in length from one to two 
hours, and focused on the period of the slow emergency, excerpts of which 
are used in the following chapters. These conversations with Islanders also 
proved valuable in communicating the daily challenges that quotidian 
existence posed to Islanders in this period.   
 
As recorded in Appendix D, interviewees’ backgrounds provided a wide 
geographical coverage of the Islands; this was intentional to ensure that, 
within the limited time frame I had in the Islands, voices with first-hand 
experience of Stanley, the East Falkland Camp and West Falkland Camp 
respectively, were heard. Temporally it was necessary that the Islanders who 
were interviewed were living in the Falklands during the period of slow 
emergency, which meant that all were of mature and in some cases advanced 
years. Within the group, Camp farm managers were represented, as well as 
white and blue collar professionals from Stanley, so creating a cohort that was 
aware of, and familiar with, the broad spectrum of Falkland life during the 
period of slow emergency. While the Camp farming settlements were clearly 
represented, had time allowed and the opportunity been available, a former 
Camp farm worker would have also been a very welcome addition to this 
cohort.  
 
The wider temporal context of slow emergency, which necessitated a focus on 
a period which was between 30 and 45 years earlier, was potentially a 
concern, as interviewees were invited to recall experiences and perceptions 
which, inevitably, were no longer recent. However, the interviews in no small 
measure allayed this concern as interviewees’ recollections appeared 
credible, and proved consistent both with other interviewees and my wider 
research, especially in the Jane Cameron National Archives. 
 
Undertaking research in a small, geographically isolated community 
presented both opportunities and challenges. It enabled me, in a short space 





interviewees were able to suggest who else I might interview or have an 
informal conversation with, which meant that I was able to meet more 
Islanders than originally envisaged. I also had one other (probably unique) 
benefit in my Falklands research, namely my experience of working in the 
Stanley Post Office in 1984, and there were still a few Islanders, in particular 
Patrick Watts and Tim and Sally Blake, that recalled me from then. This 
meant that for me as a researcher I had some pre-existing contacts in the 
Islands, which proved helpful in helping me establish connections, and 
engage with, the wider Islander community.  
 
This context also gave me a better understanding of the community than if 
this 2012 research visit had been my first time in the Islands. Whilst it was 
from nearly three decades before, it nonetheless meant I did have an 
understanding of the sensitivities involved in undertaking the research, and 
was also aware of how information passes around quickly in this small 
community. When I had visited the Islands in 1984 information could be 
quickly passed on person to person via 2-metre sets, the ‘R/T’ (Radio 
Telegraph), and phone calls in Stanley which idiosyncratically required a 
variable number of rings to call the recipient. Alasdair Pinkerton’s Strangers in 
the Night; the Falklands Conflict as a Radio War (2007) gives a 
comprehensive overview of the communication technology then in use in the 
Islands. By way of contrast, in 2012 Islanders had access to the internet and 
mobile phones, but the operative point is that in both instances the technology 
of the day facilitated prompt dissemination of information throughout the 
Islands. 
 
The interviews and discussions I conducted with Islanders included some 
potentially controversial areas, such as how the Islanders were treated by the 
British authorities in the period from the mid 1960s to 1982 appear to have 
been positively received, as more Islanders offered to speak with me. My 
research interviews took place either at the Malvina House Hotel or in the 
homes of the interviewees. It should also be mentioned that however much of 
a particular interview I was ultimately able to use in this thesis, each interview 





triangulation with letters, histories and articles, to provide a deeper and 
clearer understanding of the research topic. These conversations increasingly 
confirmed the view that a less conventional approach, more focused on the 
Islanders’ everyday experience would be essential to better understand the 
Falklands in relation to emergency.  
 
Capturing Islanders’ contemporary political experience and perspectives was 
vital, dominated as these were by the Anglo-Argentine sovereignty dispute; it 
was, however, essential to capture other aspects of the slow emergency. 
Socio-economic pressures were an area demanding close attention, and lay 
at the heart of the slow emergency. Similarly, the importance of three-
dimensionality in the Falklands, including but not limited to Argentine aerial 
incursions, was also very apparent; it made little sense to regard the 
Falklands two-dimensionally as islands, when aerial vulnerably and sub-
marine resources, especially oil, all contributed to the slow emergency. 
Likewise, the role of bodies in the slow emergency also demanded a major 
focus; for such a micro-community, the (limited) number of bodies presents a 
particular challenge to the community’s practical and biological survival, with 
emigration and immigration having a potentially destabilising impact, whether 
in terms of an influx, or loss, of bodies.  
 
As was evident both in formal interviews, informal conversations and 
contemporary local newsletters, the loss of families and young people had 
been keenly felt by Islanders, a challenge which was exacerbated by the 
presence of several dozen Royal Marines stationed in the Islands; ostensibly 
there to help defend the population in the event of an Argentine invasion, 
while in practice they were siphoning off young female Islanders to the 
‘outside world’, the progressive and cumulative loss of their bodily presence a 
key feature of slow emergency. The chapters of this research project are 
therefore organised to reflect this quartet of political, socio-economic, three-
dimensional and bodily challenges. As will be demonstrated, any one of these 
had the potential to be the decisive element in slow emergency, and 
collectively were contributing to an attritional and ongoing demise of the 






A wide range of other sources were employed to develop this research 
project. Further interviews, such as with Islander Graham Bound and Joaqin 
Allolio, a Uruguayan who had worked in the Falklands during the period of 
slow emergency, were valuable in their corroboration of the profound 
challenges facing the Falklands at this time.  
 
As evidenced in the bibliography, a wide range of reading was undertaken, 
and primary sources such as The Times, Hansard and Panorama, a 
contemporary mass-circulation Argentine magazine which took a particular 
interest in the Malvinas question, were used.  The invitation of Professor 
James Sidaway at the National University of Singapore to present a paper on 
the Falklands and sovereignty to the PEAS (Politics, Economies and Space) 
group in January 2013, encouraged me to reflect on the nature and processes 
of the Falkland emergency, and what made it distinct. Similarly, a guest 
editorial I submitted in September 2013 to Political Geography about three-
dimensionality, entitled Geopolitics of Volumander – the Falklands/Malvinas 
and East Asian Island disputes, led me to reflect further on the relationality of 
different key areas of slow emergency to each other. 
 
The process of assembling literatures for ongoing study related to the Falkland 
Islands did not prove straightforward, owing to a relative paucity of sources on 
the period of the 1960s and 1970s. Inevitably the Falklands War of 1982 is the 
dominant strand of literature on the Islands, this ‘lens’ however serving to 
obscure important geopolitical and socio-economic developments taking place 
in the Falklands prior to 1982. Investigating the pre-Conflict period of slow 
emergency was a key motivation in writing this thesis, but crucially I wanted it 
to address and unpack the Islanders’ everyday, first hand experience. It was 
not intended to produce a more conventional, diplomatic-related account of 
the period such as Peter Beck’s The Falkland Islands as an international 







Owing to this relative lack of sources, it became important to fill some of the 
gaps by assembling evidence of different types of provenance. An important 
early example of this, and a key first stage in its own right, was to build up an 
overview of the formative period of 1964-1970 as I was due to meet Sir 
Cosmo and Lady Haskard in the initial stages of the project (July 2011). 
Research undertaken at Royal Holloway, University of London helped me 
gather empirical evidence about the Falklands during the period of Sir 
Cosmo’s gubernatorial incumbency. I therefore drew on a range of primary 
and secondary Falklands related literatures to put together the detailed 
overview which can be found in Appendix A. It was particularly helpful in 
providing me with a clear oversight of the sequencing of developments, in 
relation to each geopolitical actor (I am including the Falkland Islands in this 
description as both Governor Haskard and the Falkland Islands Councillors 
exercised degrees of agency, notwithstanding London’s wishes). It proved, as 
intended  a valuable resource in my discussions with Sir Cosmo and Lady 
Haskard; it also gained a further purpose, namely as a timeline for use by the 
Haskards themselves recording their time in the Falklands, and I provided a 
copy for their own private archive. 
 
With the focus of this project firmly on everyday experience in the Falkland 
Islands, it was imperative to source locally produced newsletters such as the 
Falkland Islands Times, Falkland Islands Monthly Times and Penguin News 
which proved invaluable, as well as the reportage of London papers such as 
The Times and Daily Express. I was keen to leverage contemporary accounts 
in the research to shed new light on developments in, and concerning, the 
Falklands. Stubbs had recently shown the importance of the Times of Cyprus 
during the Cypriot independence struggle, and how it ‘conveyed the lived 
experience of emergency rule’ (Stubbs 2016, p. 87); this thesis similarly aims 
to give everyday press accounts of the Falkland slow emergency era due 
attention. It should also be mentioned that whilst I uncovered much material 
whilst in the Jane Cameron National Archives, I also able to bring back e-
copies of many pages of the Falkland newsletters, so continued to discover 






In terms of a sustained narration of the Islander voice, the aforementioned 
privately printed As Ignorant as Sheep (Malcolm 2002) can, in many ways, be 
regarded as important a document as the relatively well known John Smith’s 
74 Days (1984), which was an Islander account of the period of Argentine 
occupation, and proved a popular account in the mid-1980s (attesting to its 
significance at the time, Margaret Thatcher provided the foreword for it). Rex 
Hunt’s My Falkland Days (1992) provides a valuable gubernatorial account of 
the Islands in this period; similarly Southby-Taylor’s (2003) Reasons in writing 
provides important insights into contemporary interactions between Islanders 
and the Royal Marines. Considering how high profile Chalfont’s 1968 visit to 
the Falkland Islands was, it is perhaps surprising that there is no published 
definitive account of this, though it has been covered in different histories, 
such as Mary Cawkell’s The History of the Falkland Islands (2003) and Martin 
Abel Gonzalez’ The Genesis of the Falkands (Malvinas) Conflict (2013), often 
framed as best suits the narrative or the author. Jean Austin’s (2009) Falkland 
Diary provides an important perspective of quotidian life in the Islands in the 
early 1970s, and draws on her own experiences as a contemporary expatriate 
observer. In its narration of Islander lives, former Governor David Tatham’s 
(2008) privately published The Dictionary of Falklands Biography provides 
valuable insights into the Falklands of this slow emergency era, as do official 
reports, notably Shackleton’s (1976), which offer further insights into the 
(often hard) realities of Island life.  
Photo journalistic narrations of the Islands from this era, notably Panorama 
magazine (1968) and The Sunday Times Magazine (1977) provide a kind of 
visual time travel in which scenes from the Islands from contemporary 
moments in time are two-dimensionally captured ‘in perpetuity’. As can be 
seen in these pictures, and those from the Haskards’ private archive, there 
was something distinctly visual about emergency in the Falklands. As 
mentioned previously, there was the counter-intuitive but politically shrewd 
use of the union jack against the policies of the British government which 
appears in published photographs. It is also illuminating to consider how the 
physical appearance of Islanders’ was presented by photo-journalists (often to 





visually highlighted, such as numerous manifestations of a ‘hard life’ in the 
Islands. With the daily challenges of living, indeed surviving (be that 
economically, socially or physically), in the Falklands intensifying during this 
era of slow emergency, photographs published in the British press offered a 
direct and immediate way to inform Britons and other audiences of their 
struggles. Dodds et al (p. 17) argue that ‘The act of looking is an act of the 
state as well as of the individual’, and the way the Islanders were represented 
in photographs suggest that the British state had been ‘looking the other way’, 
neglectful of its responsibilities to the Islanders; in this way, photos could act 
as agents provocateurs.  
Photographic representations of the Islanders published in the British press, 
notably in the Daily Express often offered the prospect of a sympathetic, 
supportive observance, and were addressed to a largely ‘Kith and Kin’ British 
readership to win domestic support for the Islanders. Rose (2007) draws our 
attention to how ‘Visual imagery is never innocent; it is always constructed 
through various practices, technologies and knowledges’ (Rose 2007, p. 26); 
photographic images have a back story, and do not merely ‘appear’. They can 
be used to reify a particular narrative, such as the Daily Express photoshoot 
of 20 September 1968, when Islanders gathered en masse with union jacks at 
Stanley’s Christchurch cathedral and Whale Bone Arch to ‘keep the Falklands 
British’ and frustrate a British government ‘betrayal’. Whatever the motivation 
in the producing and dissemination of an image, photographs along with other 
visual imagery provide a means to deliver a particular narrative, and the 
capacity to influence public opinion. 
For the research, it was also important to be aware of the unique aural and 
oral communications culture of the Islands in this era; ‘With radio as their 
primary communication technology, Falkland Islanders were part of a ‘sonic’ 
community framed around a complex radio environment’ (Pinkerton 2008, p. 
344). Jean Austin recalled how the airwaves were central to Falkland life: 
The government-operated radio-telephone plays an essential part in islands 
communications keeping the forty-odd settlements in touch with Stanley and 
each other…[this] godsend to the housewife as she tunes in while at her 





settlements as well as local gossip. The network also fulfills the role of a flying 
doctor service with medical officers in Stanley able to give advice to patients in 
camp, and when accidents are reported, a Beaver can, if necessary, be alerted 
at short notice  (Austin 2009, p. 191).   
During Austin’s time in the Islands (1972-1975) Edith McMullen operated the 
Radio-Telephone (R/T) from Stanley, and her account conveys both the 
intimacy of knowing the operator as an individual, and the unavoidable public 
intimacy of private matters being broadcast throughout the Islands,  
Edith McMullen, or Radio Edith, as she is code-named and popularly known 
everywhere in the islands…[is] At the controls daily, morning and afternoon, 
she tunes in to the settlements. The radio-telephone however is public. 
Consequently all gossip is common knowledge down to the most intimate detail 
(Austin 2009, p. 191).   
Whilst 2 metres ‘walkie-talkie’ radio system replaced the Radio-Telephone as 
the main form of intra-Island aerial communication from the mid-1970s, 
personal privacy, however, continued to be hopelessly compromised. ‘In both, 
the radio signals were open for all to hear, and ‘listening in’ to other people's 
calls became a form of entertainment in the Islands. No information was 
private—and the effect was to create an unusually open and transparent’ 
(Pinkerton 2008, p. 348). While there was a greater degree of privacy in 
making a call in Stanley through the Islands’ capital telephone lines, there was 
a similar personal intimacy, with the operators providing; 
a very direct and personal service – far more than just connecting lines, they 
were seen as a general point of information for the entire Stanley 
community.  They would often be called to answer questions ranging from 
“When is this power cut going to end?” to “What is the best way to make 
gravy?” ….If it was quiet, the operators were happy to listen and provide 
companionship when it was needed (http://www.falklands-museum.com/r-t---
telephone-exchange.html). 
It is important for the researcher to be aware how aurally and orally engaged 
this community was in its communications. The closeness of the Islander 
community surmounted the intra-archipelagic distances between Falkland 
settlements, and adds weight to the importance of contemporary textual 
sources, such as letters and comment from the Falkland Islands Times. 
These textual sources capture and record everyday discourse within the 





ranges from the geopolitics of territorial control, to an intimate geopolitics of 
bodies.  
It should be noted too that this was also a very geopolitically informed 
community, which would listen on ‘The Box’ (as radios were known) to 
international news from the BBC Overseas Service; similarly Islanders were 
sonically kept in touch with the (growing) Falkland diaspora through the 
‘Calling the Falklands’ show; 
Every morning, except Sundays, broadcasting begins at 8:00am in summer, 
9:00 am in winter, with relayed BBC news… On Sunday evenings listening is 
more limited... the highlight being a half-hour broadcast ‘Calling the Falklands’, 
a programme of record requests and messages from relatives and friends in 
Britain, relayed by the BBC (Austin 2009, p. 192).   
With Islanders very aware of developments both within the Islands, and in 
Britain and Argentina through the BBC, their geographical remoteness did not 
mean a lack of information (which in the case of Argentina during the ‘Dirty 
War’ era, was entirely counterproductive to efforts to win over the Islanders). 
Ian Strange (1981, p. 152) noted how Islanders had a tradition of sonic 
independence:’ The amateur has played an important part in the history of the 
Falklands, with amateur radios being used when official circuits have failed… 
it was often the ‘ham’ who was the first to receive incidental news’. As will be 
considered later, Falkland Governor Neville French in particular did not fully 
grasp the importance of Islanders’ sonic culture, which added a sonic 
dimension to slow emergency. Along with the Rayburn stove, the radio was a 
mainstay of Islander living rooms, regularly informing Islanders about world 
news as part of the daily routine. Indeed, during my 1984 visit to the Islands, I 
saw how central radio was to the community, and my impression then was 
that many Islanders were better informed than many of their contemporaries 
in the United Kingdom, a geopolitical awareness that is often evident in 









4   Chapter Four – ‘1968, Loyalty and all that’ - Political Emergency, 
loyal struggle and the Falklands’ territorial future 
 
4.1 The Falklands as part of a British slow emergency 
 
This opening section sets out to examine why, from the mid 1960s, the 
Falklands appeared to have become less secure as a British geopolitical 
entity. It identifies key developments for Britain, and the implications and 
logics of these for the Falklands. As will be seen logics of vulnerability and 
anachronism left the Falklands particularly exposed unless some counter-
polarity were applied; this would be done through the mobilisation of loyalty. 
 
Accelerated emergency in the Falklands was most pronounced in 1968, yet 
the period up to 1982 remained predominately characterised by slow 
emergency. The Falkland emergency of 1968 can also be understood as 
enveloped within another emergency, that of the slow emergency of what type 
of country post-imperial Britain was, particularly regarding its own ethnic 
composition and place in the world. 	
 
Whilst a wider examination of the post-war dismantling of the British Empire is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to note how the latter 1940’s 
witnessed a period of accelerated international emergency for Britain’s status 
in the world, as the former British imperial hegemon effectively became a 
client state of the USA. Nor had Britain’s Dominions grouping of Australia, 
Canada, the Irish Free State, Newfoundland, New Zealand and South Africa 
survived, post Second World War, as a means to cushion the loss of great 
power status. As Darwin (in Brown and Louis 1999, p. 85) has argued: 
‘Long before the final erasure in the mid 1960s of British pretensions to world 
power through a system of satellite states, the Third British Empire had 










Within two years of Britain’s’ dismantling of the Raj and Indian and Pakistani 
independence in 1947, Britain had become one of a grouping of a dozen 
countries subsumed within the anti Soviet politico-military alliance of NATO, 
as it sought US geopolitical protection from Soviet domination. By the 1960s, 
Britain – its residual pretensions to great power status devastatingly exposed 
by the Suez emergency/debacle of 1956 – was still coming to terms with what 
might be regarded as the national psychodrama of its reduced status; the 
bipolar geopolitics of the Cold War era, and relentless advance of 
decolonisation, meant that this once ‘Big Three’ victor power of 1945, had 
now become relegated to the role of a supporting actor. As Dean Acheson, 
US Secretary of State, bluntly put it in 1962 ‘Great Britain has lost an empire 
but has not yet found a role’” (cited in Brinkley 1990, p. 601).  
 
This challenge to British identity coincided with the arrival of mass 
Commonwealth immigration from the former British Empire, which had once 
created the Falklands colony. There remained much ‘unfinished business’ 
from Empire; as discussed previously, Britain was still dealing with numerous 
‘emergencies’ from former – or soon to be former – colonies, even though the 
Cold War struggle had now become the overriding focus of British policy. 
However, it did not necessarily follow that Britain itself was entirely reconciled 
to its newly diminished role in the world, or had come to terms with the hard 
lesson administered by the United States in the 1956 Suez Crisis. Darwin (in 
Brown and Louis 1999, p. 86) posits that it is no longer 
 
  ‘as clear as it once seemed that Britain has escaped unscathed from the 
 wider loss of a wider Britannic identity, or that shrugging off the Imperial 
 burden has had the liberating and energising effects once confidently 
 predicted’  
 
By the latter 1960s, Rhodesia and Northern Ireland had also become pressing 
issues in the debate about Britain’s identity and role in the world and, along 
with the Falklands and Gibraltar, can be seen as part of another emergency, 










key aspects of British 
slow emergency 
Implications for Falklands as 
a British territory 
Logic 
Disintegration of the 
British Empire after the 




Falklands no longer part of 
British Empire – now effectively 
a territorial appendage to a post 
war Britain which appeared in 
decline as a global power 
Anachronism; 
vulnerability  
Identity – ethnic 
composition of post war 
Britain 
Falklands’ ethnic composition fit 
the traditional profile of a white 
Britain – but post-war Britain 





Falklands at risk if Northern 
Ireland’s Unionists, or 
Gibraltarians, are transferred 
against their wishes to the 
sovereignty of the Irish Republic 
or Spain respectively 
Vulnerability 
Rhodesia Falklands at risk? White settler 
community of British descent 
abandoned by British 
government - but over the issue 
of white minority rule which did 
not apply in the Falklands 
Vulnerability 
 
Table 4.1 ‘The Falklands as  part of British slow emergency’ – how the beleaguered 
colony became enveloped in Britain’s own slow emergency of finding its place/role in 
the post war world, and changed ethic composition 
 
The relationality of the Falklands to the wider issue of whether Britain’s future 
was – or was not – to be exclusively as a regional, European power is clear; 
British territorial retention of the Falklands implied not only an extra-regional 
presence for Britain in the South Atlantic and Antarctic region, but also 
upholding a loyal ‘kith and kin’ population, who were effectively a ‘micro-
dominion’. The Falklands provided a way for lingering sentiments of dominion 
and ‘kith and kin’ to find an outlet and updated expression in Britain’s reduced 
post-war circumstances.  However, by the mid 1960s, change at the British 
macro-level already threatened the Islands’ continued existence in a number 
of ways, adding to the numerous difficulties it faced during the colony’s own 
slow emergency era. As explained in Table 4.1, such developments had 







of vulnerability and anachronism suggested that the Falklands’ future was 
likely to be finite. 
 
The issue of the future of Northern Ireland, which potentially had implications 
for the Falklands own future, came to the fore in the month before the 
Chalfont visit to the Falklands, with the domestic United Kingdom emergency 
of ‘The Troubles’ commencing in Londonderry on 5 October 1968. As with 
Falkland Islanders, Ulster’s Unionists were determined to maintain the 
territorial status quo under the British crown. ‘Surrendering’ the Falklands to 
Argentina might presage a similar fate for Northern Ireland, or Gibraltar to 
Spain, hence the logic of ‘No surrender’ for those like Biggs-Davison applied 
as much to the Falklands as Ulster.   
 
Donaghy (2014, p. 30) sets out the relationality of the two cases through the 
example of Conservative John Biggs- Davidson MP, who became a leading 
Falklands supporter; 
 
When rumours of a Falkland sell-out abounded in the late 1960s, the 
Northern Irish question was at the forefront of British politics. Biggs-Davison 
saw the danger of a precedent being established in transferring sovereignty 
over a small British community abroad, and its possible implications for the 
loyalist population of Ulster. 
 
Whilst the struggle between the British government and Irish Republicans is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to highlight how Northern 
Ireland became enveloped within legal emergency, which ‘included the 
Emergency Provisions Acts (EPA) of 1973, 1975, 1978, 1987 and 1991 and 
the Prevention of Terrorism Acts (PTA) of 1974, 1976, 1984, and 1989’ 
(Wartchow 2005, p. iv). This was an accelerated emergency, in which Britain’s 
‘attempts to introduce colonial measures – internment, interrogation-in-depth, 
curfews – proved to be politically disastrous within a UK context’ (Burke 2015, 
p. 21), amounting to ‘an emergency regime’ (Wartchow 2005, p. vii). For the 
Falklands’ continuation as a British colony, however, the fate of Northern 
Ireland within the United Kingdom was a key factor in surviving its own slow 
emergency; had the British state lost the will to support Ulster’s retention 







similar outcome for Islanders under Buenos Aires was foreseeable. In Fig. 4.1 
the union jack has been – and continues to be – mobilised as a symbol of 

















Another area of vulnerability for Falkland Islanders was that Britain was 
changing demographically, potentially making the Islands appear 
anachronistic and expendable as an imperial relic of a bygone age. Post war 
mass immigration from Commonwealth countries brought home, in both 
meanings of the phase, the ethnic diversity of the erstwhile empire to the once 
overwhelmingly white British population, and challenged British residual 
colonial mentalities about the ‘superiority’ of white bodily pigmentation. This 
‘fast’ demographic change, however, was also a source of anxiety and/or 
resentment amongst many Britons, with New Commonwealth emigration 
rising from 200,000, 0.4% of population, in 1951’s census to over 1 million or 
Fig. 4.1 In both unionist Northern Ireland (left), and in the Falkland Islands (right) the union jack is 
used on buildings 
 










2.1% of population by 1971 (Webb 1989, p. 617). As Ward explains, mass 
immigration from Commonwealth countries into Britain challenged perceptions 
of Britishness, not least in its embodied (white) pigmentation, for some a 
bodily emergency: ‘Difference, and particularly that of skin colour, was 
therefore seen as a problem in itself because it challenged the presumption of 
homogeneity and rigidity associated with Britishness’ (Ward 2004, p. 126).   
With the slow emergency of what type of country post-imperial Britain was 
crystallising around the subject of immigration, the mono-ethnic Falklands 
appeared increasingly less relevant to a multicultural Britain, more focused on 
supporting the welfare state than maintaining limpets of empire. The degree to 
which modern Britain was still, however, attached to ‘kith and kin’ remained to 
be seen, with the Wilson government’s approach to Rhodesia not necessarily 
being a reassuring case.  
 
In November 1965, white-minority-ruled Rhodesia declared its Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain, in a bid to maintain the 
supremacy of 224,000 whites, largely of British ‘kith and kin’ descent, over the 
black majority. UDI proved a humiliating geopolitical experience for post-
imperial Britain, with the Wilson government placing the ‘white settler-
dominated Rhodesia under an ineffective sanctions regime. What offered 
some hope for the cause of ‘keeping the Falklands British’ was the attachment 
that many members of the British public showed for their Rhodesian ‘kith and 
kin’, who still claimed to be loyal to the Crown (whilst revolting against British 
rule). In his memoirs, Dennis Healey, then Defence Secretary, expressed the 
view that so substantial was support for UDI Rhodesia amongst British military 
personnel that ‘the British armed forces could not be trusted to execute orders 
for a military intervention against their Rhodesian “kith and kin.”’ (The Time of 
My Life, p. 332). 
 
As with domestic British support for Northern Ireland’s Unionists, Rhodesia 
had primed the Falklands issue, establishing that despite the many changes 
affecting post-war Britain, support for ‘kith and kin’ was a trigger issue in 
political life. The same Falklands’ ethnic homogeneity which, compared to 







gaining support from members of the public resistant to the dilution of 
‘traditional Britishness’, and unhappy about the treatment of Rhodesian ‘kith 
and kin’. In this febrile atmosphere, in the month after the Falkland Islands 
Emergency Committee was formed, came Enoch Powell’s speech of 20 April 
1968 in Birmingham; its assertions of white Britons increasingly being 
disadvantaged through mass immigration were followed by a chilling 
prophesy: ‘As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I 
seem to see ‘the River Tiber foaming with much blood’ (cited in Heffer 1998, 
p. 453). 
 
Powell was subsequently dismissed from the Conservative opposition’s front 
bench for this speech, which was widely regarded as racist and incendiary 
amongst politicians. The speech was, however, well received by the British 
public, with a Gallup poll indicating that 74% agreed with it, and that only 15% 
disagreed; this considerable public support for Powell prompted his 
biographer, conservative journalist Simon Heffer, to conclude that ‘he spoke 
for the majority of the country, however unsophisticated that majority may be’ 
(Heffer 1998, p. 457). The public support for a ‘traditional Britain’ presented 
Falkland Islanders with the opportunity, as white subjects of the crown, to 
appear as a part of a ‘true’ Britain to be supported/defended, not discarded.  
 
This then was the wider British context that the Falklands were positioned 
within – tied to and dependent on a Britain going through its own slow 
emergency, as it sought to re-position itself in the post-imperial world and 
come to terms with the implications of Commonwealth immigration.  
 
Schwarz (2012, p. 12) also indirectly provides for us an important insight into 
why, at this unsettled time in British history, the Falklands proved such a 
charged issue. He describes the significance of what, in a meeting with him, 










He [Powell] explained that at the end of the 1960s he had opened a file called 
‘The Thing’.  In it, he had recorded all examples of subversion that he had 
encountered… I came to understand why Powell had been unable to name 
the disorder he saw all about him… What was ‘the Thing’ and what did it 
represent?... My own view is that in this disorder, or in perception of disorder, 
we can discern the political-cultural effects of the end of empire ‘at home’ 
(Schwarz 2012, pp. 4-5). 
 
In this way, Schwarz sees the end of empire and Commonwealth immigration 
as significantly impacting on the Britain of this era. For contemporary Britons 
who had concerns about ‘Thingly’ developments, the ‘disruptive’ political and 
social change – or ‘disorder’ - of the 1960s offered little reassurance. Large-
scale immigration from former colonial subjects had also led to a stronger 
awareness of ‘whiteness’ amongst the British public, meaning that: ‘At the 
very moment of decolonisation, a language of racial whiteness assumed a 
new prominence at home’ (Schwarz 2012, p. 12). Fig 4.2, of a pro-Powell 
march in the west Midlands, captures the white, racial homogeneity of these 
protests, with the union jack transformed from an imperial symbol into an 
expression of anti-immigration sentiment. 
 
The idea of ‘The Thing’ as a Powellite articulation of slow emergency provides 
an important insight into why, both in the latter 1960s and subsequently, the 
Falklands issue elicited support from conservative elements concerned about 
the direction of Britain. Contemporary support for the Islanders’ cause from 
such quarters helped provide a palliative, if not an antidote, to their aversion 
to aspects of ‘the modern world’, such as post-imperial disorder and the 
diminished status of ‘the ‘white Briton’. In a small, but nonetheless symbolic 
way, it acted as an affirmation of support for order, maintaining a community 
of beleaguered white, Anglo kith and kin, and their ‘traditional’ (British) way of 
life. In this sense, the Falklands issue was driven by both Britain’s past and 











Fig. 4.2 A contemporary march in support of Enoch Powell’s 20 April 1968  ‘Rivers of 






4.2 The Falklands and the ‘Foreign Other’  
 
As substantial support for Powell’s views confirmed, there evidently remained 
considerable resistance to the ‘foreign other’, and such mentalities were not 
necessarily confined to those with traditional or reactionary views. In relation 
to the future of the Falklands, William Hunter Christie recalled the 
perspectives of left wing Labour MP Stan Newens about Argentines. 
  
William Hunter Christie: I’d like to instance a Labour member of Parliament, 
Stan Newens, who said in a Foreign Affairs Labour Party Committee that he’d 







British Empire, and he wasn’t going to hand the last two thousand over to a 
bunch of… er… he used a word which would not be very popular and I won’t 
repeat it.’ 
 
Michael Charlton: ‘To a bunch of what?’ 
 
William Hunter Christie: ‘I think he said ‘dagos’. He was a left-wing Labour 
Member of Parliament, and he took the view that he wasn’t going to see his 
life’s work finished by simply handing over a colonial people against their will. 
It did not matter whether they were black, white or khaki. He felt just as 
strongly about white people in the Falkland Islands as he felt about black 
people in Africa (Charlton 1989, p. 88). 
 
Irrespective of precisely whatever representation of Argentines Newens may 
have offered, in a British political landscape where immigration was such a 
divisive and heated issue, the representation of the Falkland Islanders as 
‘authentic’ Britons in the South Atlantic gained traction in, and from, 1968.  
The ‘Falkland cause’ was able to point to Islander ‘kith and kin’ who were 
upholding British territory under threat from Argentina. 
 
Nor did the politics of compelling white ‘British’ Falkland Islanders to be 
‘handed over’ to Argentina, a ‘third world’ Latin American county with a 
military dictatorship and home to a significant number of former Nazis, play 
well in a country which, only a couple of decades earlier, had defeated Hitler’s 
Germany. As with Rhodesia, the Falklands had stood loyally by Britain in that 
conflict as part of the Empire, with the colony donating funds for five spitfires. 
 
Discourse associated with British ‘kith and kin’ meant that the Falkland 
Islanders’ plight would prove highly controversial. Thus, owing to ‘the highly 
charged nature of issues involving ‘kith and kin’’ (Charlton 1989, p. 19) there 
was no British official confirmation of negotiations with Argentina, or 
discussion in Parliament, until 1968, as slow emergency catalysed to reveal to 
Islanders that a sovereignty transfer was close.  
Yet this very diplomacy coincided with a wider narrative in Britain about 
neglecting the interests of Britons for the benefit of ‘foreigners’. The reality, 
however, that British diplomacy had been responding to the Falkland Islands’ 
colonial status, became increasingly asynchronous in the new post-colonial 







the UN, unopposed by Britain, called on Britain and Argentina to resolve this 
colonial dispute.  
Significantly, Resolution 2065 merely affirmed the ‘interests’ rather than 
‘wishes’ of the Falkland Islanders; as has been noted, ‘the use of the word 
‘interests’ rather than ‘wishes’ implied only a limited regard for whatever 
misgivings the islanders had’ (Freedman and Gamba Stonehouse 1988, p. 8). 
The choice of the word ‘interests’ is of critical importance; it implied that, 
unlike other ‘colonial peoples’, the Falkland Islanders’ wishes were not a 
decisive consideration in resolving this inter-state dispute, and were therefore 
expendable.  
Lord Chalfont, who in 1968 would become publicly associated with the 
Falklands, later acknowledged that ‘The ‘interests’ of the islanders’ was the 
key phrase. […] we all realized, or thought we realized, we were the people 
who could decide upon the interests of the Islanders, not so much the 
Islanders themselves’ (Charlton 1989, p. 19). Whereas ‘interests’ offered a 
convenient mechanism to disregard Islander views, ‘wishes’ implied an 
Islander ‘right’ to approve or veto a settlement, something which neither the 
British and Argentine governments, nor the UN, wished to concede. Royle’s 
assessment (2001, p. 134), that ‘the (more) usual insular position regarding 
politics, especially for small islands, is one of powerlessness, dependency 
and insignificance’ appears to reflect the dilemma of the Islanders, 
geodeterminstically caught between two state actors.  
At serious risk of being denied the right to their (geo)political ‘wishes’, the 
Falkland Islanders’ lack of agency appears self-evident. Such ‘powerlessness’ 
anticipates an inability to determine an outcome, which Resolution 2065 
appeared to confirm for the Islanders, though as will presently be considered 
there was much political ’strength’ to be derived from their embodiment of 
British ‘kith and kin’ at risk.   
It is important to note that other forms of ‘powerlessness’ were also at play; 
the Argentine government itself had for over 130 years been powerless to 
reverse the British seizure of the Malvinas, but with UN support, there now 







need not be a permanent condition. Britain too began to face up to intimations 
of powerlessness and constrained agency, further to the 1966 Defence 
Review: 
The British Ministry of Defence renounced carriers and landing […] of troops 
against sophisticated opposition outside the range of land-based air cover. 
From 1966, the U.K demonstrated an increasing willingness to compromise 
on the Falklands (in contrast to Argentine military belligerency) and an 
increasing reluctance to make naval shows of force in response (Kinney 
1989, p. 49).  
The Falkland Islanders fitted this ‘traditional’ perception of embodied 
Britishness, which meant the representational, if yet unrealised, power of the 
‘white’ Falkland Islanders posed a political challenge for the British 
government; its geopolitical options over the Falklands would be seriously 
curtailed should a narrative of white ‘kith and kin’ being ‘sold out’ to the 
Argentine Other gain traction. The Falkland issue also unhelpfully fitted into 
the wider narrative of what some Britons saw as the ‘white plight’ of UDI 
Rhodesia. It is worth reflecting that had the residents of Diego Garcia had 
bodily representations of ‘whiteness’ (rather than ‘colour’) to enlist in their 
defence, the Chagossians’ deportations from 1967-1973 would have been 
more difficult to undertake. 
The Falkland question was no longer one of two state actors and its citizens 
claiming competing sovereignties over this South Atlantic archipelago, 
regularly using the tools of banal geopolitics to assert their claim. The 
emergence of the Falklands Islanders created a new political context, one in 
which linking the fate of the colony and its inhabitants to British domestic 
politics, and invoking loyalty (openly) and race (implicitly) opened up the 
chance to assert some agency as to their future. The deployment of 
representations of loyalty and ‘Britishness’ offered Falkland Islanders and 
their supporters the possibility of significantly influencing British domestic 
discourse and governmental policy about the future of the Islands. Calculated 
usage of key banal objects would help determine the fate of the Islands in a 
post-colonial world, particularly the Union Jack with its affective loyal 







4.3 Contested Falklands futures: unfolding emergency and mobilising 
the politics of loyalty 
 
In the early 1960s, the future of the Falklands as a British territorial entity had 
appeared more certain, with British colonial governance and the union jack’s 
vertical presence in the Islands seemingly secure, notwithstanding Argentine 
irredentist aspiration. There was no prospect of the Falklands progressing to 
being a ‘micro-New Zealand’, and the politics of loyalty’ to Britain, and an 
emphasis on being ‘kith and kin’, provided a natural route to carving out a 
future and identity apart from Argentina. In an era of decolonisation, this was 
an improbable path; as Skelton noted of Montserrat’s continued preference for 
British colonial status ‘from a postcolonial perspective, … it complicates the 
assumption that all colonial territories ipso facto seek independence’ (Skelton 
2000, p. 116).  Argentina’s wish to end the perpetuation of such a British 
colonial anachronism meant that it was unlikely the era of decolonisation pass 
by and leave the Falklands colonial status quo intact. 
 
Argentine interest in the future of the Islands was demonstrated in the mass 
circulation magazine Panorama, which in latter 1966 challenged the 
assumption that there was a British future for the Islands. It subverted the 
image of the Islander’s new Governor Haskard on its front page. The meaning 
of this photograph was reversed; far from the new Governor’s image being 
seen as the affirmation of continuing British authority and control, he was 
represented as ‘El ultimo gobernador ingles?’, signifying the embodied decline 
of British power in the Falklands. The cloth and metallic objects of Haskard’s 
traditional, colonial attire appear anachronistic, ‘on borrowed time’, this 
message consistent with the anticipatory headline. This mass circulation 
magazine thus sent a powerful signal to the Argentine public – and to the 
Falkland Islanders and British government – that territorial change to an 
anachronistic status quo was expected. 
 
The interaction between the politics of loyalty in the Falklands and Argentine 
irredentist ambition from the mid-1960s proved to be a mutually reinforcing 







Argentine geopolitical gestures of Fitzgerald’s 1965 flight and the 1966 
Condor hijack helped develop a ‘siege mentality’ in the Islands, Islander 
perceptions of the progressive betrayal of the British government became the 
accelerative factor in mobilising the politics of loyalty. As will be demonstrated, 
a mutually reciprocated mistrust between Islanders and the Wilson 
government slowly ended up with a tentative commitment to the other,  
occasioned because neither party was able to replace the other with a 
politically acceptable alternative. 
 
When on 9 September 1965 Argentine aviator Miguel Fitzgerald successfully 
flew his Cessna 185 from Rio Gallegos to Stanley he obliged both Islanders 
and Argentines to re-imagine the archipelago’s position in relation to the 
‘mainland’. He had made a symbolic three-dimensional reclamation of the 
Islands for Argentina; entering into, and descending from, Falkland airspace, 
he vertically planted an Argentine flag into the ground, leaving the object of a 
letter for the Falkland authorities, asserting that ‘having awakened from a long 
sleep and conscious of her moral and material grandeur, [Argentina] had 
resolved not to permit England to continue occupying an archipelago that for 
geographical, historical, political and just reasons belonged to Argentina’ 
(Falkland Islands Monthly Review, 5 October 1964, p. 1).  
 
That Fitzgerald had effectively used Falklands aerial volume as a conduit to 
establish the first airbridge to the Falklands was a source of deep anxiety, and 
encouragement, for Islanders and Argentines respectively. For the former, this 
symbolic gesture proved alarming; popular historian Mary Cawkell 
characterised this flight, in her pro-Falklands narrative, as ‘the start of the 
extraordinary years’ (Cawkell 2001, p. 111), implying the arrival of a new 
three-dimensionsal insecurity and vulnerability for Falkland Islanders. Whilst 
this sense of vulnerability was one causal factor in the development of a 
mobilised loyal politics in the islands, its impact would have been significantly 
reduced had there been more confidence about the seriousness of Britain’s 
commitment to ‘keeping the Falklands British’. For the latter, Fitzgerald’s 
narration of possession of the islands functioned as an expression of national 







(1988) analysis of the significance of territorial loss in the Argentine national 
psyche.  
 
Islander anxieties about the mother country’s intentions were intensified by a 
July 1966 BBC World Service programme aerially transmitted through 
Falkland volume which advocated the Falklands’ incorporation into Argentina, 
and was broadcast at the time of (secret) Anglo-Argentine exploratory talks 
about territorial change. 
 
On 23 July 1966 listeners were give an unwelcome shock by a surprising 
broadcast from London of a talk by a member of the Bank of London and 
South America which seemed to advocate a transfer of sovereignty to 
Argentina. That such a broadcast should come from London rather than 
Buenos Aires was the first public indication that the British government were 
inclined to appease Argentina (Tatham 2008, p. 275). 
 
A narrative of potential betrayal by London was emerging, an unfolding slow 
emergency for Islander loyalists: that the BBC World Service had been used 
as a vehicle to challenge, rather than reinforce, the Falklands’ connection with 
Britain prompted leading Falklands Islanders on the Executive Council (ExCo) 
to express their dismay to Haskard. This was conveyed to London in 
Haskard’s telegram of 24 July 1966, in which he represented the broadcast as 
an ‘inaccurate, biased and unsympathetic BBC commentary’, and robustly 
affirmed that the ‘Council wishes to emphasise that Falkland islanders have 
no desire whatsoever to be handed over to Argentina. On the contrary 
population wishes to retain closest possible ties with Britain and rejects any 
suggestion that Colony of Anglo-Saxon stock should be used as pawn for any 
transitory political or material advantage’ (Haskard 24 July 1966 FCO 42/67) 
 
As with Fitzgerald, this BBC commentary broadcast had used Falklands 
volume as a conduit to subvert the status quo and advocate the Falklands as 
part of Argentina, challenging Falkland loyalty existentially and prompting 
Haskard’s loyal counter-discourse on behalf of the Islanders.  
 
Haskard’s representation of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ Islanders being ‘handed over’ to a 







1940-45, had a very strong resonance. The synchromatic invocation of 
‘Anglo-Saxon stock’ emphasises that the Falkland Islanders were kith and kin, 
very closely related to the ‘traditional’ (white) British population, and should be 
treated accordingly. The politics of loyalty were thus being framed by 
Haskard; the very need for these implied that there was also politics of 
subversion being practiced by the Foreign Office, as suggested in the 
reference to appeasement. As ExCo’s reaction indicated, far from 
encouraging Islanders to engage with Argentina, the broadcast had prompted 
performative declarations of loyalty, made all the more ‘necessary’ by the 
perception that London needed reminding about this loyalty. Indeed, given the 
afore-mentioned context of contentious, contemporary British political 
discourse, the Falkland issue was already an unfolding slow emergency, both 
for the Islanders, and the Wilson government, though the latter had yet to 
anticipate the depth of domestic political waters they were entering in, in trying 
to divest Britain of this ‘remote’ colony. 
 
A sense of a besieged loyal Falkland community (as the Summerhayes 
Report noted the following year) deepened through another three dimensional 
intrusion on September 28, 1966, when ‘20 young Argentine extremists 
belonging to the Movimiento Nueva Argentina (The New Argentina 
Movement) staged Operación Condor, a 'symbolic' seizure of the islands, 
which made the British public generally aware of the existence of the dispute’ 
(J.C.J Metford 1968, p.464). What for the hijackers had been a ’geography of 
re-possession’ served to fortify a narrative of Argentines as the hostile Other, 
as the Falkland population ‘began to wonder after that whatever next’ (Lady 
Haskard, 23 July 2012, recorded interview with author). This comment not 
only reveals the uncertainty of the time in the Islands, but implies too that the 
Haskards too were uncertain about what might happen to the Islands in the 
near future. This slow emergency era uncertainty was neatly captured in the 
October 1966’s edition of Argentina’s mass circulation Panorama magazine, 
which presciently posed the question ‘The Falklands: the final English 





























Panorama’s subversion of Haskard’s formal image in gubernatorial garb, 
depicting him as potentially the last, representative of British colonialism in 
‘las Malvinas’, a figure of decreasing relevance, was in fact uncomfortably 
close to the truth.  Haskard’s efforts to represent Islander concerns had made 
his views count for less in Whitehall, as he acknowledged: ‘I think to a certain 
extent they thought that this chap has gone native, and is over-influenced by 
the people who are around him, which is to a certain extent true’ (Sir Cosmo 
Haskard, 23 July 2012, recorded interview with author) 
  









The following photo, obtained by Panorama for its October 1966 publication 
(Fig 4.4), and therefore taken comfortably before the events of February 1968, 
suggests a warm working relationship already developing between Councillor 
Barton and Haskard. Both parties’ gaze and attention are focused on the 
other rather than towards the camera taking the shot, with both displaying 
relaxed body language. This photo, when taken together with Haskard’s 
preceding comments, offer an insight into the human interactions that the 
Governor’s ‘going native’ (Sir Cosmo Haskard, 23 July 2012, recorded 
interview with author) involved, leading Haskard to be closely engaged with 













4.4. Sir Cosmo Haskard and ExCo Councillor Arthur Barton at Government House, 
Stanley  
Source: Panorama, October 1966, pp. 14-15 
 
At this time of growing diplomatic momentum to resolve the Falklands dispute, 
and with Governor Haskard thus marginalised, the Islanders were becoming 
increasingly vulnerable - at real risk of being without agency in responding to 
this developing slow emergency. By December 1967, Britain was ready to 
cede the islands to Argentina, through a proposed Memorandum of 
Understanding [MOU], based on Islander interests, rather than wishes. The 
logic of the politics of loyalty in the Falklands required that leading Islanders 







continuation of colonial rule. However, such a dependence struggle, 
mobilising the politics of loyalty, implied adopting the politics of resistance, to 
apply political pressure on London to think again.  
 
A significant point in reinforcing the loyal counter-discourse came 
unexpectedly through an initiative of Haskard’s, whose invitation to Councillor 
Summerhayes, from the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, to visit the 
Falklands (January 1968) led to a highly significant report submitted to the 
British Ambassador in Argentina, Sir Michael Cresswell. This confidential 
report provided valuable insights into the ways in which the ‘politics of loyalty’ 
had formed within the islands: 
 
In my talks with all the leading Falklanders I made it my first task to give them 
an up-to-date picture of Argentina, its politics and economy and […] a realistic 
idea of Argentine intentions and feelings about the islands. For many this was 
the first time that they had heard such an account’ (Summerhayes Report 
1968, p. 2). 
 
This clearly suggests that Islander perceptions and representations of 
Argentina, key aspects behind the politics of loyalty, were based on a lack of 
knowledge, which can also be taken as an implied criticism of Haskard and 
his Colonial Office predecessors for not sufficiently informing the Islanders 
about Argentina. Furthermore, Argentine banal geopolitical behaviour had: 
 
done great damage to a relationship which was never close or cordial. The 
cutting-off of sea communications, the holding up of mail and over-stamping 
of letters with Islas Malvinas, the petty interference by immigration and 
customs officials, the jibes and irredentist propaganda directed at Britain, as 
well as the ‘Fitzgerald’ and ‘Condor’ Incidents, has convinced most 
Falklanders that the Argentines mean them nothing but harm (Summerhayes 
Report, 1968, p. 2). 
 
The politics of loyalty were thus, in part, conceived as a reaction to 
Argentina’s performative assertions of sovereignty, though Summerhayes 
Report does not more fully examine British responsibility for enabling this too. 
The report concluded that the gap between Falkland politics of loyalty and 
Argentine hopes for territorial restitution ‘will in my view be virtually 
unbridgeable’ (Summerhayes Report, 1968, p. 4), a finding accepted by 







accommodate Argentina were unwise, effectively ending Haskard’s isolation 
in arguing against how Falkland policy was being managed. 
 
The political, and indeed geopolitical, problem of Falkland loyal resistance had 
thus been recognised, but as confirmed in London on 14 February 1968 to 
Haskard by a displeased Foreign Secretary Brown, policy direction would not 
change. The scale of the challenge posed to Falkland politics of loyalty, and 
the degree to which the emergency had accelerated, was made clear on 20 
February 1968; the long-feared ‘betrayal’ was confirmed when Haskard 
confidentially showed ExCo a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), 
based on Islanders interests rather than wishes, which if uncontested would 
reduce the Islanders to disempowered actors.  
 
As confirmed by Haskard (23 July 2012, recorded interview with author), 
during this sensitive period of MOU related diplomacy - or for Islanders, of 
unfolding emergency - he had been ‘instructed not to refer to Gibraltar in 
public’, as this was seen as unhelpful to ongoing official efforts to settle the 
future status of the Falkands. Both in Whitehall and the Falklands, the 
Gibraltar and the Falklands were recognised as geopolitically related 
territories and issues. As Lady Haskard confirmed, ‘we were always anxious 
to know what view HMG would take regarding the Spanish claim to Gibraltar’ 
(Lady Haskard, 23 July 2012, recorded interview with author). This 
observation helps confirm that this interconnectedness was well understood in 
the Islands, particularly in a population that, through hearing ‘intensely 
geopolitical’ BBC Overseas Service radio news broadcasts (Pinkerton 2007, 
p.349) was exposed to a wider geopolitical perspective, an assessment which 
also challenges Summerhayes’ representation of an ill-informed Islander 
parochiality (Summerhayes Report 1968, p. 2). 
In managing potentially disruptive politics of loyalty, the British Government’s 
wish to keep apart the ‘twin situations’ (Sir Cosmo Haskard, 23 July 2012, 
recorded interview with author) of small British colonies facing the territorial 
ambitions of an authoritarian, larger, hispanic neighbour was understandable, 







valuable to be maintained, the Falklands were not geographically proximate to 
Britain, potentially a geo-military liability rather than asset.  
 
From a Falkland loyal perspective however, Gibraltar offered a hopeful 
precedent, namely that a population that wished to preserve its British colonial 
status against a larger neighbour’s irredentism, had agency to mobilise loyal 
performance and build up networks of influential domestic British support 
within parliament, press and the public. Gibraltar’s recent and decisive 
rejection of Spain’s territorial ambitions in June 1967 had shown how loyal 
resistance could be – and had been - mobilised, when a referendum on the 
colony’s future status had been held, resulting in 12,138 voting for the British 
status quo and 44 for absorption into Spain. Hills described how, in this 
referendum, ‘Gibraltar took on an aspect resembling the areas of Belfast 
where Orangemen are in a majority. A pro-British frenzy developed’ (Hills 
1972, p.465), in which loyalty was affectively demonstrated throught the 
extensive use of union jacks, pro-British signage and patriotic gatherings.   
 
Whilst the Falklands population was less than a tenth of that of Gibraltar and, 
unlike Gibraltar, geographically dispersed, patriotic performance and 
establishing support networks in London offered Islanders counter-emergency 
mechanisms that could yet derail British government efforts to secure the 
MOU with Argentina. Gibraltar had demonstrated the importance of mobilising 
the politics of loyalty as a means to decelerate the emergency that faced the 
Falklands. 
 
By February 1968, notwithstanding Summerhayes report or Ambassador 
Cresswell’s interventions, it was clear that a polite politics of Islander loyalty 
had brought no discernible benefit. Within a week of Haskard sharing a draft 
of the emerging MOU at ExCo, its unofficial members Councillors Barton, 
Goss, Miller and Bonner publically broke with the British government and 
Foreign Office, and decisively began to mobilise the politics of loyalty.  
 
On 27 February 1968 the four Councillors sent an open letter to all Members 







urgent assistance in what was represented as the patriotic cause of saving 
the Falklands from cession to Argentina. On the one hand, this was a difficult 
escalatory move for loyal politics, given that it challenged the authority of Her 
Majesty’s government which governed the polity to which Islanders were 
asserting loyalty. For the Councillors however, the impending MOU 
represented an accelerating emergency that necessitated a mobilised, and 
combative politics of loyalty. The official Falkland Islands Government 
publication ‘Our Islands, Our History’ (2012) explains the rationale for the 
Councillors’ conduct, including breaking their oath of secrecy as ExCo 
members, in this way: 
 
In February 1968 Barton led three other councillors in making a direct appeal 
to the British members of Parliament against the Memorandum of 
Understanding reached between British and Argentine officials. This 
represented a breaking of his oath of secrecy but he considered the need 
overwhelming. 
 
Source: Falkland Islands Government (2012), ‘Our Islands, Our History’ 
http://www.falklands.gov.fk/assets/OurIslandsOurHistory.pdf 
 
This perception that there was an overwhelming need to make a ‘Unilateral 
Declaration of Dependence’ on the British state comes through strongly in the 
letter that Barton and his fellow councillors wrote. Its power lies in its themes, 
and appeal to many British parliamentarians, press and public. That it had 
now become necessary (from the Councillors’ perspective) to appeal to British 
public opinion over the heads of the Wilson Government and Foreign Office, 
to the point of oath-breaking, is testimony to a cornered politics of loyalty, 
which sought to decelerate this emergency.  
 
As can be seen immediately below, this appeal invoked contemporary 
touchstone issues, for example that the Islanders were ‘kith and kin’, 
performatively using this implied ‘whiteness’ to enlist domestic British support.  
The letter consciously emphasised that the Islanders are ‘as British as you 
are, mostly of English and Scottish ancestry, even to the 6th generation’, with 








To Members of Parliament From Unofficial Members of Falkland Islands 
Executive Council (A.G. Barton - R.V. Goss - S. Miller - G.C.R. Bonner)  
ARE YOU AWARE THAT - 
Negotiations are now proceeding between the British and Argentine 
Governments which may result at any moment in the handing-over of the 
Falkland Islands to The Argentine.  
TAKE NOTE THAT - 
The Inhabitants of the Islands have never yet been consulted regarding their 
future - they do NOT want to become Argentines - they are as British as you 
are, mostly of English and Scottish ancestry, even to the 6th generation - five 
out of six were born in the Islands - many elderly people have never been 
elsewhere - there is no racial problem - no unemployment - no poverty, and 
we are not in debt.  
ARE YOU AWARE THAT - 
The people of these Islands do not wish to submit to a Foreign Language, 
Law, Customs, and Culture because for 135 years they have happily pursued 
their own peaceful way of life, a very British way of life, unique in fact, when 
you consider that the Islands are 8,000 miles from the Country which they still 
call 'Home' in spite of the Immigration Act.  
Lord Caradon said to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1965: 
"The people of this territory are not to be betrayed or bartered. Their wishes 
and their interests are paramount and we shall do our duty in protecting 
them." British Ministers have said the same until 1967 since when there has 
been silence.  
QUESTIONS - 
Is our tiny community to be used as a pawn in Power Politics? 
Do you not feel ashamed that this wicked thing may suddenly be foisted on 
us? What can you do to prevent it? What are you doing?  
WE NEED YOUR HELP!’ 
Source: Unofficial Members of Falkland Islands Executive Council 
Appeal, 27 February 1968, in The Times 
 
The themes raised and language used – ‘this wicked thing’ (Falkland Appeal 
27 February 1968) – was calculated to mobilise British patriotic sentiment 
about an imminent deal with Argentina, a ‘call to arms’ for concerned 
parliamentarians to save a far flung corner of Britain from a foreign power. 
 
The councillors discreetly received loyal support Governor Haskard, who 
subsequently confirmed that he had actively sought to make the case for the 
Falklands’ continuation as a British colony. In relation to four Councillors 







territory and people, he noted: ‘They’d taken on really what I’d been doing for 
several years’ (Sir Cosmo Haskard, 23 July 2012, recorded interview with 
author). This recognition of Haskard’s role in frustrating Foreign Office efforts 
to end the existence of the Falklands as a British entity reflects how the 
politics of loyalty had not only led to Falklands Islanders councillors directly 
challenging the Government and Foreign Office, but had caused profound 
dissent within the ranks of British officialdom. Haskard had helped the 
Councillors decelerate this accelerative emergency.  
Through mobilising the politics of loyalty, the Councillors began to build up 
some counter-emergency deceleration to stymie the MOU’s momentum; as 
has been noted of the Councillors’ Appeal of 27 February 1968, ‘The letter 
had the desired effect. An all-party Falkland Islands Emergency Committee 
was established, under the chairmanship of a director of the Falkland Islands 
Company. MPs deplored the very idea of negotiating with Argentina and 
editorials warned of betrayal’ (Freedman 2005, p. 7). 
This mobilisation of loyal sentiment in Britain was essential to redrawing the 
power asymmetry between Falkland Islanders and the British Government. In 
terms of a loyal Falkland Islander narration of February 1968 as a watershed 
in the Islanders’ deployment of loyal politics, Velma Malcolm’s privately 
published and locally printed autobiography As Ignorant as Sheep (2002), 
provides a valuable perspective. She became a leading practitioner of 
mobilised loyal politics in Stanley through her work in the Falkland Islands 
Association (Stanley Committee), later becoming the first ever Islander Vice 
President of the Falkland Islands Association. She narrated developments in 
1968 in these terms: 
As a result of all the goings on behind closed doors in the Foreign Office the 
Falkland Islands Government Emergency Committee was born in 1968. 
Fortunately for us the Governor of the day, Sir Cosmo Haskard, was so 
incensed when he realized what was secretly planned he put his head on the 
chopping block and told councillors what was going on (Malcolm 2002, p. 85). 
In unpacking what loyal politics meant in the Falklands, Malcolm’s choice of 
title for her autobiography is particularly apposite, since the world view it offers 







of the image of the ‘ignorant sheep’ is highly significant. The sheep itself was, 
and is, the symbol of the Falkland Islands, with the implication that Islanders 
were ill informed in the eyes of expert external actors, a stubborn flock to be 








As explained by Malcolm (2002, foreword): 
The title is chosen because this was my feeling of the way the Colonial Office, 
now Foreign and Commonwealth Office, tended to view us along with 
hundreds of journalists and many, many visiting diplomats and others who 
voiced their opinion in one way or another with no knowledge of the Falklands 
whatsoever. 
Malcolm’s cartoon sheep on the front of the object of this book visualised the 
‘ignorant sheep’ (Fig 4.5). At first sight, the sheep – used as a metaphor for 
the Falkland Islander – is simply exercising its mobility, seemingly content in 
its loyal ignorance, which arguably was the position prior to 1968. Considered 
Fig. 4.5. As Ignorant as Sheep by 
Velma Malcolm; this was printed 
and privately published in Stanley. 








further, however, this representation of the sheep subverts the notion of 
ignorance. The smart ovine biped is depicted as knowing where it is going 
and, as indicated by the rucksack, has already prepared for the journey to its 
Falklands – but not Argentine – future.  The cartoon’s significance is that 
Falkland Islanders were shown as capable of independently exercising their 
own agency in pursuit of a loyal agenda, this principle asserted through the 
unofficial ExCo Councillors’ Appeal of 27 February 1968. 
In connecting with influential parliamentarians and journalists, the unofficial 
members of ExCo – the politicised incarnation of Malcom’s Falklands sheep - 
had effectively initiated an attritional campaign of loyal politics against British 
government policy. To that end, the all-party Falkland Islands Emergency 
Committee was established in March 1968 to defend the colony against 
cession to Argentina. Ellerby’s (1990) unpublished thesis British interests in 
the Falklands Islands: Economic Development, the Falklands lobby and the 
Sovereignty Dispute, remains the key academic work on the Falklands lobby. 
Unpacking the processes through which this political networking/pressurising 
mobilised domestic British support for loyal politics is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, since its predominant focus is centred on the Falkland Islander 
experience. It should though be noted that in setting up as a cross party 
organisation, the political reach of loyal politics was amplified: 
The Falklands lobby was an alchemy of politics drawn largely from the right of 
the Conservative Party but extending also to Fabian socialists, who saw in 
the Commonwealth a secular agency for good. The lobby was linked to great 
names which stirred the memory, like the last of the great imperial 
adventurers, Scott of the Antarctic (Charlton 1989, p. 78). 
The use of the term ‘Emergency’ emphasised that Islanders and their 
supporters recognised that the Falklands faced an emergency, in relation to 
the MOU and the Foreign Office/British Government support for this.  
In terms of mobilising loyal support in the Islands, Arthur Barton proceeded to 
organise an unofficial ‘referendum’, a mechanism of loyal politics used in 
Gibraltar the previous year (but there, unlike in the Falklands, with official 
British approval). This exercise gave Islanders the opportunity to sign a 







account (below), the politics of loyalty in this exercise left no room for 
ambiguity; it was a binary choice, with the choice made being remembered 
within the community thereafter.  
Arthur Barton played a big part in all this, and he also held his own 
referendum by coming on to the radio and asking people if they wanted to 
remain British and if so to make their way to various stores to sign a paper he 
had put there for that purpose. I think practically everyone who was capable 
of making the trip to a shop did so and Mr Barton had the support he needed 
in visible evidence. There were two or three on the other side of the paper, 
one at least still lives here today but very recently printed a letter in the 
Penguin News saying I was born British and I wish to die British so may be 
there has been a change of heart (Malcolm 2002, p. 88).  
Through Barton’s activism and the work of the Falkland Islands Emergency 
Committee, the future of the Falkland Islands assumed a much higher profile, 
bringing with it growing British public scrutiny of Government policy, as 
evidenced in this Daily Telegraph report from 14 March 1968. This report’s 
headline – the ‘Islands Britain may give away’ - offered a politically charged 
framing of territorial loss, which would result in the abandonment of a loyal 
community. The article pointed out that ‘The Islanders anxiety runs deep, so 
deep that if Britain does hand over the Falklands to Argentina, not a single 
kelper will want to remain’  
 
This type of counter-discourse served to erode public trust in the Wilson 
Government’s handling of the Falklands’ future. This narrative of letting down 
‘kith and kin’ was reinforced with the photo of Barton, his image and name 
effectively acting as metaphor for an imperiled traditional Britain, whilst the 
caption immediately below it conveyed a real sense that an emergency about 
the Falklands future could erupt at any time; Mr Arthur Barton, the Falklands 
emissary, seen in London. Back home, they wait and wonder’. 
 
Notwithstanding such sympathetic press coverage, the Councillors’ appeal to 
Parliament and Press and a fortnight ‘fact-finding’ visit to the Islands by Daily 
Express reporter Jack Comben in April/May, Anglo-Argentine diplomacy 
continued to advance to the point that by August a final version of the 







The Government of the United Kingdom, as part of such a final settlement, 
will recognise Argentina's sovereignty over the Islands from a date to be 
agreed. This date will be agreed as soon as possible after -  
(i) the two governments have resolved the present divergence between them 
as to the criteria according to which the United Kingdom Government shall 
consider whether the interests of the Islanders would be secured by the 
safeguards and guarantees to be offered by the Argentine Government, and  
(ii) the Government of the United Kingdom are then satisfied that those 
interests are so secured. 
Source: cited in Oliveri Lopez 1995, p. 51 
By now however, the Wilson’s Government’s diplomatic efforts to implement 
the MOU faced the prevailing headwinds of the disruptive power of the 
Islander allies in Parliament and the press, who had nearly half a year to 
organise loyal politicking. This domestic scrutiny increasingly limited the 
scope for delivering the MOU; as a case in point, in September 1968 fears 
were expressed in cabinet that the Memorandum would cause ‘an absolute 
howl of anger in Parliament’, especially as it would be interpreted as a 
precedent ‘for a betrayal in Gibraltar too’ (Beck 1988, p. 101).  
The Falkland Islanders’ most vociferous support came from the Daily Express; 
its report of 20 September 1968 dramatically re-ignited the Falklands for 
domestic British audiences, running ‘Britain gives in to Argentine demands: 
FALKLAND SELL OUT’ as its lead headlne (Fig.4.6). This was the Falkland 
accelerated ‘slow emergency’ framed as front page news, and designed to stir 
opposition in Britain to what was presented as an unworthy abandonment of 
British subjects by the British government.  
 
Squire Barracalough reported that an announcement of a sovereignty transfer 
to Argentina could occur as early as October 1968, which would provoke: 
 
a tremendous row […] it now appears that Whitehall, and particularly Foreign 
Secretay Michael Stewart, has decided that the best interests of the 
Falklands will be served by some kind of unification with the Argentine. 
 
The government’s thinking appears to based on the cynical idea that once 
this long-term decision is announced the population of the Falkland Islands – 
largely British in origin – will emigrate, and the territory they eventually hand 








The Government is expected to argue that the Falklands are naturally part of 
the Argentine and that they can have no future apart from the mainland  














































Fig. 4.6 ‘Falklands Sell-Out’ – the Daily Express makes the Falklands 
front page news 
  








The Daily Express report had thus significantly catalysed what was now 
becoming an accelerating slow emergency for the Wilson government’s 
Falkland policy, particularly holding Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, 
backed by Harold Wilson, to account, and noting the efforts of Commonwealth 
Secretary George Thomson to resist this. Official confirmation of a 
sovereignty transfer would, according to Barraclough’s report, intentionally 
catalyse emergency for the Falkland Islanders by driving them to emigrate, 
leaving the Islands depopulated, and so able to fulfil the geopolitical logic of 
their propinquity to Argentina, namely integration, which the Wilson 
Government was said to believe was their future.  
 
Moreover, the article also reported: ‘It has also been strongly suspected in the 
Falkands that the Governor, Sir Cosmo Haskard, has known that these moves 
were underway but was forbidden by London to talk about them’ (Daily 
Express, 20 September 1968, p. 1). The Daily Express report thus employed 
(accurate) Islander rumours about Sir Cosmo’s permitted agency to discuss 
this matter in its reportage. 
 
Adding to the Wilson government’s discomfiture was the strongly worded 
Daily Express editorial of 21 September, which accused the government of 
betrayal and arrogance, and demanding that Wilson or Stewart personally 
deny that there would be a surrender of sovereignty. It also cited an 
uncommon geographical association between the Falklands and the Isles of 
Scilly. Ostensibly this was because both of these Atlantic archipelagos had 
British populations in excess of 2,000 people; however, it was also an implied 
criticism of Harold Wilson himself, who had been a property owner on St. 
Marys since 1958 (and is now buried there). Whereas Wilson was known for a 
strong affiliation for one group of islands where he owned a bungalow, his 
government was preparing to abandon the other group of British islands to a 
foreign power: 
The report that the British Government means to hand over the Falkland 
Islands to the Argentine has been received in Buenos Aires with ‘amazement 
and glee’. It has been heard throughout Britain with stupefaction, incredulity 
and horror. For this would be the worst of all betrayals. It has been denied by 







be categorically and authoritatively denied by the Prime Minister or Foreign 
Secretary […] 
 
In the Falkland Islands there are living 2,184 (or thereabouts) people of 
British stock. Is it suggested that they do not have the same right to 
determine their political future as, say, the 2,273 people of the Scillies? 
 
(Daily Express, 21 September 1968, p.8). 
 
The Daily Express’ Squire Barraclough and Maurice Trowbridge also 
predicted that: 
  
A Government minister is expected to go to the Falklands shortly to tell the 
2,000 inhabitants that Britain is ready to let the Argentines have sovereignty 
over their islands […] Disclosure in the Daily Express yesterday that a deal 
was near caused joy in Argentina, dismay in the Falklands and sharp reaction 
in London (Daily Express, 21 September 1968, p. 8).   
 
The cabinet minister later chosen to be the ‘trouble shooter ready to soothe 
the Falklands’ (Daily Express, 21 September 1968, p. 8) would be Alun 
Gwynnne Jones, better known as Lord Chalfont, Minister at the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. His mission was to decelerate the growing political 
emergency surrounding the future of the Islands, through encouraging 













4.4 Visualising Loyal Politics; the ‘loyal camera’, Daily Express 
photoshoot and mobilisation of accelerative emergency pressures on 
British government Falklands policy 
 
The despatch of Daily Express reporter Aubrey Mathews to the Falklands 
followed, ‘with instructions to take as many photographs of residents as is 
possible in the short time at his disposal’ (Falkland Islands Monthly Review, 
October 1968, p.17) enabled a further mobilisation and mass dissemination of 
the politics of loyalty for British audiences prior to the upcoming ministerial 
visit. The object of the ‘loyal camera’ provided a means for the visual narration 
of an imperilled British community, offering a vital decelerative tool for 
maintaining the territorial status quo in the unfolding Falkland emergency.  
 
In preparing for the arrival of the Daily Express’ ‘loyal camera’, the Falkland 
Islands Monthly Review mobilised a range of exhortative comments from 
Islander leaders, such as Arthur Barton, Wickham Clement, Richard Goss, 
Nanette King, Richard Hills and Robin Pitaluga, all of whom were members of 
ExCo. Their ‘pitch’ emphasised the vital importance of this occasion as a 
visual statement of loyalty, with the clear expectation, and implied social 
pressure, that Islanders should attend. Wickham Clement stated ‘Of course I 
am going to be there – we are all going to be there. Everyone must be there. 
This is a vital time and it is an important opportunity to show who and what we 
are’ (Falkland Islands Monthly Review, October 1968, p. 17). Clement’s 
comment signposted how important attending the photo-shoot would be, to 
show British audience who the Islanders were, that is, fellow white Britons 
loyal to the motherland.  
 
Arthur Barton’s message to fellow Islanders was that ‘this photograph has my 
fullest support. It will be a great disappointment if anyone fails to turn out’ 
(Falkland Islands Monthly Review, October 1968, p. 17), reflecting that there 
was a clear social pressure to be seen there as members of the Falkland 









In a similar vein, Richard Hills highlighted that staging such a photographic 
event carried risks – if Islanders did not turn out in strength, Matthew’s visit 
ran the risk of being a counterproductive exercise. ‘The danger is that if only 
half the population turns out someone might think that only half the population 
is interested in the future of the Falkland Islands. We must make sure 
everyone turns out’ (Falkland Islands Monthly Review, October 1968, p. 17).  
This comment in itself reflects that it was at least thought possible that there 
could be a less than convincing turnout, although any such fears proved 
unfounded, notwithstanding a number of Islanders having measles. Whether 
there were any cases of some Islanders diplomatically claiming to have 
measles to avoid appearing in the photograph, and so being seen by 
Argentine government operatives, is unknown. 
 
On 2 October 1965 Mathews’ ‘loyal camera’ did its work. The dramatic result 
was the widely seen counter-emergency photo, published in the Daily Express 
on 3 October (Fig 4.7), of a large Falkland Islander crowd at the vertical object 
of Stanley’s Whalebone Arch; this proved a critical – and successful – 
moment in visually constructing and publicising the Falkland Islanders as a 
white British community, loyal subjects who should not be bartered away to 
Argentina.  
  
The symbolism in this Daily Express photograph proved a cornerstone in 
creating a narrative for the British public that the future of the Falkland 
Islanders concerned the fate of kith and kin, that the Falklands were not some 
obscure colonial ‘loose end’ to be disposed of but Britons who needed 
protection from the motherland against the ‘otherland’ of Argentina. Similarly, 
the backdrop of ‘seascape’ in Stanley harbour offered another familiar 
association to Britons, the windy, elemental Atlantic waters suggesting a 












































 Fig. 4.7. The Daily Express picture of the Falkland Islanders , 3 October 1968. 
 Source: Daily Express, 3 October 1968, p. 1 
 
Matthew’s picture unambiguously, and therefore successfully, conveyed the 
physical appearance of the Islanders as white Britons who, in terms of their 







headscarves worn by millions of Britons in their daily lives. This performative 
moment captured by Matthew’s camera allowed the Falkland Islanders to 
represent themselves as a traditional ‘little Britain’, and was described by the 
Falkland Islands Monthly Review in these terms: 
 
On Wednesday 2nd October, in bright but slightly windy conditions, the Daily 
Express photographer, Mr Matthews, viewed hundred of the town’s residents 
who had gathered on Arch Green for the purpose of being photographed as 
mentioned earlier. Dozens of placards were on display, all on the same 
theme “Keep the Falklands British”, and Union Jacks were fluttering from the 
hands of the adults as well as children. Such a demonstration should 
convince those who might be contemplating handing us over to the Argentine 
that the wishes of the people of the colony are: ‘keep us British” and “Leave 
us where we are, in our homeland (Falkland Islands Monthly Review, October 
1968, p. 17). 
 
The turn-out of almost eighty per cent would undoubtedly have been greater, 
but the measles epidemic has confined many to their homes – these, we are 
sure, were, in thought, supporting those who were fortunate to be present.’ 
The staging of the Daily Express photograph came at a very sensitive time for 
official efforts to manoeuvre the Falkland Islanders into an accommodation 
with Argentina.  For millions of Daily Express readers and other Britons seeing 
this picture, Falkland Islanders were shown to be no unknown exotic foreign 
‘other’; put simply, this photograph was ‘us’’  
 
In the course of this research, Sir Cosmo and Lady Haskard made available 
two further images of this photo session (Figs. 4.8 and 4.9), which add further 
insight into how Mathew’s picture worked.  
 
In Fig 4.8, the use of Christ Church cathedral as a vertical ‘actor’ amplifies a 
familiar, British sense of place; its architecture, name and site as a 
consecrated place of Anglican worship helps construct a narrative of the 
Falklands as a sacred far-flung corner of Britain. The height and depth of the 
cathedral similarly provide a striking three-dimensional perspective, 






























Fig. 4.8. Falkland Islanders gather in front of Christ Church cathedral Stanley for the 
Daily Express photo, 2 October 1968. 
Source: Haskard private photograph collection. 
 
The Union flags in the crowd, in Fig 4.8, also collectively function as a 
dramatic vertical actor, especially the one attached to the flagpole in the 
foreground; these loyal objects ‘called’ on fellow Britons to stand by their kith 
and kin in the South Atlantic. Islanders’ placards, produced to perform loyalty 
in Mathews ‘iconic’ picture (Fig 4.7) served to narrate patriotism and protest 
 
This picture (Fig 4.8) enables us to see the affective, emotive Islander slogans 







Kelpers want to remain so’ and ‘As British as the British’ featured, as 
Islanders invoked and appealed to ‘Britishness’. The message conveyed here, 
and in Mathews published picture (Fig 4.7) was that this was not any crowd, 
this was a loyal crowd 
 
 Fig. 4.9. Falkland Islanders gather on Arch Green, at the Whalebone Arch, 2 
 October 1968. 
       Source: Haskard private photograph collection 
 
In Fig. 4.9, the Falklands’ whalebone arch and the elemental seascape of 
Stanley harbour as the background, which along with the Islander crowd and 
the cathedral created the visual assemblage of Mathews’ picture (Fig 4.7), 
provide a maritime framing. With Atlantic waters as the physical connector 
between Great Britain and the Falkland archipelago, this suggested that the 
Falklands could be supported by the residual maritime power of the Royal 
Navy.  
 
Through visually combining the kith and kin crowd, the Anglican cathedral and 







mobilised powerful narratives against British Government policy on the 
Falklands. Bonnet (1997, p. 194) noted that ‘the issue of race returned to 
British geography when the Empire ‘returned to Britain’’; in an unexpected 
way, as the Daily Express photo (Fig 4.7) showed, this was true of the 
Falklands Islanders too in their struggle for dependence on, rather than 
independence from, Britain. 
 
The Daily Express photo-shoot visually brought home to Britons that loyal kith 
and kin compatriots in the South Atlantic faced a very real prospect of an 
emergency outcome to Anglo-Argentine diplomacy, namely the demise of 
their territory as a British colony. From the Islanders’ perspective, scaffolding 
this narrative was a vital decelerative counter-emergency move; in exposing 
their treatment by the Wilson government, the potential political cost to the 
latter was raised, so reducing its capacity to exercise agency in terms of 
delivering the MOU to Argentina. 
 
Now on the backfoot, and facing its own accelerating emergency in its 
conduct of Falkland policy, the British government sought to regain the 
initiative; in an effort to offer a counter-narrative of reassurance about a future 
accommodation with Argentina, the Government made a direct appeal to the 
Islanders, to be undertaken by Lord Chalfont. In the Dictionary of Falklands 
Biography (2008, pp. 146-47), Chalfont, writing in the third person, described 
the mission in these terms: 
 
Chalfont’s task was not merely to emphasise to Islanders that there could be 
no change in sovereignty against their wishes. He also hoped to convince 
them that maintaining the status quo was not in their real interests; 
permanent isolation from Argentina and a refusal even to negotiate was 
damaging to their own economic interests and could be dangerous in the 
longer term. Britain was no longer the great imperial power, but if the 
Islanders could bring themselves to face the future realistically they could rely 
on the British government to defend their rights and allay their fears about 
closer ties with Argentina. 
 
This was to be an effort to enjoin the Islanders to engage with the new 







mission on behalf of The Guardian, reflected this sentiment, retrospectively 
framing it in these terms: 
 
Lord Chalfont, then a minister at the Foreign Office, was the leader of this 
expedition. He had the unenviable task of trying to persuade the 2,000 
islanders that the British empire might not last for ever – and that they should 
start to entertain the notion they might be better off being friendly to their 





The perceived need to impress a ‘modern’ weltanschauung on Islanders lay 
behind the mission; as events would however show, the possibility that 
Islanders’ loyal protest and resistance would reinforce and expand support for 
the Falkland Islands remaining British was significantly underestimated by 
Chalfont. Nor was it fully appreciated that this visit created an unprecedented 
opportunity for the Falkland Islander loyal display to be mobilised against a 
minister of the crown, with a subsequent mass circulation of politically 
damaging press reports and photographs.  
 
That the Anglo-Argentine MOU was not published prior to the visit also proved 
highly problematic for Chalfont who was therefore deprived of the opportunity 
to cajole Islanders into ‘accepting the inevitable’. Chalfont explained the 
importance of the MOU in these terms: 
 
The Memorandum of Understanding that I was taking to them was roughly on 
these lines; that Argentina, and Britain, had a common objective which was to 
settle amicably, but finally, the dispute over sovereignty – taking into account 
the ‘interests’ of the population, not the ‘wishes’, the crucial word.  
 
The political space for loyal politicking created by the absence of the MOU’s 
publication was enlarged by a similar absence of any British Government 
statement of intent as to the Falkland’s future. Chalfont’s mission therefore 
faced the prospect of failure before it had even happened, with the Wilson 
Government unwilling to incur parliamentary and press opprobrium, and 







Gonzalez’s assessment of how Chalfont’s mission was politically exposed 
from the outset implicitly recognises this British Government’s lack of resolve; 
  
Chalfont’s visit had been planned under the expectation that the 
Memorandum of Understanding and the British unilateral statement would be 
published before his arrival in the colony, so the minister could explain its 
contents to the Falklanders while at the same time presenting them with a fait 
accompli. Deprived of a statement that – however weak – was at least an 
unmistakable indication of Britain’s intent, Chalfont was utterly disarmed to 
confront the unwelcoming community of devotees to the Crown (Gonzalez 
2013, p. 209) 
 
Chalfont was heading into deep political waters in seeking to loosen Islanders’ 
allegiance to the United Kingdom. As a former military chief and defence 
correspondent for The Times, he was an experienced political operator, but 
was to find the visceral politics of loyalty difficult to manage. As implied in the 
Daily Express photographs, the binaristic of loyalty suggested that a politics of 
disloyalty existed, and his support for territorial cession of the colony of the 
Falkland Islands placed him on the ‘wrong’ side of these for those who were 
determined to defend its continued existence. Loyal narratives, such as the 
following by Conservative MP John Biggs Davison, offer an insight into what 
was felt to be at stake in the struggle for the Falklands: ‘It fits into the very 
nature of the British nation. It is an offshoot of the British nation. It is perhaps 
the most British part of the British nation. To betray that is to betray the nation 
itself’ (cited in Charlton 1989, p. 82).  
 
Before he had even set foot in the Islands, Chalfont had effectively assumed 
the role of British Government ‘messenger to be shot’, his visit to the 
Falklands allowing the Islanders to showcase their loyalty to Britain, whilst 
exposing the emergency in British Government Falklands policy. Particularly 
damaging to Chalfont’s mission would be the way it was narrated in much of 
the press, with the ‘loyal camera’ again helping subvert official efforts to reach 










4.5 Chalfont’s arrival in Stanley on the morning of Sunday 24 November 
1968, and the loyal crowd 
 
The speeding up of the emergency in relations between the Wilson 
government and Islanders was graphically exposed through the protests 
which Chalfont met on his arrival.  Chalfont’s arrival in Stanley on 24 
November 1968 followed his first day in the Islands on West Falkland, which 
is addressed later in Section 7.7. This was the first time a serving government 
minister had set foot in the Islands capital, and provided the opportunity for a 
loyal Islander crowd to express their rejection of his initiative to secure an 
accommodation with Argentina.  
 
In loyal narratives, Chalfont’s visit is not remembered as a happy event; 
activist Velma Malcolm portrayed Chalfont’s visit as a patronising British 
government initiative to ‘re-educate’ Islanders into accepting Argentine 
sovereignty and accompanying territorial cession. 
 
Lord Chalfont gave us a very stern talking to telling us our future lay with 
Argentina, it was in our best interests, and all that other rubbish they had 
been feeding us for the last eight years. The theme of his message was that 
you belong to Argentina (Malcolm 2002, p. 87). 
 
Ferdinand Mount, writing in The Spectator (10 April 1982, p. 4) shortly after 
Argentina’s 1982 invasion recalled, not without a certain flippancy, the 
difficulties that Chalfont faced in persuading Islanders to embrace his 
narration of the future: 
 
Back in 1968, Lord Chalfont, then Minister for Peace and Disarmament at the 
Foreign Office (one of Sir Harold’s masterly fancies), was nearly debagged by 
the islanders when they gathered the impression that Britain intended to 
discuss a transfer of sovereignty with Argentina. 
 
Crowd protest against Chalfont’s efforts to settle the Falklands’ future status 
had been anticipated. Patrick Keatley, foregrounded for the Guardian’s 
readership the circumstances of the Falklands issue. In a succinctly entitled 
article ‘Islander Loyalists’ (The Guardian, 22 November 1968) he raised the 







this reporting of Islander fears of an impending ‘second Munich’ implicitly cast 
Chalfont in the role of a South Atlantic Neville Chamberlain, ready to sacrifice 
the colony and its inhabitants to appease Buenos Aires. 
 
Approximately half of the 2179 people who comprise the total population are 
expected to line the quayside or take their places along the main street, to 
watch the minister ride by in company with the Governor Sir Cosmo Haskard. 
 
But these people mostly the descendants of Welsh Scottish and west country 
sheep farmers who emigrated in Victorian times, will not be motivated by 
loyalty and kinship alone when they make their demonstrations for the 
distinguished visitor. 
 





This is the bitter phrase one encounters now, and private conversations with 
the Falklanders, although they are careful not to put it on the record in public 
statements lest it bedevil relationships with Whitehall which are already 
bedeviled enough  (Keatley, The Guardian, 22 November 1968, p.11). 
 
Averting this feared betrayal by the Wilson Government, and so decelerating 
this loyal emergency, required Islanders to demonstrate in substantial 
numbers, and to assemble objects of protests such as placards and union 
jacks, preparations that Government House did not disrupt. A national stage 
to perform Islander loyal politics was guaranteed by the presence of Fleet 
Street journalists accompanying the Chalfont party, namely Richard Gott (The 
Guardian); Donald Seaman (Daily Express); Richard Wigg (The Times); 
Michael Field (The Daily Telegraph); Donald McLachlan (The Daily Mail).  
Whereas Donald Seaman and Michael Field proved strongly supportive of 
loyal politics, and Richard Wigg and Donald McLachlan largely so, Richard 
Gott stood out for his radical views, making him much less sympathetic to the 
Islanders. Indeed, Gott’s coverage of the Falklands made him a ‘bete noir’ for 
Islanders during, Velma Malcolm acerbically recalling: 
 
Accompanying him [Chalfont] was a young reporter from The Guardian 
newspaper called Richard Gott. Once the party left the Falklands Richard 
Gott’s report came over on the BBC World Service saying how Lord Chalfont 
had told us at the public meeting in no uncertain terms where our destiny lay 
but he doubted if many of us were capable of grasping the message 








Malcolm (2002, p. 88) also noted that Gott was subsequently alleged to have 
been exposed as a Soviet agent of influence, further associating the ‘project’ 
of transferring the Falklands to Argentina with mentalities of betrayal. Whilst 
Gott proved himself no friend of Islander loyal politics, he nonetheless 
acknowledged the visual impact of the organised, loyal protest that met the 
Chalfont party on their arrival at Stanley on 24 November 1968. His account 
also brings out the three dimensional nature of the occasion, referring to the 
usage of aerial and maritime volume, and the vertical objects of protest that 
were union jacks and loyal signage. 
 
This morning with a helicopter overhead, a naval hovercraft circling around 
and the Antarctic survey ship Shackleton moored near by, Lord Shackleton 
went ashore from HMS Endurance to be greeted at the jetty of Port Stanley 
by 500 citizens. All the children carried union jacks and most of the banners 
they held bore the single slogan “Keep the Falklands British”. Since the 
population of the town is only 1,000 this was a most impressive turnout (The 
Guardian, 25 November 1968).  
	
Donald Seaman of the Daily Express was markedly enthusiastic about the 
loyal demonstration, and articulates a sense of the type of affective 
experience perceived by Islanders and the supporters. His reportage brings 
out the powerful visual impact of the waiting mass assembling of Islander 
bodies, the collective physical presence and facial expressions of the 
Islanders helping to transform their loyal performance into an emotional 
experience felt by both participants and sympathetic observers such as 
himself. 
You could see it in their faces as they stood, 700 men, women and children, 
on the windswept quay waiting for Lord Chalfont’s boat to come in. You could 
see it in their Union Jacks and in their placards. The message was “Keep the 
Falklands British”. 
There were many ways of putting it. 
One was: ‘We are loyal to you – stay loyal to us” 
Another was: “Don’t sell us to Argentina for tins of bully beef”.’ 
(Daily Express, 25 November 1968, p. 2). 
 
Michael Field of the Daily Telegraph and Donald McLachlan for the Daily Mail 
both estimated crowd numbers of 700 and emphasised the use of signage as 







Field commented on how ‘A typical poster bore a portrait of the Queen and 
read – “We are loyal to you – be loyal to us” ' (Daily Telegraph, 25 November 
1968, p. 21), so appropriating monarchial imagery against a minister of Her 
Majesty’s Government. McLachlan similarly drew readers’ attention to the 
patriotic sentiments on signage, as well as the crowd’s weaponisation of 
silence to express dissent. 
There were plenty of placards and stickers saying “Keep the Falklands British” 
and “British we are, British we stay”. But the reaction from 700 Islanders as 
Lord Chalfont came ashore from warship Endurance was a stiff silence. 
(Daily Mail, 25 November 1968, p. 2) 
 
Richard Wigg of The Times estimate of the number of Islanders present was 
markedly less than that of his fellow journalists, but similarly reflects on the 
powerful affective display of loyal sentiments, through the assembling of 
bodies, a censorious crowd of silence protested, mobilising patriotic signage 
and claiming the image of Elizabeth II. 
 
A crowd of about 250 Falklanders with posters saying “We want to stay 
British in the British Falkland Islands” silently lined the harbour in icy winds 
when Lord Chalfont, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, came ashore to the tiny capital town of Stanley… Other signs included 
one on the side of a corrugated-iron general store with a portrait of the Queen 
and the words “We are loyal to you. Be loyal to us”, chalked beneath it (The 
Times, 25 November 1968, p. 4). 
The representations offered by these journalists were critical in narrating for a 
domestic British audience the loyal emergency which faced Islanders; the 
presence too of these journalists indicated too the importance that the 
Falklands had assumed as a domestic political issue in 1968. Ostensibly 
Chalfont was the actor with political capital; through his visit, however, he 
provided Islanders with both the occasion, and the means (through press 
reportage) to articulate their loyal protest directly from the Falklands; in this 
sense, he effectively walked a loyal trap largely of his own making. 
 
Accompanied by Haskard, who had ceremonially greeted him at Stanley’s 
public jetty, Chalfont began to walk up the jetty towards Ross Road, towards a 







Before he reached the crowd, Chalfont was introduced to Council members, 
including the four unofficial ExCo Councillors whose efforts had contributed to 
the Government’s present Falkland difficulties.  
 
4.6 Loyal politics three-dimensionally reinforced through the buildings 
and spaces of Stanley’s townscape 
 
The backdrop of the Jubilee Villas Terrace as seen to the rear right of Figs 
4.10 and 4.11 incongruously juxtaposed an image of suburban Britain with 
colonial protest in the foreground; this protest though was one in which all 
visible bodies were of white ethnicity, powerfully signalling to the British public 
that the Islanders were ‘kith and kin’. In constructing a narrative that the 
Falklands were a trans-oceanic corner of Britain, the Jubilee Villas played a 
particularly useful role. Strategically sited by Stanley’s public jetty and 
vertically prominent, and so highly visible to those arriving in the Islands by 
boat, these villas - built in 1887 to commemorate Queen Victoria’s Golden 
Jubilee - were built in a style similar to many substantial, late Victorian British 
terracesFig.4.10. Members of Executive and Legislative Councils and other prominent 
Islanders introduced to Lord Chalfont on his arrival at the public jetty, Stanley.  
 









Fig. 4.11. The Times’ photograph of Chalfont’s arrival in Stanley (very similar to 4.10 
the Haskards’ private photograph) 
Source: The Times, 2 December 1968, p. 5 
 
The familiarity of this type of building to British eyes acted as a declaration 
that the Islands were part of Britain, a declaration of British sovereignty 
through objects of assembled bricks. Other visible quotidian objects of 
domestic British life in this photograph served a similar function such as 
Islanders’ overcoats, a policeman in uniform and a parked estate car in the 
distance; these objects scaffolded the decelerative counter-emergency 
narrative that the Falklands were British. 
 
The ‘stage’ on which the Islander crowd met Chalfont was, given the nature of 
his mission, a politically and historically uncomfortable space ‘populated’ by 
street names, buildings and public areas, which evoked the traditional British 








Fig 4.12. Map of Stanley, Falkland Islands: on the far left can be seen the Public Jetty 
where Chalfont arrived, with Ross Road running along the harbour side. 
 
Source: David Sami, Falkland Malvinas travellers reference map, Design and 
Cartography Multi-Mapping Limited (1997) 
 
Ross Road itself was named after British Antarctic explorer James Clark 
Ross, whose 1839-43 expedition charted much of Antarctica, including 
discovering the eponymously named Ross Sea and Ross Ice Shelf. Another 
significant commemoration of the British connection was the immediately 
adjacent Victory Green, which marked the Royal Navy’s 1914 victory over the 
German East Asian squadron in the Battle of the Falklands Islands, whilst the 
Upland Goose tavern and hotel opposite signified the ‘British-ness’ of the 
practices of pub life, as well as class distinctions with its ‘Colony Club’ section 
hosting expatriates and leading Islanders such as farm managers. Other 
important buildings with strong British resonance along Ross Road included 
the Post Office, with its banal usage of British royal insignia, and the 
Falklands’ main retail outlet, the Falkland Islands Company-owned West 








Christ Church cathedral, itself the setting of the aforementioned Daily Express 
picture of the Islander community only a few weeks earlier (2 October), was a 
key element in the construction of the Falklands as a distinct ‘place’ with a 
British identity. The most southerly Church of England cathedral in the world, 
it was consecrated in 1892; this place of worship was the colony’s tallest 
building and vertically dominated the Stanley ‘skyline’, a solid affirmation of 
British identity and connection. An impression of the permanence of the 
British presence in the Falklands volume was conveyed through the solidity of 
its British designed vertical stone and brick construction, while its Bishop 
traditionally claimed episcopal authority over all South America (except British 
Guiana). 
 
Within the cathedral’s grounds stood the whalebone arch, which had been 
erected to commemorate the 1833 centenary of British rule over the Islands, 
and which also featured prominently in the Daily Express pictures of the 
Islander community. The four whalebone jaws from blue whales signified not 
just the continuity of British administration, but also the British colony’s 
connection with the whaling industry and presence in the Southern Ocean. 
The narrative of British maritime power was also further conveyed by the 
nearby obelisk commemorating the Royal Navy’s 1914 victory, whilst nearby 
Government House where Chalfont later retired with Haskard after his 
walkabout, built in and much extended since 1845, represented over 120 
years of British gubernatorial rule.  
 
4.7 Walking westwards on Ross Road; Chalfont’s ambulatory encounter 
with the loyal crowd, on the morning of Sunday 24 November 1968 
 
Walking onto the Ross Road ‘stage’ presented a real challenge for Chalfont, 
as standing Islanders had effectively taken three-dimensional possession of 
Ross Road space; in standing alongside the road, they had made their bodies 
vertical objects of protest. In their othering of Chalfont, the Islander crowd 







the Wilson government, who sought to ‘sell out’ the Falkland Islanders to 
Argentina. 
 
As soon as Chalfont and his team left the Public Jetty, they turned right on to 
Ross Road, encountering a ribbon-like crowd of Islanders as they progressed 
westwards. A number of photos from the Haskard private photo collection 
were made available for this research, which makes it possible for us to gain 
new perspectives on Chalfont’s reception in Stanley. 
 
Fig. 4.13 shows an early encounter in front of Jubilee villas, at the eastern 
extremity of Ross Road, in which a couple of Islanders made their loyal three-
dimensional protest with a vertical banner reading: ‘God save the Queen, God 
save our Islands, ‘Falklands’ British for ever!’, invoking both the monarch and 
the divine in affirming the Falklands as a British. 
 
Figure 4.13. In front of the Jubilee Villas, Ross Road, Stanley: Lord Chalfont meets 
different generations of Islanders, with Sir Cosmo Haskard to his left. 
 








The appearance of the Islanders conveyed their quotidian Britishness, for 
instance evidenced in the style of overcoat and scarf of the female protestor, 
and the anoraks of the boys. As previously unpacked, the presence of Jubilee 
villas created a scene redolent of provincial Britain, and can be regarded as a 
powerful object-actor in conveying the idea of Britishness. Whilst the ‘wriggly 
tin’ fence adds an authentic touch of Falkland identity to the picture, the role of 
the large hedge behind it visually emphasises the Britishness of the colony. 
The hedge, a familiar feature of many British gardens, stands out as a living 
vertical object in its own right, with its subterranean roots reflecting the 
established nature of the Falkland Islander community. The ordinariness of 
the suburban scene was powerful as a means in narrating the Falklands from 
a British colonial to provincial space, with Chalfont’s mission inadvertently 
catalysing this process. 
 
As Chalfont walked further down Ross Road with Governor Haskard (Fig. 
4.14), he encountered hundreds of protesting Islanders and was followed – or 
pursued – by many of them, with their placards mobilising loyalty against this 





















Fig. 4.14. On Ross Road: Lord Chalfont with Sir Cosmo Haskard to his left, 
and his private secretary Michael Tait to his right.                                                                                      
 








What is noticeable in this and other pictures is the participation of a wide 
variety of ages engaged in loyal protest, Fig 4.15 (below) for instance showing 
a number of children with Union Jacks, with Fig 4.14 (above) even showing a 
baby’s pushchair repurposed as a mobile object of loyal protest. 
 
4.15. On Ross Road: Lord Chalfont and Sir Cosmo Haskard walk past Islander children. 
 
Source: Haskard private photograph collection 
 
The ethnocultural appearance of Islanders – white Britons, dressed in 
‘ordinary’ British clothes – was problematic for Chalfont. Such representations 
of the Islanders were conveyed and amplified through press reportage and 
the ‘loyal camera’ to the British public, so reinforcing a narrative of the 
Falkland Isanders as a ‘British us’, rather than an ‘exotic other’. As these 
pictures show, this narration of familarity included an elemental dimension; 
the Islanders protesting loyalty did not live in sunnier climes such as 
Rhodesia, and so could not be depicted by critics as using professions of 
loyalty to maintain a comfortable existence. In contrast, as recorded 
photographically, the Falkland Islanders evidently lived in a climate which was 







including Chalfont’s, headscarves, the (largely tree-less) vegetation and the 
fluttering flags. This gave further credibility to the Islanders as authentic 
Britons, living with the vagaries of a changeable and often cold climate. 
 
Whilst Chalfont’s arrival in the Falklands had provided the occasion for the 
formation of the Islander crowd, further insights can be gained by unpacking 
photographs from the occasion after Chalfont and Haskard had walked by. 
Figs 4.16 and 4.17 reveal mechanisms of loyal protest which helped 
undermine the former’s mission, both within the Islander community and 





Fig. 4.16. Ross Road Resistance: walking westwards in the direction of the Post Office 
and Government House 
	








In the first photograph (Fig. 4.16), the bodily concentration immediately by the 
public jetty and Philomel Store (the white building with green roof) show how 
numerically significant this loyal protest was in terms of Islander population. 
Assembling and equipping the crowd with objects of loyalty, notably flags and 
placards, required organisation on a significant scale over a period of time; 
that, as the photograph evidences, the organised crowd was allowed to 
proceed indicates premeditation rather than spontaneity.  
 
The westward flow of the crowd from the public jetty is evident in both photos, 
with the affective experience of loyal protest particularly evident on some 
faces, notably the placard carrier in the second photograph (Fig. 4.17) who, 
flanked by fellow Islanders on either side, has effectively taken possession of 
Fig. 4.17. Ross Road Resistance: Islanders take possession of Stanley’s most important 
thoroughfare. 
 








the road. This placard-carrying Islander, alongside the woman to his left, are  
the same individuals who met Chalfont by Jubilee villas shortly after he had 
left the Public Jetty. With their loyal message of ‘God, monarchy and 
Britishness’, they led what had effectively become a processional crowd. This 
was a crowd of faith asserting loyal tropes, but also very much one of 
demonstrated popular sovereignty. Chalfont’s visit to the Islands had 
inadvertently updated the case for British sovereignty, with this 
unprecedented loyal crowd protest asserting Islander self-determination, 
whilst (ironically) appropriating the Union Jack as their symbol of rejection of 
the policy of the British Government (as well as Argentina).  
 
Richard Field’ s assessment of how Chalfont’s first day in Stanley on Sunday 
25 November had proceeded did not seek to conceal the real anxiety and 
frustration experienced by Islanders.  He noted that ‘The dominant mood 
among the Islanders is perplexity that the British government could even 
consider discussing sovereignty with Argentina. But normal politeness and 
natural pleasure at seeing a group of people from Britain does not conceal 
hurt feelings and indignation’ (Daily Telegraph, 25 November 1968, p. 21). 
To undertake loyal protest, however, implied motivation to do so; that this was 
felt necessary by many Islanders accustomed to living with varying speeds of 
emergency is hardly a source of surprise. Islanders ongoing experience of 
‘emergency life’, at both a political and personal level, had left a deep sense 
of insecurity about the future, as well as anger as Chalfont experienced first 
hand at ExCo immediately after his walkabout on the afternoon of 24 
November, and then the following day. 
4.8 ‘Angry Ioyalty’ – Chalfont and ExCos’ emergency meetings on the 
afternoon of Sunday 24 and morning of Monday 25 November 1968 
With the performance of the walkabout completed, and initial public duties 
completed, Chalfont faced what were effectively two emergency meetings 
with ExCo. Loyal protest had already provided a public outlet for Islander 
indignation and anger at their treatment by the Wilson Government. This 







private space, much ‘straight talking’ occurred. Revealing contents of these 
discussions appear to have been leaked from both the Islander and Chalfont 
parties, and notwithstanding the ‘spin’ of each article, are remarkably 
consistent in the emphasis they place on Islander anger as a driving force 
behind the politics of loyalty. In considering these accounts, behaviours 
connected with anger, confrontation and accusations have been italicised. 
Richard Field of the Daily Telegraph reports how at the first ExCo meeting, 
Sidney Miller, one of the ExCo Councillors who had signed the letter to 
parliament and press, angrily confronted Chalfont.  
He looked Lord Chalfont straight in the face and said 'If you agree we are 
British, why talk about it with Argentina?’ Lord Chalfont gave him the usual 
reasons - the United Nations obliging Britain to hold talks, the interests of the 
large British community in Argentina. 
(Daily Telegraph, 25 November 1968, p. 2) 
Similarly, Richard Wigg reported for The Times that Arthur Barton accused 
the Labour government undermining (and so accelerating emergency) in the 
colony. Barton offered Chalfont the advice that official Falkland policy should 
be changed fundamentally, with the Government hereon reciprocating loyalty 
towards the Falkland Islanders as British subjects: 
 
Mr Arthur Barton, a member of the Executive Council, and former manager of 
the Falkland Islands Company, who emerged as an opponent of any change 
to status at any time […] blamed the Government for the prevailing 
uncertainty about the colony and said that if 40 or 50 families left the 
Falklands “I think the colony may well go under … the minister should go 
back to London and say: 
‘“Look, Mr Stewart, all we have heard about the Falkland Islanders attitude is 
correct, and we can not let them down, now or ever”’ (The Times, 27 
November, 1968, p. 6). 
 
Similarly, McLachlan of the Daily Mail highlighted anger amongst ExCo 
members at both ExCo meetings. So strained do these ExCo talks appear to 
have been that he claims that Chalfont had to point out that the Councillors 
needed to honour their oath of secrecy (unlike in February, when the four 
unofficial ExCo Councilors’ letter to parliament and press was made public). 
 
The Islanders’ five representatives had a stormy meeting with Lord Chalfont 







And when they tangled with him again today [Tuesday 65 November] they 
were still seething… Before leaving they were reminded of their 'secrecy 
oath'. 
 
But the angry faces spoke volumes and were enough to strengthen rumours 
of a scuttle, although Lord Chalfont has pledged there will be no transfer of 
sovereignty to Argentina against the islanders' wishes (Daily Mail, 26 
November 1968, p. 2). 
 
With the headline ‘Falklands diehards hold out’ (The Guardian, 26 November 
1968, p. 2), Gott also presented a narrative to readers of ill-tempered and 
stubborn loyal resistance led by Arthur Barton and Sidney Miller. ‘Diehard’ is a 
revealing description, suggesting that the author perceived Barton and Miller 
to be implacably against Chalfont’s efforts to advance the MOU, irrespective 
of their merits; interestingly, he implies that their approach may have caused 
some anger on Chalfont’s part too. While his report makes light of Islander 
anxieties and exaggerates Chalfont’s effectiveness in addressing these, it 
clearly reserves its disapprobation for the duumvirate of Arthur Barton and 
Sidney Miller. 
 
While Lord Chalfont has had little difficulty reassuring the shepherds and old 
ladies that Britain is not going to abandon them, he has already run into 
problems with the tough-minded Executive Council after giving them an 
outline yesterday [Monday 25 November] of the state of Britain’s’ negotiations 
with Argentina […] Lord Chalfont has not hidden his displeasure with the 
Executive. 
 
Part of the trouble stems from the fact that the two men leading the anti-
Chalfont group in the Council, Mr Arthur Barton and Mr. Sidney Miller, are 
both old men who lack the vision to foresee anything for the Falklands except 
a continuing colonial relationship with Britain. It is not easy to persuade those 
people who want to keep the Falklands British that they are in favour of a 
Britain that no longer exists’ (The Guardian, 26 November 1968, p. 2). 
 
The Economist’s assessment, anonymously written and published a fortnight 
later, offers a more balanced account of the interaction between Chalfont and 
the Councillors, and significantly it addresses the angry and emotional nature 
of the ExCo meetings with Chalfont.  
But from all accounts Lord Chalfont's sessions with the islands' executive 
council were tough going. He showed them the draft of the 'agreed position' 
that the British Government hope soon to issue with the Argentineans and they 
did not like it all, They were angry, hurt and baffled that Britain should be 
telling its subjects that if they wanted to stop being British it would not stand in 







unofficial member of the Council […] In the end sophistication won out over 
simplicity. The Council, half dazed, accepted London's good faith, bolstering its 
insecurity with Lord Chalfont's promise that sovereignty will not be transferred 
against the Falklanders wishes. 
 
(The Economist, 7 December 1968, p. 33). 
The importance of anger as an energy in mobilising Islander loyal sentiment is 
evident in these accounts. The breakdown in trust between Islanders and the 
Wilson government had clearly been an accelerative aspect of Falkland 
emergency, and as Chafont’s interactions with ExCo showed, angry loyalty 
was the result. As is evident, loyalty extended to much more than the vertical 
display and performance of vexillogical fabric; it was an emotional geopolitics, 
and the Wilson government’s apparent indifference to the fate of this loyal 
community had created the dichotomy of a loyalism that was both angry 
towards, but still wanted to be under the authority of, the British government.  
The perceived disrespect to the Islander community by London was a 
humiliation (Moisi 2007) for the colony, and as Chalfont experienced first 
hand, there was no shortage of anger about this.  
 
Moisi’s cultures of ‘fear-humiliation-hope’ (2007) trope argued that: ‘The 
Western world displays a culture of fear, the Arab and Muslim worlds are 
trapped in a culture of humiliation, and much of Asia displays a culture of 
hope’ (Moisi 2007, p. 8). Applied to the Falklands in 1968, the strength of 
Islander loyalism can, in many ways, be explained by the colony’s humiliation 
at the hands of the Wilson Government and Foreign Office; this, combined 
with fear of cession to the Argentine government, meant there was no hope 
other than the continuation of an imperfect status quo. Angry loyalty was the 
product of emergency in Falklands, and emotions notwithstanding, the ExCo 
Councillors had little option but to accept whatever assurance Chalfont was 
prepared to give – which they did. Angry loyalty was a loyalty that felt acutely 
betrayed by London, but was locked into a geopolitical ‘catch 22’ of there 
being no alternative to British rule - except Argentina. Writing at the end of the 
Chalfont mission - and after one last meeting with ExCo on 28 November had 
occurred - McLachlan informed his readership that ExCo had been tamed: 
 







match for Lord Chalfont, surely one of the most polished persuaders of the 
political world. 
After hours of talks, their confidence gone and their minds bewildered by 
Whitehall arguments, they agreed to accept at least the ‘good faith’ of the 
British government. They are beaten and they know it (Daily Mail, 29 
November 1968, p. 2). 
This was, however, a fundamental misreading of matters – Islander leaders 
had to put their scepticism to one side and accept Chalfont’s pledge to 
respect their wishes, however much they doubted it. Islander loyalism had 
grown accustomed to, and fortified by, humiliation, be that from a seemingly 
indifferent Wilson government, or those like McLachlan or Gott, who used 
language in their reporting that suggested that Islanders were ‘As ignorant as 
Sheep’ (Malcolm 2002). 
4.9 Aerial vicissitudes, Tuesday 26 and Wednesday 27 November 1968  
 
With the public emotional ‘atmospherics’ of the mission already so difficult, 
and after two bruising meetings with ExCo, Chalfont now spoke to Islanders 
collectively through a radio interview on Tuesday 26 November, which was 
also repeated the following day, to provide Her Majesty’s Government’s 
perspective on the Falklands future.  
 
Aerially disseminated across the Falklands volume, this broadcast offered an 
opportunity to provide a counter-narrative of reassurance, taking the form of a 
‘question and answer’ with Arthur Barton and The Guardian’s Richard Gott, 
the former having kept Chalfont preoccupied at ExCo.   
 
Chalfont’s responses consistently suggested that on further reflection and with 
the passage of time, Islanders might well come to regard their loyalty to 
Britain as anachronistic, positing that: 
 
a good deal of Islander attitudes can be traced to the present lack of 
communications, and unsatisfactory relations with the mainland especially 
Argentina […] Mr. Barton pointed out that a number of people here would 
welcome the opening of communications with Argentina – for holiday purposes, 
schooling and the like – but he would not agree to this if it meant changing the 








(Falkland Islands Monthly Times, 2 December 1968, p. 3) 
 
Whereas Gott’s questioning was purposed to assist Chalfont’s case for 
engaging with the ‘modern world’ and territorial change, Barton’s was framed 
in terms of loyalty and security; his closing comments were significant in the 
way they highlighted the maximal size of the Falkland audience who had been 
listening to the broadcast, and the extant deep sense of insecurity. It is 
noticeable too that Chalfont implicitly acknowledged that this uncertainty 
about their future had prompted Islanders to write to him about how they 
wished to maintain British rule. 
 
Mr. Barton, in winding up the meeting, told Lord Chalfont that a maximum 
audience would have been listening to this broadcast, as all these people want 
comforting words and lasting security. Lord Chalfont expressed his gratitude to 
everyone who made him so welcome, and thanked those who sent him 
telegrams from the Camp and Stanley – these made it quite clear to him what 
the Islanders wanted. 
(Falkland Islands Monthly Times, 2 December 1968, p. 3) 
 
Reassurance through aerial volume appears to have improved the emotional 
atmospherics surrounding Chalfont’s mission with The Times’ Richard Wigg 
suggested that this broadcast had helped reassure the majority of Islanders - 
so reducing anxiety about the degree of emergency that Islanders faced. 
 
 Sampling the reaction this morning of those islanders, who had listened to the 
 broadcast – which was almost everyone in this town of 1,000 inhabitants – I 
 found that while some continued to mistrust the British Government’s 
 promises, the majority felt that their doubts had been reduced now they had 
 heard the position for themselves’ (The Times, 28 November 1968, p. 4). 
 
Chalfont’s  efforts to create a calmer atmosphere were, however, disrupted on 
Wednesday 27 November, with a dramatic new aerial incursion made by 
Miguel Fitzgerald in a patriotically liveried Grand Commander aircraft, this 
time sponsored by the Argentine Cronica mass-circulation newspaper. 
Fitzgerald however, proved unable to land safely at Stanley racecourse, and 
had to make an emergency landing at the narrow Eliza Cove Road, on high 
ground in east Stanley, by the Murray heights. The crashed plane can be 
seen in 4.18, in patriotic Argentine blue and white paintwork, with the 











Fig. 4.18. Fitzgerald’s return: the crashed Cronica plane  
 
Source: Haskard private photograph collection 
 
 
With his plane immobile, Fitzgerald was now detained by the colonial 
authorities, and shortly afterwards deported from the Islands (departing on the 
HMS Endurance with Chalfont). Whilst this dramatic performance generated 
Malvinas-related publicity for Cronica, its aerial subversion of British 
sovereignty at this highly sensitive time was damaging to Chalfont’s efforts to 
encourage Islanders to consider seriously the possibility of an Argentine 
future. The Economist commented on this dichotomous situation: ‘The crash-
landing of an Argentine journalist's plane reminded the inhabitants of Port 
Stanley again how exposed they are to the crazy stunts of Argentine 
irredentists, the people they are supposed to learn to love (The Economist, 7 
December 1968, p. 33).  
Whilst Fitzgerald had created his own micro-emergency, this performance had 







Islanders or Chalfont’s perspective. What it had achieved though through its 
volumetric disruption was to further unsettle Islanders about the possibility of 
an Argentine future; given that achieving this was Fitzgerald’s objective, the 
timing of this aerial incursion was spectacularly misjudged. 
 
4.10 Stanley Town Hall meeting, evening of Wednesday 27 November 
1968; the temporal dimension of Falkland emergency, and 
anachronisation of the Falklands territorial future 
 
Loyal resistance to an Argentine future had, when Chalfont arrived in Stanley, 
drawn strength from assembling a crowd as an actor in its own right. The 
large outdoors crowd of protest of Sunday 26 November, however, proved a 
unique event, and Islander insecurity about the present and the future – a 
temporal emergency - had not gone away. The sombre seated crowd in the 
picture (Fig 4.19 below) of Chalfont’s address at Stanley Town Hall on 28 
November 1968 stands in marked contrast to the expectant standing crowd 
on Ross Road three days earlier. The sitting bodies of the crowd, and 
Chalfont’s too, appears defensive; the pensive facial expressions, hands 
placed on faces and folded arms in the picture appear to suggest an attritional 
experience in the town hall for audience and speaker alike.   
 
Chalfont used the temporal dimension of Falklands emergency to persuade 
Islanders in a bid to consider an Argentine future, exploiting Islanders’ 
uncertainties. Richard Gott, in an article entitled, ‘Falklanders warm to 
Chalfont's cold comfort’ (The Guardian, 29 November 1968, in Beck 1968, p. 
1), reported to his readership how Chalfont had encouraged Islanders to let 
go of the British past and present, and engage with an Argentine future, 










Fig. 4.19. Chalfont addresses Stanley Town Hall, 28 November 1968. 
 
Source: Haskard private photograph collection. 
 
 You are reluctant to realise that things are changing in the world outside. 
 Great Britain is not the imperialist power of the nineteenth century. It is still a 
 great power but in a different sense. It’s your future. I am not offering any 
 assurances, but, when you say ‘Keep the Falklands British’, make absolutely 
 certain you know in your own minds what this means. It means something 
 different to what it meant in 1900 (The Guardian, 29 November 1968, p. 1). 
 
The strongly implied criticism of Islander loyalism in Chalfont’s speech was 
that the Islanders’ geopolitical attachment to the United Kingdom was proving 
temporally subversive, and would be anachronising the Islands territorial 
status for as long as it was allowed to continue. Chalfont’s representation of 
Islanders wanting the Falklands to be maintained as ‘islands that time forgot’ 
was not well received, but notwithstanding this, the meeting ended in a 
surprisingly positive note. In his discourse, Chalfont conceded that the Wilson 
Government would respect their wishes, that is that the Islanders heard what 







Gott’s reportage of the event framed Islander loyalism as anachronistic, he 
acknowledged that this was what Islanders wanted: 
For all the tough talking, the Islanders clapped him enthusiastically, chiefly 
because he told them emphatically that the Islands’ status would not be 
changed against their wishes. He hinted as broadly as possible that economic 
necessity will probably force them to change their minds, though I am 
uncertain how many got the message (The Guardian, 29 November 1968, p. 
1). 
Chalfont’s anticipation of accelerating economic aspects of Falkland 
emergency appears not to have diminished Islanders’ wish to retain the 
territorial status quo of British sovereignty. This point – about how the 
audience wishfully read too much into Chalfont’s promise to respect Islander 
wishes - was similarly picked up by the Daily Telegraph’s Richard Field, who 
cited an anonymous ‘local official’ (Daily Telegraph, 29 November 1968, p. 1) 
questioning the wisdom – for both the speaker and the audience – of 
Islanders’ affective applause for Chalfont’s assurance that their wishes would 
be respected: 
 One local official, however, asked “Can he really be happy that he has been 
 applauded too much?” He answered his own question: “Doesn’t it mean that 
 they simply haven’t understood that whatever we want, it means the end of 
 the colony is in sight?’’ (Daily Telegraph, 29 November 1968, p. 1). 
Yet as the audience applause demonstrated, assurances from Chalfont about 
respecting Islanders’ wishes were taken at face value, even though 
accompanied by a strong ministerial warning that the continuation of British 
rule would be both anachronistic and economically insecure. The Economist’s 
assessment that such assurances ‘were “straws” worth clutching for a crowd 
resistant to a future geopolitical change’ (The Economist, 7 December 1968, 
p. 3) is a convincing interpretation. As the Wilson government’s efforts to 
secure the MOU and encourage Islanders to accept an Argentine future had 
shown, Islander loyalty already had substantial grounds for feeling itself 
betrayed. This said, it was still preferable to accept the debased currency of 
British government assurances minted by Chalfont, rather than simply end up 








4.11 Chalfont and the Loyal Camp: focus on Saturday 23 November in 
West Falkland, and conclusion 
 
Loyal resistance to Chalfont’s initiative was geographically spread throughout 
the Falklands archipelago, extending from Stanley throughout the Camp. 
Chalfont spent two dedicated days in Camp, Saturday 23 November in West 
Falkland prior to sailing to Stanley, and Tuesday 26 November on East 
Falkland. With East Falkland already considered at length through the focus 
on Stanley’s loyal display in section 4.4, which included many East Falkland 
Camp residents including Councillor Sidney Miller, this section will focus on 
West Falkland. 
 
Unlike the large crowd which would concentrate on Ross Road in Stanley the 
following day, the small West Falkland groups – effectively loyal ‘micro-
crowds’ – that met Chalfont on Saturday 23 November, his first day in the 
Falklands were spatially dispersed, but consistently made use of vertical 
protest signs and Union Jacks. Chalfont’s self-penned entry in the Dictionary 
of Falklands Biography (writing in the third person) recalls his landfall at Port 
Howard, West Falkland: 
 
where he was greeted by Islanders in what he assumed was traditional 
welcome – only to see that their placards say ‘Chalfont go home!’ Despite this 
the Islanders were unfailingly courteous and Chalfont met about sixty people 
in the village hall.  He sensed that the profusion of union jacks was more than 
an expression of imperial nostalgia. The Islanders clearly felt a deep sense of 
insecurity about the future (Chalfont in Tatham 2008, p. 147). 
 
Whilst Chalfont’s mission was in itself an affective contributory factor to 
insecurity about the future, the Islanders’ connection to the United Kingdom 
and its former empire was, as Chalfont perceived, also being performed: to 
use the Union Jack was to express and affirm three- dimensionally their 
imperiled Islander identity, as the minister would experience performed much 










Fig. 4.20. Port Howard protest, West Falkland, on 23 November 1968. 
 
Source: Haskard private photograph collection 
 
The prominent (left) vertical placard in this photograph of West Falkland 
Camp residents (Fig. 4.20) serves as both an object of loyal protest, and as 
an expression of Falklands identity: 
 
                                We want the Falklands to remain British 
           We are all under the same old flag 
                Brothers in arms are we    
                      God save the Queen 
 
On this sign, a credo of Islander loyalism is articulated through national, racial 
and cultural identity, as well as through divinity and monarchy. Unpacking the 
phrase ‘remain British’, Islanders’ unconditional allegiance to Britain is 
asserted (notwithstanding Whitehall’s efforts to detach them from their fellow 
British ‘brothers in arms’), and so protect their Falkland sub-culture; this 
affirmation also operates as a scarcely concealed rejection of geopolitical, and 








The fabric object of ‘the old flag’, the Union Jack, operated both as a symbol 
of national origin and allegiance, with divinity and monarchy also invoked to 
reinforce the narrative of British sovereignty as the ‘natural order’ in the 
Falklands. The flag’s use in Camp at the time of Chalfont’s visit also narrated 
an angry loyalty, stirred by the humiliation of the Wilson government’s 
seeming indifference to their fate.  
 
The Guardian’s Richard Gott confirmed the archipelagic scope of such 
Islander loyalist sentiments throughout the Islands, citing rejectionist slogans 
such as in the preceding photo (Fig 4.20); the loyal reception that Chalfont 
received on West Falkland on his first day in the Islands proved consistent 
with how he was greeted throughout in the East Falkland Camp, and of 
course in Stanley. Gott also implied that loyal sentiment encountered across 
the Falklands’ geographically dispersed settlements had, on occasion, more 
to do with being anti-Argentine than pro-British.  
 
Over 10 days, we visited just about every farm and homestead in the two 
principal islands. We were greeted everywhere – and we could see the 
slogans and the union flag from the air before we landed – with the same 
messages: "Chalfont Go Home" and sometimes "We Want To Stay British". 
The islanders were adamant. They wanted nothing to do with Argentina, and 
Chalfont left them with a promise that nothing would happen without their 
agreement. (The Guardian [online], ‘Argentina’s claim to the Falklands is still 
a good one’, 2 April 2007). 
 
Whilst Gott is hardly a neutral source, given the Islanders treatment by 
Whitehall, this assessment suggests, not without reason, that Argentophobia 
or Argentoscepticism, rather than Anglophilia, was a more important element 
in loyal sentiment than might at first appear to be the case. 
 
Richard Wigg for The Times reported on the prevalence of Islander loyalist 
sentiment in the Camp, and the framings that underlay Islanders’ loyal 
assertion of their British connections. Again, the use of the Union Jack as an 
object and expression of loyal protest is prominent, this time deployed on 
Islanders’ bodies, on their windcheaters. There is an inversion of the 







lay with Argentina; in comments heard whilst on Carcass Island, off West 
Falkland, on Saturday 23 November 1968, Wigg reported that he had heard 
the view expressed that Argentina was a country of ‘primitive’ attitudes, a 
backward actor rather than the harbinger of progress envisaged in Chalfont’s 
‘future narrative’. 
 
These Islanders, too, had their signs out, proclaiming that they were British. 
Some wore union jacks on their windcheaters. The signs revealed their 
underlying suspicions about the British Governments intentions […] The 
conversation between the Minister and Mr. and Mrs. Cecil Bertrand, owners 
of Carcass Island, 4000 acres in extent with 2000 head of sheep, typified 
many of the day. Lord Chalfont asked Mrs Bertrand what their attitude would 
be if Argentina was more friendly towards them and established better 
communications. She replied: “We might not be so bitter perhaps, but the 
thing that worries us is giving us away.” 
 
After Lord Chalfont had reassured her on this point, she came back with “The 
Falklands are as British as parts of Britain and always want to remain so.” [...] 
Mr Bertrand, who was born in Argentina 59 years ago, said it was Argentina’s 
“primitive attitude” to them which caused the hostility (The Times, 25 
November 1968, p. 4). 
 
It is clear in this reportage that Islander loyalism in the West Falkland Camp 
saw the Falklands as a micro-Britain; regarded association with Argentina as 
effectively a means of backwards time-travel to an era of ‘primitive attitude’; 
and – echoing Gott’s observation – incorporated Argentophobia, or at least 
Argentoscepticism, as an element of loyalty.  
 
Based on exposure to Islander loyalism in the West Falkland Camp, and then 
in Stanley, the Daily Express report of 25 November 1968 reinforced the 
rejection of Chalfont’s time-travelling argument that future generations of 
Falkland Islanders may wish to integrate with Argentina. In a robustly pro-
Islander, loyal article entitled ‘From Carcass Island to Port Stanley, they left 
Chalfont in no doubt: ‘We want to stay BRITISH’’, reporter Donald Seaman 
rebutted this entire ‘future’ premise: 
 
Since everything about these Islands, every custom, every neat house, every 
afternoon tea, is so British, it is difficult to see why children now starting 
school might think any differently to their parents when they grow up (Daily 








This bid by the Daily Express’ Seaman to debunk one of Chalfont’s pivotal 
arguments was based on loyal mentalities he had encountered in West 
Falkland. His account (below) has value on a number of levels; it appears to 
confirm the loyal views of remote Camp Islander communities from Carcass 
and West Point Islands, and how Camp micro-crowds mobilised the Union 
Jack as an object of loyal three-dimensional protest and resistance. Other 
volume-related observations in his report include Chalfont’s need to use a 
helicopter and Beaver seaplane to access this; these were the sole means 
available to provide him with the necessary bodily mobility to be transported 
quickly throughout the Falkland volume to deliver his message to remote 
Camp settlements. His reference to the white-painted stones on West Point 
Island proclaiming ‘Keep the Falklands British’ illustrates one highly visible 
politicisation of West Falkland Camp volume, a loyal trope designed to be 
seen by descending and ascending aircraft, including Chalfont’s. Seamans’s 
reference to ongoing Islander surveillance of Chalfont as he journeyed around 
the Camp is also revealing, and highlights how Islanders networked, using 
radio to apprise each other of what had happened, and what to anticipate in 
their interactions with Chalfont on his Camp visits.  
 
What the Falklands think now was made perfectly clear when Lord Chalfont’s 
West Falkland’s visit took him to Carcass Island. The whole population – 
eight – turned out with Union Jacks to meet him off his helicopter. Alongside 
them stood eight more – all the people living on nearby West Point Island […] 
 
Said 81-year-old Mrs. Gladys Napier: ‘My father came here more than 100 
years ago. I would willingly give my life to save this land’… 
 
Wherever he went by helicopter and by Beaver seaplane round the lonely 
settlements, they talked over their radios: ‘How did you get on?’ Did you tell 




These islanders have said time and time again ‘Tell the Daily Express to keep 
fighting for us’. 
 
 (Daily Express, 25 November 1968, p. 2) 
 
As Chalfont’s West Falkland induction had shown, his mission faced an uphill 
struggle to win Falkland ‘hearts and minds’; the response from the West 







Falklands’ socio-economic fabric had not yet proved so parlous that Islanders 
were ready to embrace an Argentine future.  
Inevitably, discourse about the future aroused strong loyal emotions, 
particularly anger at Chalfont’s advocacy of reaching an accommodation with 
Argentina. Donald McLachlan described the raw emotions that Chalfont 
encountered in West Falkland on  23 November 1968 in these terms:  
There were few people to see. He talked with little groups where he could find 
them, but they had their hackles up. 
 
There were three angry confrontations – one with an English sheep farmer, 
who has only been here for only two years and who gave Lord Chalfont lunch 
at a lonely windswept farmhouse. The arrival of the soup did not finish it but it 
calmed temperatures a bit (Daily Mail, 25 November 1968, p. 2). 
 
Three angry encounters on West Falkland, even before the numerous angry 
encounters in Stanley, gave Chalfont exposure to a range of ‘Angry Islanders’ 
a decade before that term was appropriated by the anonymous letter-writer to 
the Falkland Islands Times (Chapter 7). By the time his mission was over on 
28 November 1968, Chalfont’s experiences in certain respects suggested that 
the Falklands were ‘The Angry Isles’. This, however, would be an unfair 
representation. In their cumulative experiences of emergency, Islanders had 
encountered humiliation, insecurity and uncertainty, with their loyalty to Britain 
unrequited.  
 
The emotions that Chalfont had, through his visit, brought into the domain of 
national news in Britain were powerful for residents of Stanley and the Camp 
alike. Behind expressions of loyalty and anger, which coalesced as angry 
loyalty, lay a distinct lack of hope; as Donald McLachlan in the Daily Mail (29 
November 1968) observed ‘there is an air of helplessness and hopelessness 
about most of the 2,000 people scattered over the Falklands inhospitable rock 
and peat bog wash’. Llewellyn Chanter, the Daily Telegraph’s Commonwealth 
correspondent also highlighted to his readers how Chalfont’s visit had 









A telephone conversation between London and Port Stanley, the Falklands, 
showed clearly that Lord Chalfont’s visit, while being welcome as a gesture 
by the Government, has left the 2,000 Islanders in a depressed and nervous 
state (Daily Telegraph, 28 November 1968, p. 1). 
Rather than ‘Angry Islands’, the Falklands appeared to be islands lacking 
hope, anachronistically locked in the past, facing an uncertain and without a 
viable future; this at least was the temporally and socio-economically focused 
narrative of emergency that Chalfont himself had publicly and unsentimentally 
signposted to Islanders, in his bid to deconstruct and dismantle their loyalty. 
The Economist noted that ‘Lord Chalfont was very gloomy about the 
Falklands’ future when he talked to the Islanders. He emphasised the fall in 
the price of wool on which the Islands depend’ (The Economist, 7 December 
1968, p. 20). Encouraging an atmosphere of gloom can be seen as Chalfont’s 
Parthian shot to Islanders, in which this pessimistic narrative of an 
accelerated emergency of decline would become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
 
4.12 Angry loyalty and Chalfont’s humiliation 
 
As Chalfont was to experience first hand, angry loyalty was not geographically 
confined to the Falklands. Owing to the high profile of his mission, Chalfont, 
rather than Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, had become the ministerial 
‘face’ associated with efforts to accommodate Argentina; his efforts to win 
Islanders over to a future of integration attracted much press criticism.  
On 28 November 1968, a hostile Daily Telegraph’s lead story had been 
‘Britain ready to surrender the Falkland Islands’ (Daily Telegraph, 29 
November 1968, p. 1); with a hostile editorial the following day entitled ‘Fog 
over the Falklands’ acerbically noting that ‘Lord Chalfont has a lot to explain at 
home and in the Falklands’ (Daily Telegraph, 29 November 1968, p. 18); for 
its part too, The Times ran an editorial, entitled ‘More Grounds For Suspicion’, 
reinforcing a critical narrative: 
 
Lord Chalfont had spent five days trying to persuade the 2,000 inhabitants of 
the Falkland Islands that they have nothing to fear, and nobody can blame 
them if as a consequence they remain very worried indeed… The whole 
business looks more and more shabby and unnecessary (The Times, 30 








The front page of The Times on that day (29 November 1968, p.1), Fig 4.21, 
conspicuously presented Chalfont’s Falklands visit as an unconvincing failure, 
with the damaging headline ‘Minister fails to allay fears on Falklands’ stoking 




Even before this edition of The Times had gone to press, Chalfont was being 
angrily assailed by Conservative MPs John Biggs Davison and Michael Clark 
Hutchinson through the letters page. They penned a public condemnation of 
Falkland policy, denouncing Chalfont and the Wilson government for 
prioritising the interests of a foreign power over loyal British subjects, 
treasonable behaviour being implied: ‘The discussion with a foreign power of 
the sovereignty of a British colony of entirely British stock, against the will of 
Fig. 4.21. Chalfont’s Falkland visit on the front page of The Times (29 
November 1968, p. 1). 







the people and without consultation, is surely unprecedented’ (The Times, 29 
November 1968, p. 11).  
 
A motion calling for the British government to assert that the Islanders were 
British was signed by 100 MPs (Beck 1988, p. 102), and as John Biggs 
Davidson confirmed in parliamentary debate on 3 November, the possibility of 
Chalfont’s impeachment had been seriously investigated (House of Commons 
debate, 03 December 1968 vol. 774 p. 1268). Vigorous denunciation of 
Chalfont’s activities in both the Commons on 3-4 December 1968, and in the 
Lords on 11 December 1968, confirmed the deep parliamentary loyal anger 
that existed. This, combined with the associated transformation of the 
Falklands into a domestic British political issue, testify to the effectiveness of 
the original Falkland Islands Councillors’ Appeal to Parliament, the Falklands 
Emergency Committee’s hard lobbying and critical Press coverage; together 
these elements coalesced to to position the Falklands’ future as a matter for 
domestic British loyal politics, and also resulted in a personal emergency for 
Chalfont’s parliamentary reputation as a reliable political operator. Adding to 
Chalfont’s difficulties Richard Gott, ostensibly a journalistic ally of the 
embattled minister, published a spectacularly ill-timed article in The Guardian 
on 3 December 1968 that approvingly signposted that the kith and kin of the 
Falklands faced being ‘sold down the river’. In this article, entitled ‘Still 
Edwardian’, Gott claimed that: 
 
The Islanders loved him [Chalfont]. So palpably debonair, he melted the 
suspicion from all hearts. Even the terrible gang of old sheep owners who 
have misruled the colony for years had to admit that they had met their 
match, prompting the irreverent thought that if they are going to be sold down 
the river Islanders would prefer it to be done by a lord. 
 
For they live very far back in the past. The Falkland Islands is probably the 
only place in the world where Edwardian Britain is maintained intact. 
(The Guardian, 3 December 1968, p. 8) 
 
Gott’s somewhat irreverent article which suggested that the demise of this 
territorial anachronism was a real prospect, served to add fuel to the loyal 
Falkland parliamentary fires of December 1968, not that any more was 







about, Chalfont regarding his Falkland mission, Robin Edmonds, Head of the 
Foreign Office’s Latin American Department, observed: 
 
He was howled down on the floor of the House, this gentle, kind, humane 
man. Howled down by members, and nobody, no Member of Parliament in 
any party, and above all not in his own party, ever forgot that. That is why I 
regard December 1968 as an absolute watershed. From then on, in my view, 
in this country the Falkland Islands issue became primarily an issue of 
domestic politics (Edmonds, in Charlton 1989, p. 28). 
 
Chalfont had become the ‘lightning rod’ – or perhaps more appropriate to this 
particular context, ‘the sacrificial lamb’ - for press and parliamentary criticism 
of Falkland policy, but the Wilson government as a whole was widely held 
responsible for an ill-judged initiative, as this memorable cartoon from The 
Times of 29 November 1968 (Fig 4.22) indicates. The cartoon unflatteringly 
portrays Harold Wilson’s Falklands policy as akin to leaving a vulnerable baby 
on a stranger’s doorstep, in this case Argentina. Implied in the 
characterization of the Falklands as a baby is that a family member, bereft of 














Fig. 4.22. Harold Wilson’s approach to the Falklands unflatteringly portrayed in The Times. 







Recognising the intractability of the Falkland issue, by 11 December 1968 the 
Cabinet opted to abandon the MOU, and Foreign Secretary Stewart assured 
the Commons that there would be no sovereignty transfer of the territory of 
the Falkland Islands against Islander wishes. The Wilson Government’s bid to 
respond to UN Resolution 2065, and diplomatically resolve this dispute with 
Argentina, had (for now) been frustrated by a powerful mobilisation of the 
politics of loyalty in both the Falklands and Britain, leaving Argentina empty-
handed. With the Falkland Islanders, after Stewart’s announcement, 
seemingly in possession of a veto over a sovereignty transfer to Argentina, 
the power of this politics of loyalty, which strongly resonated with many 
influential parliamentarians, journalists as well as members of the British 
public, had been tangibly demonstrated. Loyal anger had mobilised the 
struggle to keep the symbolic object of Union Jack flying over this South 
Atlantic archipelago, so affirming the de jure, if not necessarily de facto, 
volumetric status quo. The absence in 1968, or at any other point prior to April 
1982, of a definitive territorial settlement with Argentina, however, ensured 
that the British government had now become enveloped in its own slow 


























5.   Chapter Five – ‘Volume Control’: Volumetric emergency in the 
Falklands in the period prior to the 1982 Conflict 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In its efforts to contain and subdue colonial emergency, Britain had become 
accustomed to using air power in pursuit of its geopolitical objectives. From 
Mesopotamia in the 1920s to South Arabia in the 1960s, the Royal Air Force 
policed emergency across the globe, though its achievements are open to 
question, as Mumford has noted; ‘historical reassessment of airpower in 
Malaya, Kenya, and South Arabia highlights is that aerial bombardment 
against insurgent units is either futile or detrimental’. Adey cites contemporary 
figures indicating the lack of effectiveness of aerial bombing unless 
undertaken intensely, noting that, in the Malayan Emergency, to achieve ‘near 
certainty’ of eliminating communist fighters in a four mile square area of 
forest, 74,000 projectiles would be needed (Adey 2010, p. 163). However 
great the impact on the ground, in periods of colonial emergency, Britain had 
become accustomed to being aerial hegemon; in the Falklands, however, in 
an unusual role reversal, Britain effectively ceded this role to Argentina in the 
slow emergency era, specifically from 1971 onwards.  
This chapter examines the Falklands in the slow emergency era as a three-
dimensional space, and explains how land, sea and air were enrolled in an 
unwelcome project, the result of the British government’s decision to scrap the 
RMS Darwin and adopt the 1971 Communications Agreement through which 
Argentina became master of the Falklands/Malvinas skies. These two 
developments are of much greater geopolitical significance than has hitherto 
been recognised, amounting to a British cession of volumetric control, and 
thus de facto sovereignty, over the Falklands/Malvinas; through this reading, it 
is argued that this is the moment when both British and Argentine 
governments explicitly and formally re-framed/recognised the 
Falklands/Malvinas as a three-dimensional geopolitical dispute. 
Consequently, it is contended that Argentina established from 1971, what I 
term an ‘aerotectorate’ in the Islands, with LADE (Lineas Aeraeas del Estado) 







5.2 Falklands/Malvinas volumetric foregrounding 
 
Agnew’s paradigm of four types of sovereignty over territory – classic, 
imperialist, integrative, globalist – reflects how under more rigorous scrutiny, 
sovereignty becomes a more complex proposition than a traditional 
Westphalian representation allows for offering the perspective; ‘We do not live 
in a world that is singularly imperialist, globalist, integrative or Westphalian’ 
(Agnew 2005, p. 456). Given the complexities of sovereignty which Agnew’s 
assessment implies, ‘simple’ categorisation can be problematic, and it is 
productive to think in terms of sovereignties rather than (merely) sovereignty. 
This is a helpful position from which to start when thinking about volume, and 
states’ ambitions to exercise territorial control over this. In conceiving land, 
sea and air collectively as volume, it becomes clear that sovereignty can be 
exercised over some or all of these spaces, whether in a de facto or de jure 
manner.  
 
In encouraging us to re-think what volume involves, Elden has deconstructed 
the term (2013, p. 15) ‘volumetric’, highlighting ‘the dimensionality implied by 
‘volume’ and the calculability implied by ‘metric’ … Just as the world does not 
exist as a surface, nor should our theorisations of it; ...space is volumetric’.  
Three dimensional, volumetric control, underpinned with political calculation, 
force and violence, has foregrounded the binaries of possession and 
dispossession of sovereignty in Falklands/Malvinas geopolitics and history. 
Out of these struggles, sovereignty has become a legitimising cipher for state 
power over volume, the slow emergency Falklands/Malvinas of the mid-1960s 
to early 1982 being shaped by previous volumetric outcomes. 
 
As will be examined, volume can be filled and altered by ‘intrusive’ objects, 
which enable sovereignty protagonists to leave their volumetric mark, even if 
for a limited temporality; in this way altered volume creates geopolitical effects 
and potentially emergency for the population living within the disputed volume. 
Significantly, geopolitical manipulation of volume shows that emergency has 
an elemental quality. In vying for volumetric hegemony, competing state 







terrain, rocks and seabed, both accelerating and decelerating emergency as 
their transient geopolitical fortunes ebb and flow. This elemental perspective 
offers us a different reading of emergency, but one which is ultimately a 
geopolitical legerdemain. Objects of power offer only a temporally finite 
means to assert volumetric control over air, water and land unless replaced by 
successor objects; nor may a power, in the first instance, be in a position to 
















Whilst Britain traditionally had been able to assert control over 
Falkland/Malvinas land and sea, it had not done so over air. As a case in 
point, HMS Clio’s forcible re-occupation of the Falklands/Malvinas on 3 
January 1833 enabled Captain Onslow’s party of Royal Marines to raise the 
Union Jack at Port Louis, East Falkland, asserting British sovereignty over the 
archipelago; in this way, an imperialist sovereignty (Agnew 2005, p. 456) was 
asserted over land and adjacent sea, but without the means to assert power 
over it, aerial space remained effectively unclaimed. Fig. 5.1 provides an 
imagined philatelic representation of Onslow’s assertion of sovereignty in 
which the union jack is hoisted in Falklands aerial space; the reality, however, 
is not as one might deduce from in the stamp.  Whether in 1833 or 1968, 
Britain was not in a position to exercise three-dimensional control over the 








The 1914 Battle of the Falklands too signified another critical moment when, 
in the worst militarised violence in the Islands’ history (until 1982), the 
metallically encased, militarised volumes of the Royal Navy and German 
Pacific Fleet confronted each other, as prosecuting agents for their respective 
states’ war aims; the latter lost the Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, Danzig, Nurnberg 
and the lives/bodies of 2,200 sailors, tragically encased within the sub-marine 
volume of the South Atlantic. A British, imperialist sovereignty (Agnew 2005, 
p. 456) was re-asserted over Falkland/Malvinas land and sea, but again this 
only comprised partial volumetric control, with aerial space still unsecured.  
 
It is clear that, for Britain, the elusive part of volumetric control was aerial 
space, signifying an incomplete hegemony. With the advent of aircraft 
accessing the Islands, the opportunity to exercise control over the Islands’ 
airspace finally arose, which Britain partially did through the introduction of a 
civilian air service. From December 1948, following the introduction of the de 
Havilland Canada DHC-2 Beaver float plane, the Falkland Islands 
Government Air Service (FIGAS) was operational, the name itself a banal 
geopolitical signifier of British sovereignty. A new inter-connectedness was 
established between Stanley and the Camp, with Beavers’ encased metal 
volume providing aerial mobility of bodies, produce and objects within the 
Falkland/Malvinas archipelago. Aerial inter-connectedness, however, also had 
the potential to revolutionise the Islands’ connections with southern cone 
countries, which provided new opportunities for asserting Argentine 
involvement with, and sovereignty claims over, the ‘volumen irredenta’ of las 
Islas Malvinas especially in relation to aerial space. 
 
5.3 Volumetric insurgents: Fitzgerald and the Condor hijackers 
 
Argentine aerial volumetric insurgency of the Falklands/Malvinas profoundly 
altered the Islands’ geopolitical position, signaling to both Islanders and the 
British authorities that the Islands air space was very much within Buenos 
Aires’ reach. Whilst these flights were unofficial, they did not need to be 
‘official’, for the significance was clear; the potential to command aerial 







the opportunity to disrupt British land and sea domination of the Islands, and 
usefully create anxiety in the Islands as to when the ‘next’ aerial incursion 
might happen. For the first time since 1833, Argentina had the opportunity to 
mount a volumetric counter-offensive, with an aerial corrosion of British 
sovereignty. 
 
The appearance of Argentine aviator Miguel Fitzgerald’s Cessna in 
Falkland/Malvinas skies on 9 September 1964 signified that a profound 
volumetric moment had occurred; that Falkland/Malvinas aerial volume was 
open and vulnerable to Argentine aircraft, introducing a new, volumetric 
dimension to the Islands’ emergencies.  On landing, Fitzgerald planted the 
Argentine tri-band flag reclaiming the Islands, and in making the return trip 
from Stanley back to Comodoro Rividavia he created the now proven 
elemental reality of a two-way ‘air bridge’ from Argentina to the 
Falklands/Malvinas. 
 
Fitzgerald’s insurgent performance subverted British sovereignty, his flight 
dramatically asserting Argentina’s sovereignty over the Islands’ aerial volume 
and territory. Indeed, the union of air, surface, and sub-surface (accessed 
through planting the Argentine tri-band) provided a powerful three-
dimensional performance that forced the geographical imaginations of 
Islanders to reflect on the proximity of the Falklands/Malvinas to Argentina.  
 
A particularly relevant and still unpublished source which directly addresses 
aspects of the Islanders’ volumetric experience is Malcolm’s As Ignorant as 
Sheep. So far as the Falklands in the period prior to 1982 can be said to have 
had a leading political activist, it was Velma Malcolm. Her role was described 
in Harold Briley’s entry in the Dictionary of Falklands Biography in these 
terms:  
From the early 1970’s, Velma Malcolm was the driving force behind the 
Falkland Islands Emergency Committee (later the Falkland Islands Association) 
as secretary of the Local (Stanley) Committee. She was also a vice-president 
of the Association and indefatigable fundraiser. She ceaselessly monitored and 
energetically countered Foreign Office attempts to accommodate Argentina’s 
sovereignty claim, in liaison with Hunter Christie and the Association’s other 








Malcolm witnessed first-hand the volumetric and political developments of the 
period. Whilst her loyal agenda was to ‘Keep the Falklands British’, and her 
discourse therefore altogether partisan in its approach, Malcolm nonetheless 
provides a unique and under-studied narration of contemporary perceptions 
and experiences that existed within the Islander community. 
 
Anxiety was felt within the Falkland Islander community over Fitzgerald’s 
aerial incursion into the Islands’ air space and territory; far from seeing his 
flight as a logistical achievement, Malcolm regarded it as an aerial object to 
advance neo-colonial Argentine sovereignty ambitions, and gave vent to her 
objections to these:  
 
This was a protest about the British being in the Falklands, and they 
[Argentina] had been working up to going to the Committee of 24, the 
Decolonisation Committee of the United Nations, claiming that Britain was a 
colonial power and the colony had to be decolonised. However, they just 
wanted to colonise us from Argentina instead of Britain (Malcolm 2002, p. 81).  
 
Fitzgerald made a further aerial incursion to the Island’ during Lord Chalfont’s 
November 1968 visit, this time resulting in an ignominious emergency landing 
in the Falklands/Malvinas. Whilst this crash landing undermined the 
geopolitical symbolism of this ‘repeat’ performance, it again illustrated that 
whilst Britain claimed the formal trappings of volumetric control – de jure 
sovereignty – it lacked the aerial-military capability to assert that control 
against one solo Argentine aviator insurgent, let alone the Fuerza Aerea 
Argentina (FAA).		
	
As volumetric insurgents, the twenty Argentine Condor hijackers of 28-29 
September 1966 had a more powerful impact than the maverick actor 
Fitzgerald. The hijacking of the ‘micro-aerial’ volume encased within a DC4 
flying from Buenos Aires to Rio Gallegos, and its diversion to/through 
Falkland/Malvinas ‘macro-aerial’ volume, led to a short emergency standoff at 
Stanley race-course; during this the passengers’ bodies, as well as those of 
five captured Islanders, were commodified as a resource in dramatically 































Fig. 5.3. Operation Condor – DC4 performs Argentine sovereignty. 
 
Source: Panorama, October 1966, pp. 16-17 
 
This sovereignty performance, consummated through the hijackers’ planting 
Argentine flags in the Falkland soil, produced the most powerful post-1833 
assertion of Argentine sovereignty in the Islands – the combination of bodies 
(hijackers/hostages), fabric (flag) and metal (DC4) subverted/contradicted the 
narrative of British sovereignty, reviving the Islas Malvinas palimpsest; indeed, 
it was not so much the DC4 that was ‘hijacked’, as the facade of British 
control/power over the Islands stood exposed. Through aerial performance, 
Argentina had made a practical and highly symbolic assertion of its volumetric 
power. 
 
The equivocal nature of British support for the Islanders became increasingly 
evident, as its ‘soft’ response to the 1966 Condor Incident – a significantly 
more serious instance of aerial infiltration than Fitzgerald in 1964 – reflected. 
Velma Malcolm was highly critical of Britain’s ‘soft’ response to the Condor 
hijackers seeing it as performative weakness; she recalled that immediately 








I had occasion to visit [Acting Governor] Les Gleadell in his office in the 
Secretariat and he said how good it was that the aircraft had flown away 
without mishap. I’m afraid my comment then was as it would be now, that the 
aircraft should never have been returned to Argentina. He further commented 
about all the poor innocent children who had been on it to which I replied 
there was no such thing as an innocent Argentine and that in 20 years time 
those children would be adults and perhaps come back (Malcolm 2002, p. 
83).   
 
The intensity of Malcolm’s narrative shows the anger that existed within 
elements of the Islander community about the hi-jacking. The removal of both 
the Condor and hijackers from the Falklands volume in Malcolm’s account is 
effectively narrated as evidence of de facto British collusion with Argentina 
resulting in an aerial and bodily volumetric infiltration. For Malcolm, this was a 
threat that was being ignored, one so great in her view that even Argentine 
children are not regarded as ‘innocent’, and may well pose a future threat to 
the Islands.  
 
Falkland/Malvinas aerial volume had thus been proven to be unsecured by 
both the Condor hijackers and Fitzgerald volumetric insurgencies of 1964 and 
1968, and the Islands’ volume was three-dimensionally altered, exposing the 
spatial hollowness of British sovereignty claims. Without the necessary 
militarised aerial objects of power to resist Argentine aerial incursions, 
unofficial or official, the Falklands lay entirely open/vulnerable to both Fuerza 
Aerea Argentina (FAA) incursions/ ‘sovereignty-performance’, as well as 
those of unofficial, insurgent Argentine actors. For an economically stretched 
Britain which was pulling back from ‘East of Suez’, creating a major new 
Royal Air Force (RAF) base on the Islands was not a serious option. There 
was, however, one obvious way to manage the Falkland/Malvinas aerial 
volume, namely transfer the responsibility for aerial volume to Argentina, so 
ensuring the FAA secured/policed aerial volume.  
 
In this implied de jure cession of aerial volume, the 1971 Anglo-Argentine 
Communications Agreement made a virtue of British volumetric weakness, 
and effectively sought to avoid future aerial emergency through relinquishing 
responsibility for Falkland airspace. This Agreement acknowledged the 







volumetric control over aerial volume. Framed as an arrangement about 
communications, the inventive 1971 Anglo-Argentine Agreement ceded in all 
but name the Islands’ aerial volume to Argentina, though appearing to be 
about ‘closer practical collaboration’ between Islanders and ‘their mainland 
neighbour’ (Smith 1991, p.21). Britain assumed the role of administering 
power within an Argentine volumetric aerial imperium, enabling it to maintain 
the face-saving facade that it continued to govern the Islands. This agreement 
confirmed that the volumetric status quo had been altered, with British 
agreement.	
                                                                                                                            
5.4 ‘What if the Falklands’ volume were handed over to Argentina and no 
one noticed?’ - The 1971 Communications Agreement, and aerotectorate 
This was (metaphorically) a ground-breaking agreement – the impasse of 
1968, when a prospective British-Argentine sovereignty transfer had been 
thwarted by a combination of Falkland Islander and British parliamentary 
resistance, had been successfully circumnavigated. The appearance that the 
geopolitical outcome of 1833 still stood had largely been maintained, but had 
been volumetrically disrupted, Argentina recognised by Britain as having the 
capacity to assume aerial dominion. Whilst the 1971 Communications 
Agreement can be seen as a kind of undeclared Argentine-British 
condominium, this seems misleading; this was British cession of aerial space, 
the foregrounding to a subsequent formal transfer of British sovereignty over 
the remainder of Falkland volume. The uneven nature of the Anglo-Argentine 
volumetric binary is not conveyed in the diplomatic wording of the ‘Joint 
Statement’ of Communications Agreement, which effectively concealed its 
profound geopolitical implications: 
Special conversations were continued in Buenos Aires from the 21st until the 
30th of June, 1971, about communications and movement between the 
Argentine mainland and the Falkland Islands by delegations of the Government 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of the 
Argentine Republic, the former including participants from the Islands [...] The 
delegates concluded that, subject to the approval of their Governments, the 
following measures should be adopted on the understanding that they may 
contribute to the process of a definitive solution to the dispute between the two 
Governments over the Islands which is referred to in Resolution No. 2065 (full 









The opportunities provided by the Communications Agreement for Islanders 
to have new aerial transport links and connections also opened the way for 
Islanders to be won over to their formal absorption into the Argentine state, 
their bodies – and conceivably loyalties – increasingly subsumed within 
Argentine geopolitical control.   
This clearly was a ‘high point of Anglo-Argentine diplomacy’ (Welsh 1995, p. 
158) but not in the conventional way Welsh conceived it; its achievement lay 
in the ‘inconspicuous’ transfer of responsibility for the Islands aerial volume 
from Britain to Argentina, tacitly recognising that, pending a final territorial, 
settlement Britain’s continuing role in the Falklands was conditional on 
Argentine co-operation. 
That air provided the basis for Argentina to exercise its power over the Islands 
suggests that a new term is needed for conceptualising this arrangement from 
1971 through to 1982; this can usefully be conveyed in the term 
‘aerotectorate’, a(n Argentine) aerial ‘protectorate’. Through the writ of the 
aerial pro-consul that was the resident LADE (Lineas Aeraeas del Estado) 
commander, Argentina not only exercised control from above, but on the 
surface too.  
As Fig 5.3 shows, the Falkland Islands Company RMS Darwin functioned as a 
highly visible statement of British commitment to the Islanders and their 
mobilities, linking Islanders to Montevideo and the outside world. The 
withdrawal of the RMS Darwin and its sea-link to Montevideo in late 1971, 
meant the mobilities and communications of Islanders and those 
visiting/staying on the Islands now came under the de facto control of the 
LADE commander, including for the volumetrically disempowered British 
governors of the era. Falkland Islanders were aware that there was a political 
dimension to this envelopment within Argentine de facto control, severing the 









I personally think the withdrawal of the (R.M.S) Darwin was partially at least 
politically motivated […] we had a visit from (Foreign Office officials) David 
Scott […] (and) Fred Burrows […] Communications was the theme of their visit 
and communications with Argentina was the plan. This was a very unpleasant 
shock for us and hardly anyone willingly wanted to come and go through 
Argentina […] Basically its content was that Argentina was responsible for air 
travel to and from the Falklands and would build a temporary airstrip and 
Britain would maintain a shipping service which never materialised (Malcolm 
2002, pp. 91-92). 
Whilst not conceiving it in terms of volumetric domination, Islander Ian 
Strange (1981, p. 240) too was aware that there were sovereignty implications 
to the Communications Agreement, retrospectively calling it ‘Probably (sic) the 
largest single step in the Falklands’ history concerning the very longstanding 











Fig. 5.3. R.M.S Darwin serving the Falklands prior to its 1972 withdrawal.                           








With a de facto aerotectorate agreed, Argentina deployed/embedded LADE 
staff in Stanley, effectively operating as a shadow administration with its own 
officials, and significantly for the first time since 1833, a concentrated 
Argentine bodily presence was established in the Islands.   
Another core aspect of volumetric control lay in the airwaves, a further 
opportunity for Argentina to establish its imprint, albeit aurally rather than 
visibly, on the Islands’ aerial volume. Whatever the accuracy of Velma 
Malcolm’s various claims, her account is valuable as it reflects the deep 
suspicions which existed amongst members of the Falklands community of 
Argentine, and particularly LADE’ s, activities; 
Following quickly on the communications agreement Argentina certainly took 
communications seriously. They installed a very powerful radio transmitting 
office straight across the road from Gerald Cheek’s house […] They used it to 
the full. Every little anti-Argentine incident was quickly relayed to Buenos Aires 
and our punishment was no mail that week […] The radio station in the LADE 
office was used to blot out reception of the radios in people’s houses along the 
airway and affect their 2 metre sets (Malcolm 2002, p. 97).   
Under the aerotectorate, Islanders became subjects of this Argentine 
volumetric imperium, their mobilities now regulated from Buenos Aires; they 
were required to use the ‘white card’, the tarjeta provisoria, a de facto 
Argentine passport for islanders. With LADE as gatekeeper to the Islands and 
thus final arbiter of the aerial mobilities of bodies and objects, the ‘white card’ 
– and not British passports – became the key travel document, with all flights 
routed to Argentina. Velma Malcolm relates the significance of the tarjeta 
provisoria as an object of bureaucratic power, one which subverted 
performances and practices of British sovereignty on entering and exiting 
Falklands volume aerially. 
Another very distasteful point of the Communications agreement was that 
Islanders had to travel through Buenos Aires on a White Card which was in 
effect an Argentine cedular and Argentines would travel here on the same 
documentation… in fact everyone who visited the Falklands had to travel on a 
White Card and many people even British ones had to have three or four 
days in Buenos Aires to obtain this White Card (Malcolm 2002, p. 92).  
 
Through exercising dominion over Falkland/Malvinas air volume, LADE also 
acquired the power of life and death over Islanders’ lives, but also brought 







hospital was available, such practical humanitarian assistance potentially 
offering Buenos Aires the opportunity to win over Islander ‘hearts and minds’, 
as this instance clearly illustrates:  
 
In November 1971 Matthew McMullen who was a lighthouse keeper became 
seriously ill with internal bleeding for about a week. The only way to save his 
life was to have him lifted out. It ended with an Argentine albatross flying boat 
coming to get him (Malcolm 2002, p. 95).  
 
As Fig 4.6 shows, Argentine Grumann HU-16 Albatross Aircraft were able to 
transport people and objects between the Falklands/Malvinas and Argentina; 
this new mobility, in contrast with the slow RMS Darwin, enabled Argentina to 
offer a quick response in the event of medical emergency. Designed to take 
off and land on water, the amphibious Albatross was able to use Stanley 
harbour as an aqueous runway (subject to weather conditions) during this 
period, helping overcome the medical shortcomings of the Islands in the slow 
emergency era. As the 1970s developed, Argentine aerial connections with 
the Islands grew tighter; a temporary land airstrip in Stanley was established 
















Fig. 5.4 Argentine Grumann HU-16 Albatross Aircraft takes off in Stanley harbour  
Source: Haskard private photograph collection. 
The 1971 Communications and subsequent 1974 YPF (Oil) Agreements 
awarded Argentina an extra-territorial position in the Falklands, through which 







latter 20th-century volumetric equivalent of a Chinese treaty port, with air and 
land, rather than air and sea, as the main theatres of operation. In respect of 
tacitly yielding aerial and, increasingly under the aerotectorate, territorial 
control to Argentina, the term ‘graduated sovereignty’ (Ong 2000) holds some 
purchase; ‘volumetric sovereignty’ would however seem more apt as a term, 
as this articulates the extent to which Islanders’ lives, bodies, mobilities and 
communications had become subsumed by the ‘volume creep’ of the 
Argentine state. For Islanders committed to the retention of British rule this 
development encompassed and intensified all four sub-emergencies (Socio-
economic; Geopolitical; Governance; Information control); in contrast, for the 
British government, giving Argentina a volumetric role in the Islands offered a 
means to contain Buenos Aires’ sovereignty ambitions, and de-intensify 
emergency in the Islands.  
	
On a practical note, everyday links with Argentina were now more achievable. 	
Some islanders more open to these connections than others, but this did not 
necessarily imply a continuing growth of Islander-Argentine interactions; as has 
been pointed out: 
a growing number of Islanders were able to have direct contact with 
Argentina for health, recreational and commercial purposes. Between 1972 
and 1975 some 30 children attended school in Argentina, but by 1978 the 
numbers had declined due to the deterioration of the political and security 
situation in Argentina (Dodds 2002, p. 148).  
 
Morover, LADE could inadvertently also end up reinforcing cultural ties with 
Britain, and become an accidental enabler of British connections. This can be 
seen in this recollection from Islander Steph Middleton, in which she recalled 
how Falklands Film Officer Joe Booth, who showed films in Stanley’s Parish 
Hall; 
went further when the LADE air link was established by obtaining films from 
the UK sent by air parcel post on a three week hire.  These were hectic times 
as the film would take one week to arrive, had to be shown every night of the 
week to recoup costs, then put back in the post for return to the UK.  Two 
specials from this period were “My Fair Lady” and “The Sound of Music 
(Steph Middleton, account sent to author, November 23 2012, Appendix G) 
 
In theory, the aerotectorate could serve Islander interests – offering new 







wishes about the future of the Islands to align with interests. In practice, its 
degree of success was conditional on prevailing Argentine political 
circumstances; these deteriorated from 1974 as the Junta pursued its ‘Dirty 
War’ against left wing opponents, representing a major emergency for  
Argentina. What is interesting is that a combination of growing connections 
with Argentina, and the BBC Overseas Service reportage of that country, 
seems to have had the reverse effect of that intended under the 1971 
Communications Agreement, confirming Islander doubts about too close a 
connection. In essence, Argentine power extended into Falkland volume, 
rather than winning Islanders ‘hearts and minds’, provided a more effective 
means of advancing Argentine influence. 
 
The 1974 YPF Agreement emphasised the degree to which the aerotectorate 
had subsumed the Falklands economically, with Argentina’s YPF now 
becoming the sole supplier of petrol, diesel and oil to the Islands. Not only had 
Argentina secured the Falklands/Malvinas’ aerial volume, it now 
monopolistically consolidated its control over provision of all energy resources 
facilitating mobility within the Islands. The YPF Agreement signified a further 
consolidation of Argentine volumetric power, exploiting what might be called 
the harsh reality that ‘the apparent flexibility of mobile technologies such as 
the aeroplane are entirely dependent upon the liquidity of the resource oil’ 
(Dennis and Urry 2009 cited in Adey 2010, p. 207). Not only did Argentina 
possess the objects of aerial control, it now had a monopoly on the fuel-
powered FIGAS and all Islander engine-based transport. To an Islander 
loyalist such as Malcolm, the 1974 YPF Agreement further symbolized the 
ongoing erosion of British sovereignty, and only Argentine ‘bad intentions’ 
were discernible: ‘Argentina didn’t mind losing out on freight on fuel since it 
now had its greedy big hands on communications, immigration and fuel. Next 
step the handing over the document of sovereignty. They were firmly 
convinced of this’ (Malcolm 2002, p. 98). 
The Wilson Government’s abortive 1974 condominium proposal flattered 
Britain’s role in the Islands; the notion of joint sovereignty bore little relation to 







up since 1971. Similarly, the geographical range of aerotectoral power over 
maritime volume was extended by the ARA (Armada de la Republica 
Argentina) as it built up its power over the ‘Argentine sea’, as 1976’s RRS 
Shackleton incident, and the establishment of an Argentine base at South 
Thule to the South, confirmed. The YPF Agreement also brought more 
Argentine personnel into the Islands. For some Islanders, this was very much 
a case of the ‘wrong bodies’, not simply because of their perceived Argentine 
origin, but also gender. It is striking that while Malcolm acknowledges some 
Falkland girls had entered relationships with Argentine males, she also notes 
uncritically that violent chastisement was administered by fellow Islanders to 
girls who fraternised in this way with Argentines. 
 
A huge workforce arrived to build the tank farm to hold the fuel […] With the 
arrival of all these men there were problems and some girls had Argentine 
boyfriends. Those who were opposed to Argentines being here would 
sometimes slap those girls with Argie boyfriends. Result – no mail that week. 
Once we had no mail for three weeks (Malcolm 2002, p. 98). 
 
Given the envelopment of the Falklands/Malvinas within Argentina’s ‘national’ 
volume, Lord Shackleton’s 1977 re-envisioning of a future for the residual 
‘archipelago’ of Islander settlements as a revived Falkland Islands 
represented a disruptive counter-proposal. In conceiving of the Falklands as 
having the possibility of a future as an economically viable British territory, 
Shackleton opened up the (then) slim possibility of British volumetric re-
engagement, so posing a geopolitical challenge to the Argentine 
aerotectorate. The eponymous 1976 Report saw the potential for three-
dimensional development of the Islands. In the maritime volume, fisheries, 
kelp and politically sensitive oil were cited as areas with potential, whilst the 
development of a long-range airfield – entirely counterproductive to Argentine 
aerial interests - would facilitate the usage of aerial volume, particularly for 
tourism. Furthermore, subdivision of Falkland Islands Company land, and the 
development of grasses, and roads, also offered re-imagined territorial usage 
as part of this three-dimensional re-invention.  
Notwithstanding the Shackleton Report’s disruptive impact on the volumetric 







Callaghan’s Labour government did in fact appear to discretely re-assert, if 
only temporarily, some measure of (maritime) volumetric presence. Further to 
Argentina’s 1976 occupation of Southern Thule and its growing impatience at 
not already having acquired formal possession of the Falklands/Malvinas, 
Operation Journeyman was launched in which the nuclear-powered hunter-
killer submarine HMS Dreadnought was ‘secretly’ deployed to the 
Falklands/Malvinas’ watery volume. HMS Dreadnought’s rules of engagement 
included the instruction that in the event of a hostile Argentine act ‘minimal 
force should be used to restore the status quo’ (cited in Donaghy  4, p. 172) – 
emphasises the volumetric reality, that Britain did not seek to challenge the 
geopolitical reality of Argentina as dominant volumetric actor in the 
archipelago. 
5.5 Volume, invasion and sovereignty 
The Communications Agreement of 1971 had resolved which state actor 
controlled Falklands/Malvinas’ aerial volume; the issue of the Islands’ political 
status, however, remained unresolved, to the increasing dissatisfaction of the 
Argentine junta. Anglo-Argentine talks about a transfer of sovereignty, initiated 
in 1977, finally led to the 1980 leaseback initiative in which it was proposed 
that sovereignty be formally ceded to Argentina, with Britain being granted a 
limited lease over the islands. Leaseback was envisaged as a means to 
‘solve’ the political issue of accommodating Argentine sovereignty aspirations 
and Falkland Islander ‘anxieties’. Michael Freedman in The Times on 28 
November 1980 explained its rationale: 
An outright transfer would be politically unacceptable. The leaseback idea, on 
similar lines as for Hong Kong, is the one Whitehall has been suggesting 
behind the scenes for some time. A freeze would merely defer the decision. A 
break-up of talks would probably lead to a confrontation (The Times, 28 
November 1980, p. 7). 
Behind these ‘options’, the geopolitical reality was that Britain was the state 
actor largely denuded of volumetric control. Consistent with the 
Communications Agreement/aerotectorate, leaseback meant that Argentina 
would continue as volumetric hegemon, the key difference being that Britain 







archipelago’ of Falklands settlements in the Camp, three-dimensionally 
surrounded Argentine volume would temporarily remain under British 
administration. Islander resistance, and parliamentary opposition, to this 
initiative unsuccessfully handled by Nicholas Ridley, Foreign Office Minster for 
Latin America, in 1980 resulted in a freeze on sovereignty talks; Britain was 
thus left in a fundamentally, untenable geopolitical position, maintaining the 
forms of sovereignty, without the reality of volumetric control.  
The submarine volumetric around the Falklands/Malvinas further 
demonstrated Britain’s volumetric vulnerability. Owing to oil, the maritime sub-
surface was acquiring greater significance, notably in the Magellanes Este 
block (within ninety-six miles of the Islands). Gustafson has postulated that: 
‘Had Argentina continued the policy of unilateral oil development that it had 
been following since the late seventies, it would have taken de facto 
sovereignty of the Falklands waters’ (Gustafson 1988, p. 116). In fact, there is 
a strong argument that it was the other way around, because Argentina 
already exercised de facto volumetric sovereignty over Falklands waters (and 
territory), its issuance of licenses was simply a post facto ‘legal’ rendering of 
volumetric reality (and as Operation Journeyman had demonstrated even 
when Britain had the capability to take on Argentina, the political will to use 
this was still lacking).  
British volumetric weakness was compounded with the decision to withdraw 
the militarised volumetric object of HMS Endurance in 1981; such British 
‘signals’ to Argentina - which subsequently led Freedman and Gamba-
Stonehouse to write ‘Signals of War’ (1990) - meant that when April 1982’s 
Argentine invasion occurred, it was an unsurprising deus ex machina. Whilst 
catalyzed by the Argentine junta’s emergency short-term domestic 
calculations, this was simply the moment when the geopolitical reality of 
Argentine volumetric control was dramatically revealed/performed to a global 
audience.  This invasion represented a military consolidation of the status 
quo, since Argentina had increasingly been in control of the 
Falklands/Malvinas volume since 1971. What had been geopolitically implicit 







dimensional’ securing of the Falklands against Britain, as performed by 
Argentine planes ‘above’, submarines and naval vessels ‘below’, and its 
forces on the territorial ‘surface’. Residual agents of the British state such as 
Governor Rex Hunt, colonial officials and captured Royal Marines were 
expelled from the Falklands/Malvinas’ volume in April 1982, signifying that the 
aerotectorate had now been superseded by full incorporation of the Malvinas’ 
volume into Argentina. 
Before 2 April 1982, Argentina had controlled the Falklands’ volume; after 2 
April 1982 Argentina (initially) controlled the Falklands’ volume. In failing to 
take into account the (geo)political ‘face’ of the British government, the 
Argentine junta, however, had given the Thatcher government a powerful 
incentive to overthrow the volumetric status quo of the Communications 
Agreement/aerotectorate. In this sense, Argentina had itself profoundly de-
stabilised the extensive volumetric control it already secured, through its 
overt, dramatic militarisation of volume. Control of volume was, in itself, not 
the immediate casus belli of the 1982 Conflict. Rather, it was the political wish 
of both Argentine and British governments to be seen to be in control of the 
Islands, with the former’s unilateral actions in early April 1982 making the 
same a political imperative for the latter.  
5.6 The challenge of volume 
Volume challenges our geopolitical understanding. As in the case of the 
Falklands a volumetric perspective leads us to re-visit widely accepted 
understandings about a geopolitical issue, not least in relation to emergency.  
Understanding the Falklands/Malvinas through volume means that the period 
from the mid-1960s to 1982 looks very different. This period has widely been 
understood as one in which, diplomacy notwithstanding, Argentina was still 
denied the Falklands, primarily owing to the resistance of Islanders and their 
domestic British political allies, the ‘impasse’ only broken by the 1982 
Argentine invasion. In this narrative, volume is not evident; however, when 
volume is considered, new perspectives emerge which re-write this two-







emergency, but principally for Islanders opposed to engagement with 
Argentina.  
Argentina was able to establish de facto volumetric domination over the 
Falklands, through the aerotectorate. To a large extent the 1971 
Communications Agreement, with its three-dimensional implications, 
represents the point when the Falklands/Malvinas space were tacity ceded to 
Argentina, though the full significance of this arrangement was not 
immediately apparent in the Islands or in Britain.  
Whilst the Communications Agreement helps us to see how volume was 
used/manipulated to assuage Argentine aspirations and save British face 
(including managing aerial insurgency) from 1971 to April 1982, it signifies a 
more profound meaning, namely that domination of volume, rather than 
simply the cipher of sovereignty, lies at the heart of this geopolitical dispute, 
with sovereignty simply functioning as a legal expression of volumetric control 
(or the contested lack of it).  
For the cause of ‘keeping the Falklands British’, the Communications 
Agreement represented a particularly dangerous form of slow emergency, one 
more serious threat than Chalfont’s efforts because it actually happened, and 
consequently Falkland volume was filled and altered by Argentine three-
dimensional power. Islander loyalism, which Velma Malcolm’s memoirs As 
Ignorant as Sheep (2002) help gives voice to, was simply unable to overcome 
the volumetric hegemony of objects of Argentine intrusion such as planes, 
transmitters and militarised bodies.   
In counterproductively focusing on the formal assertion of sovereignty, 
Argentina’s junta lost sight of the de facto reality of its power over the 
Falklands’ volume, hence its dramatic and unnecessary militarisation of the 
Islands’ volume on 2 April 1982. This invasion had profound three-
dimensional implications; in essence, Argentina had clumsily converted a slow 
volumetric emergency for Islanders into an accelerated volumetric emergency 
for themselves. In breaking with the British, who had effectively enabled 







unraveled Argentina’s decade-long, slow volumetric absorption of the Islands, 
provoking this extra-regional state actor to reclaim the volume.  
An emphasis on volume therefore provides a very different perspective on the 
Falklands: that the Islands were effectively ‘handed over’ to Argentina in 1971; 
that, unlike ‘usual’ colonial emergency, Britain did not dominate aerial volume, 
quite the opposite; that Argentina snatched volumetric defeat from the jaws of 
victory in 1982; and that control of volume, rather than sovereignty, ultimately 
lies at the heart of this dispute. As Weiszmann (2002) has demonstrated, 
applying volume (literally) adds another dimension to our understanding; 
similarly, interrogating the Falklands from a volume-related perspective offers 
profoundly different readings of the Islands’ geopolitics and slow emergency 
in the years prior to 1982. Elden’s (2013) focus on volume is thus useful in 
encouraging us to think three-dimensionally about geopolitics; as the case of 












‘The Falkland Islanders can not shelter behind their much beloved British flag 
until it drapes their coffin.’ So warned Times of London journalist Michael 
Frenchman, as he exhorted the benefits of economic engagement with 
Argentina (The Times, 23 February 1977, p. 19). Through invoking the banal 
nationalistic image of the union flag as a potential ‘patriotic shroud’ in this 
imagined demise of the colony of the Falkland Islands, the readers of The 
Times were presented with a potent image, one which conveyed a powerful 
sense of unfolding emergency facing this British micro-community in what 
appeared to be a failing struggle for survival, one which was running out of 
time.  
 
That such a warning should emerge from the pages of The Times’ principal, 
and often supportive, writer on Falkland matters is particularly significant, 
attesting not only to the Falklands’ continuing decline, but the continued 
erosion of hope after the Shackleton Report, released in July 1976, was 
subsequently disregarded by Whitehall. Far from delivering any ‘escape 
velocity’ to a future without socio-economic emergency and absorption into 
Argentina, the Report, or rather its non-implementation, had simply become 
another element of the Falklands’ slow emergency, with its attendant 
chronopolitical pressures.  
 
Slow emergency provides an important framing for understanding 
developments in the Falkland Islands of the mid-1970s, both empirically and 
theoretically. As a contemporary term to describe and manage 
representations of British colonial crises such as in Malaya and Kenya, 
‘emergency’ holds a special, indeed unique, empiric purchase as the 
preferred explanatory/obfuscatory British official word of choice to simplify and 
manage serious colonial turmoil. Theoretically, the term ‘emergency’ is also 
highly relevant, with the work of Adey and Anderson (2011), Neocleus (2006), 







with a Virilio (1977) and Nixon (2011) inspired speed-related framing adding a 
further dimension to emergency. 
 
This chapter seeks to explore this slow emergency in relation to the Falklands 
and uses socio-economic developments immediately before and after, the 
Shackleton report as its empirical basis. It seeks to bring together ideas of 
speed and time in relation to emergency. Regarding the former, Rob Nixon 
laid particular emphasis on slow violence, explaining it in these terms:  
 
 By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a 
 violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an 
 attritional violence that is not viewed as violence at all. It is this idea – of 
 speed, and particularly the lack of it – that I seek to relate to emergency, 
 where it is temporally drawn out, less obvious but nonetheless potentially 
 destructive (if not averted) (Nixon 2011, p. 2). 
 
Inbuilt in slow emergency are the political implications of time, the availability 
of which is determined by the speed of a given emergency. Virilio’s chapter 
‘The State of Emergency’ from the seminal Speed and Politics (1977, p. 147-
67) placed emphasis on speed as a determining factor in civilisational 
struggle, with ‘the war of time’ superseding ‘wars of space’ in significance. His 
assessment was that: ‘The transition from the state of siege of wars of space 
to the state of emergency of the war of time took only several decades’ (Virilio 
1977, p. 157).  
 
Such an emphasis on the importance of speed for emergency is important in 
unpacking the Falklands dispute; indeed, until the dramatic new speed 
brought to Falkland chronopolitics by the deus ex machina of the 1982 
Argentine invasion, there had been a ‘long game’ played out through slow 
emergency, with a ‘cast’ of Islander, British and Argentine state actors. Klinke 
has argued that: 
 
Questions of prediction, historical analogy, and even periodisation have 
played key roles in the analysis of geopolitical discourse, but the many 
references to geopolitics as the politics of space alone inhibit a full 








It is in this spirit that this chapter seeks to consider slow emergency, that is, 
as a factor of both spatial and temporal political significance. I see slow 
emergency operating as a less ‘obvious’, subtler form of spatial and temporal 
struggle, with its effects cumulatively manifested. In combating slow 
emergency, the Islanders and their lobby allies faced not only the geopolitical 
aspirations of the Argentine government, but strategic chronopolitical 
pressures from those British diplomats and politicians who prioritised 
accommodating Argentine, over Islander, wishes.  As this chapter will 
evidence, the Falklands of the mid-1970s were, in essence, a ‘failing colony’, 
and it appeared only a matter of time until this geopolitical domino would, 
through attritional slow emergency, be toppled by Argentina. 
 
As will also be unpacked, the logics of prevention and preemption were vital in 
this struggle for the future of the Falklands, and can be summarized in these 
terms:  
At the core of the chronopolitics of prevention, we find a striving for 
normalization and conservation of the present vis-à-vis dangerous futures. In 
contrast, the chronopolitics of preemption are geared towards a reformation, if 
not even a revolution of the present (Kaiser 2015, p. 166).  
 
Applied to the Falklands context, prevention would allow slow emergency to 
continue as the norm, so avoiding a dangerous future of Anglo-Argentine 
confrontation, whilst pre-emption would involve the correction of slow 
emergency to save the Falklands from a future of socio-economic collapse. In 
essence, applying Klinke’s framing (2015), slow emergency left un-pre-
empted would inexorably lead to Islander (chronopolitical/geopolitical) defeat, 
as there would be a moment when the British government would quite literally 
‘call time’ on a no longer viable Falkland Islands colony, to Argentina’s benefit. 
Pre-emption – or however much of this as Islanders and their allies could 
muster – therefore offered a means to resist, if not reverse, slow emergency, 











6.2 Slow emergency experienced in the mid-1970s Falklands 
 
Nixon-inspired (2011) ‘slow emergency’ is thus used in this chapter to 
articulate the speed of the parlous and deteriorating state of the Falklands 
socio-economic existence in the mid-1970s, both prior to and during the 
Shackleton-French era. The atrophying state of the Islands by the mid-1970s 
can be seen as widely pervading Island life, and a major causal factor in 
emigration, bringing into question the colony’s survival. As will be seen, it 
largely fell to external observers with expert, political or journalistic 
backgrounds to summarise of the Islands’ predicaments and to frame 
characteristics of slow emergency. Elements common to these narrators of 
slow emergency, ranging from the Argentine Dr. Ronald K. Crosby to the 
British Lord Shackleton, were that they invariably Caucasian males, usually 
(though, as journalist Ian Jack shows, not always) older, and as a general rule 
undertook a ‘fact-finding’ visit to the Islands in person. Everyday 
characterisations of elements of slow emergency also feature in the pages of 
the Falkland Islands Times; both male and female Islanders such as Ron 
Reeves and Margaret Davidson respectively, addressed aspects of these. 
 
Contemporary observers commented at length on the deterioration of 
quotidian life in the Falklands. As a case in point, Malvinas scholar Dr. Ronald 
K. Crosby, an Anglo-Argentine rancher from Patagonia, and author of El Reto 
de las Malvinas (‘The Falkland Islands challenge’) (1968) was interviewed for 
a 26 November 1974 article entitled ‘MALVINAS: Will we have to invade 
them?’, by the influential mass circulation Argentine current affairs magazine 
Panorama (full translation is in Appendix F). Notwithstanding the attention-
catching nature of the article’s headline, itself raising the chronopolitically and 
geopolitically threatening prospect of an ‘invasion emergency’ for Islanders 
and the British government, Crosby himself offered a detailed summary and 
overview of the socio-economic conditions in the Islands based on field 
research he had undertaken there, in which he effectively identified key 














Fig. 6.1. Panorama magazine, 26 November 1974, ‘Malvinas special’ – ‘ Will we have to 
invade them?’  
 
Source: Original copy 
 
Before addressing the contents of this article, it is important to consider the 
visual framing that Panorama magazine, of 26 November 1974 (Fig 6.1), 
offered to its domestic Argentine audience. The magazine’s colour cover is 
devoted exclusively to a powerful cartographic representation of the Islands, 
so articulating the importance of the Malvinas geopolitically. As can be seen, 
the Malvinas Islands are given an imagined prominence through raised 
vertical lines around the Islands’ littoral, designed to convey an impression of 
height and salience, so providing a striking three-dimensional representation 









Adding to this dramatized three-dimensional visual impact, and highlighting for 
readers the inhabited geo-strategic site that would need to be seized through 
invasion, is a photograph of the Islands’ capital, Stanley [or Puerto Rivero], 
looking immediately towards Port William sound. This photographic view of 
this geographically small part of East Falkland is enlarged to cover the entirety 
of both East and West Falkland, attesting to the significance attached in 
Panorama’s representation to the Falklands capital, the symbolic and 
quotidian seat of the Falklands British colonial government – and key 
geopolitical target for an Argentine invasion. Significantly, too, the three-
dimensional map of the Islands rises out of what appears to be the blue 
waters of ‘the Argentine Sea’, with the words ‘MALVINAS: HABRA QUE 
INVADIRLAS?’ starkly placed below them; this headline is written in white 
capital letters, and so Argentina’s national colours of blue and white are 
powerfully referenced through the combination of blue sea and white lettering, 
emphasising the patriotic nature of the objective of bringing the Islands under 
the Argentine flag. 
 
Panorama sought to popularly disseminate the research of Dr. Ronald K. 
Crosby; senior reporter Rodolfo del Gallo del Catillo pointed out to its many 
readers that Crosby’s analyses were based on significant research and 
reflection, noting that: ‘His observations, product of seven-weeks staying in 
the archipelago, are summarized in a book called El Reto de las Malvinas 
(‘The Falkland Islands challenge’)’ (del Catillo in Panorama, 26 November 
1974, p. 34). Del Catillo proceeded to ask Crosby the following questions: 
 
Del Gallo del Catillo: What type of population is living in the islands? 
 
Crosby: A decreasing population. In 1946 there were 2239 people. Currently 
there are no more than 1.900 inhabitants. In the 60s the decrease declined to 
30 Falklanders per year.  
 
Del Gallo del Catillo: What causes this exodus? 
 
Crosby: Mainly the lack of communication, the poor level of education and 
training, the lack of opportunities to progress in work and the inability to 
acquire lands. The only port from the whole South American continent they 








The lack of inner routes and the Estrecho de San Carlos (Falkland Sound), 
which divides the main islands, increases the feeling of isolation. There is no 
secondary education and children between 5-15 years old receive a very poor 
level of education, in fact below our Primary School. Therefore, important job 
positions are given to native English or Scottish people, with a higher level of 
education. There are also very few entertainment opportunities. I think due to 
these factors, isolation and lack of incentives, a very serious drinking problem 
arose. Added to the negative factors just mentioned, this exerts a very 
unfavourable influence upon the home life, resulting in a very high divorce 
rate’ (Crosby in Panorama, 26 November 1974, p. 34). 
 
Crosby’s overview of socio-economic problems, such as emigration, isolation, 
lack of education and opportunities, outline a number of critical aspects of the 
slow emergency, a beleaguered Islands community under chronopolitical 
pressure that was gradually but inexorably wasting away, in which 
depopulation, decline and deterioration were pervasive, attritionally shaping 
the affective experience of Island life and responses to that, such as drinking 
and divorce.  
 
Opportunities were highly limited in what was increasingly becoming a 
‘zombie’ colony; Governor Rex Hunt recalled being told by Dick Baker, Chief 
Secretary, that only three factors that made the Islands function: ‘FIG, FIC 
and DIY’ (Hunt 1980, p. 31)’. This ‘story of neglect’ is effectively an ‘anatomy’ 
of the Falklands’ slow emergency, with the colony facing a future of terminal, 
drawn-out decline through the effects of progressive degradation rather than a 
fast coup de main from the Argentine military, such as in the Fast Falklands 
Emergency of 1982 on 2 April 1982.  
 
Crosby’s perceptions closely align with those of British oil expert Richard 
Johnson, which shed further light on the slow emergency. Similar to Crosby, 
Johnson had spent several weeks in the Islands in 1976, in this case as part 
of Shackleton’s team of experts. Published soon after his visit, Johnson’s 
article ‘The Future of the Falklands’ (1977) likewise outlined socio-economic 
features of the colony’s slow emergency which, over time, threatened its very 
survival: 
 
One hesitates before using the word ‘survival’ […] as experience has shown 
in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland in the face of migration and a 







‘survival’ thresholds were reached. However, the circumstances are rather 
different for a group of islands 7,500 miles away from the mother country, 
which must support their own government of much wider responsibilities than 
those of UK authorities, and where a population trend leading to the 
continuous shrinking of the proportion of indigenous islanders (currently about 
80%) must eventually colour the attitude of a government defending the 
sovereign wishes of Falklanders against outside claims. For it is among 
kalpers that migration has been most marked. The position has now been 
reached with the islands cannot afford to lose many of the present and next 
generation of young Falklanders (Johnson 1977, p. 225). 
 
Depopulation, decline and deterioration in the colony feature strongly in 
Johnson’s summary of the Islands’ drawn out socio-economic disintegration, 
and similar to Crosby, feature strongly as elements of slow emergency in the 
Falklands. Johnson’s report highlights particular challenges to the socio-
economic viability of the Islands, laying emphasis on the current and future 
difficulties of sustaining wide-ranging government functions for a dwindling 
micro-population. In decoding Johnson’s observation that continuing 
depopulation ‘must colour the attitude’ of the British government, the 
chronopolitical and geopolitical implications of slow emergency for the survival 
of the Falkland Islands as a British community, and territory, are clear – 
unless this was reversed, the Islands’ future as a ‘British space’ was now on 
‘borrowed time’, that is, the chronopolitical would determine the geopolitical. 
As will be seen, slow emergency within the Islands was composed of diverse 
elements, not least anxiety about the future, depopulation and neglect; these 
elements functioned with different intensities as they ebbed and flowed (for 
instance the temporary breakdown in FIGAS services mentioned in this 
Chapter), but the overall ‘direction of travel’ of slow emergency was a 
corrosive hollowing out of the Islands as a British geopolitical entity. 
 
Colin Phipps, Labour MP for Dudley West from 1974 to 1979, also an oil 
expert and geologist, visited the Islands in 1975; this subsequently led him to 
pose the question ‘What future for the Falklands?’ as the title of his Fabian 
Society Tract (1977), again highlighting the centrality of depopulation for our 
understanding of what slow emergency in the Falklands involved. The 
cartographic representation of the Islands on the pamphlet’s cover is itself a 







Phipps viewed the Islands. The Islands are described solely as the Falkland 
Islands with no acknowledgement of their Spanish name designation as las 
Islas Malvinas. The sense of geographical separateness from South America 
is emphasised through their cartographic golden shading, distinct from the 
white of Argentine and Chilean territory (with the golden line of the Argentine-
Chilean border excepted).   
 
It is interesting too to see how this map sets the Islands in a localised, 
regional setting, rather than in a wider international framing; only Argentine 
and Chilean Patagonia are present, to the exclusion of the rest of their 
respective national territories, with Uruguay and Brazil similarly absent. The 
inclusion of the term ‘Scotia Sea’ (rather than ‘Argentine Sea’) provides a 
reassuringly British geographical framing for the Islands, as does the use of 
the name Stanley for the Falklands’ main centre of population as opposed to 
the Argentine designation Puerto Rivero (later changed to Puerto Argentino in 
the 1982 Conflict). In this way, the Islands are effectively made other from 
South America, a distinct insular offshore space, and whilst the map 
acknowledges that Argentina and Chile are (unlike Britain) geographically 
proximate, a sense of offshore British-ness is cartographically conveyed. In 
this way, the map on Phipps’ report reflects its contents, namely a focus on 
the Falkands Islands as a British entity, albeit a precarious one with an 
imperiled existence. 
 
Phipps (1977, pp. 2-3) referred to:  
 
the tiny population, over half of whom live in Stanley. The rest is dispersed 
among 33 widely separated settlements known collectively as the Camp. 
There are two characteristics of the population which mainly strike the visitor 
(a) the almost feudal nature of the social structure - especially in the 
settlements and (b) the remarkable way in which such a tiny population 
manages to sustain the infrastructure of modern society, running everything 
from schools, hospitals and a publicly employed civil service of more than 150 
people, to an airport, radio telephone system and a power station. All of the 
principal social problems, especially drink and divorce, arise from the isolation 
of a small tightly integrated community. It is the increasing impact of the 
outside world upon this community which is now breeding the most urgent 
social problem – emigration. 
 







the challenges faced in the Falklands, the logic of depopulation was 
remorseless. Unless the haemorrhaging of population was pre-emptively 
staunched and reversed, there was little, if any, socio-economic – or British – 
future for a demographically hollowed out colony affected by social 
dysfunction, in which emigration by those who chose to leave ‘for something 
better’ amounted to a form of self-deportation.  
 
The chronopolitical logic was clear: progressively, over time, the slow 
emergency of attritional socio-economic conditions was effecting a 
demographic clearance of this contested insular space, ultimately paving the 
way for an Anglo-Argentine territorial settlement, no longer complicated by a 
‘viable’ Falkland population. Unlike in the Indian Ocean in 1968, no Diego 
Garcia-type forcible deportation would therefore be necessary to ‘clear’ the 
Islands in the ‘British South Atlantic Territory’ of the Falkland Islands, and 
unlike in the 18th-century Scottish Highlands, effecting a ‘Falkland Clearance’ 
would require no military compulsion by Britain – or Argentina. 
 
The potency of slow emergency over time lay in the cumulative effects of 
deterioration over time, and further, future socio-economic deterioration was 
also widely anticipated, offering grounds for chronopolitical hope or 
apprehension, depending on one’s perspective, of a Falkland Clearance. 
Argentine Foreign Minister from 1973-75 Alberto Juan Vignes believed that 
‘the Islands’ economy […] was getting worse steadily. There did not seem to 
be a real future there’ (Alberto Juan Vignes in Charlton 1989, p. 47), with the 
Islanders’ socio-economic plight offering hope to Argentine irredentism. For 
many Islanders profound apprehension about the Falklands’ socio-economic 
viability coalesced with geopolitical uncertainty regarding the Islands’ future, 
ensuring the continuing appeal of emigration. Islanders Joan and Terry 
Spruce articulated such fears in an article in the Charrington Review of 1976 
(the house journal of Charrington Industrial Holdings, the then parent 
company of the Falkland Islands Company), when they explained: 
 
Lots of people do actually worry whether it's worth planting their gardens this 







might be handed over next week". And her husband Terry says "we get the 
feeling that the Government are trying to force the islanders to say "alright we’ll 
go with the Argentine", and the Islanders are very much against this. They want 
full contact with Britain, to live their own life, but now they think that the British 
government are selling us out – 90% of the Islanders believe this 
(Charrington’s Review 1976, cited in Falkland Islands Times, 7 December 
1976, p. 11). 
 
In using the phrase ‘force the islanders’ Terry Spruce was articulating the 
perception that socio-economic conditions were being exploited by the British 
authorities against Islanders whose community was running out of time, 
effectively a strategic chronopolitical weaponisation of slow emergency.  
 
Another key actor, the Falkland Islands Company, also contributed to slow 
emergency; aalthough employer and provider for many Islanders, the 
Company’s economic monopolization and quotidian domination of life in the 
Islands meant that, over time, it had also effectively functioned as a ‘recruiting 
sergeant’ for emigration.  The limited opportunities to function economically 
outside of the domain of the Falkland Islands Company are set out by Crosby.  
When asked by Panorama’s Rodolfo del Gallo del Catillo: 
 
“Is there a Monopoly managed by the Falkland Islands Company?”, he 
responded: “Doubtlessly, there is. Not only because they own 46 per cent of 
the territory, but also they exert a real monopoly over the trading of the 
Islands. From 31 farms existent in the islands, only 4 of them do not sell their 
production through this company. Besides, this company sells the farms most 
of the supplies arriving to the archipelago, as well as what they sell at the two 
convenience stores they own at Stanley Port” (Panorama, 26 November 
1974, p. 34).   
 
The over-concentration of economic power in the hands of the Falkland 
Islands Company was similarly noted by Jean Austin who observed in her 
diary that: 
 
the Falkland Islands Company still enjoys the monopoly[…] in particular in 
Camp where[…] farm hands went to the Company store for everything, 
including postage stamps. Stanley residents had to eat whatever the Company 
thought fit to provide, a complaint of present day Stanley (Austin 2010, p. 122).  
 
The Company existed to make money for shareholders, and was not a 







Falkland Islands and their uncertain future’ (Sunday Times Magazine, 13 
August 1978, p. 14), Ian Jack presented the Falkland Islands Company as a 
monopolistic, stultifying and exploitative entity; the title of the piece with its 
reference to a chronopolitically ‘uncertain future’ conveys a powerful sense of 
slow emergency. Interestingly, in referring to the phrase ‘held fast’, he cites an 
historic association from 1896 of the word ‘fast’ with the Falklands, albeit with 
a different meaning, in which the phrase ‘held fast’ actually implies the 
prevention of speed. As presented in Jack’s rendering, the extended process 
of slow emergency had been impeding development in the Falklands for 
nearly a century, with the cumulative consequences very evident. 
 
Today it owns about half the total land area, more than 1.3 million acres. Even 
in 1896 the Daily Telegraph was moved to describe the Falklands as ‘a 
strangled economy, fast in the grip of the land monopolist’, and some in the 
Falklands would say the position is little changed today. The men of the Camp 
live in tied Company houses on Company land. They shop in the Company 
store for goods delivered by Company ships, and have bills deducted from 
Company wages. Many of them use the Company as a bank […] By means of 
directorship and shareholdings, and by owning the only means of transport and 
marketing, the Falkland Islands Company extends its influence over the 
islands’ few other landlords. For better or worse, the Falklands are Company 
Islands […] This fact breeds apathy. There is little local enterprise in the 
Falklands and their recent history is peppered with little projects, the bright 
ideas of outsiders which have met failures; canning factories, mink farms and 
the like (Sunday Times Magazine, 13 August 1978, p. 14). 
 
Jack’s dissection of the Falkland Islands Company’s impact on the Falklands 
unpacks what the slow emergency meant there; an economically dependent 
and disadvantaged population with little stake, or opportunity of a stake, in the 
betterment of their lives, or of the Islands, in which there was – as the 
contemporary 1977 Sex Pistols song ‘God save the Queen’ opined – ‘No 
Future’.  
 
The logic behind Jack’s narration of the Falklands as ‘Company Islands’ and 
the claim that this bred apathy is clear(Sunday Times Magazine, 13 August 1978, 
p. 14).; this was an economically disempowered population, in which Islanders 
had to be resigned to their temporally drawn out fate, unless they opted for a 
‘future’ by emigrating overseas. In either instance, slow emergency applied 







population, or greater emigration. Royal Marine commander Ewan Southby 
Taylor was highly critical of what he saw as the corrosive effect of this 
unequal relationship, and claimed that ‘The Islanders’ greatest mistake was to 
accept a decline in self-respect, but this in turn was based on the lack of investment 
due to a poor return on their GNP – and for that most blamed the FIC’ (Southby-
Taylor 2003, p. 45).  
 
An atmosphere of disempowerment and apprehension for those living in the 
Islands function as a vital part of the Slow Falklands Emergency, with the 
prevailing uncertainty leading to corrosive outcomes, notably depopulation. An 
insight into the quotidian atmospherics of work in the Islands is provided by a 
letter from Ron Reeves to the Falkland Islands Times, written from Hill Cove 
on 17 March 1977, in which he laid bare the implications of an imbalanced 
power relationship between Islanders and their employers: 
 
There are in the colony three main outlets for employment; the camp, which 
encompasses all farms, Falkland Islands government and the Falkland Islands 
Company for town, and a few independents. This has some bearing on the 
situation as assuming you have a desire to see reforms made in the camp then 
it is of no use chasing from one farm to another as they all have a tendency to 
have the same basic problems. If you fall out with the government, you're left 
with the F.I.C, assuming you haven't crossed swords them in the camp, which 
then leaves you little choice (Ron ‘Pseudo’ Reeves in Falkland Islands Times, 
14 April 1977, p. 4).  
 
Limited opportunities for work, initiative and self-expression emerge as 
important aspects of slow emergency, with its practical effect – emigration – 
the result: 
 
I'm quite sure that all of these main sources of employment, have at some 
stage or other crossed swords with a "good man". There usually being no give 
and take on the employer’s side, the result – emigration and many a good man 
has left the company for good […] Employees still retain the old-fashioned 
Victorian view of "if you don't like it, get out" rather than examine the trouble of 
anguish to try to involve a solution (Ron ‘Pseudo’ Reeves in Falkland Islands 
Times, 14 April 1977, p. 4).  
 
An anachronistic Falklands is depicted by Ron Reeves (‘Victorian’), which 
aligns with the earlier description of ‘almost feudal’ (Phipps 1977, p. 2) in 
conveying a sense that these were backward-looking, temporally left behind 







that contemporaries perceived the experience of slow emergency as a 
present belonging to the past, offering little – if not no – future. What is quite 
remarkable is that the way the Falkland Islands Company presented itself to 
the British public as a progressive actor, which supported Islanders’ 
independence and resilience, in contrast to the anachronistic dependency and 
demoralisation that resulted from experiencing the effects of slow emergency 
‘on the ground’. In a post Shackleton Report advertorial (Fig. 6.2) about the 
Falklands in The Times on 26 August 1976 – entitled ‘They may be small but 
they stand on their own two feet’– Charringtons, as owners of the Falkland 






































Fig. 6.2. Charrington’s ‘advertorial’ 
 








he Company is by far the biggest employer on the islands, and it tries to 
discharge the responsibilities which this entails – not just as regards 
conditions of employment, but is sponsoring social activities and community 
efforts, and helping the islanders to keep in touch with friends and relations in 
Britain. It is pledged to do its best to see that Britain does not let them down. 
 
 This representation of the Falkland Islands Company as beneficently 
operating for the wider good of the Islands, patriotically upholding the ‘wool 
man’s burden’ in the South Atlantic, stood in stark contrast to the reality of 
slow emergency in the Falklands.  
 
It is interesting to note how the Islands are cartographically represented, in 
cloud – or wool – like form, helping foster an atmosphere for readers of 
reassurance. It is also noticeable how, in the the advertorial, the Falkland 
Islands Company provides ‘cover’ for the British government over the lack of 
subsidies to the failing colony, instead laying emphasis on the Islands’ 
economic benefits to the inhabitants of Britain. The narrative moves from the 
counter-factual ‘Even if the Falkland Islands received large subsidies […]’ to 
the factual ‘But they are not a ’grant-in-aid’ colony, and they make a very 
healthy contribution to the sterling area’s balance of trade, with the £2m worth 
of superb wool they send us each year [...] They are entirely self-supporting’. 
It is, indeed, hard to reconcile this advertorial with the grinding reality of life in 
the Falklands ‘slow emergency’. 
 
Crosby offered a more accurate assessment of the socio-economic decline of 
the Islands under the duumvirate of the British government and the Falkland 
Islands Company; he argued that that Islands were, in fact, being run down 
and asset stripped: ‘It becomes harder every day to re-float the economy of 
the archipelago, and they are sinking it before surrendering power to us’ 
(Panorama, 26 November 1974, p. 34). Interestingly this suggests that 
chronoeconomic considerations (‘exploit the Islands while one can’) preceded 
chronopolitical ones, such as ‘accepting the inevitable’ and yielding to 
Argentina’s sovereignty demands, albeit according to Crosby over an 
economically denuded archipelago.   
 







geopolitical and chronopolitical uncertainty about the Islands’ future militated 
against investment both from the Company itself, and any other economic 
actor that might seek to challenge its monopoly. Reflecting on the 
atmospherics of economic and social ossification over the years prior to the 
1982 conflict, Joan and Terry Spruce, in a research interview for this chapter, 
recalled the apprehension and stagnation that made up slow emergency: 
 
Joan Spruce: Why would you invest in a country where you’ve got no idea 
what you’re going to end up as? […] 
 
Terry Spruce: […] the social structure was Victorian! What were we watching 
the other night? [...] Downton Abbey! (laughter) 
 
(Terry and Joan Spruce, 23 October 2012, recorded interview with author)  
 
The reference to ‘Victorian’ again reinforces the sense of the Falklands as 
anachronistic, in many ways less a relic of the British Empire than a splinter of 
19th-century Britain ‘out of time’ enduring in the South Atlantic, where the 
Falkland present was the British past. In this reading the Falklands can be 
seen to resemble more a domestic provincial backwater than a colonial 
outpost. 
 
Yet, as this section has sought to establish through drawing on a range of 
contemporary observers – Islanders, British and Argentine – there was little, 
or no, future for Islanders. Slow emergency was, over time, reducing the 
Falklands to the chronopolitical point of non-viability, effectively a ‘slow 
clearance’. The combination of demoralising atmosphere and outcomes 
underscored Slow Emergency’s potential to remove the Falklands as an 
irritant in Anglo-Argentine relations, this ongoing socio-economic 
disintegration progressively putting Islanders under chronopolitical pressure.  
The eventual elimination of the Islanders as a non-state actor in the dispute 
would allow the British and Argentine state actors to definitively resolve this 
geopolitical dispute. We now turn to the Shackleton Report and its role in 
addressing, but eventually becoming subsumed by, the Falklands’ slow 








6.3 Slow Emergency in the Shackleton-French era: the Shackleton 
Report 
 
The Shackleton Report of July 1976 provides a diagnosis of the nature of the 
slow emergency that affected the Falklands in the years prior to 1982 but 
rather than helping pre-empt its continuation, it became a factor compounding 
it. Its significance lies not simply in its findings, but in what these reveal about 
constituent elements of slow emergency – the sub-emergencies which 
collectively make up slow emergency – as well as in the atmosphere it 
generated in the Islands at the time, and how the non-implementation of its 
recommendations deepened the chronopolitical pressures of slow emergency. 
Indeed, the reluctance of the British government to act on the Shackleton 
Report recommendations also reflected its clear role as a major contributory 
factor in slow emergency.   
 
In terms of mapping out the key areas of slow emergency as experienced in 
the Falkland Islands context, a framework of constituent elements can be 
constructed (as per Table 6.1 below). It should be noted that this is intended 
to be a flexible, rather than fixed, framework of constituent elements. Whilst 
sub-emergencies 1, 2 and 3 (socio-economic, geopolitical and governance) 
are very likely to be widely applicable as constituent elements in other 
empirical cases, sub-emergencies particularly specific to the area of study in 
question are to be expected, as per sub-emergency 4.  
 
In the event that an emergency materialises, the speed of emergency over 
time can be expected to be in flux, accelerating or decelerating as determined 
by the unfolding of the constituent elements that function as sub-emergencies. 
Slow emergency in the Falklands or elsewhere can be seen as a supra-
emergency incorporating sub-emergencies, the latter contributing to overall 
acceleration or deceleration according to their respective impact at any point  
in time, thus determining its overall speed and chronopolitical significance. 
Acceleration is taken as when a sub-emergency, either individually or in sync 
with another sub-emergency, speeds up the rate of decline socio-







opposite. Whether acceleration or deceleration occurs, the impact is felt 
directly in the Falklands’ strategic chronopolitics, with the speed of emergency 
providing less or more time for actors to pre-empt or prevent envisaged future 
outcomes. In applying the logics of pre-emption and prevention to the 
respective sub-emergencies, Islanders and the British authorities can be seen 
as having distinctly contrasting perceptions of the present and future (see 
Table 6.1 below). 
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Table 6.1 Constituent elements of the Falklands’ slow emergency with logics 
 
For Islanders, their present and past had been shaped by slow emergency, 
and pre-emption was required to avoid slow emergency determining – and 
ultimately eradicating – the Islands’ future as a British geopolitical entity. In 
contrast, slow emergency offered a much more comfortable future for 
Whitehall, offering as it did a means to extricate itself from this 
temporal/colonial South Atlantic relic, achieve improved Anglo-Argentine 
relations, and remove the Islands as an anachronistic problem for future 
British foreign policy to manage. These different logics – ‘instruments we 
choose to modify the present, namely, normalizing procedures in the first case 
versus reforming procedures in the second’ (Kaiser 2015, p. 171) – reflect the 
vital importance of influencing the strategic chronopolitics for the Falklands’ 
future, with the Shackleton report a key episode in this. 
The origin of the Shackleton report can be traced back to British Prime 
minster James Callaghan who, in commissioning the report, preventatively  
envisaged it as a future means to economically develop the Falkland sub-
region, to contain Argentina through economic engagement and to 







doing, sub-emergencies 1 (socio-economic) and 2 (geopolitical) could be 
addressed, the logic of prevention from the official British perspective being to 
‘buy time’ to resolve the dispute with Argentina satisfactorily. 
 
The purpose was to explore the possibilities of economic development in the 
Falkland Islands and southwest Atlantic, in a way in which we could engage 
the cooperation of the Argentine government. Throughout the whole period I 
had anything to do with this, my assessment was that, provided the 
Argentines’ believed that we were willing to keep discussing these matters, 
and to find various formulae, that would enable them to satisfy their public 
opinion, then the issue would not come to a head. It was insoluble. There was 
no solution that could satisfy both sides […] So, not in any attempt to dodge 
the issue, but to try to create conditions in which the Argentine government 
could feel satisfied, it was this that led me to propose the Shackleton 
Commission (Callaghan in Freedman 2005, p. 45-46). 
 
What became known as the Shackleton Commission potentially offered a way 
to manage slow emergency, containing an irredentist Argentina over time 
through developing economic collaboration, with the socio-economic benefits 
accruing to the Falklands from this illustrating the ‘wisdom’ of engaging with 
Argentina to the Islanders. It offered the possibility of creating a future 
‘preventative architecture’ for a geopolitical resolution of the dispute. 
Subsequently, and counter-productively to Callaghan’s aims, the report 
produced by this Commission, under Shackleton’s auspices, effectively  
evolved into a schema to pre-empt and disrupt deepening slow emergency in 
the Falklands with only a marginal role for Argentina; in the report’s emphasis 
on sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) rather than 2 (geopolitical), 
Callaghan’s ambition of creating ‘conditions’ (Callaghan in Freedman 2005, 
p.46) to satisfy the Argentine government had become compromised and pre-
empted. This development will be unpacked more fully later in the chapter, but 
it is important to draw attention to the implications of how slow emergency 
was addressed. Any deceleration of slow emergency which subsequently 
resulted from implementing Shackleton’s recommendations would implicitly 
function as a ‘reforming’ chronopolitical and geopolitical act which would, if 
only for a limited temporal respite, perpetuate the territorial status quo – to the 
benefit of Islanders, and Argentina’s disadvantage.  
 
Left unaddressed, however, the corrosive decline of slow emergency on the 







hopes, the resulting non-viability of the islands as a British colony anticipating 
an Argentine geopolitical future. It is hardly surprising therefore that the 
Shackleton commission and its work became a source of Anglo-Argentine 
geopolitical tension rather than cooperation, even before its recommendations 
were announced. 
 
The impending Shackleton Commission was announced in an October 1975 
Times article, entitled ‘Lord Shackleton for Falklands’ (The Times, 17 October 
1975, p. 6), in which correspondent Roger Berthoud revealed that an 
‘economic and fiscal’ survey of the Falkland Islands had been commissioned 
by the Callaghan government, which was an implicit acknowledgement of the 
cumulative impact of slow emergency through past and present economic 
weakening (sub-emergency 1):  
 
The move reflects British concern at the weakening of the islands’ economy 
[…] The British Government’s aim remains to balance its moral obligations to 
the islanders, who enjoy vigorous support at Westminster, with cooperation 
with Argentina and Britain’s broad national interest on an issue where it has 
few friends (The Times, 17 October 1975, p. 6).  
 
Whilst this ‘weakening of the islands’ economy’ was said to be a concern for 
the British government, the reference to Anglo-Argentine ‘cooperation’ was 
code for managing Argentine behaviour, namely sub-emergency 2 
(geopolitical).  
 
The following day’s editorial in The Times endorsed this tackling of slow 
emergency; emphasising the chronopolitical dimension of the Shackleton 
Commission initiative, it noted that whilst such an initiative should have been 
adopted in previous years, it would now help ensure a less troubled future: 
 
The Government’s initiative in dispatching Lord Shackleton and a small team 
of wool, oil and fishing experts to examine the prospects for diversifying the 
one-crop economy of the Falkland Islands is the more welcome for being 
several years overdue. A bad year for wool – still the Islands’ sole exportable 
product – and the likelihood of renewed pressure from the Islanders’ effective 
Westminster lobby no doubt contributed to the decision. For once, it was 
decided to forestall trouble, rather than react to it (The Times, 18 October 








Yet contrary to The Times’ expectations, this initiative accelerated rather than 
decelerated emergency in the Falkland region through sub-emergency 2 
(geopolitical) intensifying Anglo-Argentine confrontation, the opposite to the 
future cooperation the British government sought, compromising the logic of 
prevention. The Shackleton initiative was interpreted by Isabelita Peron’s 
government as a cynical British attempt to advance their interests at Argentine 
expense – Argentine historian Bullrich articulated this perception in these 
terms: 
From 1975, faced with Argentina’s deteriorating internal situation, the British 
decided to take unilateral steps to consolidate the status quo. To this end, the 
Shackleton mission was sent to look at the options for the independent 
economic development of the islands (2000, p. 162). 
 
The perception that Britain was exploiting Argentina’s current socio-economic 
turmoil (in managing sub-emergency 2) to consolidate the territorial status quo 
and develop the region’s untapped resources, particularly oil, provoked an 
atmosphere of renewed Anglo-Argentine tension.  
 
British domestic comment, such as The Times editorial of 20 January 1976, 
added intensity to sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical); neither in its tone towards 
Argentina, or in its description of the Islands’ economic value, was an 
atmosphere of Anglo-Argentine co-operation fostered, which suited Islander 
hopes of winning more British support to help resist the effects of slow 
emergency and Argentine irredentist aspirations. 
 
The slippery slope to appeasement with Argentina over the sovereignty of the 
islands began in the late 1960s and had now been accelerated […] The 
Islanders have always declared their intention to remain British, and part of 
Lord Shackleton’s brief, is to confirm their views and to examine the 
resources of the colony and its dependencies. From an economic point of 
view, the islanders are far from being a drag on the British economy, as the 
income from the wools sales contributes some £2 million worth of hard 
currency to our balance of payments. Approximately 80 per cent of all the 
islands’ trade is with British companies, and in addition there is no tax 
relaxation for the islands. With such a small population, the Falklands Islands 
have one of the highest per capita incomes in the world’ (The Times, 20 
January 1976, p. 12). 
 
The profitability for Britain which the article refers to was at the expense of 
denuding the Islands of wealth, primarily through the Falkland Islands 







emergency 1 (socio-economic). What is also interesting is the reference to 
‘The slippery slope to appeasement of Argentina’ (The Times, 20 January 
1976, p. 12), and how this was said to have been ‘accelerated’ (The Times, 
20 January 1976, p. 12). Taken at face value, this suggests that the Anglo-
Argentine sovereignty dispute was more of a catalysing element than 
economic considerations in the Falklands’ slow emergency, that is that sub-
emergency 2 (geopolitical) held more accelerative force than sub-emergency 
1 (socio-economic).  
 
The catalysing, though sporadic, activation of the sovereignty dispute in 
speeding up slow emergency was soon evidenced in the February 1976 
Argentine attack on RRS Shackleton, approximately 80 miles off the 
Falklands. Here sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical) had ‘flared up’ into a faster 
emergency, the acceleration of which was conveyed in a dramatic headline on 
the front page of The Times, ‘British ship fired on by Argentine warship’, 
describing the incident. In the account written by reporter Robert Fisk, it was 
stated: 
The unarmed British research ship Shackleton, carrying a crew of 30 and with 
explosives on board, last night reached the safety of the Falklands Islands 
after being shadowed for six hours by an Argentine destroyer which had fired 
across its bows when it had refused to stop […] The shooting – during which 
the Argentines ordered the British vessel to heave to – is by far the most 
serious incident in the dispute over the ownership of the Falkland Islands 
(The Times, 5 February 1976, p. 1). 
 
The slow emergency facing the Falklands had escalated, if only momentarily, 
into a dangerous present, suggesting the possibility of further Anglo-Argentine 
clashes; the ‘preventative’ future the Callaghan government sought was 
proving difficult to construct. Whilst a misplaced belief that Shackleton himself 
was on board the vessel named after his explorer father may have served as 
the trigger for the incident, it nonetheless reflected genuine Argentine hostility 
to the Shackleton initiative, with an ‘unhelpful’ consequent intensification of 
sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical). Robin Edmonds, former Head of the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office Latin American desk, recalled the gravity of the 








They adopted an attitude towards the whole Shackleton exercise, long before 
his report, from the word go, of complete hostility. So violent was the reaction 
that I can recall – it was February of the following year, by which time 
Shackleton and his team were out there – walking down the corridor [in the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office] when the Falkland Islands desk officer 
rushed up to me [referring to the incident] and said “They’ve shot 
Shackleton!” (Edmonds in Charlton 1989, p. 48). 
 
Whilst it was the RRS Shackleton rather than Lord Shackleton which had 
been shot at, it is evident that the very existence of the Shackleton initiative 
had, through activating/destabilising sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical), counter-
productively led to the acceleration of emergency, to the point of actual 
military confrontation. Under the charged headline ‘Argentine Aggression 
Angers Islanders’, the Falkland Islands Times (11 February 1976, p.1). 
reported that ‘The ‘Shackleton Incident’ last week angered, annoyed or 
bewildered many Islanders’. Subsequently, to better manage sub-emergency 
2 (geopolitical) and provide future chronopolitical leverage should it be 
needed, Callaghan deployed a precautionary task force to ports in southern 
Brazil and Uruguay to contain any further acceleration of emergency. 
Ironically, this strategy had strayed into pre-emption, as it showed that the 
British government recognised, militarily, ‘the importance of pre-empting 
trouble, and leaving Argentina in no doubt about its political will in defending 
the islands’ (Donaghy 2014, p.213-14). This in itself was recognition that the 
Shackleton initiative had already counter-productively exacerbated sub-
emergency 2 (geopolitical), the opposite to Callaghan’s professed aim. 
 
The arrival of Shackleton and his team in the Falklands which had accelerated 
Anglo-Argentine tensions and sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical), bringing an 
intensification of the Islands slow emergency, had chronopolitically preceded 
the RRS Shackleton Incident by a month. Shackleton’s arrival in Stanley had 
provided an opportunity for chronopolitical performance for a declining micro-
population experiencing the effects of sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic). 
Falkland Islander resistance to the effects of slow emergency, and Argentine 
sovereignty aspirations, was expressed through organised expressions of 








With the headline ‘Sun Shines for Shackleton’, the Falkland Islands Times  
(11 February 1976, p. 1) reported the ‘Britishness’ of the reception that 
Shackleton and his party received, notably an enthusiastic large crowd who 
had timed their assembling at Government House to coincide with his arrival 
there; Shackleton himself soon joined in and was waving the Union Jack, in 
an affective performance which helped lift the ‘Falkland spirit’, which in its 
assertion of British identity was implicitly ‘unfriendly’ to Argentine sovereignty 
ambitions and encouraging to Islander ‘pre-emptive’ hopes. 
 
January 3 1976 for many Islanders will be remembered as Shackleton Day. 
The morning dawned warm and sunny – the finest we have had for some 
time. At around 9am. HMS Endurance, carrying Lord Shackleton and his 
Economic and Fiscal team, steamed into the harbour firing a seventeen-gun 
salute to His Excellency the Governor. A crowd of about two hundred people 
gathered at the east entrance to Government House and to their delight Lord 
Shackleton with the Governor alighted from their car when they arrived just 
after 10am. Three cheers are given in response to which Lord Shackleton 
said ‘I shall do all I can to help you’. The Governor then introduced him to 
some members of the Community and photographers were busy while Lord 
Shackleton posed for them. The highlight of the welcome was when he asked 
a lady for her Union Flag which he then held high and waved it for all to see 
(Falkland Islands Times, 11 February 1976, p. 1). 
 
The Falkland Islands Monthly Review also gave an account of Shackleton’s 
loyal reception by Falkland Islanders on 3 January 1976, again emphasising 
the stirring, affective patriotic crowd performance of the occasion, in defiance 
of the draining quotidian realities of slow emergency: 
 
On approaching the Eastern Driveway to Government House he was greeted 
by an impressive sight – dozens of people waving Union Jacks and bearing 
banners with ‘Keep the Falklands British’ on them’. To three hearty cheers ‘for 
Lord Shackleton’ he stepped from the car. After being introduced to the 
chairman of the Falkland Islands Committee, Lord Shackleton posed with a 
number of children and borrowed a union jack, for photographs. He then 
continued his interrupted run to Government House, waving to the Crowd 
(Falkland Islands Monthly Review, January 1976, p. 6). 
 
The role of the crowd as a factor in accelerating or decelerating slow 
emergency is of particular interest. Aradau, citing Canetti (1960), offers 








The attributes of crowds immediately translate into different types of crowds: 
open and closed crowds, stagnating and rhythmic crowds, slow and quick 
crowds, visible and invisible crowds. Crowds are then distinguished by their 
predominant emotions: baiting crowds, flight crowds, prohibition crowds, 
reversal crowds and feast crowds (Canetti, 1987 [1960]: 65). The workers 
who strike become a ‘prohibition crowd’, a crowd of refusal, negation and 
resistance, which emerges through dis-connecting from the coordinates of the 
workplace (Aradau 2015, p. 169).  
 
The Falklands crowd at Government House can be seen as one characterised 
by both ‘loyalty’ and ‘prohibition’ (Aradau 2015, p. 169), with the highly visible 
patriotic ‘waving’ of hands and flags described in both the preceding accounts 
affirming past and present loyalty to ‘Queen and country’, in order to prohibit 
being maneuvered through economic and political pressure into a future 
‘unpatriotic’ accommodation with Argentina. This too can be seen as a highly 
chronopolitical crowd performance. It had chosen to assemble at a most 
opportune time, when Shackleton and the British press had arrived in Stanley, 
and sought to enlist their support for the pre-emptive cause of rebuilding the 
Falklands as a viable British colony, a future which would require resisting 
slow emergency and Argentina.  
 
This well-timed and emotionally affective crowd performance which bodily 
engulfed Shackleton into this living assemblage may also have influenced his 
subsequent view of what his report ‘should be’. Similarly it is likely to have 
stiffened Islanders’ pre-emptive instincts, so helping perpetuate and 
moderately accelerate the Slow Falklands Emergency. Irrespective of the 
precise impact of the crowd dynamic on Shackleton’s arrival, neither 
Shackleton nor the Islanders would prove able to exercise sufficient agency to 
extricate the colony from the slow emergency processes which in little over 
half a decade would lead to Argentine invasion, in what effectively played out 
as the Fast Falklands Emergency of 1982.  
 
Certainly, in the manner of his morale-boosting arrival at Stanley, Shackleton 
had given the Islanders succour and the Argentines more reason to be 
antithetic to the work of his commission; the findings of his subsequently 
produced Report gave them further reason to do so. It addressed key features 







1 (socio-economic), and implicitly suggested that a future without Argentina 
was possible, so guaranteeing Argentine hostility to its recommendations.  
 
Even before its July 1976 release, supporters of the Falkland Islanders were 
hopeful as to the forthcoming contents of the Shackleton Report. Former 
Governor Miles Clifford, who in his gubernatorial duties from 1946-54 had 
introduced the Falkland Islands Government Air Service and Radio-
Telephone to the Islands, wrote forthrightly to The Times; in his letter (27 
March 1976, p. 15), he rejected an acceptance of the Falklands’ economic 
decline, and by implication a terminal slow emergency for the colony, 
emphasising the scope for improvement. 
 
The population is wholly British and is intensely loyal to the Crown; they have 
been repeatedly assured that there will be no change in status unless they, 
themselves, demand it, and of this there is not the remotest likelihood. That 
the economy can be improved – it rests at present entirely on wool – is not in 
question and they will await with interest, and with hope, the 
recommendations of Lord Shackleton’s recent mission. 
 
Published in July 1976, the Shackleton Report sought to address the socio-
economic problems facing the Falkland Islands – sub-emergency 1 (socio-
economic) – and thus key elements of slow emergency.  The Report placed 
emphasis on the past and present degradation of the economy, declining 
population, socio-economic difficulties and a culture of dependency, the 
cumulative logic of which was that, even without the further corrosive impact 
of the sovereignty dispute, the Falklands’ future collapse as a micro-
community was entirely foreseeable. Indeed, the overview the Report came 
close to being an autopsy, rather than an anatomy, of the state of the Falkland 
Islands. Over time, without remedial pre-emptive action, sub-emergency 1 
(socio-economic) would catalyse, as slow emergency accelerated into an 
epistemic emergency.  
 
The past and present drain of resources was emphasised, evidencing how the 
enduring intensity of sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) was a key reason for 
slow emergency: ‘If there is any one cause of the decline in population and 







to the UK’ (Shackleton Report (1), 1976, p. 28).This posits the clear 
implication that the shareholder-driven imperatives of the monopolistic 
Falkland Islands Company were responsible.  
 
Diplomatically, the Shackleton Report ascribed the Falkland Islands 
Company’s attritional depletion of the Islands’ wealth to the latter’s historical 
developmental stage. The Report observed that: ‘There is no doubt that the 
FIC plays a dominant role in the Falkland Islands economy similar to that of 
other trading companies in the early stages of their respective territories’ 
(Shackleton Report (1), 1976, p. 334).  As the chief actor of economic 
exploitation in the slow emergency (rather than through calculated neglect 
and strategic chronopolitics in the case of the British government), the 
Falkland Islands Company – despite what Charringtons’ ‘patriotic’ publicity 
claimed – was ‘sucking the economic lifeblood’ out of the Islands, eroding the 
capacity of the Falklands to ‘stand on their own two feet’ (The Times, 26 
August 1977, p.10).  So entrenched was the FIC’s contribution to slow 
emergency through denuding the Islands of resources that, without pre-
emptive change, a future of continuing decline appeared inevitable, indeed 
systemic to the Islands’ economic life.  
 
The Shackleton Report’s assessment was a sobering one; with the 
vulnerability of its over-reliance on the sheep industry, and underinvestment in 
development, there was no prospect of the Islands avoiding a future of further 
decline. A further, gradual acceleration of decline, as sub-emergency 1 (socio-
economic) progressively deteriorated, was thus anticipated in the Island’s 
economy by the Shackleton Report: 
 
 
Based as it is on the ranching of sheep for wool production, supported by a 
service sector of just sufficient size to provide basic services, the Islands’ 
economy is static, but showing an underlying tendency to decline. The 
Falkland’s current development plan is insufficient in terms of capital and 









Whilst the economic aspect of slow emergency was reversible with greater 
investment, a further aspect of sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) – 
emigration – would make this significantly more difficult to achieve. Emigration 
functioned both as a significant causal factor, and consequence, of slow 
emergency; the Shackleton Report explained how emigration from this micro-
population had been a constant drain over the past four decades, and 
anticipated not only future loss of population, but a possible ‘acceleration’ 
(Shackleton Report (1), 1976, p. 334) of this. The Report found that:  
 
Gradual emigration has persisted for at least the last forty years; there was a 
resultant decline in population, which was temporarily halted in 1975 due to 
the commencement of work on the permanent airport. The decline is likely to 
continue, and possibly accelerate, without the emergence of economic 
opportunities and social changes (Shackleton Report (1), 1976, p. 334).   
 
There was also a slow emergency amongst the indigenous Islander 
population that stayed in the colony; this aspect of sub-emergency 1 (socio-
economic) again over time seriously threatened the future viability of the 
Falkland Islands community. The use of the word ‘stock’ should also be noted, 
a term which in the Falklands would appear more applicable to sheep rather 
than its inhabitants. This collective framing is used to describe Islanders, with 
the reference to ‘lower birth rate’ highlighting the decline in Islander women 
maintaining ‘stock’ numbers: ‘Taken with the lower birth rate and higher death 
rate, the decline of the indigenous stock seems confirmed as one of the most 
significant features of the population situation (Shackleton Report (1), 1976, p. 
12).  
 
This aspect of slow emergency was serious enough; as Fig 6.3 illustrates, a 
Falkands funeral provided a formal and important for the small Falkland 
community to come together to pay their respects; the growth in the death 
rates since this particular funeral (1966) meant these had become a more 









Fig. 6.3. The passing of an unknown Falkland resident in 1966 
  
Source: Panorama, October 1966, pp. 10-11 
To make up for this loss of population, the colony needed to ensure there 
were sufficient younger Islanders to ensure the survival of the community. 
However, the decline of the birth rate instead looked set to accelerate this 
demographic slow emergency, particularly due to the loss of Islander women 
of reproductive age, who had married Royal Marines.  
 
The same Royal Marines whose presence in the Islands was intended to help 
forestall a geopolitical emergency (sub-emergency 2) had themselves 
become a potent causal factor in sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) and the 
ongoing exacerbation of slow emergency, chronopolitically undermining the 
community that they were meant to protect (effectively serving the purpose of 
those in Whitehall who sought to use slow emergency to resolve the 








Fig. 6.4 (below) is a photo of young Islander women participating in the 
Falklands 1966 Beauty Queen Competition, the year after the arrival of the 
Royal Marines in 1965. I was told by informants on the Islands that many of 
the young Islander women wanted to ‘marry a Marine’, and so embark on a 
life outside the Islands. The slow emergency could be thought of as a highly 
gendered depletion as fears were expressed that the Falkland community 
would be an aging society short of women. Argentina’s ambitions were not the 






















Fig 6.4.  Young Islander women participate in the 1966 Beauty Queen Competition 
Source: Panorama, October 1966, p. 15  
The Shackleton Report highlighted the grave demographic implications of this:  
A significant feature in regard to female emigration is that about two-fifths of 
the local women who left in 1975, were married to, or about to marry, Royal 
Marines who had been stationed in the Islands. In a population as depleted of 
women […] as the Falkland Islands this represents a significant loss 
(Shackleton Report (1), 1976, p. 13).  
 
Nor did the Shackleton Report find Islanders well equipped to face the 
challenges of the present day, let alone the future; they were perceived as 
dependent, and lacking initiative: ‘the population shows a marked degree of 







contributed to low levels of confidence and enterprise’ (Shackleton Report (1), 
1976, p. 334). Neither was it felt to be a population that was well integrated. 
Indeed, the reverse was seen to be the case, both in the present and past:  
 
The pattern of economic activity and settlement history has brought about an 
unusually fragmented social structure’ (Shackleton Report (1), 1976, p. 334), 
again emphasising the importance of sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) in 
the colony’s slow emergency that was inexorably shaping its future. 
 
As the Shackleton Report recognised in its anatomisation of the elements of 
slow emergency, the past was very much the present in these colonial 
Islands, tied as they were to Victorian and quasi feudal practices, and 
struggling with the vicissitudes of the wool market and the need for the 
Falklands Islands Company to add value for its shareholders. Slow 
emergency offered a genuinely uncomfortable future for Islanders both 
individually and collectively, with the socio-economic collapse of the colony a 
very real prospect.. 
 
Offshoring the future of the Islands was Shackleton’s answer to transitioning 
to modernity, and in the process deferring, if not resolving, the slow 
emergencies facing the colony. He saw the potential of commercial fishing to 
‘be on scale larger than any other existing or likely potential economic activity 
in the Falklands. It would undoubtedly confirm the long-term economic future 
of the Islands and raise overall living standards’ (Shackleton Report (2), 1976, 
p. 13). A fishing industry would provide a modern future of ‘post-feudal’ 
economic activity, and held out the prospect of a re-population of the Islands 
as ‘It should also be recognised that the fisheries development would 
irreversibly change the size and constitution of the population, many of whom 
would not originate from the UK’ (Shackleton Report (2), 1976, p. 13). Whilst 
fisheries offered a pre-emptive future of economic regeneration, helping 
outflank the apparent economic death spiral of slow emergency, there is a 
certain irony in a proposal which potentially would help ‘keep the Falklands 
British’ bringing in many non-British nationals to the colony. Such a 
diversification of the Islands’ population offered the rejuvenating prospect of 
developing an island micro-nation more in line with modern Britain; for those 







would, however, be at the cost of homogeneity amongst Islander ‘stock’ 
(Shackleton Report (1), 1976, p. 12).  
 
Shackleton’s proposals for an offshore future for the Falklands were, for 
understandable diplomatic reasons, articulated more circumspectly in relation 
to oil and gas, and foregrounded with the comment: ‘First, it should be said 
that no offshore developments are likely without a form of cooperation 
agreement with Argentina’ (Shackleton Report (2), 1976, p. 14). The report 
sought to further reassure Argentina about how a future oil industry might 
function, carefully noting: 
 
The production stage, if oil were discovered in commercial quantities, would 
not necessarily involve a pipeline to the Falklands, and there would be 
several advantages in building a pipeline to Argentina. If distances from land 
and water were such to make laying a pipeline to the Falklands the most 
economic method of evacuating oil from the discovered field, the impact in 
terms of population influx, both in the construction phase and the permanent 
operating phase would literally be overwhelming in relation to the size of the 
existing population. This could more than double and it would impose severe 
strains on the existing economy of the Islands (Shackleton Report (2), 1976, 
p. 15).  
. 
Shackleton sought to present this offshore future for the Islands as not 
uncomfortable for Argentina, at the same time neatly not ruling out the 
possibility that an oil pipeline would go to the Falklands rather than Argentina, 
and presenting the socio-economic regeneration that would follow as 
problematic for the Islands. The operative point is that Shackleton had dared 
to imagine a Falklands future with hydrocarbons which did not necessarily 
revolve around Argentina, disrupting the narrative that the Falklands’ future 
was bound to Buenos Aires. 
 
Shackleton’s proposal to enhance the Stanley airfield represented another bid 
to offshore the Falklands’ future, this time aerially, linking the Islands to 
airports in proximate countries, and not exclusively Argentina. His 
recommendation was that: 
 
The permanent airfield should be strengthened and extended to a length 







such as Boeing 707’s, on the final leg of international flights […] Action should 
be taken at the earliest opportunity (Shackleton Report (2), 1976, p. 66).  
 
This proposal, had London been prepared to action it at the time, offered the 
creation of a future for the Falklands in which aerial mobility, tourism and 
commerce could also bring the Islands into the ‘modern world’. Whilst 
Shackleton diplomatically noted that ‘this is another area where close 
cooperation with Argentina is highly desirable’, in practice it offered a means 
for the Falklands to remove Argentina’s monopoly of international air travel to 
the Islands (Shackleton Report (2), 1976, p. 66).  
 
Indeed, so significant and symbolic was this proposal, that in late 1976, by 
which time it had become very clear that the Shackleton Report had been 
shelved, the call for the extended runway was adopted as a particular (and 
unsuccessful) campaign focus from the Falkland Islands Committee, to use as 
a litmus test that British Government would evidence a serious commitment to 
the future of the Islands. 
 
Shackleton’s pre-emptive offshoring of the future, extricating the Falklands 
from slow emergency, ran counter however to London and Buenos Aires’ 
strategic chronopolitics, in which the Falklands’ present and future would be 
the continuation of the past through slow emergency, until such time as a 
definitive diplomatic solution determining the archipelago was achieved. In 
terms of the Falkland Islanders, the pre-emptive future which Shackleton’s 
offshore recommendations constructed offered a future which was not in thrall 
to slow emergency, offering instead a measure of hope to this socio-
economically beleaguered community. Shackleton’s forward-looking report 
had, in essence, sought to defer the numerous emergencies comprised within 
slow emergency; in this way, Shackleton had disrupted the view (as one 
Islander informally put it to me) that ‘decline meant the Argentine’. 
 
This is important as it helps explain Islanders’ chronopolitical militancy once it 
became clear in the weeks after July 1976 that London wished to ignore the 
report, October 1976’s protests providing Islanders with the occasion to 







French, who approached slow emergency pressures as a means to 
‘encourage’ Islanders to accept the logic of accommodation with Argentina.  
 
As has been observed, appreciating ‘people’s longstanding images of the 
future and belonging, their ‘lieux de future’ is a useful way into understanding 
present tensions’ (Feaux de la Croix 2014, p. 62). This view was based on 
research in contemporary Kyrgyzstan (Feaux de la Croix 2014, p. 51), and is I 
believe similarly applicable in this context. As will be explained, there was a 
profound acongruence between Governor and governed over the Falklands’ 
future, the former seeing co-operation and territorial accommodation with 
Argentina as desirable, the latter resisting a collusive co-operation which 
resulted in such an absorption. As will also be evidenced through Falkland 
Islander public actions and discourse cited later in this chapter, London’s 
preventative frustration of Shackleton’s positive counter-future – its disruption 
of his disruption - proved chronopolitically radicalising in a community whose 
hopes for the future had been dashed. 
 
Notwithstanding the Shackleton report, slow emergency would remain the 
defining feature of mid-1970s Falklands. Times correspondent David Spanier 
summed up the Shackleton Report in an article entitled ‘Falklands report 
urges local initiative’, with a summative comment which reflects why slow 
emergency is key to understanding the Falklands in this period. He noted: ‘An 
economic survey of the Falkland Islands published yesterday, says that their 
economy shows an underlying tendency to decline’ (The Times, 21 July 1976, 
p. 6). This implicitly emphasised the relevance, chronopolitically, of slow 
emergency in the attritional socio-economic and geopolitical unwinding of the 
Falklands colony. The Times editorial of 21 July 1976, entitled ‘Economy of 
the Falkland Islands’, did however praise the recommendations of the 
Shackleton Report in seeking to pre-empt future decline; it commented: 
 
Lord Shackleton and his team of experts have produced an impressive and 
comprehensive survey of the possible ways of boosting the economy of one 
of Britain’s remotest remaining economies, the Falkland Islands. Virtually 
every conceivable source of extra revenue, ranging from gigantic stocks of 
fish and krill and offshore oil and gas, to increased trade in live specimens of 







been examined in detail and judiciously commented upon (The Times, 21 
July 1976, p. 6). 
 
Whilst Shackleton generally judged ‘the Islands viable’ (Freedman 2005, p. 
47) and so pre-emptively retrievable from slow emergency, the hard truth was 
that the Shackleton Report’s economic recommendations did not exist in 
isolation from the wider geopolitical context, that is, that in addressing the 
Falklands’ slow emergency, sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) needed to 
take account of sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical). In essence, existing 
Argentine cooperation, and the possibility of this being lost, functioned as a 
subtle but potent form of ‘slow violence’ (Nixon 2011, p.8) against the 
adoption of Shackleton’s proposals. This can be seen in relation to the 
Reports’ gingerly recommending that the runaway be extended by 2,500 feet. 
Whilst this potentially enabled non-Argentine international civilian flights 
access to the Islands, it also made British military flights possible in the event 
of an accelerated sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical). The Times editorial of 21 
July 1976 argued that: 
 
In his introduction, Lord Shackleton conceded that the sovereignty issue 
overhangs the report, and that in any major new developments of the island’s 
economy, notably in exploiting offshore resources, cooperation with 
Argentina, even participation, should be secured. Given this underlying 
assumption, it is some ways unrealistic to examine economic possibilities 
largely divorced from political considerations (The Times, 21 July 1976, p. 6). 
 
The chronopolitical dimension was central to The Times’ understanding of the 
Falklands’ prospects, as is conveyed in its (somewhat misleading) use of the 
phrase ‘steady decline’. ‘Steady’ implies a broadly constant development over 
time, yet as has been discussed, there are a number of sub-emergency 
constituent elements which can accelerate at any point and do not necessarily 
present themselves in a ‘steady’ fashion, as the chronopolitical ‘spike’ of the 
RRS Shackleton incident illustrates. This said, The Times awareness of the 
multi-causal nature of the Falklands’ decline implicitly recognises the 
interconnectedness of sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) and sub-
emergency 2 (geopolitical) as two vital elements of slow emergency. It also 







and preservation, the former throwing a chronopolitical ‘lifeline’ to the 
Falklands in arresting ‘steady decline’. 
 
The basic choice is whether to allow the steady decline in the situation of the 
islanders to continue; or whether to arrest the decline and exploit some of the 
possibilities examined by Lord Shackleton, at the same time putting relations 
with Argentina on a more stable basis. This will not be easy, given the volatile 
nature of Argentina’s domestic politics and the complications likely to arise 
from the Law of the Sea Conference (The Times, 21 July 1976, p. 6). 
 
Sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) and sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical) have, 
in this section, been our areas of focus for slow emergency; sub-emergency 3 
(governance) and sub-emergency 4 (information control) are now addressed 
through the gubernatorial experience and implosion of Neville French, who 
took advantage of the slow emergency malaise to erode the ‘democratic 
space’ in the colony and had a much less ‘happy’ experience of the Falklands 
crowd than Shackleton. Whereas the essentially pre-emptive, forward-looking 
Shackleton Report would become part of the morass of slow emergency 
through being largely ignored by a prevention-focused Whitehall, French’s 
governorship experienced a similar outcome, through bringing new 
exacerbatory intensities to sub-emergency 3 (governance) and sub-
emergency 4 (information control), and very conspicuously losing control of 
chronopolitical developments.
 
6.4 Accelerating Slow Emergency in the Shackleton-French era –  
erosion of trust between Governor French and Islanders 
 
An acceleration of slow emergency resulted from Neville French’s tenure as 
Governor (27 January 1975 to 2 December 1976) with the intensification of 
sub-emergency 3 (governance) and sub-emergency 4 (information control).  
Unlike sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) and sub-emergency 2 
(geopolitical), neither of these sub-emergencies were, in themselves, likely to 
lead to the disappearance of the Falklands as a colony; they did, however, 
prove decisive causal factors in creating an atmosphere of profound mistrust 
in the Falklands between Governor and governed, which prematurely ended 









As Governor, Neville French’s priority was to address sub-emergency 2 
(geopolitical), and deepen the present and future cooperation with Argentina 
that the Foreign Office had sought to develop since the 1971 Communications 
Agreement; as he said, in what can be seen as his leitmotif during his time in 
office: ‘We must have co-operation with Argentina’ (The Times, 26 August 
1976, p. 11).   
 
French sought to manage the decline of the colony; ‘cooperation’ meant 
proactively ‘managing’ Islanders’ views and their access to information, so as 
to ensure a future of positive relations with Argentina was constructed. 
Managing an emergency atmosphere in the colony required political skill and 
subtlety, capitalising on everyday emergency as a means to encourage 
Islanders to see the benefit of accommodating Argentina; however, if enacted 
clumsily, such an approach ran the risk of losing Islanders’ confidence and 
trust. As events would show, French proved unequal to the task of skilfully 
manipulating an atmosphere of emergency; his efforts to secure Islander 
cooperation led him to personally vet the contents of the Falkland Islands 
Broadcasting Service news bulletins, as he later publicly confirmed to The 
Times (26 August 1976, p. 11), resulting in a loss of Islander trust. This 
management, or censorship, of news soon became a publicly expressed 
source of concern, with sub-emergency 4 (information control) an accelerated 
element of the Islands’ wider slow emergency. Writing to the Falkland Islands 
Times, under the pseudonym of ‘A not so calm but vigilant Falkland Islander’, 
one reader complained about the growing suppression of news stories, noting 
that: 
In recent months articles have appeared in the British press and elsewhere 
concerning the islands but we in the islands have never heard the broadcast on 
the only means of mass communication, the radio. All Falkland Islanders have 
a right and the Government a duty to keep us informed on all comments made 
regarding the islands be they political or not (Falkland Islands Times, 11 
February 1976, p. 6).  
 
French’s ‘information regime’ applied different intensities of control in relation 







recognised in the Falkland Islands Times: 
 
Overseas readers may be interested to know that during the last few weeks our 
local Friday night newsletter has included news cuttings which a few months 
ago would not have been read. Even the locally produced ‘Magazine’ 
programme recently featured comments from there Stanley residents about a 
lengthy TIMES article (U.K 22 March) about the Falklands. The Magazine 
programme scheduled for February 11th was not broadcast when, shortly 
before it was due to go on air out Chief Secretary – who is at present enjoying 
a holiday in a sunnier clime – heard at the Colony Club that the programme 
included an account of the ‘Shackleton’ incident as recorded on the ship’s 
bridge on 4th February (Falkland Islands Times, 15 April 1976, p. 1).   
 
As this account recognises, French’s efforts to control the present and future 
dissemination of information (sub-emergency 4) were a ‘source of interest’ to 
both a domestic and overseas audience. Notwithstanding such scrutiny, 
French’s efforts to build a Falklands future based on co-operation with 
Argentina were soon directed to ‘determining’ how Islanders would and should 
respond to the Shackleton Report. In announcing the publication of the 
Shackleton Report to its readership on 30 July 1976, the Falkland Islands 
Times reminded Islanders about how Government House expected them to 
respond to it, both in the present and future (key words/phrases indicative of 
this are italicised below): 
 
 It's out! Co-operation – the keyword. 
 
The long-awaited Shackleton report was published in the colony and the United 
Kingdom on Tuesday, 20 July……The much broadcast government 
commentary on the report sounded two notes of warning about it. Firstly, it was 
not a magic wand which would dispel over like the problems facing the colony. 
The report was an independent one and its recommendations and their 
financial and political implications called for a careful and detailed study by Her 
Majesty's government and at this stage no comment should be expected about 
acceptance of any of the recommendations [...] The commentary went on to 
say that the least helpful attitude of all would be to skim through the report for 
selected quotations to be deployed in support of political points  
(Falkland Islands Times, 30 July 1976, p. 1) 
 
French’s dirigiste efforts to generate sub-emergency 4 (information control) in 
the interests of managing sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical), amounted to a kind 
of enforced ‘Government House Party line’, one which was repeated through 
radio broadcasts so that the Islanders understood what was expected of 







French to Islander opinion, which in turn led to the future of his governance of 
the Islands being brought into question, so activating sub-emergency 3 
(governance).   
 
David Tatham, himself a former Falklands Governor, cites how French had 
previously experienced difficulties in the past with (crowd) governance when, 
as Commissioner of Geita in Sukumaland, Tanganyika, he had authorised the 
use of force in July 1958, including tear gas, against an ‘illegal’ nationalist 
protest march at Mwanza (Tatham 2008, p. 231-32); in this way, French had 
suppressed the Mwanza crowd as an agent of emergency, and the incident 
has prompted the observation that: 
 
The interest in this incident lies in what it reveals about French’s character in 
the light of his subsequent performances in the Falklands nearly twenty years 
later. Highly regarded as an administrator by his superiors, he found himself 
embattled and isolated in his single-mindedness and impatience in carrying 
out a policy which was not of his making against the increasing strength of 
African nationalist feeling (Tatham 2008, p. 232).  
 
Whilst French’s present methods of control in the Falklands did not involve the 
bodily violence meted out to the ‘prohibitory’ crowd (Aradau 2015) in 
Tanganyika, they were intended to support the Foreign Office’s established 
policy of a future based on Anglo-Argentine cooperation. Such methods, 
however, proved counterproductive to domestic governance, generating 
unrest and protest amongst Islanders, and reached national prominence in 
Britain through an unsympathetic report in The Times on 26 August 1976. 
This important article, depicting French as an unpopular, isolated and 
controlling figure, holds particular purchase for unpacking perceptions of his 
gubernatorial rule, and examining the respective significance of sub-
emergencies (as per the following summaries which precede each section of 
The Times report). 
 
Mr Neville French, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Falkland 
Islands, is convinced that the future of the Islands lies with Argentina. He 
said: ‘We are pinning our hopes on the Shackleton report. We must have 
cooperation with Argentina […] it makes very good sense and is absolutely 
essential[…] I keep telling them (the Argentines) that they are too impatient. 







‘Do it on a flamboyant scale, it may take 10, 15 or 25 years’’ (The Times, 26 
August 1976, p. 11). 
 
‘Flamboyant’ (which I have italicised) was an unusual choice of word, not a 
term that would ordinarily be associated with Falkland matters, and sits 
uncomfortably with the more ‘down to earth’ nature of the community over 
which he presided. French’s comments, by his own admission, confirm he had 
been advising Argentines as to how Islanders could be won over to their ‘side’ 
through a policy of Buenos Aires pursuing high-profile acts designed to win 
Islanders favour over time; this would imply largesse and treatment of a more 
generous nature than that on offer from the British government. The logic of 
French’s advocacy of Argentine wooing (or bribing) of Islanders was that 
British rule over the Islands would be progressively hollowed out, a slow 
opportunity rather than emergency to end British rule over the Islands.  
 
Neither French’s approach to Argentina, or his clumsy efforts to ‘micro-
manage’ information had endeared him to Islanders, leaving him isolated  
from the community over which he presided, and undermining his capacity to 
fulfil his gubernatorial role. The Times highlighted this gubernatorial isolation, 
and French’s practice of having the Royal Marines’ commanding officer 
accompany him when ‘off site’ from Government House: 
 
He is certainly a lonely man, rarely seen outside Government House, and 
when he does go out he is nearly always accompanied by a Royal marine 
major who commands the detachment of 36 marines that defend the islands 
[…] Mr French is undoubtedly sincere and genuinely has the interests of the 
islanders at heart. Unfortunately, he does not seem able to convince them of 
this and consequently his public relations image has evoked a considerable 
amount of criticism and bad feeling […] Previous governors of the islands 
have come in for their fair share of criticism from time to time, but none has 
had to withstand the comments and attack that the present governor has had 
to withstand in his 18 months in Stanley (The Times, 26 August 1976, p. 11). 
 
French sought to justify the ‘information management’ methods which had 
alienated Islanders from his rule: 
 
Mr French denies that he does not keep people informed of what is going on 
“I strain to put out everything I possibly can.” He is very sensitive to any 
controversial matters being broadcast and until the spring was personally 
censoring local broadcasts. Asked why, he replied: “Because we can’t have 







or special, lobbies, or special pleading, or free debate. We have not got a full-
blown party political system here; and you could have all sorts of if you like 
fabrications and extreme points of view being pushed out over the 
broadcasting system with apparent government blessing”. 
 
He maintained he would have to spend all his time denying any such 
statements. “It is not censorship as such, just a sort of balance to make sure 
that you get them (the reports) run in some sort of rational controlled way”. He 
feared that without control the broadcasting service would be used by every 
crank and everyone with an extreme view to sound off. 
 
He added that he could not have a “particular faction pre-empting or trying to 
circumvent the basis of government”. In an obvious reference to the Falkland 
Islands Committee, he complained about people sending telegrams to 
London and said the councillors were supposed to keep their constituents 
informed of what is going on. 
 
He denied that anyone would dream of censoring anything but at the same 
time admitted that he personally saw copies of the local news bulletin which 
had to be submitted to the secretariat 24 hours before going out on the air. In 
fact, when a reference to this appeared in a Times report last March, 
restrictions were eased (The Times, 26 August 1976, p. 11). 
 
The Times’ report did not reflect well on French’s methods, and gave succour 
to his vocal critics in the Falkland Islands, and the intermittently convened 
crowd of the Falkland Islands lobby; it also provides an insight into 
relationalities of slow emergency in the Islands and their relative significances. 
Whereas sub-emergencies 3 (governance) and 4 (information control) were a 
‘regular’ source of a frustration amongst Islanders, neither of these in 
themselves would pose an immediate threat to the survival of the colony, 
hence warranting only ‘moderate’ ratings as to their overall importance in slow 
emergency. In contrast, an acceleration of sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical) as 
a result of Argentine ‘impatience’ (The Times, 26 August 1976, p. 11) had the 
potential to result in the chronopolitically hastened demise of the colony of the 
Falkland Islands, whereas French’s ‘co-operation’ paradigm envisaged a 
drawn-out process, over a time of ‘10, 15 or 25 years’ (The Times, 26 August 
1976, p. 11) prior to absorption by Argentina.  
 
The capacity of an individual sub-emergency to affect the supra-emergency, 
however, remains relative to its significance; for instance, sub-emergency 4 
(information control) is not as serious a threat to Islands’ economic survival as 







(geopolitical) resulting from intensified pressure for a sovereignty transfer from 
Argentina. 
 
Dissatisfaction with French’s regime was publicly expressed in the Falklands, 
such as through Eddie Anderson Junior’s letter to the Falkland Islands Times 
of 3 September 1976. Anderson’s narrative of a decline in political life 
highlights the acceleration of slow emergency under French through the 
intensification of sub-emergencies 3 (governance) and 4 (information control). 
Symbolically Anderson claimed ownership of French’s reference to dissenting 
Islanders as ‘cranks’ (The Times, 26 August 1976, p.11), reflecting the 
deterioration in the relationship between Governor and governed in the 
Islands.  
 
Perhaps a condition of passionate loyalty to the crown – as a defence against 
Argentina's claim to the Islands – makes us prepared to accept ideas which we 
would never have a short while ago. 
 
The word 'politics' is to most people here, synonymous of the sovereignty 
issue, but it may be a good idea to look closer home at our political system, 
which – despite minor innovations such as the elusive new constitution – has 
some room for change. Think of the censorship designed to prevent any 
number of cranks (that's us!) from expressing extremist views (Falkland Islands 
Times, 6 November 1976, p. 7). 
 
The strained and mutually suspicious relations between Governor French and 
the Islanders foregrounded an acceleration of sub-emergencies 2 (socio-
economic), 3 (governance) and 4 (information control), to a point of real 
emergency, although in a manner reflective of the Lilliputian nature of 
domestic Falklands politics, it did not immediately accelerate slow emergency 
in relation to sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical), that being a crisis for Islanders 
and British, rather than Argentine, authorities.  
 
It was a radio-telephone-related emergency, involving a critical, invisible 
crowd, that escalated sub-emergencies 1 (socio-economic), 3 (governance) 
and 4 (information control) to the point that Governor French became a 
catalyst of unfolding emergency, his chronopolitical efforts to control future 







both in the period from August to December 1976. Chronopolitically, his 
failure to govern the difference between the present and the future resulted in 
a disastrous end to his Falklands gubernatorial career. 
 
The French Administration’s handling of the New Island Incident proved a 
decisive moment in exacerbating the already strained Governor-Islander 
relations.  On 11 August 1976, a Falkland Islands Government Air Service 
(FIGAS) Beaver float plane capsized. This development represented an 
emergency for Islanders’ present and future aerial mobility, and distribution of 
vital portable objects such as mail, medication and produce, in essence an 
existential threat to the viability of everyday life in the colony. The stark gravity 
of the event was relayed in the Falkland Islands Times headline ‘STRICKEN 
BEAVER SENT BACK TO STANLEY’, informing readers it was ‘one of the 
two ‘planes that form our internal air-service. The aircraft, now a write-off, 
capsized at New Island on 11 August […] struck by a freak wind commonly 
known here as a ‘woolly’ (Falkland Islands Times, August 1976, p. 1). It also 
denounced the way French had sought to have a closed and unannounced 
enquiry into what had happened: 
 
Although not officially announced, there was a Board of Enquiry into the 
incident. Many people were annoyed as this is not the first time that a freak 
wind has capsized a Beaver but it is the first time the pilot [Canadian ‘Big John’ 
Lavino] has been grounded as a result. There were pathetic Government 
announcements about the incident and the subsequent collapse of the air 
service due to the [unrelated] hospitalisation of our second pilot Jim Kerr 
(Falkland Islands Times, unspecified date August 1976, p.1).  
 
Language invoked in this reportage such as ‘unannounced’, ‘pathetic’ and 
‘collapse’ conveys contemporary Islander criticisms and scorn of French’s 
handling of the New Island Incident and a palpable sense that sub-
emergencies 1 (socio-economic), 3 (governance) and 4 (information control) 
were accelerating into a very uncomfortable future.  
 
A combination of immense frustration of the interruption to FIGAS’ flights, and 
an administration unwilling to be open about the reasons for the loss of the 
New Island Beaver, helped create an atmosphere of aerial emergency, and 







through the next edition of the Falkland Island Times headline ‘ONE BEAVER 
– NO PILOTS. Air Service Crisis worsens’, with its representation of an aerial 
emergency which was deteriorating. It reported how pilot Jim Kerr had now 
been evacuated to the UK for medical treatment, and Islander pilot Ian 
Campbell, who had returned from overseas leave, had failed a medical test 
(Falkland Islands Times, 26 September 1976, p. 1), with Bill Luxton of 
Chartres stepping in to assist with his own Cessna Skyhawk.  
 
Notwithstanding the British Government agreement to provide a loan towards 
the cost of two new Beavers (Falkland Islands Times, 26 September 1976, p. 
1) offering some hope for the future, there was no immediate end in sight to 
this FIGAS emergency, this breakdown in the Islands’ aerial provision 
evidencing the failure of French’s Government House to ensure any depth in 
the ‘shoestring’ aerial provision, this aero-emergency a powerful metaphor for 
the colony’s failing present and future. 
 
This Falklands domestic aerial-emergency dramatically accelerated on 14 
October 1978 when popular Falklands Islander pilot Ian Campbell, known as 
‘Cam’, who by then was permitted to fly, was killed when his Beaver plane 
crashed. The efforts of the French administration to keep control of the 
circumstances of what had happened proved politically clumsy, exacerbating 
the Governor’s unpopularity; reflective of suspicions circulating in the 
Falklands at the time, it has been claimed by ‘Cam’s’ widow that: ‘The 
circumstances of the crash were never satisfactorily explained and aroused 
deep public concern, which was aggravated by Governor French’s maladroit 
handling of the enquiry’ (Nadine Campbell in Tatham 2008, p. 138). Ian 
Campbell’s death was a serious blow to the present and future of the colony, 
bringing together sub-emergencies 1 (socio-economic), 3 (governance) and 4 
(information control). With FIGAS again out of operation, and the loss of their 
iconic Islander pilot, this was not the time to alienate Islander opinion anxious 
about the present and future; whereas French would inevitably have been 
faced with an accelerated sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) through the 
loss of Campbell and FIGAS’ renewed breakdown, mishandling sub-







chronopolitical moment of developing emergency undermined gubernatorial 
authority over the Islanders. A sense of this affective emergency is conveyed 
in the Falkland Islands Times reportage;  
 
IN THE SUMMER OF HIS YEARS 
 
It is with deep regret that we have to report the death of Captain Ian Campbell 
MBE, after a ‘plane accident on the afternoon of Thursday 14th October 
(Falkland Islands Times, 6 November 1976, p. 1). 
 
This mournful atmosphere not only ensured criticism of the French 
Administration would continue, but would intensify, as it effectively made vocal 
Islander criticism of the Governor’s management of the colony more 
permissible. 
 
The search for the body led to tension between Islanders and the French 
administration, which also used the assistance of an Argentine F27 aircraft, a 
poignant demonstration of the present and future advantages of ‘co-
operation’, as well as the Royal Marines. When Campbell’s body was found at 
Mare Harbour, it won no appreciation of French’s official efforts, with the 
Falkland Islands Times reporting it thus: 
 
It seems ironical that it was this [local] group that had no Government support 
(those taking part were required to sign a disclaimer which virtually said that 
what they were doing was pointless) and for whom assistance from the Royal 
Marines on Johnsons Is[land] was forbidden by their Commanding Officer, 
should be the ones who discovered Ian’s body on November 2nd near the spot 
where [the Beaver] Alpha Kilo had grounded (Falkland Islands Times, 6 
November 1976, p. 2). 
 
Some indication of how an atmosphere of mourning was constructed both in 
Stanley and in the Camp is provided in this reportage, which with the sense of 
loss and bereavement resulting from Campbell’s death is likely to have proved 
a profoundly affective experience for Islanders. In paying their last respects 
the mourners, who constituted over 20% of the entire Island population, were 
part of a highly emotional and visible crowd response to Campbell’s death. In 
this key chronopolitical moment, French had allowed himself to be profoundly 
alienated from the ‘mourning crowd’, ensuring that in the Islanders resistance 







become the embodiment of the Islands’ malaise. As depicted in the following 
account, it was a sombre occasion; the description of the objects of flags ‘at 
half-mast’, the harsh elements through the “cold and grey’ afternoon and the 
cessation of regular performances ‘shops and offices were closed’ give an 
affective sense of the poignancy of the event: 
 
Flags flew at half-mast yesterday and on that cold, grey afternoon of the funeral 
the Colony came to a standstill. Shops and offices were closed and the Camp 
settlements were able [sic] to the short service which was broadcast. Over 400 
people came to pay their last respects to someone who was looked upon not 
as just another pilot but as everybody’s friend and helper (Falkland Islands 
Times, 6 November 1976, p. 2). 
 
Yet, prior to the discovery of Campbell’s body (2 November) and subsequent 
funeral (6 November 1976), a political crisis which incorporated sub-
emergencies 1 (socio-economic), 3 (governance) and 4 (information control) 
had erupted, with emergency in the Islands – with the exception of sub-
emergency 2 (geopolitical) – accelerated, to what for French would prove a 
fast and destructive conclusion to his gubernatorial rule, as he lost control of 
chronopolitical governance.  
 
An emergency Executive Council (ExCo) meeting was called for Monday 18 
October, at which Councillors John Smith and Sydney Miller demanded that 
the French Administration (unlike in the case of the recent New Incident) 
accept an independent enquiry with inspectors from abroad. They then 
resigned and walked out, so seizing the initiative in a powerful pre-emptive 
political performance. French’s efforts to regain the initiative backfired when a 
subsequent, and unattributed, sensitive conversation was leaked on the RT, 
which admitted that a now conceded Deputy Governor-led crash investigation 
was to be attributed to French’s personal initiative, and not (chrono)political 
pressure from Smith and Miller. This apparent preventative misrepresentation 
of the sequence of events further damaged French’s credibility, giving 
substance to rumours within the Islands of an official ‘cover up’ about the 
reasons for the Campbell’s fatal plane crash. 
 







conversation on 4.5 MHz in which it was said much wool had been pulled over 
EX.CO’s eyes, it was announced that evening that the Governor had appointed 
the Deputy governor to establish a Board of Enquiry into the accident. The 
announcement which was made before the one informing us of the [Smith and 
Miller] resignations attempted to give the impression that ‘the Governor’s action 
automatically followed official notification of the accident’ (4 days after)’ 
(Falkland Islands Times, 6 November 1976, p. 2). 
 
Further dramatic chronopolitical performance followed over the next 48 hours, 
involving major crowd protest against the French administration, which grew 
so intense that it effectively became a pre-emptive, reforming uprising against 
the Governor, the Falklands own ‘October Revolution’, albeit without a 
storming of Government House. Not only was French now forced to accept 
that this time there was to be an independent enquiry into the causes of a 
Beaver plane crash but also demonstrated that he had lost control of the 
colony. For London this was particularly dangerous, given that sub-
emergency 2 (geopolitical) had the potential itself to accelerate into Anglo-
Argentine confrontation; in this politically and emotionally charged atmosphere 
of disturbance, an unexpected incident involving an Argentine citizen and 
Islander was entirely possible. The volatility which eventually convinced 
French’s superiors that his position was untenable is conveyed in this 
reportage, the logic of which would compel London to adopt a pre-emptive 
policy towards the chronopolitically outmaneuvered Governor.  
 
The role of crowds as an accelerant of slow emergency, and chronopolitical 
catalyst, is very evident, with ‘crowd(s) of prohibition’ (Aradau 2015, p. 169) 
playing a vital role in French’s gubernatorial demise. The two visible and 
emotional crowds cited below both occurred in Stanley over a two-day period 
(19-20 October 1976), one seemingly a smaller ‘mobile crowd’, which acted 
as a precursor to a 200 strong ‘crowd of place’ that assembled the following 
day. 
 
On Tuesday 19th a crowd of people visited homes of Stanley councillors to 
express their support for the actions taken by John Smith and Sydney Miller 
and show their lack of confidence in the Administration. At about 7pm on 
Wednesday 20th a crowd of over 200 people gathered in Murdo’s paddock to 
demonstrate their mistrust of Governor French and Chief Secretary Arthur 
Monk and at which most Councillors (including Councillors Blake, Monk and 







Times, 6 November 1976, p. 2). 
 
The catalyzing effect of the ‘prohibitory crowd’ (Aradau 2015) on slow 
emergency, both in its emotional rejection of French’s handling of sub-
emergencies 1 to 4, and effective incorporation within these, led to urgent 
counter-emergency measures from the British authorities to decelerate 
emergency and regain the chronopolitical initiative which French had 
spectacularly lost.  
 
Of significance is Councillor Adrian Monk’s 22 October initiative to use radio 
as a means to engage with, and calm, the invisible crowd of disaffected 
Islanders; this bid to decelerate slow emergency, and so pre-empt further 
physical crowds re-emerging in Stanley, was however not enough to restore 
Islander confidence in the (chrono)politically humiliated French: 
 
On 21st October it was announced that a team of three from the Accident 
Investigation Branch of the Dept. of Trade in London and headed by Mr. G.C 
Wilkinson would be arriving on the 28th. On Friday 22nd in what could be 
described as an attempt to bridge the widening gap between the people and 
Administration, Councillor Adrian Monk gave a talk over the air. Space is 
running out here […] but the announcement about our next Governor was most 
timely in that it was seen as a diplomatic move to take the heat off a potentially 
explosive situation (Falkland Islands Times, 6 November 1976, p. 2). 
 
The announcement that French was to be pre-emptively withdrawn amounted 
to London stepping in to decelerate this emergency, so that sub-emergencies 
1 (socio-economic), 3 (governance) and 4 (information control) were defused, 
and would not inadvertently accelerate sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical). 
French later broadcast to the Islanders that he would not be returning: 
 
On 16th November Governor French gave a broadcast address in which he 
announced that due to the desire of Her Majesty’s Govt. to discuss with him 
directly a number of issues raised by the Shackleton Report he would be 
leaving the Islands on 2 December. His Excellency said that although 
Councillors felt strongly that he should return to the colony after discussions 
with Minsters on the future of the Falklands, it would be an unjustifiable charge 
on public funds (Falkland Islands Times, 7 December 1976, p. 2). 
 
In understanding the factors that combined with Ian Campbell’s death to 







French’s governorship, Islanders’ discourse in the Falkland Islands Times 
offers valuable insights. Stuart Wallace’s letter of 3 September mapped out a 
culture of secrecy, rumour and censorship sub-emergency 4 (information 
control), and by extension sub-emergency 3 (governance) – to the degree that 
the author reimagined French’s ‘Falkland Administration’ as a ‘junta’, the 
damaging implication being that the Governor’s administration – like the 
Argentine junta – was acting autocratically, constricting the democratic space 
available to Islanders, with Chief Secretary Arthur Monk singled out for 
particular criticism.   
 
The construction of Wallace’s letter is of particular interest; words which 
scaffold a narrative of an untrusting and untrustworthy administration are 
placed in italics. Significantly, there is a clear sense of disseminated official 
narratives from the French administration being disbelieved, at least by some 
of the invisible crowd of Falkland radio listeners, and of an undemocratic 
administration’s past and present failings presaging future ones: 
 
The events of the past weeks have given rise to much doubting of our 
administration’s ability to run the day to day affairs of our community, the 
bulletins from the Mr Arthur Monk, have been largely evasions and contained 
nothing that any good 4.5 listener was not already aware of. 
 
The incident at New Island resulted in the loss of one of our aircraft, and with 
the hospitalisation of our other pilot, caused many Campers inconvenience 
and much anxiety. Yet we did not hear officially of the grounding of our pilot 
nor did a whisper of the results of any enquiry reach us. 
 
The Falkland administration seems incapable of conducting the simplest of 
our affairs in anything resembling an open and honest manner. I hear that our 
own people supposedly in positions of some authority are not allowed to 
make any real decisions without first trotting up to the Chief Secretary and 
getting his approval. 
 
‘Keep taking the pills’ seems to be ExCo’s current maxim. Shrouded in 
secrecy and, reportedly, constantly hampered by the Governor’s directives on 
‘Correct Procedure’, they meet regularly at dead of day on the outskirts of 
Stanley. At some recent meetings Mr. John Smith was the only elected 
member present. (Good on Yer John!) Did someone mention a Junta!’ 
(Falkland Islands Times, 6 November 1976, p. 8). 
 
Framings of rumour and suspicion such as ‘evasions’, ‘whisper’ and ‘shrouded 







(governance) and 4 (information control), articulating the collapse in trust 
between the Governor and a vocal section of Islander opinion, the latter key in 
the emergence of the invisible or visible ‘prohibitory’ crowd (Aradau 2015), 
and gubernatorial loss of chronopolitical control. The breakdown in relations 
between the Governor and a number of Islanders, itself a growing factor in 
accelerating slow emergency, brought a further exacerbatory intensity to sub-
emergency 1 (socio-economic) by causing intra-Islander tensions about how 
to respond to the French administration. A readiness to think the worst of 
French was well established, and it has been noted too that he was suspected 
by Falkland Islanders of instructing the police to keep certain Islanders under 
surveillance on suspicion that they were considered violent towards resident 
Argentines (Dodds 2002, p. 153).  
 
This narrative of decline, suspicion and mistrust, reflecting the intensification 
of sub-emergencies 1 (socio-economic), 3 (governance) and 4 (information 
control), was reinforced by Don Davidson of West Point Island, in his letter of 
26 October 1976; in this he confirmed that he had been one of the radio-
telephone users who had recently been outspoken about the French 
administration, so confirming his role as a member of the invisible but highly 
audible emotional radio-telephone crowd that denounced French in the 
aftermath of the recent protest crowds in Stanley. He asserted that the only 
controversial comment that he had made over the radio-telephone was that 
Governor French’s Falklands ‘could virtually be called a ‘benevolent 
dictatorship’ (Falkland Islands Times, 6 November 1976, p.11), so highlighting 
for the crowd of radio-telephone listeners the continuing (chrono)political 
pressure on a governor whose tenure was rapidly coming to a close, through 
amplifying the widespread view that French’s administration was autocratic 
and controlling. His letter reads as somewhat contrite, but also self-
justificatory, and certainly confirms the extended geographical spread of his 
crowd-audience: 
 
Firstly I was speaking to my elected representative Mr. L.G. Blake, on matters 
which were worrying me deeply, and in the only way available to people on 
islands (sic) at the present time, the R.T; exercising my right as a British citizen, 







them to uphold my right to say it [...] In my talk to my representative, after which 
eight Camp stations on the East and West came up and agreed with me, the 
only statement I made which I think might come under the ire of the councillors, 
is that I expressed the opinion that "we are living under what could virtually be 
called a benevolent dictatorship". Now one of the things about a benevolent 
dictatorship, is that people can live their lives as they wish as long as they keep 
their opinions to themselves and don't criticise the actions, or lack of them, of 
government […]. People are unsettled because of a lack of facts and lack of 
contact with the administration, which breeds mistrust’ (Falkland Islands Times, 
6 November 1976, pp. 10-11).  
 
Davidson’s letter makes clear how sub-emergencies 2 (socio-economic), 3 
(governance) and 4 (information control) had all been negatively affected, with 
the ‘unsettled’ state of Islanders (Falkland Islands Times, 6 November 1976, 
p. 11) directly linked to French’s information management style, itself 
disruptively accelerating, rather than usefully decelerating, slow emergency in 
the Islands, and his loss of chronopolitical control. 
 
A similar critical perspective on the French administration is offered by 
Sydney Miller, one of the Stanley councillors who had resigned, in his letter of 
29 October. Miller was robust in describing how he had sought to mobilise the 
radio-telephone as a crowd-inducing chronopolitical weapon against the 
French administration, in order to ‘awaken’ Islanders to aspects of ‘the 
Administrations performance’ (sub-emergency 3 – governance), and the 
‘secrecy’ of the Islands Councils meetings (sub-emergency 3 – governance; 
sub-emergency 4 – information control) (Falkland Islands Times, 6 November 
1976, p. 12). Miller explained his crowd-focused accelerative actions in these 
terms: 
Very recently by radio telephone undisguised criticism was used by this writer 
to stir the colony's people and in particular to awaken your members of council 
to some of the facts of the Administrations performance. People were stirred 
and the response was colony wide but the combined Councils which sat in total 
secrecy as is customary seem to have produced something of a damp squib. 
True enough in a subsequent broadcast which he told us was his own 
manufacture, one member [Adrian Monk] made lofty remarks, to use his own 
words, about ' talking in an immoderate way on the radio in deplorable bad 
taste which does harm to relations with Argentina'[…] This kind of pussyfooting 
towards a foreign country does nobody any good. Any internal criticism is 
within our own family of people and we are totally uninterested in any 
degrading appeasement of foreign opinion. That attitude has both annoyed and 
worried me during the recent ExCo years (Falkland Islands Times, 6 November 








In Miller’s narrative, sub-emergency 4 (information control), and by extension 
sub-emergency 3 (governance), had become seriously compromised due to 
the geopolitical issue of the ‘nature’ of the relationship with Argentina (sub-
emergency 2). Miller’s critique, that over time, both during and before 
French’s administration, the development of a culture of preventative ‘secrecy’ 
was attributable to ‘pussyfooting’ towards Argentina, represented a significant 
denunciation of the limits of freedom of expression in the Falklands. As 
conceived by Miller, an uncomfortable undemocratic present and, potentially, 
future had been created out of past ‘kowtowing’ to Argentina. Miller had 
deliberately sought to rouse Islanders and mobilise Councillors against pre-
emptively talking (chrono)politics against the French administration, 
weaponising the radio-telephone as a source of disruptive, crowd-inducing 
discourse, so adding new exacerbatory intensities to sub-emergencies 3 
(governance) and 4 (information control).  
 
Further explanation of the accelerative factors in slow emergency, which is 
likely to have fed the frustration of the invisible and visible crowd, and added 
to temporal pressure on French, can be seen in Margaret Davidson’s 
chronopolitically activist letter of 26 October 1976, addressed to ‘the four 
elected members of the Legislature and the Falkland Islands Times’. Margaret 
Davidson argued that in the past and present under the French 
administration, ‘the position continues to worsen’ (Falkland Islands Times, 
7 December 1976, p. 5), as exemplified in the New Island Incident, creating a 
bleak Falklands future.  
 
Similarly, themes of secrecy – key aspects of the emergency in the 
governance of the Islands (sub-emergency 3) – were strongly articulated, 
through words/phrases such as ‘silent’ and ‘in the dark’ (as italicised below). 
The letter offers a powerful insight into emergency-acceleration in the 
Falklands, with Davidson subversively arguing that only in one respect was 
secrecy not being maintained, that is through Argentine monitoring of the 
radio-telephone. 
 







gambled with to show restraint as the position continues to worsen. Rome may 
not have been built in a day but accidents - mortal accidents do happen in a 
day…(Falkland Islands Times, 7 December 1976, p. 5). 
 
Granted some, repeat some, of the recent conversations were hysterical so 
but often they are the only information we have. How otherwise would we on 
the West have known anything about some recent events? – e.g. the reasons 
behind the Ex-Co resignations, the public meetings in Stanley. Government 
tells us nothing. The broadcasting system is silent. Our Leg Co members tell 
us nothing – admittedly in the case of our representative on the West, 
because he was probably as much in the dark as we were.  I am sure if a 
more free public debate was the rule here in the Islands, the hysterical tone of 
such conversation would disappear. 
 
I am quite sure that our RT system is avidly monitored on the coast, but do you 
honestly think that anything we may say here will have the slightest effect on 
the United Nations? We must realise that our skins are the wrong colour to 
make any impression at the UN’ (Falkland Islands Times, 7 December 1976, p. 
5). 
 
The emotional framing offered by Margaret Davidson – one of past, present 
and continuing (future) decline – sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) – and 
resentment towards a culture of secrecy under Governor French (sub-
emergencies 3 (governance), and 4 (information control) – maps out key 
accelerative elements in speeding up slow emergency, a chronopolitical 
process catalyzed by French’s mishandling of the aero-emergency of latter 
1976. Davidson’s narrative acknowledges that some of the discourse of the 
invisible crowd on the radio-telephone had been ‘hysterical’ (Falkland Islands 
Times, 7 December 1976, p. 5), reflective of the highly charged, febrile ‘state’ 
of some Islanders in latter 1976.  The question of how best to respond to the 
deterioration in relations between the French Administration and Islanders 
proved a source of tension within the Islander community, accelerating sub-
emergency 1 (socio-economic). Whereas the Davidsons and Sydney Miller 
favoured a more robust approach, Adrian Monk took a more conciliatory, 
though not uncritical, line. In a letter to the Falkland Islands Times of 15 








I agree entirely with a great deal of what Margaret Davidson says.  No one 
supports free speech more than I do. No one wants a more democratic form of 
council than I do. No one is more aware of administration's shortcomings all 
has felt more frustrated than I have on occasions  (Falkland Islands Times, 
15 December 1976, p. 6). 
 
He then pointedly sought to re-frame Margaret Davidson’s advocacy of free 
speech and freedom of information in the Falklands, maintaining that criticism 
of governance (sub-emergency 3) and the dissemination of information (sub-
emergency 4) served to undermine the effort to manage Argentina (sub-
emergency 2). 
 
The right of free speech brings responsibilities as well. Criticisms, questions, 
doubts, condemnations etcetera should be made in a reasonable manner, 
especially over the radio [...] If Margaret Davidson thinks nothing we say makes 
the slightest difference in the United Nations then I'm afraid she is living in 
cloud cuckoo land. Without strong lobbying of members of parliament by FI 
committee members and others in the past it is doubtful if we would still be 
British. If when we disagree with the Administration’s actions, or lack of them, 
we indulge in scurrilous comments about senior officials of Her Majesty's 
personal representative [French] then we do nothing to strengthen the British 
government resolve in keeping us British and everything to help be part of 
Argentina's case which is that, we are a downtrodden colonial population under 
a despotic expatriat regime (Falkland Islands Times, 7 December 1976, p. 6). 
 
 
In addressing Davidson’s critique, and through that engaging with the anti-
French visible/invisible crowd, Monk acknowledged – this time through the 
medium of the published letter rather than spoken word – that there were 
legitimate concerns about the dissemination of information in the Falklands; 
he ‘even’ pointed out that he had proposed that broadcasting – namely the 
dissemination of information – be transferred from the Falkland authorities to 
a group – or micro-crowd – of citizens. This initiative, a means to address sub-
emergency 4 (information control), would however have compromised sub-
emergency 3 (governance), as the chronopolitical management of information 
was seen to be directly related to governance in the Islands. In claiming that 
the usage of the radio telephone had validated some concerns from the 
French administration about misuse of media, he effectively sought to reclaim 
‘the RT’ from crowd-inducing chronopolitical activism, and turn Margaret 








Finally I would like to point out that I recently introduced a motion and 
legislative council that would have taken the control of all broadcasting from the 
administration and put it in the hands of an autonomous body of citizens. The 
idea being to dispense with Administration censorship and to encourage more 
public debate on matters of interest and a better news service. In the course of 
the debate on this the chairman secretary faulted the issue with a lot of verbal 
red herrings. Anyway the motion was lost the majority of Legislative council 
members opposed it. 
 
I got the impression at the time that they believe in freedom of speech but 
doubtful if we were in all respects ready for it, thinking that our broadcasts 
might often degenerate into slanging matches. I entirely disagree with that 
thinking and still do though I am bound to state my confidence was somewhat 
shaken when I listen to some, and I repeat, some of the comments made on 
the RT in the last few weeks (Falkland Islands Times, 7 December 1976, p. 6). 
 
The intensification of sub-emergencies 3 (governance) and 4 (information 
control) as accelerative factors was robustly addressed by the Falkland 
Islands Times of 7 December 1976; this included a provocative mobilisation of 
the term ‘desiring the right’, a direct allusion to ‘Desire the Right’ on the 
Falklands Coat of Arms, with the implied criticism that the French 
administration had subverted this. The highly critical tone of this piece, with its 
emphasis on sub-emergency 3 (governance), not only helped undermine the 
credibility of (departing) Governor French and his associates, but also 
functioned as a potential chronopolitical ‘call-to arms’ for further crowd-
resistance. 
 
How many of us complain in the right quarters about some of our uncivil civil 
servants who act sometimes like mini-Hitlers or express their concern about  
the sorry state of our Police force (now down to one regular constable and two 
‘specials’) or the way animals will roam around the Town or question the 
upsurge in expenditure on the upkeep of Government House or many other 
things that spring to mind when desiring the right (Falkland Islands Times, 
7 December 1976, p. 1). 
 
The Falkland Islands Times then accelerates its critique, alleging 
‘suppression’ by the French administration, and confirms the past and present 
destabilising and disruptive impact of the New Island incident on Islander trust 
in governance (sub-emergency 3).  
 
As for suppression (using the least sinister meanings) we could give many 
instances such as the Alpha lima (New Island) accident’. It was never publicly 
reported that there had been an Inquiry but after reporting an incorrect 







announcement stated – ‘As the public will be aware a formal Investigation 
under the Colonial Air Navigation Order was in fact held by the Chief 
Secretary who as appointed Inspector for the purpose and he was assisted 
by the Supt. Civil Aviation and the Airport manager (Falkland Islands Times, 
 7 December 1976, p. 1). 
 
The operative point is that amongst some Islanders bad faith on the part of 
the French administration was widely assumed, and this had already led to 
the chronopolitical performance of Stanley’s resistance crowds on 19-20 
October 1976. French’s methods of information control had provided grounds 
to assume the worst, another accelerative factor in slow emergency. Indeed, 
there appears to have been a perception, which the Falkland Islands Times 
confirms, that French’s ‘suppression’ appears to have been more extensive 
than it actually was, giving French further opprobrium without any additional 
operational ‘benefit’.  
 
Sub-emergency 4 (control of information) had not deteriorated to the degree 
that some Islanders may have believed, as evidenced by the publication of 
the charge of ‘suppression’ on the first page of the Falkland Islands Times, 
and the unrestrained use of the radio-telephone by some ‘members’ of the 
invisible crowd. The Falkland Islands Times further illustrates this point in 
seeking to expose the ‘dissembling’ methods applied by the Chief Secretary in 
managing unwelcome discourse: 
 
Then, of course we have the more flagrant type of suppression – censorship, 
which contrary to the belief of some, we do suffer. A most recent example of 
this was when, after the completion of the last edition of The Times, and due 
to the embargo on all F.I.G.A.S operations (including medical flights) there 
were some 160 copies at the Post Office awaiting distribution to the Camp 
and it was obvious that most Campers would not be able to read theirs for 
some time. I [Editor] submitted page 3 of it (Don Davidson’s fairy story) for 
inclusion in the 19th November newsletter. However, when I rang the Chief 
Secretary, who appears to be responsible for much unrest here lately, to ask 
him why it had not been read he told me that newsreaders did not make it a 
practice of reading newspaper articles (a downright lie) and that as ‘editor’ of 
the Newsletter programme he considered it unsuitable …. 
 
Until more people stand up and let themselves be counted there is an 
increasing danger that the aforementioned diseases will become terminal. 
The writing has been on the wall for some time now and it is up to us to heed 
the writing on the wall before it is too late’ (Falkland Islands Times,  








From the opinions expressed in the Falkland Islands Times, whether in letters 
or the preceding editorial, it is clear that a range of factors – or at least 
Islander perceptions of these – drove the acceleration of slow emergency, 
and a bleak anticipated future; these included secrecy, dissembling, 
‘pandering’ towards Argentina, with the chronopolitical activism of the visible 
and invisible Islander crowd the response to these concerns. The developing 
aero-emergency of late 1976 coalesced with such concerns to make a 
politically toxic amalgam for Governor French, resulting in an overall 
acceleration of slow emergency, gubernatorial loss of chronopolitical control 
and subsequent pre-emptive removal. Far from being able to preventively 
deliver British government objectives in the Islands, French had increasingly 
become an accelerative factor in sub-emergencies 1 (socio-economic), 3 
(governance) and 4 (control of information); his lack of credibility in the eyes 
of many Islanders rendered him incapable of managing sub-emergency 2 
(geopolitical). Damagingly, he had been unable to prevent Stanley’s ‘popular 
revolt’ of 20-21 October 1976. Ironically French’s excessive use of tactics 
such as information control and censorship prevented him from fulfilling the 
very strategy of ‘cooperation’ with Argentina upon which he had placed such 
emphasis; his inability to secure the confidence of Islanders proved self-
defeating, incapacitating him from acting as a credible advocate of 
preventative cooperation with Argentina.  
 
The Falklands ‘slow emergency’ claimed both the Shackleton Report and the 
French Administration as its casualties. Whilst the case can be made that, 
given the micro-population, sub-emergencies 1 (socio-economic), 3 
(governance) and 4 (information control) in the Islands are Lilliputian 
concerns, this underestimates their significance.  
 
French’s gubernatorial failures and chronopolitical loss of control achieved 
national prominence – again – in The Times on 8 December 1976, which 
having informed its readership about the sour political atmosphere in the 









The island [sic] is seething with discontent and uncertainty, and in October public 
protest demonstrations took place of a kind never before seen in the islands’ history. 
Councillors and islanders accused the Governor Neville French, the Chief Secretary, 
Mr Arthur Monk, and his deputy Mr Doug Morrison of ‘misleading and misinforming’ 
them. Shortly after the latest demonstration involving about 200 people in Port 
Stanley, which only has a total population of 900, the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office announced that Mr French would be replaced by a new Governor Mr J.R.W. 
Parker, a career diplomat  (The Times, 8 December 1976, p. 16). 
 
Whilst attritional, slow emergency over time remained the dominant feature of 
the Falklands in the Shackleton-French era, French’s particular ‘contribution’ 
was to animate ‘lesser’ sub-emergencies to varying degrees, counter-
productively reduce the Islanders’ democratic space and provoke 
chronopolitical activist crowd-resistance; this in turn led to an overall 
acceleration of slow emergency, and his preventative removal from office in 
the uncomfortable present his past actions had created for himself. 
 
6.5 Slow emergency in the Shackleton-French era – the neutralisation of 
the Shackleton Report, and atmosphere of demoralisation 
 
The accelerated Slow Falklands Emergency of late 1976 which had resulted 
in French’s gubernatorial scalp had coincided not only with the progressive 
side-lining of the Shackleton Report, but also Argentina’s present emergency 
of the Jorge Videla-led military junta’s rule; indeed, notwithstanding 
representations of the French administration as a ‘junta’ in the Islands, 
French’s handling of sub-emergencies 3 (governance) and 4 (information 
control) bore no serious relation to that of Argentina’s military governance. 
Whilst French’s rule had expired by late 1976, the Falklands lobby in the 
United Kingdom had sought to keep the future envisioned by Shackleton 
Report alive, and pre-emptively reminded British domestic opinion that 
Falkland Islanders, as British subjects, should be protected from Argentine 
junta rule.  In a letter to The Times entitled ‘Future of the Falkland Islands’, 
former Governor Sir Cosmo Haskard strongly made this point, emphasising 
the need for a future in Islanders could rely on British support against 
Argentina: 
 
Last night I heard on BBC 4 an interview with a correspondent recently 







the rule of law appears to be ignored, serves as a reminder of the state of 
affairs in which Falkland Islanders could be subjected if ever their homeland 
should be transferred to Argentine sovereignty. 
 
Is it not wrong that the inhabitants of these islands should in any way be 
subjected to pressure designed to compel them to opt for Argentina? 
(Sir Cosmo Haskard in The Times, 21 September 1976, p. 13). 
 
As 1976 waned, it was clear that preventative official resistance in Whitehall 
to Shackleton’s pre-emptive recommendations had to all intents and purposes 
prevailed, and that the future implementation of the Report was as effectively 
side-lined as (former) Governor French’s career.  On the same day [8 
December 1976] that The Times had announced French’s departure from the 
Falklands, correspondent Michael Frenchman reported on the British 
authorities’ unwillingness to construct a Falklands future based on the 
implementation of Shackleton’s recommendations, and so pre-emptively 
decelerate sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic), albeit at the risk of 
accelerating sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical) through ‘disregarding’ Argentina. 
He observed: ‘Islanders fear that the Shackleton Report will be ignored. 
Unless something is done quickly they believe the noose is being tightened 
economically so that they will be forced into accepting an unwanted solution 
with the Argentine’ (The Times, 8 December 1976, p. 16).  
 
Frenchman symbolically contrasted the unwelcome future that awaited 
following the neutralisation of the Shackleton Report with the first ever group 
wreath-laying by Islanders at the Cenotaph in London, due to happen that 
day, in commemoration of the 8 December 1914 Battle of the Falklands. The 
juxtaposition of a supportive loyal Falkland crowd commemorating war dead, 
with elements of the British government, notably the Foreign Office, that 
sought to accommodate Argentina was not a helpful chronopolitical framing 
for the British government, the clear implication being that it was neither 
patriotic nor willing to follow through on the findings of the Report it had 
commissioned. Frenchman’s article even implied that the Shackleton Report – 
through its non-implementation, and by extension compounding of sub-
emergency 1 (socio-economic) – was being manipulated to create a future in 








It is now more than four months since the Shackleton report on the disputed 
British colony of the Falkland Islands was published. Whitehall has still failed 
to implement any of its recommendations and a Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office spokesman will only say that Lord Shackleton’s team’s proposal on the 
economic future of the Islands ‘are under active consideration’. Any further 
inquiries, particularly over lengthening the permanent airstrip being built by 
the British government which could provide the islands’ only lifeline for a 
growth economy would seem to indicate that the only thing Whitehall wants to 
do is to deny any economic development to the islands. This attitude appears 
to be adopted in the hope that it will lessen the demands to remain British 
(The Times, 8 December 1976, p. 16). 
 
The geopolitical reality was that the Callaghan government preventatively 
wished to avoid accelerating the Argentine element of slow emergency (sub-
emergency 1), and pre-emptively adopting the Shackleton Report would 
simply ensure a future of Anglo-Argentine tension over the Islands. Ignoring 
Shackleton’s recommendations offered the prospect of a Falklands future in 
which the colony would be degraded to the point of socio-economic non-
viability, managed decline presenting the opportunity of realising the inevitable 
outcome of manufactured slow emergency, namely accommodating Argentine 
sovereignty claims. Unsurprisingly, the sidelining of the Report had 
contributed to an atmosphere of growing pessimism in the Islands about the 
future, as was ruefully acknowledged in The Falkland Islands Association 
newsletter of November 1976. A narrative of demoralized Islanders struggling 
with present adversity, a neglected ‘British crowd’ in need of support, was 
powerfully conveyed, with particular emphasis placed on the pre-emptive 
importance of building an extension to the airfield, without which a future of 
slow emergency and Argentine domination looked unavoidable. 
 
The Falkland Islands are passing through one of the most difficult periods in 
their history and they need all the support we can give them. It is with regret 
that we have to report that morale in the Falkland Islands is at a low ebb. 
Unusually severe weather conditions, loss of confidence in the government 
executive and delay in a definitive announcement regarding the extension of 
the airfield at all contributed to this state of affairs. The United Kingdom 
Falkland Islands Committee is convinced that the answer to the problem of the 
colony lies in the extension to the airfield. The Committee has therefore 
concentrated its efforts over the past few months on this one aspect of the 









French’s December 1976 departure was no compensation for the enduring 
present of unaddressed socio-economic and governance sub-emergencies (1 
and 3 respectively); with no prospect in sight of a post Shackleton future in 
which the malaise of slow emergency would be pre-emptively alleviated, an 
atmosphere of demoralisation prevailed. Evidence of the profound, ongoing 
tensions extant within the Islands at this time can be seen in a letter published 
in the 4 January 1977 edition of the Falkland Islands Times; its author, Dave 
Coalville offers a highly critical framing of past and present life in the Islander 
community, to the point of suggesting that those who lacked faith in the British 
government’s good intent should remove themselves from the Islands, and so 
from being involved in the Islands’ (chrono)political future. Whereas Coalville 
was generous, or perhaps naïve, about the British Government’s bona fides, 
he did not hold back in singling out individual Islanders: 
 
Why don't […] Jimmy Alasia, Mr. Haddon, Mrs. Malcolm and the Spruces pack 
their gear and go somewhere else if they have no faith in the British 
government. I've lived under this present British government and it is surely 
one of the best Britain has ever had […] Self-determination I've heard a lot 
about, not to mention self-importance and self-pity. What a lovely place to work 
in. Huh! Yours sincerely, D. Coalville (Falkland Islands Times, 4 January 1977, 
p. 5).  
 
A sense of post-Shackleton despondency within the invisible Islander crowd is 
palpably articulated by ‘a Kelper’, who warned of a present and future 
‘detention camp atmosphere’ (Falkland Islands Times, 15 April 1977, p. 3). 
This demoralised atmosphere is constructed by the author through a feeling of 
the incarceration of Islanders, and loss of control of their mobilities, being 
subject to the bureaucratic force majeure of Argentine state power. That this 
perception existed within the Islander community, that the Falklands were de 
facto ‘prison islands’, shows the degree to which Falklands governance (sub-
emergency 3) and geopolitics (sub-emergency 2) were intimately connected; 
of significance too, is that whilst the socio-economic neglect of sub-
emergency 1 was a keenly felt feature of Islander life, this particular rendering 
exclusively focuses on feeling imprisoned: 
 
The Falkland Islands –  







A place where ingress and egress for all travellers, except VIPs is controlled by 
Argentina. 
That even Armed Forces personnel have to obtain a permit before they can 
enter the colony from the Argentine is disturbing enough and increases the 
detention camp atmosphere. 
That the Falkland Islands is in the hands of an oppressive harsh regime would 
be ideal for concentration camps has been noted and discussed. 
 
Contributed by a Kelper (one of the pawns) (Falkland Islands Times,  
15 April 1977, p. 3). 
 
Whilst this represents the affective experience of Falklands’ slow emergency 
as felt by at least one ‘pawn’ Islander, the broader point – as the 
aforementioned Falkland Islands Association Newsletter of November 1976 
noted – was that the British government’s reluctance to extend the airport 
ensured Argentine aerial control, and that Islanders, or at least their mobilities, 
were ultimately in thrall to the Argentine junta, with their futures facing a 
similar prospect. 
 
Hopes of pre-emptive improvement, which had been had momentarily 
aroused by the Shackleton Report, had largely flickered out for many 
Islanders by 1977. The British government’s preventative prioritisation of 
addressing the geopolitical sub-emergency over the socio-economic sub-
emergency was confirmed both in its sidelining of the Shackleton Report, and 
1977’s renewed Anglo-Argentine diplomatic efforts under minister Ted 
Rowlands. A sceptical editorial in the Falkland Islands Times, entitled ‘A 
turning point for better or for worse?’, directed its attention to Rowlands’ 
upcoming March 1977 visit, striking a sceptical tone about Labour ministers in 
the past and how the Shackleton Report would henceforth be ‘used’ in the 
future: 
 
It was a Labour government minister of state (in the form of Lord Chalfont) who 
came here in 1968 hoping that it would take little persuasion to get us to 
embrace Argentina like some kind of foster parents. However next week's 
messenger will arrive with a trump card. He will no doubt tell us that Friend of 
the Falkland Lord Shackleton states in his Economic Survey that our future lies 
with cooperation and even participation of our neighbour Argentina – a country 
whose language, culture, history and political regimes are as foreign to us as a 
Circassian circle [popular Falkland dance] is to them (Falkland Islands Times, 








Socio-economic anxieties (sub-emergency 1) remained unresolved by 
Rowlands’ visit, with the Shackleton Report now ‘reclaimed’ by the British 
authorities as a point of reference to encourage future ‘co-operation’ with 
Argentina (sub-emergency 2). Nor was trust in the British government’s bona 
fide deepened; Velma Malcolm cites how when ‘The (Falkland Islands) 
committee met him at Neil Watson’s house on Pioneer row and we could 
barely get a word in but I’m nearly sure he reassured us. However no sooner 
had he left here than it was announced he was going back to Argentina to 
discuss sovereignty’ (Malcolm 2002, p. 102). 
  
The neutralisation of the Shackleton Report’s pre-emptive recommendations 
was recognised in a Falkland Islands Association newsletter article entitled 
‘Implementation of the Shackleton report’, in which an epitaph was effectively 
written for ‘[t]his imaginative and constructive survey’, of which it stated that; 
 
the determination and will to build a strong diversified economy which would 
increase even the present economic contribution to Britain have been 
frustrated by political pressure and bureaucratic procrastination (Falkland 
Islands Association Newsletter 1b, June 1977, p. 1).  
 
Falkland Islanders had, briefly, through the Shackleton Report had a glimpse 
of what would prove to be a counter-factual future; the slow emergency, which 
had defined both the colony’s past, had a firm preventative on the present, 
with a strategic chronopolitical future of socio-economic degrading which 
looked set to lead to a geopolitical recrudesence of las Islas Malvinas in the 




The Falklands of the mid-1970s provide a valuable case study for unpacking 
the workings of slow emergency. This period sheds light on how speed can be 
seen to affect the unfolding of emergency over time through causing 
acceleration or deceleration, a process which, for the most part, was slowly 
played out over years rather than quickly in days, hours or minutes. The 







economic equivalent of ‘death by a thousand cuts’ for this damaged and 
deteriorating British colony; there was no single, fatal blow such as the fast 
emergency of Argentina’s attempted ‘military solution’ in April 1982, though 
the strategic chronopolitical logic of Whitehall’s disregard for the Shackleton 
report had the potential to be that blow. The overall speed of slow emergency 
at any given time was relational to the sub-emergencies that caused it to 
accelerate or decelerate.  
 
It is particularly sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) where slow emergency 
sticks; whereas the other sub-emergencies (geopolitical: governance: 
information control) have moments of intensification which can reach the point 
of crisis (for example, governance under French), but can become less 
intense. In contrast, the Falklands’ socio-economic decline, especially the 
demographic winter that depopulation was causing, was not becoming less 
intense; whatever might, or might not, ultimately happen with sub-emergency 
2 (geopolitical), it was clear that without a population there was no future for 
the beleaguered colony of the Falkland Islands.  
 
The chronopolitical dangers posed to the Falkland Islands from slow 
emergency may not have been as dramatic or immediate as those of the fast 
emergency of the 1982 Anglo-Argentine Conflict, but were no less profound; 
both emergencies – the slow Falklands emergency prior to April 1982, and the 
fast Falkland emergency of April-June 1982 – offered a means, albeit through 
different speeds and temporalities, to bring about the geopolitical extinction of 
the Falklands as a British colonial entity. In essence, the colony of the 
Falkland Islands was the product of a failed past and a failing present, both 
resulting from London’s preventative continuation of slow emergency; the 
strategic chronopolitical logic that las Islas Malvinas would be the future 
appeared inescapable, so removing Britain’s anachronistic South Atlantic 
liability. 
 
This said, the compressed temporality of fast emergency does not necessarily 
lend itself to predictable geopolitical outcomes as readily as slow emergency. 







under British rule in the pre-1982 period, not least the Shackleton-French era, 
offered a more certain path to the British withdrawal from the Islands than the 
74-day misadventure of Argentina’s 1982 fast emergency ‘bid’ to secure the 
Malvinas, and illustrates the importance of a considered strategic 
chronopolitics in achieving advantageous geopolitical outcomes. 
 
The Shackleton-French era of 1975-77 helps reveal the subtle and 
preventative weaponisation of slow emergency by the British authorities 
against the Falkland Islanders through strategic chronopolitics, with the former 
directing the pressures of socio-economic decline against this micro-
community’s continued viability. Aradau’s (2015) highlighting of role of the 
crowd as a factor in emergency provides a valuable starting point in our 
unpacking of the countervailing chronopolitical activism of the Falklands 
crowd – visible and invisible – in the Shackleton-French era, be that the warm 
crowd-reception that Shackleton received, or the destabilizing, pre-emptive 
crowd-resistance offered to the French administration. Whatever the 
accelerative or decelerative speed of slow emergency at any given point in 
time, ‘drastic action’ (Neocleous 2006, p. 194) was required to pre-emptively 
extricate the Falklands from its slow malaise, with the neutralisation of the 
Shackleton Report entrenching this, promising a very uncomfortable future for 
Falkland Islanders. Applying Nixon’s notion of slowness (2011) to emergency 
rather than violence thus offers a valuable speed-related focus, a slow 
perspective emphasising as it does that emergency can be a long, drawn out 
and attritional process, in which slow years, rather than fast hours or minutes, 












Fig. 7.1. Slow emergency Stanley 
 
Source: Panorama, October 1966, p. 5 
 
This photo of Stanley, Fig 7.1 capital of the Falkland Islands, offers an 
elementally exposed Union Jack as a focal point, visually articulating Islander 
loyalty and expressing British sovereignty. The image captures a view of the 
worn, battered, and ramshackle nature of much of Stanley of the slow 
emergency era, hardly a jewel in what remained of the colonial crown. The 
rusted ‘wriggly tin’ roofs, and the battered and impermanent wooden 
structures, suggest that the Islands’ capital was ‘down at heel’. The picture 
was captioned ‘The only city in the world without a housing problem’, 
confirming that Panorama (October 1966, p. 5) had not intended it to convey a 
flattering image of Stanley; notwithstanding this, it succeeds in highlighting 
material features of the colony’s slow emergency, such as buildings in slow 








Through this photographic image of Stanley, one is offered an insight into 
what the future, and more immediately the present held, for young Falkland 
women and men growing up in the colony who, unless they emigrated, faced 
the prospect of spending their adult life in Stanley (or else an isolated Camp 
settlement). Whilst deliberately depicted as a loyal shantytown by Panorama, 
it is clear that this photographic framing of Stanley was not without some 
foundation; all Panorama’s photographer had needed to do was to 
photograph what already existed, albeit selectively.  
 
Unlike their male counterparts female Islanders of marrying age had an 
increasingly used way of avoiding a personal future living under a British slow 
emergency or incorporation into Argentina. Young women had the opportunity 
to date/marry a Royal Marine stationed in the Falklands, and so secure a new 
life outside of the Islands; many decided to do so, thereby exacerbating slow 
emergency demographic decline. This was a point that the 1976 Report 
affirmed. 
 
This chapter specifically focuses on gender imbalance in the Islands, and the 
tensions this generated, which became highly exposed through the ‘Angry 
Islander’ controversy of November to December 1978. This was a divisive and 
contentious episode within the Islander community about the attritional loss of 
Islander women to the Royal Marines, and was conducted through the pages 
of the Falkland Island Times. It was initiated by a letter to the editor from an 
anonymous author ‘Angry Islander’. The issues raised in the ‘Angry Islander’ 
controversy – gender imbalance, women’s agency and depopulation – 
brought into question, irrespective of Argentine territorial ambitions, the very 
future of the Islands’ community; this discourse understandably evoked strong 
responses from Islanders, as the original choice of the nom de plume ‘Angry 
Islander’ itself reflects. The framing of this chapter lies particularly in gender, 
but also takes account of race and domestic violence. Of the latter, Gray 
(2019, p.196) has argued that: 
 the domestic violence which takes place in warzones should not be treated as 
 external to ‘what war really is’, rather, like other aspects of how people in 
 warzones negotiate their everyday lives, and like other aspects of violence 







 relations of war itself.  
Applying this logic to the pressures of life in the Falklands in the years leading 
up to 1982, it does not require a great leap to see intimate relationships as 
part of the social relations of slow emergency; while slow emergency does not 
presuppose that intimate tensions need exist between couples, where these 
did exist, it is likely that that wider slow emergency pressures affected the 
speed and amplified the intensities of strained relationships.  
Brickell (2008, p.1674) has found, in respect of her research into the 
relationship between alcohol and gender-based violence post-conflict 
Cambodia, how various factors were used to explain alcohol-related domestic 
violence. She cites ‘decline in the state of marital relationships, the prevalence 
of family and employment related difficulties and the broader political 
environment of Cambodia both past and present’ as among the factors cited 
by her interviewees, noting ‘the emphasis placed by men and women on 
external factors as largely responsible for gender-based violence’ (Brickell 
2008, p.1674). Brickell’s reference to a ‘decline in the state of marital 
relationships’ suggests the relevance of the idea of intimate slow emergency. 
Pain (2014, p.132) too puts forward an argument that supports the idea of the 
embeddedness of emergency in strained marital relationships, where the 
‘routine’ nature of domestic violence provides a measure of predictability 
about the frequency, and therefore likely speed and intensity, of the intimate 
emergency of domestic violence. Pain posits: 
 in some ways, domestic violence is routine, for example compared with an 
 assault by a stranger on the street, yet incidents of violence are always 
 accompanied by a feeling of shock, and often experienced as coming ‘out of 
 the blue.   
Such intimate violence is consistent with an emergency framing, with alcohol 
often functioning as a catalyst for emergency. It appears likely that such 
factors and mentalities were also at play in the Falklands, where wider slow 
emergency difficulties provided no shortage of reasons for domestic abusers 










7.2 Foregrounding the ‘Angry lslander’ controversy; its wider context 
and a paucity of female bodies 
 
In foregrounding an evaluation of this controversy, and the role of the 
presence/absence of female bodies, it is important to consider gender, and 
also race. Male and female Islanders alike were offshore white British 
subjects, whose claim to be indigenous in their South Atlantic archipelago, 
rested on the successive generations of their forebears having lived in the 
archipelago since the 1840s. Taking this framing, the Royal Marines of our 
slow emergency era can also be said to assume the role of (white) colonisers, 
but rarely of colonists; when male marines married female Islanders, they 
rarely stayed on to settle in the Islands as colonists, only staying there until 
the end of their Falkland tour of duty.  
 
British ‘Kith and kin’, euphemistic phrasing for ‘white British’ was how Falkland 
Islanders were often described in a rapidly decolonising world. When marital 
unions between an Islander female and a (male) Royal Marine took place, 
these were, racially speaking, ‘white weddings’, that is a marital union of white 
kith and kin. In this post war Second World War era, with its rising tide of 
decolonisation, a ‘racialisation of British national identity in the face of black 
immigration from the Commonwealth and former colonies’ (Ward 2004, p.50) 
occurred. A Falkland ‘white wedding’, in contrast, conformed with traditional 
representations that being British equated to being white. Of whiteness, 
Schwarz (2011, p.10) has observed ‘It was perhaps most effective in 
informing Britons who they were not’, and the ethnic homogeneity of the white 
British Falklands colony stood in contrast to the multi-cultural nature of 
modern Britain, or indeed the immigrant ‘melting pot’ of Argentina (even 
though, counterintuitively, Argentina was still overwhelmingly of white 
European descent).  
 
Whereas the unofficial Falkland Islanders Councillors felt secure enough in 
the colony’s white homogeneity to inform the British Parliament and Press in 
their February 1968 letter that ‘there is no racial problem’, gender proved to 







slow emergency for the Islands. That numerous younger female Islanders, the 
curators of indigenous Islander reproductivity, often chose a Royal Marine as 
a spouse, in preference to an indigenous male, represented both a 
demographic and reproductive loss, as well as female empowerment. In 
respect of the latter, in the slow emergency era, Islander women were able to 
reverse ‘conventional’ gender roles in leaving the colony; in asserting their 
own mobility, they left behind unmarried Islander males who had to stay home 
‘down on the (sheep) farm’. The numerical paucity of Islander women of 
reproductive age served to amplify female agentive power, and by extension 
their capacity to disrupt and reconfigure established gender hierarchies, to the 
disbenefit of unmarried male Islanders. This exercise of female agency, 
presented such Islander males with a personal slow emergency in which their 
prospects of a patriarchal role within a family context were being undermined 
by the lack of a female partner. 
 
This gender imbalance was not, however, a unique occurrence in what had 
once been British Empire; in other former colonial territories inhabited by 
British descendants, achieving a numerical gender balance had been ‘a 
painfully slow process. In Australia, for example, women did not equal the 
number of men until after the Second World War’ (Johnson 2003, p.130). 
Unlike in Australia, New Zealand or Canada, the Falkland gender (im)balance 
grew more problematic, the slow emergency of the attritional loss of young 
Islander women as Royal Marine brides amounting to an asset-stripping of 
young females and their reproductivity from the Islands.  
 
Not only did this reduction of female Islander presence place more pressure 
on those women who remained, it also had profound social and demographic 
impacts. Freedman assessed the declining Falklands demographic, and 








 The population decline was the result of migration and the exodus had 
 worrying features. The decline was in camp more than Stanley, among 
 kelpers more than immigrants, among women more than men. The result of 
 this latter factor was that in critical age groups men were coming to exceed 
 women by three to two. This had a number of unfortunate social effects, 
 including a high rate of divorce (2005, p. 46). 
 
The Islands were, as Freedman noted (2005, p. 47), visited ‘a couple of 
months before Shackleton’s team’ by Colin Phipps for the Fabian Society, 
who produced his own aforementioned report What future for the Falklands?, 
in which he highlighted the challenges of Islander life, as seen through his 
male gaze. 
 
He noted how emigration and particularly female depopulation accentuated its 
difficulties, raising questions about the Falklands’ viability, with this bleak 
representation of the Islander community implicitly questioning whether this 
was a community that was even ‘worth’ saving. The following references 
(Phipps 1977, pp. 2-3) to ‘drink and divorce’; ‘adultery’; ‘occasional incest’; 
and being outnumbered ‘three to one’ in Camp, highlight some of the key 
challenges which Islanders females faced. 
 
All of the principal social problems especially drink and divorce, arise from the 
isolation of a small tightly integrated community. It is the increasing impact of 
the outside world upon this community which is now breeding the most urgent 
social problem – emigration, mostly to the UK. It was the set intention of more 
than 60 per cent of the young people I met to emigrate at the first opportunity, 
and one of the local headmasters – an expatriate from the UK – has said he 
now regarded it as part of his duties to encourage this. Not for the first time in 
the Islands, it seems, that what had appeared a vision of romantic solitude 
from the UK soon shattered on the realities of an unending diet of mutton, 
beer and rum, with entertainment largely restricted to drunkenness and 
adultery, with occasional incest. Men outnumber women three to one in the 
settlements (Phipps 1977, pp. 2-3). 
 
Phipps was not alone in flagging up the role of alcohol in Falkland life. 
Fig. 7.2, a photo Argentine Panorama magazine had published a decade 
earlier, offers an insight into the drinking culture of Falkland life, showing 
Islanders socialising and drinking in a Stanley public house. While providing a 
framing of Islanders as substantial consumers of alcohol, the photographer’s 







dominated socialisation.  
Fig 7.3, from the same photo session, specifically shows (a) female drinking in 
Stanley. Panorama highlighted that, as performed by this Islander female, 
women were allowed to consume alcohol with men in Stanley’s public houses, 
and further claimed that ‘puritans’ in the Islands denounced Stanley as ‘the 
capital of infidelity’ (Panorama, October 1966, p. 14). In both these photos, 
drinking glasses are also prominently displayed, representing this object as a 
central feature of Falkland recreational life for male and female. Johnson 
(2003, p.130) relates how; 
 
 In Australia and New Zealand, it was hoped that the emigration of  women 
 would force men to adopt more civilised patterns of behaviour, and 
 improved work routines.  Single men were thought to be susceptible to the 




Fig. 7.2. Socialising and drinking in a Stanley public house.  
                                                                                                     
Source: Panorama, October 1966, pp. 14-15 
                                                                                                                                                                   
  
In the Falklands, there were clearly insufficient women to ‘patrol’ alcohol 







females who did imbibe in pubs appear, as in Fig 7.3, to have accepted the 





















The findings of the two-volume Shackleton Report (1976) similarly recorded 
these demographic trends and associated social impacts. Lord Shackleton 
has been commissioned by the British government to evaluate the viability of 
the colony of the Falkland Islands, and while overall the Report proved more 
positive than expected about the Falklands’ prospects, it still bore witness to 
an Islander population base which was increasingly denuded and gender 
imbalanced, and highlighted the Royal Marines’ impact on the Islander 
demographic. In reference to the preceding year 1975, Shackleton found that:  
 
the majority of migrants, are young (70 per cent under 30), that from among 
the locally born, women predominate […] A significant feature in regard to 
female emigration is that about two-fifths of the local women who left in 1975 
were married to, or were about to marry, Royal Marines who had been 
stationed in the Islands. In a population depleted of women […] as the 
Fig. 7.3.: ‘Mixed socialising and drinking in Stanley’  
 









Falkland Islands this represents a significant loss (Shackleton Report (1), 
1976, p. 13). 
 
Of a total migration/bodily loss of 55 Islanders in 1975, the Shackleton Report 
in its recommendations found that 42 were female, of which 24 were adult 
female and 18 children, out of a population that ‘at the end of 1975 is 
estimated at 1905, having declined from a peak of 2,400 in 1931’ (Shackleton 
Report (2), 1976, p. 13). It also stated in its key findings that: 
 
4. Sex structure – there is a significant surplus of males throughout the age 
range 15-64. In West Falkland in 1972, the age group 20-29 was made of 71 
per cent males and 29 per cent females. 
 
5. Marriage – doubtless because of the sex structure there are very few 
single women (8 per cent in 1972). The divorce rate is remarkably high’ 
(Shackleton Report (2), 1976, p. 13). 
 
As Shackleton confirms, retention of women was essential for the Islands’ 
future, yet the diminishing presence of females to propagate the future of the 
community presaged a demographic collapse. It also foregrounded a collapse 
in the basis of British sovereignty over the Falklands in a post-colonial world, 
namely self-determination; by the mid-1970s the Islands’ population had 
already slumped to under 2000 people, and continued female de-population 
held out the alarming prospect of a fatal erosion of self-determination, and by 
extension, the locus standi for British territorial retention. Hastings and 
Jenkins (1983, p.25) observed that: 
The islands’ population may have been almost comically small, but in the 
context of post-imperial self-determination it had an emotional weapon to arm 
itself against change than any other community under the British Parliament.  
Yet, this ‘emotional weapon’ (Hastings and Jenkins 1983, p. 25) was 
becoming increasingly blunted. Indeed, the Royal Marines’ role, in conjunction 
with Islander females exercising personal agency in becoming their brides,, 
seriously weakened the Falkland demographically; this effectively turned the 
presence of the ‘Royals’ into a demographic ‘Trojan horse’, undermining the 
Islander community from within.  
Smith (2014, pp. 1517-18) highlights the linkage between reproductive bodies 







potential of bodies and the territorial potential of babies’. Royal Marines 
providing the opportunity for women of reproductive age to exit the Falklands, 
and so preventing their future children ‘territorialising’ the Falklands, was 
doing Argentina’s demographic work for it.  
The Shackleton Report acknowledged the need to ‘do something’ about the 
Royal Marines’ profound challenges, stating that: ‘On civil/military relations, 
Lord Shackleton urged that consideration be given to accompanied tours and 
maximising the number of women in the garrison’ (Hunt 1993, p. 353).  This 
said, beyond their symbolic deterrant role, the Royal Marines’ unchecked 
demographic depletion of female Islanders, increased the likelihood of a 
sovereignty transfer to Argentina, this presence/absence of female bodies 
being of profound geopolitical significance.  
When Islander women exercised agency in choosing to marry a Royal Marine 
instead of a male Islander, this demographic loss was not without sovereignty 
implications. Smith further highlights the relationality between bodies and 
sovereignty: 
bodies become territory in a struggle to control what happens to each body 
(whether each reproduces or not, whether each is allowed to live or not) in 
the interest of projects of national territorialisation […] that is, that body 
counts determine sovereignty (Smith 2010, pp. 1516-17).  
Owing to the presence of the Royal Marines, and consequent absence of 
Islander female bodies, this process was working in reverse – both existing 
(female) Islanders, and their future offspring, were lost to the Islander 
population. 
There was a widespread contemporary understanding that there was a very 
real demographic problem, made worse by growing gender imbalance. There 
was a reluctance to acknowledge the awkward reality that Royal Marines and 
the Islander women who married them were indirectly doing Argentina’s 
‘work’, and that a demographic winter loomed. Shortly after the 1982 Conflict, 
Hastings and Jenkins commented that: 
The Falklands have long suffered from emigration and from a surplus of men 







of a marine garrison, even just forty strong, marrying one or two a year and 
taking them back to England, has been a constant source of complaint. Girls 
of childbearing age in a community of just 1,800 people are a crucial local 
resource. One consequence has been a divorce rate estimated at three times 
that of a roughly equivalent Scottish community (1983, p. 24). 
Captain Patrick Vincent of the Falkland Islands Association, also writing in 
1983, similarly acknowledged the existence of a stark gender imbalance. He 
conveniently overlooked the individual agency of Islander women who chose 
to marry a Royal Marine, instead seeking to present Royal Marines’ 
‘abduction’ of females as ‘positively’ as possible, noting: 
 Amongst the present inhabitants, there is some inequality in the numbers of 
 men and women. On West Falkland, for example, at a count a few years ago 
 there was one unmarried lady between the ages of 20 and 26, and 50 
 unmarried men. The Royal Marines detachments ‘abduct’ some half dozen or 
 so Falkland Islands’ girls each year, taking them home as Royal Marines 
 brides, a sore point with the young men of the Islands! (Williams 1983, p. 16).  
 
The severity of the demographic threat posed by this exodus of young women 
with Royal Marines was clear, and what this meant in practical terms for 
young men is explained in ‘Prospect of the Falklands Islands’ (Shackleton, 
Storey and Johnson 1977, pp. 5-6), published soon after the Shackleton 
report, in which R.J. Storey recorded how: 
 
one young man pointed out to me that a factor in migration (which could soon 
amount to a net loss of 2 per cent per annum) is the problem of finding a 
marriage partner. Bearing on this is the fact that some 10 girls left in 1975 
with husbands and fiancés from the detachment of Royal Marines stationed in 
the Islands. This represented two-thirds of the women who left the Falklands 
that year. However, I should say that the Royal Marines have played a very 
helpful part in other areas of social life! 
 
In a male-dominated micro-community such as the colony of the Falkland 
Islands, the loss of the bodily presence of so many women heralded a social 
and geopolitical disintegration, and many marriages with Royal Marines in fact 
failed. Ewan Southby-Taylor, Royal Marine Commander of NP8901 in the 
Falklands from 1978-79, outlined the scale of the social and demographic 
challenge in the period immediately before 1982 when he estimated: 
 
under two per cent of Royal Marine/Falkland Island girl marriages lasted 
beyond five years. The detachment before us married eleven out of an 







to my present knowledge, two have lasted, one in the Islands and one in the 
United Kingdom, fifty per cent being a remarkable achievement’ (Southby-
Taylor 2003, p. 44).   
 
That so many Islander women were still prepared to marry Royal Marines 
when marital breakdown was a common occurrence says much about the 
determination of agentive Islander women to avail themselves of the 
opportunities presented by these geographically mobile soldiers, 
notwithstanding the risks of divorce. In this way (some) Islander women were 
reproducing demographic and intimate slow emergency by actively opting for 
males who were not Islanders. It was, in many ways, the case of the ‘wrong 
bodies’, that is a demographic combination of too few indigenous local 
females and too many colonising British male Royal Marines; fewer British 
males and more South American females would have better served the 
Islands’ demographic needs, though the latter would have disrupted the 
racialised kith and kin’ narrative that was a source of support in contemporary 
Britain 
 
While Royal Marines were the main focus of ‘everyday’ female Islander 
interest, when other eligible males such as members of the Royal Navy and 
BAS (British Antarctic Survey) were in Stanley, they too were a source of 
interest, and female agency exercised. Expatriate Jean Austin, who unusually 
for a contemporary female in the Islands has her account published, and 
offers a female gaze on social occasions she witnessed, recalled how when 
the RRS John Biscoe was in port:  
 
Stanley’s maidens (and matrons let it be whispered) also perked up and 
parties galore were held both aboard and onshore, with a preponderance of 
gallant males in attendance. The ratio of men to women was always greater 
in the islands, but with numbers swollen by the navy and BAS, the female of 
the species bloomed like a desert rose (Austin 2009, p. 83). 
 
Austin’s account highlights a proactive, agentive interest amongst Islander 
women in making the acquaintance of such British personnel; as observed by 
Austin, this alleged collective female gaze was apparently focused on these 
‘gallant males’, the implication being this was not their ‘type’ of man they were 







again, women were taking the ‘masculine’ role, with many unmarried Islander 
males (often shepherds) remote from Stanley and squeezed out of such 
occasions for reasons of socio-economic status and geographical proximity. 
 
This endemic paucity of female bodies and the profound challenges this 
presented to the masculinity of unmarried male Islanders, was highlighted in 
the  Sunday Times Magazine of 13 August 1978, in which correspondent Ian 
Jack, with photographer Philip Jones Griffiths, reported back from the Islands’ 
sexual ‘frontline’.  The nature of the article – entitled ‘A report on the Falkland 
Islands and their uncertain future’ (Sunday Times Magazine, 13 August 1978, 
p. 14) – is such that it offers a wide-ranging contemporary perspective, 
extending to over eleven pages of this influential magazine, on the Islanders’ 
‘experience’. Interestingly the article implies that ‘only 500 miles away’ was 
sufficiently proximate for Argentina to assert a ‘logical’ sovereignty claim to 
the Islands, but acknowledges Falkland Islands life presented a more complex 
situation which had little to do with logic, an illogical reality which a map would 
not convey. 
 
On the map the Argentine claim looks logical enough, Argentina represents 
the nearest land mass, the Patagonian coastline is only 500 miles away. On 
the ground, however, this logic confronts reality and quickly melts away 
(Sunday Times Magazine, 13 August 1978, p. 14). 
 
He then proceeded to depict Islander life, paying particular attention to the 
lack of females, and consequent demographic and social difficulties. To have 
this Sunday Times Magazine photo-journalistic reportage on the Islands was 
to highlight the ‘state’ of the Falklands to a highly influential readership in the 
United Kingdom, with the involvement of Governor Jim Parker and his wife 
Deidre reflecting the importance that Government House attached to the visit.  
 
The Sunday Times Magazine audience was presented through this article 
with a ‘vision’ of the Islands as an anachronistic British colony, as its male-
only cover picture (Fig. 7.4) shows. Governor Parker (without his wife Deidre) 
and Islander chauffeur Don Bonner feature alongside the Governors’ official 







represents British sovereignty through these items, it does not represent this 
as a secure sovereignty; the title ‘Whose flag over the Falklands?’ implies that 
































Fig. 7.4. ‘Whose Flag over the Falklands?’, 
Sunday Times Magazine special report 
 










The representation of the 1978 Darwin games, to which Jack and Griffiths 
were invited to fly with Parker and his wife, similarly conveys an affective 
quaintness, more a 1930s’ than 1970s’ shared experience for the Islands’ 
community. Here was an important opportunity for masculine identity to be 
asserted by unmarried male Islanders, and to attract female interest. The 
games are described as: 
 
held every year at the end of the shearing season and go on for a week. They 
comprise dog-trials and shearing contests, ladies musical chairs and men’s 
tug-of war, catch-the-rooster competitions and numerous horse-races […] 
[after which] The governor’s wife presents a cup and the crowd breaks up  
(Sunday Times Magazine, 13 August 1978, p. 21).  
 
  
Fig. 7.5. Male dominated performance and audience – steer-riding at 1978’s Darwin 
games. 
 
Source: Sunday Times Magazine, 13 August 1978, pp. 16-17 
 
Mrs Parker’s ‘performance’ as ‘first lady’ notwithstanding, Griffiths male 
photographic gaze/record of the Darwin games attests to the overwhelming 







Goose Green recreation hall is at first sight represented as a space where 
females are more in evidence, as Griffiths’ photo shows with females to the 
fore; a closer inspection, however, reveals the preponderance of males, 
unaccompanied by females, on the sidelines of the hall, as can be seen in 
Fig. 7.6 
 
While such photographic representation conveys gender imbalance, it would 
be naïve to suppose that this male domination implies that women were ipso 
facto therefore disempowered, their bodies rendered into unagentive objects 
of, and for, male ‘possession’; indeed, the opposite appears the case, with 
some, though certainly not all, women empowered by the gender imbalance 
that provided a source of agentive power. 
 
  
Fig. 7.7. The Circassian Circle as performed at the Goose Green recreation hall, after 1978’s 
Darwin games.                                                                                                          
 








Governor Rex Hunt recalled how two years later, also at the Goose Green 
recreation Hall: One attractive young girl came up to me and said ‘Come on, 
Guv, let’s ‘ave a  dance’, whisking me off into a Military Two-Step before I 
could draw breath’ (1992, p. 28). This young woman had exercised agency, 
deciding to enlist the Governor’s body in the shared mobilities of dance. She 
had evidently not been intimidated by the construct of unequal power relations 
between herself as a ‘junior female’ and Hunt as the ‘senior male’, who she 
made apparently made more accessible through the appellation of ‘Guv’; 
indeed, through enjoining him to dance, she had – if only for the duration of 
the dance – inverted these relations.  
 
Hunt’s depiction of her as ‘attractive’ indicates that her female body had not 
gone unnoticed, evidently catching his male gaze. The sexualised power that 
this young woman’s body projected, brought to the fore through the 
performance of dance, had thus inverted power relations; the Governor was 
effectively the supplicant male to this appellant female, subverting the notion 
that gender imbalance, such as in Fig. 7.5, implied male domination over 
females. 
 
Dance provided a unique opportunity in the Islands for the sexes to engage 
recreationally in a socialised, public space, with the possibility for some men 
of a measure of physical encounter with female bodies. The Circassian Circle 
dance (Fig. 7.6 above) was important in this respect; as also recalled by Hunt: 
 
One dance with which I was unfamiliar but quickly learnt after a fashion was 
the Circassian Circle, the dance equivalent of the Falklands’ signature tune. A 
progressive dance for young and old, it was popular throughout the Islands 
and no festivity was complete without it (1992, p. 28). 
 
Through the Circassian Circle, and other dances, female and male bodies 
interacted with each other, creating physically, visually and auditory affective 
experiences for participants.  Yet, as Jack’s written account highlighted for the 
Sunday Times Magazine’s audience the stark, numerical gender imbalance 
was pronounced. He illustrates (below) that the lack of women detracted from 







source of frustration than celebration, which – depending on the individual – 
alcohol may or may not have mitigated. Jack makes use of the Circassian 
Circle as a ‘gateway’ for unpacking the multiple difficulties caused by the 
paucity of women, with the clear implication for readers that that gender 
imbalance made the Falklands far from ideal as a social – or sexual – space 
for men and women alike.  
 
Women aged from 13 to 60 range themselves down one hall waiting to be 
taken for the samba, the slow foxtrot and the Circassian circle by men who 
are drinking steadily. Whole tables lie covered with tins of the ubiquitous 
Tennants lager (so ubiquitous that the cheesecake models on the discarded 
tins smile up at you from the remotest bog and beach – Linda lying low, Pat in 
Dreamland, Penny at bedtime). When the men have drunk enough to dance, 
however, it quickly becomes obvious that they outnumber the women two to 
one […] The problem is acute. Over the Falklands as a whole, men between 
34 and 64 exceed women of the same age by three to two, and in the Camp it 
is especially bad. At the last census in 1972 the island of West Falkland has 
one unmarried woman over the age of 19 and 51 unmarried men. The results 
are predictable. The Falklands have a declining population, increasing 
amounts of adultery and divorce, a little incest and illicit intercourse with girls 
below the legal age (though perhaps no more than in any isolated 
community) and much drinking. The presence of 42 Royal Marines does not 
help. They cheer the population at large by showing the flag and wearing off-
duty T-shirts inscribed ‘Don’t Cry for me Argentina’, but they also foster gloom 
among the Islands’ bachelors. Each detachment serves a year at its base in 
Stanley, and each year half a dozen Stanley girls marry Royal Marines and 
leave the Islands for married quarters in England. 
 
 So the birth-rate declines and the population dwindles – over the past 25 
 years it has sunk from 2300 to 1800, with The Camp as the main source of 
 emigration. But the reasons for this loss lie deeper than the availability of 
 Royal Marines. They have to do with a feudal past and uncertain future’ 
 (Sunday Times Magazine, 19 August 1978, p. 23). 
 
This account offers numerous aspects to the social dimension of slow 
emergency, as understood by a white British male, particularly relating to 
drink, types of sexual impropriety both legal and illegal in nature, and a 
dwindling population and birthrate, exacerbated by agentive Islander women 
marrying Royal Marines, the latter ‘foster[ing] gloom among the Islands’ 
bachelors’. The word ‘gloom’ gives a strong feel as to the affective experience 
of unmarried male Islanders, whose patriarchal prospects were seriously 
thrown into question by the number of Islander women who preferred  








Fig 7.7 is a photographic record of when one Islander woman married a Royal 
Marine, apparently thereby contributing to ‘gloom’ amongst unmarried local 

































Fig. 7.7. A Royal marine marries an Islander bride.  
 
Source: Sunday Times Magazine, August 19 1978, p. 16 
 
The caption explains how the Royal Marine ‘steps out…with his bride’, 
suggesting a male proprietorial role relationality to the new wife, as if the 
female spouse is without agency. Possibly mitigating this, if only in terms of 
agency, is the preceding phrase ‘local girl makes good’, which appears to 
suggest that the ‘girl’ has exercised some agency in what is framed as her 
self-betterment. That this bride is a woman in her own right, who has 
consciously exercised her own agency in making this marital choice, even if at 







overlooked. Neither is a racial dimension of this marital coupling considered; 
that this was a ‘white wedding’ of kith and kin is left unaddressed. 
 
The role of alcohol in social interaction in this demographically declining, 
gender-imbalanced community was also recorded in the article, with Griffiths’ 
photo of the Globe (Fig. 7.9) showing the Sunday Times Magazine audience 
the masculine alcoholised space in which Islanders imbibed and fraternised; 
alcohol-related items such as bottles, tins, glasses and the bar itself are all 
evident.  
 
Fig. 7.8. Male bodies and alcohol dominate at The Globe, Stanley. 
 
Source: Sunday Times Magazine, 13 August 1978, p. 21 
 
The Stanley pubs provided spaces for social clustering, bringing individuals 
together in an alcoholic social interaction, including Islander girls and off duty 
Royal Marines – Stanley’s pubs such as The Globe, Rose Public House and 
Victory Bar lay within close proximity of the Royal Marine barracks at Moody 
Brook, 1.5 miles north-west of Stanley. West (1997 p, 645) has drawn 







Rhodesian African husbands restricted uxorial access to beer halls to control 
their sexual agency; in the Falklands context, public houses provided similar 
opportunities for women and men to ‘fraternise’, the scarcity of women 
enabling them to be highly selective in their choice of man. Brickell (2008, 
p.1672) also points out how drinking can ‘simultaneously solidify group 
identities while at the same time isolating ‘others’ who men are suspicious of’, 
and in the masculinised, alcoholic space of the Falkland public house, the 
Royal Marines provided an obvious ‘other’ for small groups of Islander males 
marooned in their unsought gender exclusivity.  
 
The risk of alcohol-catalysed disputes/violence, particularly over women, 
between Royal Marines and disaffected male Islanders meant that the 
presence of the latter had to be managed. Jean Austin highlighted one 
potential flashpoint, namely Royal Marines’ intense drinking in The Globe at 
Sunday lunchtime. 
 
 The latter [The Globe] is a favourite haunt of the Royal Marines for their 
Sunday ‘glory hour’, so called because the pubs are only open on that day 
from 12 noon to 1.00pm. From Sullivan House, we used to view the covered 
wagon transporting silently sober Marines towards town. An hour later 
whoops and catcalls would herald their jubilant return to Moody Brook (Austin 
2009, p. 56). 
 
Reflecting the numerous sensitivities that came with the proximity of the Royal 
Marines to the Islander community, Jack records how: 
 
A notice outside the Royal Marines mess in Stanley warns its men against the 
dangers of the slackened tongue. ‘Need-to-know’, it says ‘In a curious 
(gossipy) situation, this principle is paramount.’ A posting in the Falkland 
Islands is such a situation indeed. In a remote community of 1,800 people it is 
hard to keep anything quiet, though no doubt many adulterous husbands and 
wives have tried (Sunday Times Magazine, 13 August 1978, p. 26). 
 
As will be evidenced later, relations between the sexes, prior to, during and 
after marriage was often the source of controversy in the Falklands, with the 
presence of the Royal Marines creating inter-gender and intra-gender 
complications. 
 







glossed over the Islands shortcomings in relation to female bodily presence, 
and the problems this was causing, the Daily Express, a long-standing 
supporter of the Falklands’ continuation as a British colony, re-framed this 
male-female imbalance more positively – as an agentive opportunity for 
women. For women who wished to be in the Falklands, there was said to be 
little difficulty in finding a male body and partner in the ‘Isles of Love’, as the 
Daily Express re-imagined the Falklands/Malvinas in 1981, when it described 
what would prove to be an unsuccessful initiative to generate additional 
(British) female bodily presence on the Islands.  
 
The lure of a romantic new life in the Falkland Islands, 7,000 miles away in 
the South Atlantic, is attracting a flood of applicants [….] Any girl who goes 
there would be almost certain to find a husband”, said a Falkland Islands 
Office spokesman (Daily Express, 27 January 1981, no page number, cited in 
Falkland Islands Times, February 1981, p. 8).  
 
Notwithstanding the claim that ‘[t]he rush to start a new life in the Falklands 
[…] turned into a stampede yesterday after the Daily Express report’ (Daily 
Express, 27 January 1981, no page number, cited in Falkland Islands Times, 
February 1981, p. 8), there was no sudden female bio-infusion into the 
Islands, and many of the women already there were actively choosing to 
leave, often with a Royal Marine.   
 
Far from bodies ‘new’ to the Islands providing the demographically much-
needed females, it was the male bodies of the Royal Marines that were 
depleting the ‘existing’ female bodies, in an unchecked, un-making of the 
Falklands population.   
 
Although the body of the ‘outsider’, in this case Royal Marines, primarily 
removed Islander female bodies from the Falklands, male bodies were also 
‘lost’, as the case of Alejandro Betts illustrates. Unlike with the British bodies 
of the Royal Marines, Argentine employees of the LADE operation in Stanley, 
brought with them the ‘backstory’ of the Argentine sovereignty claim. Bett’s 
‘journey’ is (critically) presented by the Falkland Islands History group in these 
terms: 







wife and baby for an Argentine girl-friend then working in the Islands. But for 
everyone this was just an extra-marital affair that had ended in a family break-
up”. However, “nobody in the Islands knew that Betts was so infatuated with 
his Argentine girl-friend that this had led him to change sides, given his past 
as a hardline critic of the Argentine position over the Falklands. And, as for 
his “well-known” opinions on the subject (in favour of Argentina), nobody had 
the remotest idea about these. He finally abandoned the Islands in 1982 in 
order to stay with the Argentine girl-friend he was so in love with.  
 
Source: Mercopress, ‘Falklands Group Reveals Details of the Life of “Veteran of the 




Whereas Bett’s story of ‘love and defection’ is a rare one, it indicates perfectly 
well that for male and female Islanders alike, marriage held out the prospect 
of a new life outside of the Falklands. 
 
Divorce and separation of married couples, the result of intimate emergency, 
however slow, proved a frequent occurrence in the Islander community, 
particularly for Islander wives married to Royal Marines. There was an 
‘extraordinary high incidence of divorce in the Falklands’ (Shackleton, Storey 
and Johnson 1977, p. 5), and Stanley the place where this was obtained. 
Jean Austin, herself the wife of early 1970s Colonial Secretary J.A Jones, 
observed that 
 
  the divorce rate is high, and Stanley is one of the easiest places to obtain 
 one. Perhaps it has a future as the Reno of the South Atlantic, though how 
 anyone could have energy left for intrigue after gardening, cutting peat, 
 butchering, and all their other activities is beyond me (Austin 2010, pp. 52-
 53).   
 
An undeclared war between the sexes – with female depopulation and marital 
breakdown as its frontlines – threatened the fabric of Islander life, and viability 
of the community, which in turn ‘produced worrying social trends: incest and 
adultery were rife, and the divorce rate was high (more than one in four)’ 
(Donaghy 2014, p. 10).  
 
The absence of females was becoming painfully acute by the start of the 
1980s, but the presence of Royal Marines as a fundamental cause of female 







into the public domain, through a letter from ‘Angry Islander’, published in the 
Falkland Islands Times. This letter disseminated a narrative of anger and fear 
about the damaging impact that the Royal Marines were having on the 
Falkland community. The correspondence which it subsequently generated in 
the Falkland Islands Times is remarkable in that it brought into public record 
the concerns that provided the battle lines of the low-intensity civil war 
between the sexes on the Islands.  
 
7.3 ‘The Wilkinson Sword of Peace’, revealing polaroids, and the ‘Angry 
Islander’ letter 
 
It was the ‘Wilkinson Sword of Peace’ which brought about the ‘outbreak’ of 
the ‘Angry Islander’ controversy; it is possible that other items, such as 
‘incriminating’ polaroid photos, were also involved. Set up in 1966, the 
‘Wilkinson Sword of Peace’ (Fig. 7.10) was a prestigious annual award that 
was sponsored by Wilkinson Ltd, in recognition of units in the armed services 
which had made an important contribution to relations with the civilian 
community where they were stationed. In 1978 the Royal Marines in the 
Falkland Islands NP 8901 received this award; as can be seen in Fig 7.10, 
this militarised metallic object was intended to confer a prestigious recognition 
of the Royal Marines in the Falklands. Rather than becoming a source of 
strengthened civilian-military relations in the Islands, this award became a 
source of acute controversy. 
 
 
Fig. 7.9. Item of emotion: the 1978 award of the Wilkinson Sword of Peace to Royal Marines 











An anonymous letter-writer to the Falkland Islands Times who used the 
pseudonym ‘Angry Islander’ was aghast that the ‘Wilkinson Sword of Peace’ 
had been given to NP 8901, prompting him to produce the object of a highly 
critical and subversive letter; this was published on 20th October 1978, being 
circulated throughout the Islands by being reproduced in the object of the 
Falkland Islands Times. The ensuing public debate is considered in Section 
7.4; this section foregrounds the context, and the significance of, Angry 
Islander’s contribution to Falklands discourse. 
 
There is, in fact, the possibility that polaroid photographs may have been a 
relevant factor in the causation of the letter, which Royal Marine Commander 
Southby Taylor believes  
 
The authorship [of ‘Angry Islander’s letter] remained in doubt and still is, 
although I had my very strong suspicions and still do. The parents of a 
Falkland Island girl had presented themselves in my office […] they suddenly 
produced a collection of photos taken of their daughter with one of my 
marines. They were, to say the least, very intimate, and quite understandably, 
very upsetting to the parents who then demanded that the pervert (there was 
nothing perverted that I could deduce) be sent home immediately […] The 
matter was dropped but I long harboured the view that the subsequent 
anonymous letter was the result’ (2003, p. 43). 
 
Irrespective of the exact contribution of these polaroids in the origin of the 
‘Angry Islander’ letter, these photographs evidence of at least one Royal 
Marine not practicing the type of community relations that the ‘Wilkinson 
Sword of Peace’ was awarded for. What is clear is that the interplay of the 
‘Wilkinson Sword of Peace’, ‘Angry Islander’s’ letter and the Falkland Islands 
Times precipitated an acrimonious debate about the Islands’ imbalanced and 
declining demography, the presence of the bodies of Royal Marines being 
linked directly to growing absence of those of Islander women. From ‘Angry 
Islander’s’ view, both parties functioned disruptively – Royal Marines had 
taken ‘occupation’ of the bodies of a number of younger Islander women, and 
Islander women were too willingly ceding their contested bodies to the Royal 
Marines through marriage – though not always so, as the ‘polaroid’ case 
suggests. The Royal Marine as ‘geopolitical actor’ (Woodward et al 2012, p. 







protector of Islanders against Argentina, to a depopulating predator who 
waged intimate geopolitical warfare on the Islands’ females, claiming their 
bodies at the expense of ‘Kelper man’ and so jeopardising the Falklands’ very 
demographic viability. This debate was of profound geopolitical significance 
for the Falkland/Malvinas because without either a viable Islander community, 
or the presence of British military bodies, there was a strong prospect of the 
Islands soon becoming ‘transformed’ into ‘las Malvinas Argentinas’.  
Fig 7.11 gives some indication of the challenging slow emergency existence 
facing Islander males; in this photo the only female presence is a pictorial 
one, namely photographs of Elizabeth II, and the monarch, like many Islander 











Fig. 7.10. ‘God save the Queen’ – Islanders’ ‘loyalist’ support continued,  
Source: Sunday Times Magazine, 13 August 1978, p. 17 
The lyric ‘No Future’ had featured heavily in the contemporary British punk 
rock band the Sex Pistol’s controversial 1977 Silver Jubilee re-imagining of 
‘God save the Queen’. Yet for this South Atlantic British colony, struggling 







be seen as addressing the fundamental issue at stake: was there any future 
for the Falkland Islands community, or were they ‘another’ group of subjects 
who for whom there was ‘no future’?  
What is clear is that both the ‘Angry Islander’ and the Sex Pistols’ lead singer 
Johnny Rotten were articulating anger, the latter professing ‘And there is no 
future/In England’s dreaming’. The ‘Angry Islander’ letter can be seen as the 
object that exposed the Falklands’ ‘dreaming’ of a more secure British 
existence as seriously challenged by the harsh reality of life in a depopulated, 
gender-imbalanced, Marine-occupied, isolated and socially challenged 
geopolitical anomaly.  
7.4 The ‘Angry lslander’ Controversy, November-December 1978 
It was on 20th October 1978 that a letter from ‘An Angry Islander’, of 
unspecified location was re-produced/introduced in the Falkland Islands 
Times, then the colony’s only newsletter, informing the many Islanders who 
read it that: 
There now follows the first letter for ages combining anger and anonymity. It 
is published to remind people that not everyone ‘shares the same regard for 
the Royal Marines in Stanley (Falkland Islands Times, 10 November 1978, p. 
2). 
The author’s decision to call himself/herself ‘Angry Islander’ associated 
this/her letter and body with this emotion, attesting to how heavily emotions 
feature in this object-inspired discourse. ‘Angry Islander’ presented his/her 
case thus: 
It was with profound shock that I learned of the award to our local Royal 
Marine detachment of the Wilkinson Sword Peace prize. It seems ironic that a 
band of men who have inflicted more damage on our community than any 
other should be honoured with this prestigious award. The utter stupidity and 
lack of thought behind the Wilkinson Sword award can only be equalled by 
the bestowal some time ago of the ‘Freedom of Stanley’ on the same Royal 
Marine detachment […] Anyone with any awareness will realise that during 
their many years in the Falkland Islands they have inflicted terrible, and I fear, 
done irreparable damage to our community, and they are still gradually 
destroying our community. For too long now the exodus of women with 
Marines has been treated as something of a joke […] No matter how much 
they contribute to charity, or how many of them entertain us on the radio or fly 
planes during pilot shortages, they will never be able to make up for the harm 







1978, p. 2).  
In framing the loss of women as an ‘exodus of women with Marines’, the 
frustrated ‘Angry Islander’ conveniently attaches agency to the Royal Marines 
rather than Islander women (as though they were somehow inert in the 
matter, when their actions showed that they had chosen to leave the Islands) 
or Islander men. Nor did ‘Angry Islander’ see any compensating geo-military 
benefit in retaining the scourge of the Royal Marines: 
As a military force also they are useless […] If our giant neighbour decided to 
invade these Islands he would do so with a force that would swamp our 
meagre defences. We should do away with this small but troublesome force 
and request that we be given a force large-enough to be a real deterrent if the 
need ever arose (Falkland Islands Times, 10 November 1978, p. 2). 
 
Angry Islander does not make clear precisely what the ‘deterrent’ would be 
against; whilst the ‘obvious answer’ suggests ‘deterrent’ against the Argentine 
military, a larger, more ‘professional’ force, which fraternised less with 
Islander women, would also be a deterrent to female exodus. Implicit in this 
charge is an attempt to demasculinise the Royal Marines as serious soldiers, 
re-framing them in a way similar to how unmarried Islanders males had been 
‘made’ to look by the Marines’ interactions with Islander women. 
 
Predictably ‘Angry Islander’s’ letter was a source of great controversy, and 
three issues of the Falkland Islands Times were dominated by it (Issues 14,15 
and 16 1978) until the debate was ‘closed down’ in mid-December 1978. The 
strength of ‘Angry Islander’s’ irate, iconoclastic yet fearful, denunciation of the 
Royal Marines, with references such as ‘irreparable damage’ and ‘exodus’ of 
women, depicted a near apocalyptic human geography of bodies, of invasive 
and disliked Royal Marines ‘destroying’ the embedded community, itself being 
progressively denuded of its women, so heralding the geopolitical and 
demographic demise of the Islander community.  
There also appears to be a sexual micro-nationalism at play, in which the 
Royal Marines are the resented ‘sexual other’, whose predatory presence 
towards Islander females should be resisted – even if many Islander women 







geopolitics of agentive female resistance to Kelper-male domination is a 
recurring theme in the discourse that ‘Angry Islander’ instigated, to the point 
that domestic male violence applied to women emotionally and physically 
soon became exposed through the letters reproduced in the object of the 
Falkland Islands Times.  
Pain and Staeheli (2014, p. 344), observe that ‘all forms of violent oppression 
work through intimate emotional and psychological registers as a means of 
exerting control’, and in many ways the Royal Marines provided Islander 
women with a means to circumvent Islander male control, whilst gaining new 
life-opportunities. ‘Angry Islander’s’ letter can be seen as a bid to exert/re-
assert demasculinised ‘Kelper man’s’ control over ‘rebellious’ Islander women 
– an agenda which was, however, rejected by numerous further letters to the 
Falkland Islands Times. These (mostly) counter-narratives of anger were 
directed at the ‘Angry Islander’ rather than the Royal Marines, as Islanders 
offered their own emotional perspectives, which are considered in the next 
section. 
‘Angry Islander’s’ letter, re-produced in the Falkland Islands Times, had in turn 
made the paper a conduit of ire in its own right, with there now being many 
more angry Islanders in evidence. This anger-inspired discord had created an 
emotional geography in which the Royal Marines had publicly become a 
source of contention between Islanders who were for and against their 
presence, this discord being amplified through Islander networks: ‘Islander 
was now set against Islander, with us rather bemused, but not wholly 
surprised in the middle. We had to remember that everyone knew everyone’ 
(Southby-Taylor 2003, p. 43).  
Yet, whilst ‘Angry Islander’s’ letter largely provoked passionate disagreement 
in Stanley and in Camp, it should not be overlooked, as will be evidenced, that 
it did generate some agreement too. Bill Luxton from Chartres, West Falkland, 
was highly critical of both Angry Islander’s letter and the Falkland Islands 
Times itself, remonstrating: ‘What a gutless miserable little worm of a person 
your correspondent must be that he/she cannot put a name to the poisonous 







December 1978, p.  5). 
Hilda Perry from Stanley offered a female perspective which placed loyalty to 
Britain before any other considerations; indeed, she ‘express[ed] doubt that 
such venomous criticism of Her Majesty’s Forces was written by a true Kelper 
who has any real desire to remain British’ (Falkland Islands Times, 15 
December 1978, p. 5).  
The concept of the ‘true Kelper’ is of interest, and appears to suit the Kelper 
female more than the male. In Perry’s framing, the Kelper’s patriotic duty as a 
loyal British subject is to support the Royal Marines, even though this was 
profoundly contrary to the colony’s demographic interests, and eligible male 
Islanders’ personal interests; in contrast, ‘the true Kelper’ woman was not 
expected to avoid marrying a (British) Royal marine, and had agency to do so. 
This intensity of debate generated by Angry Islander’s discourse can be seen 
in Fig 7.12, the front page of the Falkland Islands Times of 24 November 1978 
dominated by the response of Islanders to this, with the Editor acknowledging 
that there had been about ‘50% more’ letters than usual (Falkland Islands 
Times, 24 November 1978, p.1). 
One group letter in this edition, evidence of how the controversy was 
networking in Stanley, came from a large group of Islander women and men, 
namely “Odette Goss + D.E Goss + S. Hewitt + Chic Felton + Walter Felton + 
Jeanette Dobbyns + Joan & Terry Spruce + A. Browning + Sheila Napier + 
Jean & Tim Dobbyns + E. Halliday +T. Halliday”, in which, as nearly 1% of the 
population, they mobilised their collective  ‘anger and displeasure’, (Falkland 
Islands Times, 24 November 1978, p. 7), conjecturing that: “Perhaps it is 
jealousy and the person concerned does not like the thought of some of the 
local girls marrying marines. So what? If they want to marry someone it’s their 























Fig. 7.11. Source of controversy; Falkland Island Times 15/78, Friday November 24, 
1978. 
 
Source: Jane Cameron National Archives, Stanley, Falkland Islands 
 
 
N.D. Buckett, wife of Ron Buckett, interestingly working on the assumption 
that ‘Angry Islander’ was male, wrote from Stanley to say: ‘As the wife of a 
serving soldier and a friend of NP8901/1978, I was disgusted with the letter 
sent to this paper by someone who hadn’t the courage or decency to put his 







So, one letter of anger had generated further written letters of anger, but 
significantly there was some support for ‘Angry Islander’s’ letter, which, as 
mentioned, in addition to being an expression of anger was also one of fear – 
fear of depopulation, of societal disintegration, of the general inadequacy of 
the Royal Marines as a deterrent, of Argentine invasion, and of whether the 
colony had any non-Argentine geopolitical future. Within all these fears can be 
seen a deep fear for the future of the masculinised unmarried ‘Kelper man’, 
whose body was seemingly not as ‘desirable’ to many Falkland women as 
that of the ‘Royal Marine’ as source of genetic/reproductive appeal, mobility or 
prosperity.   
One reader called himself/herself ‘Name withheld from publication by request’ 
responded with a letter inspired by fear; this was reflected both in its 
concerns, and in its concealed authorship, with public anonymity sought 
because ‘this issue seems to be a rather emotional one’ (Falkland Islands 
Times, 15 December 1978, p. 2). ‘Angry Islander’ too had concealed his/her 
identity behind a pseudonym, which Ellen Burnsten of Port San Carlos (‘K.C’), 
East Falkland criticised as ‘a bit sly when they couldn’t sign their name’ 
(Falkland Islands Times, 15 December 1978, p. 3). Nonetheless, this letter 
from ‘Name withheld from publication by request’ confirmed that ‘Angry 
Islander’s’ narrative of Royal Marine-perpetrated demographic destruction 
was certainly not unique to him/her: 
I feel I must voice my partial agreement with ‘Angry Islander’ […] the declining 
population is already under 1800 and showing no signs of reversing its 
alarming course, the problem is serious. It is a fact that if people continue to 
leave at this rate before long our population will not be enough to keep an 
industry or Government functioning – and that will be the beginning of the 
end. This is why every woman who leaves the Falklands on the arm of a 
Marine is a serious loss […] why not bring out married Marines with their 
families? Would it not be possible for our Government to offer incentives to 
Marines married to local girls to remain and work in the Islands? (Falkland 
Islands Times, 15 December 1978, p. 2).  
‘Name withheld’s’ linkage of depopulation, and by implication a reduced 
genetic pool, with the declining viability of the Islands’ economically and 
governmentally, exposes the degree to which the Royal Marines were 
threatening the future geopolitical existence of the community and colony they 







anonymous correspondent had offered constructive suggestions to address 
the demographic threat of the Royal Marines, and manage the bodily mobility 
that came with their role.  
This said, neither of ‘Name withheld’s’ two suggestions offered any prospect 
that Islander girls would be any less interested in Royal Marines – bringing out 
Marines’ families would only reduce, though not eliminate, the potential 
opportunity for their liaisons with members of ‘the Royals’, whilst encouraging 
Marines married to Islander girls to ‘stay on’ recognised that Islander girls 
would continue to marry Marines. What is embedded in ‘Name withheld’s’ 
analysis is that the body of the Royal Marine was the ‘object of choice’ for 
many Islander women, rather than ‘Kelper man’. Ironically, the ‘sexual other’ 
that most immediately threatened the demographic destruction of the Islander 
community was not the body of the young, ‘hyper-sexualised’ Argentine 
woman, but the militarised body of the ‘colonising’, young British soldier.  
Even vocal critics of ‘Angry Islander’s’ narrative, such as the fifteen Stanley 
residents who had authored the collective letter, conceded that there was a 
problem, albeit ascribing it to the wider lack of opportunity rather than the 
Royal Marines, affirming: 
We do agree that the Islands’ population has and is gradually decreasing, but 
it is not only girls marrying Marines that are going away and that have already 
left, there are also a lot of other young people (not only girls) leaving the 
colony (Falkland Islands Times, 24 November 1978, p. 7). 	
 
Nor would ‘traditional’ solutions suffice to this pressing demographic problem, 
as Hilda Perry, also from Stanley, rhetorically asked: ‘Should we return to the 
Victorian days and choose husbands for our daughters and make sure they 
marry local shepherds and settle in camp houses?’ (Falkland Islands Times, 
15 December 1978, p.5). Islander women had, in this framing, simply been 
exercising agency in their choice of husbands, to the disadvantage of the 
‘Kelper male’. Nor was the fact that ‘Kelper man’ was often overlooked simply 
due the Royal Marine as ‘appellant’, but also to the perception of the former 
as ‘repellent’. This was brought into public record through a letter from Trudi 







Falkland men when compared to Royal Marines, hitherto a ‘hidden’ feature of 
the debate, alcohol-induced domestic violence.  
 
Although highly critical of the ‘excreta’ that ‘Angry Islander’ wrote, Trudi Hazell 
endorsed Royal Marine-inspired female exodus, and was supported in this by 
a ‘counter-network’ of three other Stanley women, Glenda McGill, Theresa 
McGill, and Winnie Miranda, who also put their names to this public criticism 
of Islander men, exposing intimate (slow) emergency, and its relationality to 
alcohol: 
As for the local dames flitting to the UK with the Royals – I DON’T BLAME 
THEM – look at the ill-mannered drunks a lot of women have to face when 
they decide to take the plunge and try their luck with a local. My God, at least 
the UK men treat their wives as something they love, not as a punch bag 
when he’s had a few too many while he’s been out at the pub and left his 
spouse to cook his supper and in some cases feed his kids (Falkland Islands 
Times, 24 November 1978, p. 2). 
 
Whilst this prompted a number of Island women to write impassioned letters in 
support of ‘Kelper man’, it provoked further emotional, irate discourse, as with 
Stanley’s Mary Jenning’s pointed rejoinder to the author:  
 
Get your feet firmly on the ground and ask yourself ‘Why did I return to this 
booze-sodden, sex-ridden, wife-beating country with the English husband 
who alone knows how to treat and respect a faithful and loving wife’ Why? 
Because you know Trudi as well as I and dozens of others, the grass isn’t as 
green over the hill as many would wish it to be – as you yourself found out 
and was only too pleased to return to the place you obviously think is hell 
(Falkland Islands Times, 15 December 1978, p. 1). 
 
Far from being geographically imagined as enticing ‘Isles of Love’, the 
Falkland/Malvinas were framed as hellish ‘Isles of booze, sex and wife-
beating’, in what had become a bitter debate, an emotional civil war. It offers 
an insight into the perceptions of the intimate geopolitics of ‘Falkland life’ for 
women such as Trudi Hazell, Glenda McGill, Theresa McGill, and Winnie 
Miranda, which Mary Jennings unintentionally endorsed in describing her 
English husband as being ‘alone’ in the community in knowing how to treat his 
spouse, namely herself, with respect.  







association with alcohol, domestic violence and rootedness in the Islands had 
become the ‘melancholic object’ (2009, p.16), offering marriages to be 
avoided, or else to be endured. The prospect of life of intimate slow 
emergency - in a geographically remote, male-dominated, depopulating 
colony with limited life chances for women – prompted numerous young 
women to escape this, through marrying the agent of mobility that was the 
Royal Marine. 
For numerous young Islander women, leaving the Islands was evidently a 
higher priority than staying on to ‘keep the Falklands British’, which suggests 
that the narrative of a resilient Falkland community of the Kelper community, 
male and female united together resisting Argentine irredentism, is at some 
variance from the reality. The pool of Islander bodies able to participate in the 
shared experience of what Militz and Muller (2014, p. 25) have usefully 
framed as ’the banal affirmation of the nation through momentary encounters 
of compatible bodies and objects functions by means of sharing, enjoying and 
embodying the national’ was depleted. The numerous ‘Kelper women’ of 
reproductive age who exercised agency in removing themselves, through 
emigration, from physical participation in the ‘symbolic representations and 
practices of the nation’ (Militz and Muller 2014, p. 25), reduced the persons 
available, for present and future, to engage in the identity forming/reinforcing 
experiences of Falkland life, such as the aforementioned Darwin games, 
‘Battle Day’ commemoration, Stanley races and the Queen’s birthday. 
As this female Islander exodus indicated – unlike the ‘sexual other’ of the 
body of the Royal Marine – the ‘Kelper male’ was often not a source of 
physical or emotional desire. It was very evident that ‘he’ was losing the 
‘sexual war’ with Royal Marines for Islander women, as well as the emotional 
civil war with agentive Islander women, which had been publicly exposed 
through the pages of the Falkland Islands Times. ‘Angry Islander’s’ letter 
represented a rearguard action ‘which is basically about limiting the [Falkland 
micro-]nation, determining who is qualified as legitimate subjects of 
nationhood, the People, inhabiting the national will, and who are turned into 







In keeping the Royal Marines away, or at least at arm’s length from Islander 
women, ‘Kelper man’ was better placed to reduce competition in his struggle 
for marriage with a local female. The ‘Kelper male’ was in a situation not 
dissimilar to ‘surplus males’ in Asia, whose lack of a female partner render 
them ‘losers in societal competition’ (Hudson and Den Boer 2002, p. 12, cited 
in Caluya 2013, p. 56). As potentially ‘surplus’ reproductive bodies, such 
Falkland males, whether born in or working in the Islands, were faced with 
highly limited opportunities for securing a female partner, in what might be 
termed a ‘blue balls’ (Caluya 2013, p. 54) archipelago of widespread male 
sexual non-fulfillment, ‘blue balls’ referring to epididymal hypertension.  
As Sunday Times reporter Ian Jack was informed at Goose Green, 
alternatives included sexual disengagement, or masturbation – along with the 
suggested proposition that the bodily presence of Argentine women would be 
a very acceptable exchange for cession of the Islands to Argentina.  
That’s the real trouble here; says a young labourer, gripping my elbow and 
shoving a fist towards the ceiling “You either forget it or you go blind”. He 
came recently to the Falklands from Britain – he’d read a headline in the Daily 
Express “Young Britons happy in Penguin Land” – and apart from the woman 
problem was happy enough, saving ’99 per cent’ of his £2500 a year and 
living with his fellows in the farm bunk house. Others take a more treasonable 
view. “I’d let the Argies have the place tomorrow,” says a shepherd, “if they 
would just send us over a couple of plane-loads of women” (Sunday Times 
Magazine, 19 August 1978, p. 23). 
A ‘blue balls’ trope of sexually unfulfilled or frustrated men in the Falklands 
acting violently is worth considering, although as Culya (2012, p. 64) argues, 
one should not allow ‘sexual reductionism’ to simplify behaviours ‘to not 
[being] ruled by their heads, or even their hearts, but by their genitalia’. The 
metaphorical ‘blue balls’ helps relate the experience of those males in the 
Islands who did not have a female partner, or had become separated/divorced 
from her.  
Despite the ‘Angry Islander’ controversy bearing witness to major societal 
difficulties in the colony, no immediate improvement followed in the period up 
to 1982. The endemic tensions resulting from a paucity of women, however, 







‘Tragedy at Goose Green’ (Penguin News, No. 5, 5 March 1980, p. 12) was 
how the recently launched Penguin News described the fatal knifing of Tony 
Kirk, whilst the well-established Falkland Islands Times framed it a ‘black day 
in the history of Goose Green Farm’ (Falkland Islands Times, March 1980, p. 
1). ‘A violent death’ was the chapter in Rex Hunt’s Falkland Days which 
focused on this tragic event, in which Hunt (1992, p.28) describes how ‘an 
Islander had been knifed in the stomach by one of the Chilean farm hands’ at 
Goose Green – on the very same evening that earlier on he had danced the 
Military Two-Step with the agentive, ‘attractive young girl’’ (Hunt 1992, p. 28). 
Hunt offers a detailed account of how this incident had occurred, as he had 
learned about it from Eric Goss, Goose Green farm manager: 
The Chilean, Francisco Burgos, was an outside shepherd (that is, one who 
lived not in a settlement but on his own in one of the more distant shanties) 
and normally went into the settlement only at weekends for provisions. A 
quiet, retiring man and a good worker, Burgos had come in for the sports and, 
like most others at the dance, had been drinking. Leaving the men’s lavatory, 
he had bumped into Tony Kirk’s girlfriend, who was going into the Ladies. It 
was probably an accident but Kirk and his friends had chosen to think 
otherwise. Eric had heard about the incident and quietly advised Burgos to 
head for home. Burgos had followed Eric’s advice, go into the bunkhouse and 
collected his riding gear (which included a knife), intending to saddle up and 
ride for home immediately; but his way out had been barred by Kirk and his 
friends, who had advanced on him along the corridor. Kirk had punched him 
in the face, breaking his nose, whereupon Burgos had drawn his knife and 
stabbed Kirk in the stomach. A simple tale no doubt enacted nightly in 
countless taverns around the world; but there had not been a violent killing in 
the Falkland Islands for over fifty years. The unforgivable crime in the 
Falkland Islanders’ eyes was that Burgos had pulled a knife. Punch-ups 
occurred frequently, usually after drinking and over women, the men 
outnumbering women by five to one. Farm managers normally sorted out the 
culprits without calling in the police. To that extent the Islands were largely 
self-policing. But a knife was different; it was alien to the Anglo-Saxon culture. 
It was what those ‘dagoes’ used on the mainland […] I was learning fast 
(Hunt 1992, pp. 29-30). 
As Hunt’s account makes clear, notwithstanding its inaccurate racialised claim 
that ‘Anglo-Saxon culture’ eschews the use of knives, is that the fatal incident 
was initiated over a woman; on this occasion the escalation of male-on-male 
violence from ‘punch-up’ to knifing, attests to the potential for the frustrations 
and rivalries engendered by a lack of females in a largely un-policed 
community. That ‘blue balls’ violence, encouraged by alcoholic excess, had 







farm manager policing, social restraints or cultural norms had helped keep 
such violence at a low intensity (if not frequency), this had broken down at 
Goose Green.   
A letter from an anonymous reader of Penguin News who withheld his/her 
identity confirmed that some Islanders were very unhappy with Burgos’ 
subsequent conviction of manslaughter rather than murder, with ‘only’ a 9-
month imprisonment in the Islands.  
I was very shocked by the reaction of some people to the result of the 
Francisco Burgos trial. 
This ‘wild west mentality’ is surely out of place in this British colony, and if 
British rule is good enough for us, should not British justice be as well? 
The minority who seem to feel that Burgos should have been sent down for 
life cannot have any knowledge of the facts of the case. If they did, they 
would not realise that the event was not a cut-and-dried cold-blooded murder. 
Our justice is not based on the idea of an ‘eye for an eye and a ‘tooth for a 
tooth’. We should be grateful for that. 
Regrettably I am unable to put my name to this letter 
(Penguin News, No. 7, 8 May 1980, p. 20). 
Tony Kirk’s uncle, Arthur, responded from Harrow, Middlesex, expressing to 
the editor his dissatisfaction with the manslaughter verdict, the anonymous 
letter, and what he felt to be unduly sympathetic coverage given to Burgos by 
the Penguin News:  
Your anonymous [letter] writer on the Burgos trial states that he was shocked 
at the [negative] reaction of some people to the result of the trial. As an uncle 
of the victim, I am shocked at the result, perhaps the people who showed 
resentment didn’t think the punishment fitted the crime, as I most certainly 
didn’t. 
(Penguin News, No. 8, 25 September 1980, p. 10). 
Gladys Minto’s demise in December 1980 was the result of uxoricide by long-
standing Falkland resident Leonard Minto, and was described by the Penguin 
News as ‘one of the most tragic murders in Falklands History’ (Penguin News, 
No. 11, 5 February 1981, p. 5). This incident, in which domestic emergency 







with Tony Kirk’s murder, explicitly linked to the unresolved female 
demographic issue, and the violent, intimate geopolitics that existed in some 
quarters.  
The scalar leap from the micro-circulation Falkland Islands Times to that of 
the mass-circulation New York Times could hardly have been greater, but 
recurring themes such as the contested presence of the Royal Marines, 
violence, separation and sexual frustrations remained. Reporter Edward 
Schumacher filed a dispatch from Goose Green on 7 May 1981, a significant 
account entitled: 
ON A DESOLATE ATLANTIC ISLAND, A RARE CASE OF MURDER; The 
Talk of The Falklands’: 
‘They say Leonard Minto tried to slit his throat after slitting that of his wife… 
Mr. Minto is now in Toddy McMillan's jail, charged with murder. Just nine 
months earlier a Chilean hand pulled his shepherd knife and killed a British 
worker in a drunken brawl. They were the first killings in at least 40 years […] 
Mrs. Minto's death was probably to have been expected. She and her 
husband were separated and she was living with another man… 
 
The Problem: Too Few Women. 
At the root of the problem is a simple statistic: for every three men between 
the ages of 30 and 64, there are two women. It is even worse in the outlying 
areas. In a census of West Falkland Island eight years ago, there was one 
single woman over the age of 19 and there were 51 single men. 
There is little reason to believe that the situation has changed. More men 
come from Britain for the work available here. More women go to Britain for 
the life style there, often as the bride of one of the 40 marines stationed here 
on one-year tours. This galls the local men. ''Women here are like hen's teeth 
– bloody rare,'' said Peter Clement, a 31-year-old sheep shearer. 
 
(Edward Schumacher in New York Times [online], 7 May 1981). 
 
What is striking is that this murder was explicitly linked to the ‘problem’ of too 
few women; indeed, in placing Leonard Minto’s backstory in the wider setting 
of Island behaviours, noting that there were many instances of this sort, 
Edward Schumacher presents Mrs Minto’s murder as somehow ‘expected’, in 
other words a predictable homicide in the Falklands context. Governor Rex 
Hunt too had been aware of the threat posed by Minto to his estranged wife, 
and had sought to help her, cognisant of her husband’s violent disposition, 








 He had beaten his wife several times, she had finally left him and the 
 magistrate had warned him not to attempt to molest her. For her own safety, 
 we had allowed her to sleep in the hospital and, to give her some money of 
 her own, we had engaged her to be a maid at Government House (Hunt 
 1992, p. 130). 
 
Far from being contested matters on letters pages, the issues which the Angry 
Islander discourse in 1978 had brought into the public domain about life in this 
‘booze-sodden, sex-ridden, wife-beating country’ (Mary Jennings, Falkland 
Islands Times, 15 December 1978, p. 1) had proven to be in extremis 
emergency matters of life and death. With two murders of Islanders in 1980, 
as per our earlier extrapolation of Gray’s (2019) argument, it is clear that 
extreme (domestic) violence was becoming part of the social relations of the 
Falklands slow emergency , with the use of the shepherd knife assuming an 
alarming new significance. The Falkland Island Times emphasised the 
emotional impact of the murder on Islanders, alliteratively reporting: 
 
MINTO MURDER MAKES MANY MAD 
Boxing Day did not bring the usual ‘Spirit of Goodwill’ to Len Minto, for this 
was the day when the Falkland Islands Police Force formally charged Minto 
with the murder of his wife Gladys 
Mrs Minto had been found dead at her home in Stanley on the morning of 
Thursday December 11th – her throat had been cut 
(Falkland Islands Times, January 1981, p. 1). 
It then placed the Minto murder in a wider setting through a further article: 
‘THE MINTO MURDER: CUT-THROAT CAPERS CAUSE CONCERN 
The recent death of Mrs Gladys Minto, and the subsequent charge of Murder 
made on Glady’s husband Len, caused concern among most people in 
Stanley, who seemed to be asking the question ‘What the hell is going to 
happen next?’ 1980 produced 2 murders.  
(Falkland Islands Times, January 1981, p. 11). 
Rex Hunt commented: ‘Not a murder for fifty years, and now two in my first 
year’ (Hunt 1992, p. 130), and this may well be a one hundred per cent 
underestimation as it is entirely possible that there were a further two 
murders, both at North Arm in the far south of East Falkland. The suspected 







disappeared there in August 1980, and a witness in the Addis case, Johnny 
Biggs, who died shortly afterwards in a fire at his North Arm cottage. 
Various rumours were disseminated in the colony regarding the events at 
North Arm. Penguin News noted that: 
Although virtually nothing is known concerning his loss, several theories have 
been put forward […] After a little over one month, and bearing in mind the 
wintry weather that prevailed over the period, it is very unlikely that the 
Marine is still alive’ (Penguin News, No. 8, 25 September 1980, p. 3).  
Diplomatically, Penguin News did not report, or speculate on, the specifics of 
these rumours. Subsequently, the Falkland Islands Times, in reporting on the 
Coroner’s ‘open verdict’, posited that‘it is assumed that he either fell into the 
water from North Arm jetty upon attempting to board R.M.S Forrest, or that he 
wandered into the surrounding Camp and perished’ (Falkland Islands Times, 
5 February 1981, p. 1). It avoids any reference to ‘darker’ explanations. Rex 
Hunt, though diplomatic, commented that ‘Addis’ body was never found […] 
There were many theories – some exceedingly wild’ (Hunt 1992, p. 88), and 
cites R.M.S Forrest Captain Jack Sollis’ theory that Addis slipped off the jetty 
to a hypothermic death as the “most likely’ explanation’.  
Independent journalist Ian MacKinnon, writing on 29 August 1995 nearly 
fifteen years after the Alan Addis’ disappearance, claimed that: 
The favoured theory is that Alan Addis got into a row with locals and was 
"cold-bloodedly" murdered, his body burned and the remains buried’ (‘Final 
act in a Falklands drama: Marine Alan Addis disappeared from a Falklands 
social club 15 years ago’,	The Independent [online], 28 August 1995). 	
	
The absence of a definitive explanation for Addis’ demise has created space 
for ‘wild’ theories (Hunt 1992, p. 88), one of which linked the August 1980 
death of shepherd Johnny Biggs in a house fire at North Arm to the Addis 
case, about which he was due to give evidence to the police (cited in ‘The 
disappearance of Alan Addis’, Wikipedia entry, provenance undisclosed).  
Such speculation within the Islands suggests that there was a contemporary 
perception that the Falkland authorities had not been able to uphold law and 







Notwithstanding the Devon and Cornwall’s Police later involvement in this 
matter, and the arrest of four Islanders in 1995, no charges followed; neither 
did a 2010 Metropolitan Police investigation lead to any conclusive outcome, 
with the case remaining unresolved.  
What this case does show is that in extremis the Falklands prior to 1982 were 
a place, for whatever reason, from which a Royal Marine might not return 
alive; that in the region of 0.7% of the Islands’ pre-war population have been 
arrested (1995), though not charged, is in itself a thought-provoking statistic.  
After the Addis case, the Royal Marines sought to reduce risk in the Camp 
through adopting ‘the ‘buddy system’, whereby Royal Marines always went in 
pairs when travelling in camp (Hunt 1992, p. 89). Although Hunt (1992, p. 89), 
ascribes its adoption to ‘the need to respect the natural elements’, this new 
system made it less possible for a ‘disappearance’ of a Royal Marine to re-
occur for reasons unconnected with the weather or physical environment.  
Significantly, Royal Marine George Thomsen in his memoirs confirms his 
awareness in 1981 that Marines lives were said to be at risk in the Islands. He 
records how, soon after his April 1981 arrival in the Islands, he had been told 
about a recent occasion when the Addis case had been used to ‘manage’ the 
behaviour of a young Islander woman.  
As recalled by Thomsen, fellow Naval Party P8901 member ‘Ginge’ informed 
him: 
We’d been chatting up some of the local birds, at the [unspecified] settlement. 
We’d had a good time the night before […] Anyway in the morning we were 
just off when I heard this local talking to one of the girls in the kitchen[…] He 
was telling her to wind her neck in and told her that unless she wanted to see 
a repeat of what had happened at North Arm she’d better keep well away 
from any Marines (Angel and Thomsen 2009, Chapter 4, no page number 
provided).  
However accurate the substance of its claims, this account reflects the very 
real tension and suspicion that existed between an unknown number of male 
Islanders, and the Royal Marines. The contested bodies of Islander women 
provided the casus belli for this undeclared conflict, with young Islander men 







Falklands slow emergency. 
It is clear that the Falkland Islands Times had, back in 1978, already opened 
the lid on a ‘Pandora’s box’ of profound intimate societal and sexual tensions 
through ‘Angry Islander’s’ letter criticising the Royal Marines, and that 
tensions would remain entirely unresolved in the period up to 1982. An 
emotional civil war between Islander women and men; a war for womens’ 
bodies between Islander males and Royal Marines; depopulation; domestic 
violence and murder, were all evident in the slow emergency period up to 
1982. The Falklands were at serious risk of progressive societal and 
demographic disintegration, a ‘Wild South’ emerging in which alcohol and 
shepherds’ knives were readily available, and women’s bodies were subjects 
of aspiration, contention, and violence – even to the point of murder. Agentive, 
younger Islander women too were able to ‘territorialise’ the bodies of Royal 
Marines and gain mobility through marriage, making the Islands an even more 
difficult social and sexual space for ‘overlooked’ young Islander men. 
The Falkland Islands Times, in fact, transformed itself into a source of division 
through initiating the ‘Angry Islander’ discourse. The tensions exposed 
through its pages in 1978 made ‘saying the unsayable’ in an Island publication 
– that the Royal Marines were resented by a minority – possible, and exposed 
Islander-Royal Marine divisions, and opened up printed discourse about 
domestic violence and gender relations amongst Islanders. It also sowed 
further division between the sexes, encouraging Islanders and their networks 
to speculate about the identity of the ‘Angry Islander’. In late November 1978, 
it informed its readers: 
‘There is still no clue as to who ‘Angry Islander’ is – even the ‘Islander’ part is 
under some doubt, although Air Commodore Brian Frow told me that he 
knows and so do the Royal Marines. If anyone can pass a hint my way, I’d be 
grateful!’ (Falkland Islands Times, 24 November 1978, p. 1).  
Editor Dave Colville’s approach was fostering a South Atlantic ‘witch-hunt’ 
through the Falkland Islands Times’ efforts to enlist readers, and therefore 
Islander networks, to establish ‘Angry Islander’s’ identity (which had meant 
the latter had been able to avoid the type of written, personal attack that Trudi 







materialised, in which a newly responsible Colville finally closed down the 
heated discourse. Indeed, the (previously) Colville-encouraged networked 
rumours had become so ‘hot’ for Roddy Napier that he felt compelled to 
produce a letter disassociating himself from the suspicion then circulating that 
he was the ‘Angry Islander’: 
ANGRY ISLANDER CASE NOW CLOSED[...] I wonder if the ‘Ms. Mystery’ 
who wrote the original letter condemning the Royal Marines stationed in this 
British colony realised what a hornets-nest he/she stirred up. Mr Roddy 
Napier of West Point Island has written to me stating that it WAS NOT HIM 
who wrote the original, contrary to the rumours abounding recently (Falkland 
Islands Times, 15 December 1978, p. 1).  
The Falkland Islands Times’ previous readiness to publish ‘Angry Islander’s’ 
pseudonymic letter had created the climate of rumour in the first place; in a 
further volte-face, it now ceased to publish such letters, prompting Bill Luxton 
to write that: ‘I am glad to hear that in future you will ignore anonymous letters 
and treat them with the contempt they deserve’ (Falkland Islands Times, 15 
December 1978, p. 5).  
Clearly, the ‘Angry Islander’ controversy provides a cogent demonstration of 
contested discourse, rumour and suspicion amplified and circulated by local 
networks, with divisive results for the wider community and the individual, as 
Roddy Napier’s experience illustrates. The disseminative, and potentially 
damaging, power of networks in a small community is also recognised in 
Southby-Taylor’s advice to the family whose daughter’s image had been 
objectified in polaroids, which he used to ‘settle’ the matter, not least by 
highlighting the daughter’s agentive actions: 
Much as I supported their distress, I had to point out that the incident had 
been obviously carried out with the full participation (and as far as I could 
make out, the full enjoyment) of their daughter, and that any marine to be 
dismissed from the Colony for such an ‘offence’ would become public 
knowledge within minutes, adding, certainly public shame to their private 
embarrassment (2003, p. 43). 
7.5 Conclusion 
The politicised, contested nature of  the ‘Angry Islander’ case is clear, though 
many subjectivities remain. What did the Royal Marines’ bodies most signify 







protection, ‘better’ husband material than the local alternative, ‘a passport’ out 
of the Islands, an ‘enemy within’ depriving Islander males of the chance of a 
female partner? And what of the letters written to the Falkland Islands Times, 
and the newsletter itself – were these widely perceived amongst Islanders as 
evidence of legitimate expression or dangerous disruption? As letters cited in 
this chapter evidence, individual opinions varied, sometimes starkly; the one 
point of commonality is that all mobilised strong emotional responses, and 
quite remarkably, exposed certain intimate aspects of Islander life in the slow 
emergency were published in the Falkland Islands Times, notably about 
domestic violence and excessive drinking. Similarly, that the ‘Wilkinson Sword 
of Peace’ – which had its pacific political meaning made very explicit in its 
name – was ‘reinvented’, as a source of intensely emotional discord rather 
than one of peace.  
 
Whilst many factors shaped quotidian discourse in the slow emergency 
Falklands in the years prior to 1982, the ‘Angry Islander’ letter stands out for 
its emotional force in provoking/stimulating a succession of letters in the 
Falkland Islands Times which uncomfortably exposed and exacerbated 
divisions within the Islander community. Angry Islander’ as an individual of 
unknown gender (and race), clearly struggled with Islander women exercising 
agency over their life choices and the demographic implications of this; 
blaming and othering the Royal Marines, under the cover of anonymity, he 
sought to defenestrate their standing in the Falklands community, and so halt 
the defeminisation of the Islands. As with our development of Gray’s 
argument about domestic violence, ‘Angry Islander’s’ letter and the discourse 
it generated ‘can be seen as part of the social relations’ (Gray 2019, p.196) of 
slow emergency, exposing its intimate workings and manifestations within the 











8. Conclusion – ‘whose emergency is it anyway?’ 
 
 
Writing this thesis has been a rich and varied experience, which in its 
research, discussion and writing has geographically extended from the 
Falklands to the United Kingdom to Ireland to Singapore. It has been an 
independent research project undertaken over eight years of part-time study, 
whilst in full-time work in Singapore and the United Kingdom. With work 
commitments, undertaking the research and producing this thesis has not 
been without challenges, but it has been a rewarding experience throughout. 
Beyond being a journey of personal academic growth, the importance of the 
research has, I believe, grown during the course of this project.  
 
The Falklands have been, and continue to be, about more than the fate of 
these Islands, and discourse about their fate often centres on what Britain’s 
role in the world should be, a question which has acquired renewed 
importance following the outcome of the 2016 Brexit referendum, which has 
highlighted the absence of a national consensus as to whether Britain’s 
national home is, or is not, in the European Union. For its critics, Brexit, both 
in its emergence and in the drawn processes of its implementation functions 
as a slow emergency. There seems a striking alignment between issues of 
unresolved modern British identity and the Falklands issue, which as this 
thesis shows, have been in evidence for over half a century.  
 
One of the factors which enabled Brexit is a view of British exceptionalism, 
that Britain has agency to ‘go it alone’. The outcome of the Falklands Conflict 
both helped encourage this view and exorcise the ‘ghost of Suez’, with Prime 
Minister Thatcher claiming on 3 July 1982: 
 ‘When we started out, there were the waverers and the fainthearts. The 
 people who thought that Britain could no longer seize the initiative for 
 herself…. 
 There were those who would not admit it—even perhaps some here 
 today—people who would have strenuously denied the suggestion 
 but—in their heart of hearts—they too had their secret fears that it was 
 true: that Britain was no longer the nation that had built an Empire and 







 Well they were wrong. The lesson of the Falklands is that Britain has  not 
 changed and that this nation still has those sterling qualities which 
 shine through our history’. 
 (https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104989) 
In this speech, the recovery of the Islands is used to symbolise a national 
renewal, in which a global Britain was reforged, true to its imperial roots; as 
this speech reflects, the outcome of the Falklands conflict did little to 
encourage a sense of European as opposed to a British identity in the United 
Kingdom, with a vision of ‘global Britain’ now often used by advocates of 
Brexit. So I see this research as providing important insights into mentalities 
that have resurfaced in Brexit, itself a development which seemed unlikely at 
the outset of this project in 2010.  
This has been a unique investigation one which has the benefit of the 
involvement of the now sadly departed Sir Cosmo Haskard, a research 
opportunity which can never be repeated. Similarly, the focus on the everyday 
experience of Falkland Islanders in this thesis, with the research undertaken 
on the ground in the Islands, helps makes its content an original contribution 
to studies of the Falkland Islands.  
The project’s aim has been to reinterpret the Falklands/Malvinas, with a focus 
on emergency, territory and loyalty. The more I investigated the Islands, the 
more I came to see the Islands as enveloped in emergency, usually though 
not always, operating at a slow speed. As reflected in the question ‘whose 
emergency is it anyway?’, there is no one single ‘owner’ of the Falkland 
emergency (of whatever speed). Rather there are multiple owners who 
experienced it in varied ways, though clearly the Falkland Islanders were most 
exposed to the vicissitudes of emergency, even if a pre-1982 Falkland 
emergency has yet to be recognised historiographically. Slow emergency 
operated on many different levels, such as on the intimate, socio-
economically, temporally and geopolitically. 
It was also key to the success of this project to engage with visuality, to better 
understand – or see - the experience of emergency, be that of an everyday or 







which channelled emergency protests against Chalfont’s efforts to encourage 
a territorial transfer to Argentina. 
 
The Falklands/Malvinas can be understood as an assemblage of 
emergencies, islands that exercises a polarity in attracting emergencies, a 
supra-emergency enveloping the Islands. In unpacking this supra-emergency, 
it can be seen that these component emergencies extend to different actors, 
such as the Falkland Islander community faced with quotidian emergency, the 
Falkland Islands Emergency Committee seeking to forestall the emergency of 
a sovereignty transfer, the Argentine government accelerating emergency to 
achieve precisely this, or a beleaguered British Lord Chalfont seeking to 
contain domestic parliamentary and press opposition. 
 
It was the use of the designation Falkland Islands Emergency Committee that 
prompted the focus in this project on what emergency in the Falklands means 
both empirically and theoretically, and the multi-causal and multi-layered 
nature of emergency soon became evident, as well as the speed at which 
emergency often ran its course. Regarding the latter, the theoretical work of 
Adey and Anderson (2010) and Nixon (2011) was crucial in developing the 
paradigm of slow emergency. As this thesis has sought to demonstrate, the 
accelerative and decelerative capacities of emergency, and its variable 
temporalities and intensities, have been vital in developing new perspectives 
on the Falklands/Malvinas.  
 
What this study has helped reveal is that the sources of emergency are 
varied, and ‘emergency actors’ can function in various ways, as enablers, 
activists or victims. Angry Islanders, mobilised crowds, loyalist politicians and 
other actors played a distinct part in enacting the practices of Falkland 
emergency. Emergency functions at both micro and macro levels; in his own 
way, the fulminating ‘Angry Islander’ of the Falkland Islands Times was as 
significant at a micro-level emergency in exacerbating relations between 
Islanders and Royal Marines, as was the Wilson Government in exacerbating 
Anglo-Argentine relations through failing to deliver the Falkland sovereignty 







what I have called angry loyalty is intimately connected with emergency, being 
both a response to, and a factor in the development of, emergency. 
 
The role of the press as an actor in its own right in accelerating and 
intensifying emergency has been highlighted, as can be seen through 
examining the output/conduct of printed news sources ranging from the 
Lilliputian Falkland Islands Times to the Daily Express. This also attests to the 
importance of the role of the storyteller in framing and disseminating 
Falklands ‘emergency’ narratives, which then become contributory factors in 
shaping the course of the emergency. Certainly, there is no doubt that 
newspapers such as The Daily Express, The Daily Telegraph, The Times and 
The Daily Mail played a powerful role in framing the Falkland emergency. 
Such newspapers frequently offered characterisations of a weak British 
government appeasing Argentina, rather than one of anachronistic Islander 
loyalism obstructing official British efforts to broker a territorial settlement with 
Buenos Aires, the latter being argued in The Guardian by Richard Gott. 
Representations by loyal politicians such as Bernard Braine and John Biggs 
Davison of the Falklands as a beleaguered and betrayed micro-Britain 
resisting a territorially aggrandising neighbour gained traction in a Britain, 
where many were frustrated by having to confront white-minority UDI 
Rhodesia which still claimed loyalty to Elizabeth II, as well as needing to 
suppress numerous other colonial Emergencies that accompanied the 
decolonisation process, ‘from Aden to Zanzibar’ (Reynolds 2017, p. 32).  
 
Schwarz (2012, p. 12) draws our attention to contemporary perceptions of ‘a 
lost time of whiteness… an age – in the past, a generation ago, in metropole 
or colony, somewhere, sometime – where white authority had prevailed’, the 
perceived diminished status of the ‘white Briton’ highly unwelcome to many 
members of the British public. In contrast, Enoch Powell’s vision of race 
relations, itself accelerating a racial emergency in British political discourse 
with April 1968’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, proved popular with many, helping 
mobilise nativist sentiment against the perceived ‘foreign other’, both within 








A populist narrative of resistance, particularly channelled through the Daily 
Express, to ‘selling out’ the ethnically white, kith and kin Falklands to a South 
American dictatorship state actuated significant domestic British support for 
the Islanders, effectively a mobilisation of whiteness and lingering sentiment 
for a lost era of British dominions. The visual impact of press photographs of 
Falkland Islanders waving union jacks against Chalfont’s plans should not be 
underestimated, narrating Islanders as ‘us’ rather than ‘other’. 
 
The subaltern nature of geopolitics for the Falkland community is also clear. 
Craggs (2014, p. 42) has drawn attention to how ‘‘subaltern geopolitics opens 
up a space to explore those not outside or against the geopolitical system’, 
and this thesis has endeavoured to throw light on the everyday experience of 
Islanders, through investigating how slow emergency was experienced on an 
everyday basis, and mobilising Islander voices. Although on the margins, 
there were moments Islanders became more empowered, such as in their 
successful protests against Governor French in 1977. The capacity of 
emergency to lead to a subaltern micro-populism, with a dislike of paternalism 
and the ‘conspiratorial outsider’, can be seen in this incident, reflecting what 
‘Angry Islanders’ could achieve together.  
 
The Falkland Islands emergencies of the latter 1960s and 1970s can be 
understood as part of a greater, British emergency about the challenges of 
adapting both internally and externally to the post-World War Two era (with 
Brexit arguably the latest, ‘updated’ manifestation of this). Loyal framings of 
the Falklands firmly associated the colony with Britishness through tropes 
such as loyalty to the crown and (white) kith and kin; as the Wilson 
Government, and Chalfont in particular, learnt in 1968, it was politically 
inexpedient to be seen to act against the wishes of the Islanders. In many 
ways, the Islands functioned as a barometer of how Britain was managing its 
own national slow emergency adapting to a diminished status in a rapidly 
decolonising world. The very term ‘Falklands’ came to signify an emotional 
geopolitics, in which the name and survival of this beleaguered colony and its 
loyal inhabitants functioned as a micro-proxy for British nationhood, 







Representations of this nature were visually and memorably mobilised in The 
Daily Express’ famous October 1968 photo-shoot of white, kith and kin 
Falkland Islanders standing in front of Stanley’s Anglican cathedral and 
Whalebone Arch, the elemental sea in the background serving as the ‘Atlantic 
bridge’ between the colony and Britain. 
 
In respect of the Islands themselves, this insular territory faced a very different 
type of emergency to the ones in colonies such as Malaya, Kenya and Aden. 
Often framed as ‘Victorian’, ‘Edwardian’ or ‘anachronistic’ by contemporary 
commentators, the Islands appeared asynchronous with the post-colonial era, 
territorial relics of a departed era and deceased Empire. Yet the colony 
struggled on with quotidian life, notwithstanding numerous and often 
temporally extended - usually slow - emergencies, emerging at different 
speeds and degrees of intensity. Intersectional, overlapping slow 
emergencies ‘constructed’ the realities of Falkland life, manifested in areas 
such as ongoing economic decline, Argentine volumetric absorption, 
depopulation, socio-sexual tensions and British Government neglect.  
 
The practices, experiences and performances of emergency were played out 
on a quotidian basis in the Islands, to the degree that Falkland life became an 
assemblage of intersectional emergencies. The frequent reference to the 
future in the Islands, be that in relation to socio-economic or political survival, 
is entirely connected with emergency, the latter being an uncertain process 
with unknown outcomes.  
 
Falkland emergencies such as demographic decline and the ‘wrong bodies’ 
(too few Islander females; too many British males) exacerbated matters. This 
was particularly attributable to young Islander women marrying Royal 
Marines, who in pursuit of a personal ‘better life’ reproduced demographic 
emergency, rather than, biologically, the next generation of Islanders. There is 
an (unfair) argument that in exercising agency in this way these women were 
complicit in emergency; unfortunately, the result of the loss of young Islander 
women stimulated other emergencies such as those between some male 







the colony encouraged uncertainty about the future of the Islands, which in 
turn encouraged further depopulation, and validated the choice of those 
Islander women who sought to make a life elsewhere through marriage. Slow 
emergency in the Falklands amounted to a progressive zombification of the 
colony. In many ways, slow emergency’s remorseless erosion of the quality of 
Falkland socio-economic life presented a greater threat to the colony’s future 
than a major political event such as Chalfont’s November 1968 visit. Whereas 
the latter dramatically galvanised both Islander loyalism as well as domestic 
British loyal support, the former attritionally sucked life out of the colony. 
 
The support of Governor Haskard, the Falkland Islands Emergency 
Committee, and press and parliament had helped stave off cession to 
Argentina in 1968, but subsequent developments continued to erode British 
sovereignty, with an ongoing volumetric emergency for the survival of the 
colony as a geopolitical entity distinct from Argentina. Nowhere was this more 
evident than through the 1971 Anglo-Argentine Communications and 1974 
YPF Agreements, which effectively ceded aerial volume to Argentina and 
enabled the establishment of the shadow government of the aerotectorate. 
Nicholas Ridley’s 1980 stillborn leaseback initiative represented an attempt to 
apply this approach territorially, whereby British title to the Islands would be 
similarly hollowed out; in return for sovereignty, Argentina would then permit a 
temporally finite grace period for British rule to expire, so adding a future, 
temporal slow emergency for Islanders who remained. There appeared, 
indeed, to be no future for the Falkland as a British colony, a point which the 
shelving of the Shackleton Report in 1977 effectively confirmed, and Chalfont 
had predicted on his 1968 mission. At best, there was a shadow condominium 
in the Falklands/Malvinas, in which the British retained the everyday 
appearance of territorial control, but in reality Argentina dominated the 
archipelago three-dimensionally.  
 
By early 1982, Argentine de facto, three dimensional domination of the 
Falkland/Malvinas archipelago was over a decade old; literally time was on its 
side, as Argentine objects of aerial power, such as LADE’s planes, exercised 







Islanders largely neutralised. Argentina simply had to wait for slow emergency 
processes to lead to the end of the Falkland Islanders as a viable community, 
and a formal British de jure recognition of de facto reality. The Galtieri junta’s 
hasty decision to invade in 1982 instead led to an unexpected British 
geopolitical and volumetric archipelagic reassertion, and subsequent re-
invigoration of the previously moribund colony.  
 
To conclude, for those studying political geography and decolonisation, the 
thesis brings out that emergency is multi-faceted, integrates the everyday to 
the high political and is three dimensional and visual in nature. It shows that 
emergency should be understood as more than a series of state sponsored 
performances and practices designed to achieve desired behavioural and 
political outcomes from populations, that it is a ‘bottom up’ as well as a ‘top 
down’ experience. It demonstrates that speed and intensity matter, and that in 
examining how these affect a people and a place on the fringe of Empire, we 
open up a new perspective on the workings of colonial emergency.  
 
In the case of the Falklands, it can be seen that emergency is long lasting and 
multi-dimensional, with different temporalities, consisting of a hydra of 
emergencies of different speeds and intensities which coalesce into an overall 
emergency. This is not an emergency in which the British military applied 
emergency decrees and force against a hostile members of an indigenous 
community; it was more subtle, requiring the application of strategic neglect to 
secure to achieve Islander co-operation. Unlike the other ‘white’ emergencies 
of Cyprus and Northern Ireland, there was no anti-British resistance 
movement to neutralise, and no formal emergency was declared (until the 
1982 Argentine invasion). Notwithstanding times of escalation, for the most 
part emergency in the Falklands moved slowly; this slowness, however, does 
not denote a lack of long-term effectiveness, and the schema of four sub-
emergencies reflects specific ways emergency played out in the Falklands.  
 
Slow emergency attritionally ate away at the fabric of the Falklands socially, 
culturally, geographically, politically, and psychologically. What becomes 







withstand a drawn out emergency of strategic neglect. However, the 
traditional challenges and hardships of Falkland life meant that struggle and 
survival were longstanding features of the Falkland community, and slow 
emergency was a toxin to which there was already a measure of inbuilt 
immunity, albeit one which threatened to close down the colony’s ‘vital signs’ 
over time.  
 
In sum, this thesis has made the case for a temporally extended slow 
emergency,  with periods of acceleration and deceleration, and, for the first 
time, has examined the Falkland Islander experience through an island-
centred study. Slow emergency offers an original framing which can be 
productively applied to case studies on many different levels, ranging from 
high political to intimate geopolitics; as an example, applying slow emergency 
to Rwanda from independence in 1962 to the events of 1994 would help shed 
light on the processes and experiences which ultimately catalysed into mass 
genocide.  
 
The research for this thesis leads one to conclude that Falklands from 1964 to 
1982 experienced a drawn out and largely ‘overlooked emergency’, The term 
‘The Confrontation’ or Konfrontasi is used to describe the 1966-69 British-
Indonesian Emergency over the territorial status of Sarawak and Sabah; 
similarly ‘The Slow Emergency’ provides a fitting way to describe the 
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10.1 APPENDIX A 
 
Developments relating to the Falklands 1964-1970 
 
DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO THE FALKLANDS 1964-1970 
Falklands British Government Argentina/UN 
1964 
 
May – Colonial Secretary 
Thompson takes over as 
acting Governor from 


















9 October – Governor 
Haskard arrives – learns 
of renewed Argentine 
interest and Fitzgerald’s 
flight whilst in transit by 




(Islander John Leonard 
takes photograph later 
used on front of 
Panorama magazine 
shortly after his arrival). 
 
8 December – 50th 















8 September – Miguel 
Fitzgerald flew Cessna 
185 to Falklands – 
leaves notes claiming 
Argentine sovereignty 
and returns to Rio 
Gallegos. 
 



















March/April – Governor 
Haskard visits Antarctica 
in HMS Protector. 
1965 
 













16 December – UN 
Res. 2065 passed (87 
votes to nil, 13 
abstentions) inviting 
Britain and Argentine 
governments ‘to 
proceed without delay 
in finding a peaceful 













March/April – Governor 
Haskard visits Antarctica 







24 July – ExCo meets, 
further to which Governor 
Haskard telegraphed 
Commonwealth Office 
telling London that that 
the empathic wish of the 







January – Stewart 
visits Buenos Aires, 
first ever visit there by 
British Foreign 
Secretary Main British 
aim is to improve 
communications 
between islands and 






July UK – Argentina 
talks in London end 




23 July – broadcast of 
a talk by a member of 
the Bank of London 
and South America 
over the BBC World 
Service appearing to 




11 August – Michael 









































September – Governor 
Haskard in London for 
talks at the Foreign Office 


















































November – Further 





hostile reception from 
Argentines to Duke of 
Edinburgh visit to 
Buenos Aires to mark 
Argentina’s 150th 
birthday – leaflets 
thrown at him by 
students, shots fired at 
his residence, rumour of 
a ransom plot in which 
a captured Duke of 
Edinburgh would be 





hijacking of DCC4 
airliner, Aerolineas 
Argentinas Flight 648, 
to Stanley racecourse. 
Activist role of Hector 
Garcia, editor of 
Cronica, passenger, in 
this, and September 
1964 and November 
1968 Fitzgerald 
episodes. That hijacking 
occurred embarrassing 
for Argentine 
government but does 
draw attention to 
Falklands dispute. 




Ongania did not appear 
to take advantage of the 
Condor Incident, and 
went through the 
motions of being severe 








freeze for a minimum 
of 30 years, at which 
Islanders could choose 
between Britain and 















































March – British 
government accepts 
for the first time in 
meetings between 
officials that they would 
be willing to concede 
sovereignty under 
certain conditions, 
provided the islanders 
wishes are respected. 





23 June – Brown 
meets Argentine 
Foreign Secretary 
Costa Mendez, the 
latter confirming that 
making a sovereignty 
transfer dependent on 
islander wishes was 
unacceptable. Brown 
tells him he could not 
defend any other type 
of sovereignty transfer 
to parliament and 
public opinion. This 
remains Brown’s 
position from here on, 




July – Account of 
general thinking about 
human, cultural and 
property rights which 
would accompany a 














August – Governor 
Haskard on home leave 




September – Governor 
Haskard’s return; he 
becomes seriously 
concerned about British 
Government’s position 
 
October – December 
Governor Haskard writes 
a number of letters and 
telegrams to the 
Commonwealth Office re. 
islanders’ ignorance of 
negotiations, lack of 
knowledge/aversion to 
Argentina and 
Britishness. Urges delay 
as the Islanders are not 
ready for a statement on 
the lines envisaged in a 
draft treaty and MOU. 
Governor Haskard’s 
views not given much 
weights/welcome, as he 
is aware at the time. 
 
 
given to ExCo via 
Colonial Secretary 
Thompson, then acting 


































December – paragraph 
4 of the draft MOU 
cites ‘interests’ of the 
islanders. 
1968 
January – Governor 
Haskard requested to 
come to London to 






16-26 January – 
Councillor 
Summerhayes, from 
the British Embassy in 
Buenos Aires, ‘fact-

































14 February – Further to 
a number of discussions, 
Governor Haskard has a 
difficult meeting with 
George Brown, who had 
alcoholically imbibed at 
lunch, about the future of 
the Falklands. 
 
15 February – Governor 
Haskard has to see 
Brown to ‘make amends’ 
for some angry remarks 
he had made in their 
meeting on the previous 
day. 
 
20 February – Back in 
Stanley, Governor 
Haskard gives ExCo an 
account his visit, and 
ExCo showed members a 
draft MOU – he was 
authorised to tell them in 
confidence about the 
latest version of the MOU 
and the Argentine 
alternative version. In 
public he must avoid 
reference to unresolved 
issues in the MOU, and to 
Gibraltar. 
 
21 and 22 February – 
ExCo meet and discuss a 
 
9 February – British 
Ambassador to 
Argentina, Sir Michael 
Cresswell, having read 
Councillor 
Summerhayes’ report, 
advises that the MOU 
is likely to lead to 
friction with Argentina, 
and is sympathetic to 
Haskard’s arguments 
to proceed with 
caution. 
 
14 February – George 
Brown had seen 
Governor Haskard in 
London. FCO minutes 
says Brown’ 
exceedingly angry at 
the situation’, having 
been told there was ‘no 
division of opinion on 
our side’, now found 
out that both Governor 
Haskard and 
Ambassador 
Cresswell, said that the 
policy could not 












































































redacted draft MOU 
summary, which 
Governor Haskard has 
prepared for public 
announcement. Members 
appreciate Haskard’s 
position as Governor; like 
Haskard, they do not like 
its non-committal tone 
regarding maintaining 
British sovereignty. The 
statement is broadcast on 
the eve of 22 February 
and predictably is the 
subject of much anxious 
comment. 
 
24 February – Unofficial 
members of ExCo 
present Governor 
Haskard with a 
declaration of their 
dismay that so little 
attention is being paid to 
their wishes by the British 
Government and are 
concerned that at some 
future point it would act 
against their wishes. 
Governor Haskard 
transmits this to the 
Commonwealth Office. 
Initiative now passed to 
the unofficial members of 
ExCo AG Barton, R V 
Goss, Sydney Miler and 
Christopher Bonner, who 
on… 
 
27 February – publish a 
statement asking for 
urgent intervention to stop 
a sovereignty transfer, 
which was sent to each 
member of the British 
Parliament and a number 
of national newspapers, 
in a bid to put British 
government policy under 








































27 February – four 
ExCo Councillors sent 
a statement to all 
members of parliament 
and national 
newspapers asking for 
urgent intervention to 





























































































April/May – Daily Express 
reporter Jack Comben 
spends fortnight on the 
islands, leading to… 
 
2 October – Express 
reporter Aubrey Mathews 
takes a well-publicised 
photo of a larger crowd at 
the whalebone arch in 
Stanley proclaiming their 








12 March – Times 
claims that there is ‘no 
sign that the British 
government is 
changing their position 
up to now’. 
 
15 March – Times 
refers to Chalfont’s 
‘flaccid equivocations’ 
in defending the 
Governments’ position, 
and Costa Mendez’s 
hopes, running a 
leading article ‘Betrayal 
or Barter’. 
 
16 March – Stewart 
Foreign Secretary 
again – inherits the 




26 and 28 March – 
debates in Commons 
about Falklands much 










17 October – Foreign 
Secretary now 
responsible for Foreign 
and Commonwealth 
affairs following merger 
of Foreign and Colonial 
Offices. 
 
November – Queen 
and Prince Philip visit 


































































24 November – Chalfont 
arrives Falklands, greeted 
by Islanders waving union 
jacks and placards saying 
‘Chalfont go home!’ photo 
with Michael Tait, 
Chalfont and Governor 
Haskard). Series of 
meetings held in Stanley, 
with bodies from ExCo to 
Sheep Owners 
Association. Chalfont 
explains to council 
members the nature of 
the proposed MOU 
content and of a parallel 
unilateral statement that 
could be made to 
Parliament. In a radio 
broadcast, he offers 
reassurance to islanders 
about not ceding 
sovereignty without their 
agreement. On 27 
Chalfont speaks to large 
meeting in Stanley Town 
















Chalfont. No royal visit 
for Falklands but 
Chalfont and Arthur 
Galsworthy, senior 
official responsible for 
dependent territories 
































3 December – Chalfont 
visit reported back to, 
and critically received 
in, Commons. 
 
11 December –  
cabinet decision to 
abandon negotiations 
based on MOU 
because Argentina 












27 November – 
Fitzgerald lands at Eliza 
Cove but plane 
damaged, and was sent 
back to the mainland. 












December – after 
Stewart’ s announcement, 
situation in Islands 
becomes more relaxed. 
 
a sovereignty transfer 
should be subject to 
Islander wishes. 
 
11 December – 
Stewart tells Commons 
that there was a basic 
divergence over the 
British government’s 
insistence that no 
sovereignty transfer 




were under pressure to 


















21 November – British 
and Argentine 
governments tell the UN 




March/April – Governor 
Haskard visits Antarctica. 
 
April – SS ‘Great Britain’ 

































10.2 APPENDIX B  
 
 
MercoPress announces that the author of this project would be 




















Shackleton Fund with new website; makes important Falklands’ announcements 





















Patrick Watts MBE, first Falkland Islander to receive an Academic Award for his book on the history of 





















“The Christmas Sport” book 
 
The Shackleton Scholarship Fund which is closely linked to the South Atlantic and the Falkland Islands has 
announced the launch of their new website: www.shackletonfund.com. 
The SSF Committee say that they hope this will prove more user friendly for potential scholars and gives them a 
platform to more readily update the public on activities, projects and research funded by the Scholarship Fund. 
The Shackleton Scholarship Fund is shortly to welcome 2011 Academic scholar Max Hull to the Islands. Mr Hull 
will visit between the 15th & 30th October to research his project “Understanding the Falklands in the period 
1965 to 1982 – and their significance in a wider context”. 
On the scientific front, Melanie Mackenzie, a 2012 Academic Scholar, will be in the Islands in February or March 
2013 to research sea cucumbers. 
Turning to sport, the Falkland Islands Archery Association, 2012 Quality of Life scholarship winners, will 
welcome a coach and technical adviser to the Falklands shortly to coincide with their first anniversary 
celebrations. 
The Committee is also pleased to announce that Patrick Watts’ book on the history of the Stanley Sports 








10.3 APPENDIX C  
 
 
PROGRAMME FOR FALKLANDS VISIT, 14-30 OCTOBER 2012 
 
Sunday 14 October • Depart from RAF Brize Norton  
Monday 15 October • Arrive at Mount Pleasant Airport; travel to 
Malvina House Hotel, Stanley 
Tuesday 16 October • Meet Tansy Newman at Archives. Research 
in Archives 
Wednesday 17 October • Initial meeting with Sally and Tim Blake to 
set up interview 
• Research in Archives 
Thursday 18 October • Initial meeting with Terry and Joan Spruce, 
at 29 Ross Road West, to set up group 
interview with themselves and Sam and 
Hay Miller 
• Interview with Gerald Cheek at 9 Biggs 
Road 
Friday 19 October • Research in Archives 
• First interview with Tim and Sally Blake at  
1 Ross Road 
Saturday 20 October • Interview with Willie Bowles at Malvina 
House Hotel 
• Second interview with Sally and Tim Blake 
at 1 Ross Road 
Sunday 21 October • Research 
• Observational tour of Stanley 
Monday 22 October • Research in Archives 
• Interview with Eric Goss at Malvina House 
Hotel 
• Interview with Ron Binnie at Malvina House 
Hotel 
Tuesday 23 October • Patrick Watts and Gerald Cheek to go to 
Mount Langdon 
• Interview with Richard Fogerty at Malvina 
House Hotel 
• Group interview with Terry and Joan 








Wednesday 24 October • All day Camp field visit with Tony Smith, 
including interview with Aisla and Tony 
Heathman at Estancia (Aisla Heathman is 
daughter of Velma Malcolm) 
Thursday 25 October • Research in Archives  
• Meet Shackleton Committee members at 
Government House and tour of 
Government House afterwards with 
Governor Nigel Hayward  
Friday 26 October • Research in Archives 
• Visit to Camp/Volunteer Point with Patrick 
Watts 
Saturday 27 October • Interview with Bill Luxton and Grizelda 
Cockwell at Chartres, West Falkland 
Sunday 29 October • Visit Gypsy Cove/Canopus Hill with Tony 
Smith 
• Review research materials gathered; 
identify any gaps 
Monday 29 October • Complete research in Archives 
Tuesday 30 October • Depart from Mount Pleasant Airport 























10.4 APPENDIX D 
 
Research interviews and meetings with Islanders and geographical 




East Falkland West Falkland 
Terry Spruce - former manager of 
the Falkland Islands Company 
(FIC) 
Eric Goss – had 
been manager at 
Goose Green 
Tim Blake – had 
been manager of 
Hill Cove 
Joan Spruce – wife of former 
manager of the Falkland Islands 
Company (FIC) 
Tony Heathman –  
runs Estancia 
Farm 
Sally Blake – had 
been farm 
manager’s wife at 
Hill Cove 
Patrick Watts – had formerly run the 
Falkland Islands Broadcasting 
Service (FIBS) 








Gerald Cheek – had been in charge 
of the Falkland Islands Government 
Air Service (FIGAS) 
 Grizelda Cockwell 
– had been farm 
manager’s partner 
at Chartres 
Richard Fogerty – 
had worked for the Falkland Islands 
Government as a teacher 




Willie Bowles – local builder and 
former Stanley Councillor 
 Hay Miller – had 
been farm 
manager’s wife at 
Keppel Island 
Ron Binnie – local 

























10.5 APPENDIX E 
 






Lord Chalfont; Sir Arthur Galsworthy (Deputy Under-Secretary of State); Mr. C.E. Diggines 
(Head of Latin American Department); Mr. Tait (Chalfont’s Private Secretary; Mr. Gott 
(The Guardian); Mr. Seaman (Daily Express); Mr. Wigg (The Times); Mr. Field 
(Telegraph); Mr. McLachlan (Daily Mail) [as described in Falkland Islands Monthly Review, 
2 December 1968) 











1. Arrive off Port Howard 
 
 





3. Carcass Island 
 
4. Fly over West Point 
Island and Roy Cove to 
Hill Cove 




6. Port Howard to re-join 
Endurance 
1. Sir Cosmo Haskard joins 
Chalfont on HMS 
Endurance 
2. Mr. D.M. Pole-Evans 
(Manager) and Mrs. Pole-
Evans; Sydney Miller 
ExCo and LegCo 
3. Mr. and Mrs. Bertrand 
(owners) 
4. Mr. L.G Blake and Mrs. 
Blake 
 
5. Mr. James Robertson 
(manager) and Mrs. 
Robertson 
6. Supper with Mrs. D.M. 
Pole-Evans (manager) 











1. Arrive Stanley harbour; 







2. Ross Road Walkabout 
 





4. Christ Church cathedral  
 
1. Arrive Stanley harbour at 
09:30; 
to public jetty to meet Sir 
Cosmo Haskard (who had 
flown back to Stanley) 
and Council members 
 
 
2. Meet members of         
public in walkabout 
3. Meet 120 Stanley     
Residents at 12 noon, 
followed by afternoon 
ExCo meeting 
4. Join congregation     












1. Government House 
 
2. Colony Club  
1. Meet members of ExCo 








1. From Stanley, fly over 
Bluff Cove and Fitzroy, 
to Goose Green – visit 
1. Accompanied by 
Governor and Mr. Robin 













shearing pens, and 
Darwin Boarding 
School. 
2. Fly over Ajax Bay and 









4. Teal Inlet 
 
 
5. Fly over Port Louis to 
Green Patch 
 
6. Fly over SS Great 
Britain to Stanley 




2. Meet Mr. A. Miller 
(manager of Port San 
Carlos), and Mr. and Mrs. 
J. Berntsen 
3. Hosted by Mr. R. Pitaluga 
(who was accompanying 
Chalfont as part of his 
entourage that day) 
4. Lunch with Mr. J.D. 
Barton (manager) and 
Mrs. Barton) 
5. Meet Mr. K.J McPhee 
(manager) and Mrs. 
McPhee 
6. Meet Mr. A.G. Barton, Mr. 
R.V. Goss and Mr. R. 















1. From Stanley, to 
      Moody Brook 










3. Stanley Town Hall 
1. Meet naval personnel 
2. Visit Junior and Senior 
School; King Edward II 
Memorial Hospital; 
Falkland Islands 
Company Office; General 
Employees; Union HQ; 
and Town Council Office 
3. 19:00-21:30 to speak at 
meeting attended by 







       1. Stanley 
2. HMS Endurance 
 
1. Meet ExCo 
































10.6 APPENDIX F 
 
Full translation for this thesis of October 1974 Article from Panorama 
‘MALVINAS: Will we have to invade them?’ 
 
Lately it has been observed that some Argentinean authorities have set 
barriers for the journalists and legislators that wish to travel to the Malvinas. 
Meanwhile, angry voices are rising in the parliament demanding a definite end 
to the prolonged dispute with Great Britain.  
 
In the first days of November, a Panorama editor attended the office of the 
‘General Direction of Antarctica and the Falklands’ intending to ask for the 
credentials that allows one to travel to the Falkland Islands. As he arrived to 
this elegant building located in Arroyo 1034 he went to the first floor and 
asked for Minister Carlos Lucas Blanco. The Minister referred him to his 
adviser, retired Colonel Luis González Balcarce, to whom the journalist 
explained the reasons that compelled him to travel to the islands. After a long 
conversation he put him in contacted him with Mrs. Beatriz Zawells, an 
administrative employee, who explained that this kind of procedure would 
normally take 50 days. The journalist asked then how was it possible that a 
credential issued by a Chancellery takes more than seven weeks when 
getting a passport would only take one week. Mrs, Zawells explained that this 
delay was due to other bodies intervening apart from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. A few days later the reporter realised it would be hard to obtain this 
credential, precisely because of his status as a journalist. He also heard of 
other colleagues that had not been able to travel to the Falklands and 
numerous legislators who were faced with unexplained delays. To know in 
depth the reasons behind this approach, which basically prevented any 
journalist and legislator from traveling to the Falklands, Panorama decided to 









On January 3rd, 1833 Captain John James Onslow, head of a British naval 
force, lowered the blue and white flag that fluttered in Puerto Soledad, 
expelled the Argentine authorities commanded by the Colonel José María de 
Pinedo and occupied the islands. Since that fateful day every Argentine 
government with no exception has tirelessly claimed at the court of Saint 
James the usurpation of this taken archipelago.  With the same obstinacy, the 
Britannic Majesty has always refused, systematically, to listen to any 
complaints. However, when talking about international politics there is no 
guarantee that a situation will not change. On the contrary, in this secular 
dispute over the Falklands it is possible that some short-term fundamental 
changes will occur. And because of the magnitude of the conflicting interests, 
it is very possible that this old conflict will provoke a severe Argentine-British 
crisis.  
 
A NEW KUWAIT 
 
Far from being a heterogeneous set of bare rocks, as some people imagine, 
whose only interest lies in its strategic value, the Falklands are located on the 
rich Argentinian marine platform and they encompass unsuspected 
possibilities for the future. Undoubtedly, the most important are oil-bearing. 
The famous bolsón de Namuncura is a large area of the epi-continental 
platform that extends from the coast of Santa Cruz to the northern end of the 
Great Malvina, the westernmost of the two main islands. Clearly, until drillings 
are carried out there is no way of knowing what are the real possibilities of 
extracting oil in that area. Yet a year ago American capitalists declared in the 
American magazine United States and World Report that the Falkland oil 
would lead to a “New Kuwait” and they expressed their interest in the 
exploitation of Argentine oil.  
“There are big reservoirs” entrepreneurs said, and they added that the 
advantage of our sub-marine platform for oil is that you don’t have to look for it 
in the jungle, cross mountains or build ports in the ocean, like in Ecuador and 
Peru.  
The progress of the ocean exploration shows the growing importance of the 







the south of the Drake Passage and huge reserves of iron ore near 
Antarctica. In a world where the stock of raw materials on land are being 
depleted every day and investigations are being directed into the use of 
oceans, the discovery of iron and manganese is a result as important as the 
discovery of oil. Hence, the Falkland Islands become an irreplaceable key.  
 
Add to this the increasing fishing opportunities in the maritime platform plus 
the seaweed harvesting in its costs, and you can get an idea of what the 
possession of the archipelago means in economic terms. But not only future 
interests are driving England. It is also vested interests during 140 years of 
economic exploitation of the islands, which are powerful enough to mobilise 
Lord Mountbatten himself, uncle of the Queen, and other aristocratic 
characters. 50 per cent of the island´s suitable lands and 55 per cent of the 
wool production have a single owner: The Falkland Islands Company, owning 
7 of the 31 establishments spread in the Falkland´s surface.  Every year wool 
production in the Island reports back to the UK around 2 million sterling 
pounds, which is split between less than a hundred owners. None of them live 
in the Falklands; only employees, managers and pawns live in there. 
Landownership scheme in the Falkland is accentuated as the Crown has 
banned the trading of the shares of the Falkland Islands Company on the 
London Stock Exchange. Because the ownership of the lands cannot be 
changed, it is concentrated on a few owners, and the Islanders have zero 
possibilities of owning the lands.  
 
THE GREAT CHANGE 
 
Until 1960 (over 127 years) the Argentinian claims to the British government 
had no repercussions. It was the Special Committee of Decolonization, a new 
UN agency, that has proved Argentina’s best ally in the secular quarrel with 
England. In 1960 the committee achieved the remarkable. They managed to 
approve by a large majority Resolution 1514, which stated the necessity to 







On December 16, 1965 Argentinian diplomacy accomplished another triumph 
in the international forum. After several years of patient work our country was 
able to get the UN assembly to approve Resolution 2065. 
This means a definite break on the silence imposed by England to Argentine 
claims, the recognition that there is a colonial domination in the usurped 
archipelago and the international commitment to end this anomaly. The 
reversal of the situation has left Great Britain in big trouble, being compelled 




On January 14, 1966 both countries signed a declaration in which they 
committed to find a peaceful solution to the problem. As it was seen 
afterwards, far from resigning themselves to a defeat, Britain diplomacy was 
trying to gain time while waiting for a saving formula or manoeuvre. Signing 
the declaration was a move to settle UN pressure. Nothing else happened in 
1966 and neither during the first months of 1967. At the end of that year the 
UN Special Committee on Decolonization took office once again. Venezuela 
and Uruguay, members of this committee, got maximal international assembly 
support for demanding information from Argentina and Great Britain about the 
status of the negotiations. Pressured by the committee, in 1968 the Labour 
Chancellor Michael Stewart declared in London that the problem of 
sovereignty in the archipelago would be treated directly between England and 
Argentina. 
Meanwhile, that March, the wealthy landowners, owners of the archipelago 
unified in one British Committee for the Falkland Islands with the purpose of 
defending their rights before the English parliament and government. 
As a group leader they named a prominent banker from the City, Sir John 
Barlow, and among the most conspicuous members Lord Mountbatten, uncle 
of your Majesty, was affiliated. Once this important pressure group was 
established, a gradual distortion of the negotiations, claimed by the UN, 
started in England.  
 








First of all, Great Britain proposed having “conversations” rather than 
“negotiations”. Secondly, they gave special importance to communication 
agreements and carefully avoided talking of sovereignty. Thirdly, they argued 
that any resolution should be in line with the “wishes” of the current 
inhabitants of the islands. In this way, Great Britain showed itself to be jealous 
of the sacred right of “self-determination of the People”. On the one hand, 
Argentina has carried on with its duty of improving communications with the 
people of the island with no interruption. On the other hand, they have never 
acknowledged the fact that negotiations are based upon the wishes of the 
inheritors of an act of colonization and usurpation, as the Argentine 
inhabitants were forcibly expelled, and these territories were held without 





After arduous procedures, on the 19th July 1971 in Buenos Aires, English and 
Argentinean officials signed an agreement for the improvement of 
communications between Falklanders and the Argentinean Republic. As a 
result of this agreement, Argentinean air forces built in Stanley Port an 800 
metres long aluminium track that was officially inaugurated on November 15th 
1972. At the present time, every Monday at 10 AM a LADE (State Airlines) 
Fokker plane takes off from Comodoro Rividavia, and lands in Stanley port at 
12.30 Argentinean time. Two hours later, 14.30, it takes off again and lands at 
17.00 in Comodoro. The return trip costs 74.000 old pesos. Regarding 
transportation, the National Service of Naval Transport carried loads 
throughout the whole year to Port Stanley. Finally last week the first regular 
trip of the “Bahía Buen Suceso” departed to the Falkland, a vessel that will 
monthly depart to the islands carrying passengers and loads. Moreover, YPF 
(Fiscal Oil Deposits Company) has built up big fuel reservoirs and has been 
able to exclusively supply the Falkland people.  
Morover, the Argentinean Army has given Port Stanley’s athletes three cabin 







first time in history, run a competitive race against the Falklands helmsmen, in 
April this year. 
 
ENGLISH LACK OF AWARENESS 
 
 In April 1973 Henry Henley, Undersecretary of State in the Foreign Office, 
said that Great Britain “will not transfer the Falkland Islands sovereignty 
without the previous consent of its 2.000 inhabitants”. The United Kingdom 
showed, at that time, that the conversations and progress in transport and 
communications are very much welcome, but that they did not even wish to 
hear about the sovereignty problem. But Argentina did not stay behind. In 
November last year the UN Argentinean ambassador, Carlos Ortiz de Rosas 
presented a large document to the United Nations in which he refuted the 
Britain concepts. 
 “I must recall’ the note said ‘that although there has been much progress on 
opening communications between the mainland and the islands, the collateral 
issue of negotiation of sovereignty should not be affected or delayed, much 
less replaced by, the continuation and completion of all this.”  
 
Based on the extensive Argentine document, the Special Committee on 
Decolonization requested through a report the end of Great Britain’s colonial 
power, not only on the Falklands but also on the Seychelles islands, Saint 
Helena, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn Island, Solomon Islands, Virgin 
Islands, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos Islands, Bermuda and Brunei. 
 Finally, last December 13th, the UN general assembly approved this report in 
which the UK and Argentina were exhorted to resume, without delay, their 
negotiations. The voting resulted in 99 votes cast for the Committee report, 
none against it, and only 14 votes were abstentions. The countries that 
abstained were the US, Portugal, Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, 
France, Cameroon, Finland, Belgium, Germany, South Africa and Holland.  
 Despite the fact that the UN was very clear when they requested England to 
stop delaying the solution to this actual conflict, Britain continued its empire 








AN EVENING IN LONDON  
 
Last July, in the ultra aristocratic rooms of Lincoln’s Inn, the Britain Committee 
leaded by Sir John Barlow received 40 Falklanders that were especially 
invited to London. Employees were received by their employers. The lavish 
reception featured the ubiquitous presence of Lord Mountbatten and a 
conspicuous group of English nobles. The Committee finished the meeting 
saying they have requested the English government to ensure the “total 
incorporation of the colony to the United Kingdom, according to the 
departments and overseas territories formula”. Otherwise- the committee 
warned - the people from the Islands would need to appeal to their right to 
self-determination to maintain the current status quo”. 
 
VOICES OF PROTEST 
 
National deputy Antonio Moreno’s voice sounded imperious: “I have 
requested the Chamber to assign a commission within them to directly enter 
the case facing the English Parliament and the Queen, for the purpose of 
arranging the peaceful eviction of the islands and the pure recognition of our 
sovereignty over the archipelago”.  
“Despite the order of early eviction - the Federal Vanguard Party of Tucuman 
representative trusted Panorama to report this - and the recommendation of 
the Chamber and the Foreign Affairs Commission, they have never attempted 
to leave the islands.” 
“Subsequently, I requested to place my order to be addressed by the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. He will inform about the current status of our claim and, if 
he considers it necessary, take direct action after a hundred and forty years of 
peaceful claiming along diplomatic lines.” 
“The Honourable Minister has not attended, and neither a correction in the 
policy, or the handling of the claim, has been obtained. I have always 
maintained on site that England does not have, or ever had, any intention to 
return the invaded and occupied territories.” 
“As a man of the law – he said at last - I have strongly maintained that the 







investments, by supplying the invaders and the various constructions, were 
only used to legalise the occupation. A hundred and forty years of notes, 
presentations and negotiations are enough to demonstrate the peaceful spirit 
of our people. Today, we have no other choice than the previous position and 
the end of diplomatic relations with the invaders. We have exhausted all of our 
peaceful petitions.” 
National deputy Fausto Mombelli, from Acción Chubutense, was even more 
categorical: “We must invade them”, he affirmed to Panorama.  
“The sovereignty we have over the Falklands is beyond argument- he carried 
on-. For that reason, continuing arguing about this topic will only delay us from 
obtaining the right we have to occupy the territory. Consequently, I 
understand that strong measures must be implemented to occupy the 
archipelago without delay, thus avoiding future generations criticising our lack 
of decision.” 
 
Finally, last October 24th the UN British ambassador, Ivor Richard, sent a note 
to Kurt Waldheim, UN general secretary, identical to the one sent last year by 
the Conservative ambassador Sir Douglas Maitland.  
“I have been given the instruction to affirm- the note stated- that my 
government does not harbour doubts about your sovereignty over the 
Falkland Islands and I officially want to reserve the UK government’s rights 
regarding this issue. My government reaffirms their authentic desire to reach a 
fair and peaceful resolution of this issue as long as it is in line with the desires 




Adolfo Holmberg, Argentinian doctor and scientist who has kept track of this 
issue very closely, thinks that England’s view is very clear: “They want to keep 
the islands”. 
Dr. Holmberg is finishing a book that will be published by the Naval Centre 
with a very suggestive title: “Do you really think England will give us the 







“It is evident that the British are operating with a dual policy- he adds-: they 
make us believe that the surrender of the islands is a matter of convenience 
of the residents and that it takes a long, long time, when what they really want 
is to create a false independent State that will blindly respond to the British 
interests. This way they will not only please the UN, but they will also ensure 




The Argentinian government is investing increasing amounts of money with 
the intention of benefiting economically and culturally a certain sector of the 
population. Apparently, this social elite is intended by England to constitute an 
autonomous State functional to the British requirements and needs. During 
141 years England has not respected the Argentinian claims, and it has been 
almost ten years since the historical UN petition to find a peaceful resolution.   
The British Committee of the Falkland Islands is fulfilling an ambitious plan 
based on dissemination, conferences and meetings not only in England but 
also in every European country.  
The fact that a Chancellor’s office can deliberately forbid journalists and 
lawmakers to travel to the Falklands does not change the underlying problem 
but it makes it worse.   
 
FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY’S MONOPOLY 
 
Forty-one years old Dr. Ronald K. Crosby, veterinary surgeon, married with 5 
children, from Rosario though based in Formosa, has completed one of the 
most accurate social-economic reports about the Falkland Islands. His 
observations, product of seven-weeks staying in the archipelago, are 
summarized in a book called El Reto de las Malvinas (The Falkland Islands 
challenge). This book addresses the features of wood production, the 
Falkland Islands Company monopoly and the attitude taken by residents 









How many establishments are there in the Falkland Islands? 
 
There are 31 farms, 7 of which they belong to the Falkland Islands Company, 
among them the “Darwin North Arm”, with 170,000 sheep and almost 300,000 
hectares. In total, 120,000 hectares are exploited, and the sheep rodeo 
exceeds the 600,000 head.  
 
What type of farms are these? 
 
All establishments are facing the sea since wool transportation can only be 
done through sea-lane.  
 Each farm has matrimonial houses, big bachelor houses, a schoolhouse, a 
shearing shed, sheep bathroom, a cemetery, farmyards and a dock. They 
vary in size and the stage of the recent improvements oscillates between 
excellent conditions and semi-abandoned conditions. Water is abundant since 
it comes from natural watersheds that flow through numerous transparent 
gorges and streams. The pastures are generally too big (some of them reach 
the 8000 hectares), which has caused an indiscriminate overgrazing due to 
the grass mismanagement. Generally speaking very little has been done 
during the last forty years to maintain or improve soil fertility.  
 
Is there a Monopoly managed by the Falkland Islands Company? 
 
Doubtlessly, there is. Not only because they own 46 percent of the territory, 
but also they exert a real monopoly over the trading of the Islands. From 31 
farms existent in the islands, only 4 of them do not sell their production 
through this company. Besides, this company sells the farms most of the 
supplies arriving to the archipelago, as well as what they sell at the two 
convenience stores they own at Stanley Port.  
 








A decreasing population. In 1946 there were 2.239 people. Currently there are 
no more than 1.900 inhabitants. In the 60s the decreasing dropped to 30 
Falklanders per year.  
 
What causes this exodus? 
 
Mainly the lack of communication, the poor level of education and training, the 
lack of opportunities to progress in work and the inability to acquire lands. The 
only port from the whole South American continent they have been in touch 
with for decades was Montevideo, 1.600 kilometres away. 
The lack of inner routes and the Estrecho de San Carlos (Falkland Sound), 
which divides the main islands, increases the isolation feeling. There is no 
secondary education and children between 5-15 years old receive a very poor 
level of education, in fact below to our Primary School. Therefore, important 
job positions are given to native English or Scottish people, with a higher level 
of education. There are also very few entertainment opportunities. I think due 
to these factors, isolation and lack of incentives, a very serious drinking 
problem arose. Added to the negative factors just mentioned, this exerts a 
very unfavourable influence upon the home life, resulting in a very high 
divorce rate.   
 
What do you think about the current stage of negotiations? 
 
Argentina has showed to be patient and honourable, distinctive features from 
someone who is acting in their own rights. We have done everything we were 
asked to do and more. It would be a shameful if England were confusing 
courtesy with frailty and gave us no choice but to resolve the issue in a 
different way, thereby also achieving ultimate success but at the expense of 
leaving us without that final sweet taste of winning what we deserve with 
class. It becomes harder every day to refloat the economy of the archipelago, 









10.7 Appendix G  
 
Unpublished account of Cinema in the Falklands by Steph Middleton 	
 
Thanks are due to Sally Blake for forwarding this to me from Steph 
Middleton in November 2012, after I had concluded my research visit to 
the Islands. 
 
It would appear that an early form of cinema-style entertainment existed in the 
late 19th century when Reverend Brandon made his camp visits on horseback 
along with his famous magic lantern to educate and entertain.  As the moving 
picture became popular world-wide, Falkland islanders were not left behind.  
One of the first Falkland cinemas was in the Catholic School Room on 
Saturday evenings organised by the Catholic Father who was both producer 
and censor of films shown, apparently cutting out scenes deemed unsuitable 
for viewing.  These early films were mainly the silent movies of Charlie 
Chaplin and Buster Keaton accompanied by the nuns playing on the piano. 
Forrest McWhan organised the showing of films in the Tabernacle for which a 
payment of tuppence was made on the way in.  His entertainment was 
popular with children and included Charlie Chaplin, Abbott & Costello and 
Laurel & Hardy. 
 
Les Hardy took over from the Catholic Church and converted his boy’s club in 
to a cinema hall.  When the ‘old’ gymnasium opened Les rented this three 
times a week as a cinema hall.  He showed a range of silent films imported 
from Montevideo, transferring to the Town Hall on its opening in 1950 and 
continuing showings on Wednesday, Saturday and Sunday evenings.  The 
Saturday showings were for children.  Seats on the stage cost extra to provide 
better viewing.  The National Anthem was played at the end of every showing.  
Les handed over to his son Tony. 
 
Joe Booth commenced shows in the parish hall in early 1965, using two 16 







Initially he showed cartoons and newsreels plus films from the Government 
library, then added films hired from Montevideo brought on the RMS Darwin.  
Two very popular imports at the time were “Rock around the Clock” with Bill 
Haley and “Twist around the Clock” with Chubby Checker. 
Joe went further when the LADE air link was established by obtaining films 
from the UK sent by air parcel post on a three week hire.  These were hectic 
times as the film would take one week to arrive, had to be shown every night 
of the week to recoup costs, then put back in the post for return to the UK.  
Two specials from this period were “My Fair Lady” and “The Sound of Music”.  
He would also borrow films from visiting ships to give the community a chance 
to see the popular features of the time. 
 
Following Tony Hardy’s death in the early 1970’s, Peter Short and 
subsequently Val Berntsen ran the Town Hall cinema for a time before Joe 
took over.  This enabled shows to be held in the Parish hall during the week 
and in the Town Hall on Sunday evenings and continued until the Argentine 
invasion in April 1982.  Joe had many helpers ensuring the shows continued 
on a regular basis, the main ones being Phil Summers, Ted Clapp and 
Wallace Hirtle.  All film shows were well attended and enjoyed by the Stanley 
community. 
 
After showing in Stanley films from the Government library were sent to Camp 
settlements for weekly screenings – sometimes more often if there was a 
good supply of films. 
 
Today the Islands have just one cinema situated within the Mount Pleasant 
Complex (MPC).  Civilians have access to this according to the usual 
admittance procedures to MPC.  The “Services Sound and Vision 
Corporation” (SSVC – a registered charity) operated the Phoenix Cinema 
which has 134 cinema-style seats.  The SSVC are able to show West End 
films within a few weeks of Uk release and offers “the complete cinema 
experience”. 
 
 
Slow	Emergency	and	the	Contested	Politics	of	Loyalty:	
Reinterpreting	the	Territorial	Dimension	of	the	Falkland/Malvinas	Islands	prior	to	the	1982	Conflict	
	
	
	
353	
 
Slow	Emergency	and	the	Contested	Politics	of	Loyalty:	
Reinterpreting	the	Territorial	Dimension	of	the	Falkland/Malvinas	Islands	prior	to	the	1982	Conflict	
	
	
	
354	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slow	Emergency	and	the	Contested	Politics	of	Loyalty:	
Reinterpreting	the	Territorial	Dimension	of	the	Falkland/Malvinas	Islands	prior	to	the	1982	Conflict	
	
	
	
355	
 
